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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis offers an original sociological understanding of intermediary Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the modern world.  This is pursued through a 
study of NGOs and land reform in contemporary Zimbabwe.   
 
The prevailing literature on NGOs is marked by a sociological behaviourism that 
analyses NGOs in terms of external relations and the object-subject dualism.  This 
behaviourism has both ‘structuralist’ and ‘empiricist’ trends that lead to instrumentalist 
and functionalist forms of argumentation.   
 
The thesis details an alternative conceptual corpus that draws upon the epistemological 
and theoretical insights of Marx and Weber.  The epistemological reasoning of Marx 
involves processes of deconstruction and reconstruction.  This entails conceptualizing 
NGOs as social forms that embody contradictory relations and, for analytical purposes, 
the thesis privileges the contradiction between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’.  In this regard, 
it speaks about processes of ‘glocalization’ and ‘glocal modernities’ in which NGOs 
become immersed. 
 
The social field of NGOs is marked by ambiguities and tensions, and NGOs seek to 
‘negotiate’ and manoeuvre their way through this field by a variety of organizational 
practices.  Understanding these practices necessitates studying NGOs ‘from within’ and 
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drawing specifically on Weber’s notion of ‘meaning’.  These practices often entail 
activities that stabilize and simplify the world and work of NGOs, and this involves 
NGOs in prioritizing their own organizational sustainability.  In handling the tension 
between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, NGOs also tend to privilege global trajectories over 
local initiatives. 
 
The thesis illustrates these points in relation to the work of intermediary NGOs in 
Zimbabwe over the past ten years.  Since the year 2000, a radical restructuring of 
agrarian relations has occurred, and this has been based upon the massive redistribution 
of land.  In this respect, local empowering initiatives have dramatically asserted 
themselves against globalizing trajectories.  These changes have posed serious challenges 
to ‘land’ NGOs, that is, NGOs involved in land reform either as advocates for reform or 
as rural development NGOs.  The thesis shows how a range of diverse ‘land’ NGOs has 
‘handled’ the heightened contradictions in their social field in ways that maintain their 
organizational coherence and integrity. 
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Preface 
 
 
From July 1999 to August 2006, I worked as an Administrator on a training farm for an 
international NGO in the Shamva District of Mashonaland Central Province in north-
eastern Zimbabwe.  In the early months of 2000, people throughout the country started 
moving onto and occupying White-owned commercial farms and other rural lands in a 
quest for social equity.  At the time, I lived on a White commercial farm and travelled 
daily to my place of employment twenty-five kilometres away.  By the end of 2000, I was 
forced to move from the commercial farm to the NGO farm. 
 
The movement of people onto the lands eventually led to massive land distribution and 
resettlement in Zimbabwe, including within the Shamva District.  The process though 
was marked by tension, turbulence and turmoil.  No doubt, all rural inhabitants have their 
own personal story to tell, as well as their own version of the grander story that unfolded.  
On numerous occasions, I have recounted by own personal journey over the past few 
years, and I have felt a sense of emotional relief in doing so.  But, for me, personal relief 
was never enough.   
 
The events since the year 2000 impacted not only on my personal world but also on the 
world of my NGO.  By the year 2004, I felt the urge if not the responsibility to make 
sense of the events that daily swirled around the NGO.  This would mean returning to the 
discipline of sociology that I had left nearly twenty years previously.  After obtaining my 
Masters degree in Canada in 1983, I lectured in the Department of Sociology at Rhodes 
University in South Africa.  I became heavily involved in the struggle against apartheid, 
and this led to my forced removal from the country by the apartheid government in June 
1987.  This seriously disrupted my academic career.  For much of the past nineteen years 
I have lived and worked in Zimbabwe, and in a non-academic environment. 
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In the light of the significant rural restructuring in Zimbabwe over the past few years and 
its impact on the world of NGOs, I firmly believed that my strong background in 
sociology plus my years of experience within the NGO ‘sector’ would be invaluable in 
furthering an intellectual understanding of NGOs.  My experience also taught me that 
much of the story about NGOs involves ‘the inside story’ and, in particular, the ways in 
which NGOs make sense of their world.  This seemed to point in the direction of Weber 
and his notion of meaning.  Yet, my intellectual history in large part revolved around the 
works of Marx.  
 
In late 2004, I decided to enrol as a PhD candidate at Rhodes University.  My first 
contact was with Professor Peter Vale, Head of the Department of Political and 
International Studies.  I thank him for encouraging me to proceed with the enrolment, 
despite my initial reservations about being ready for the challenge.  In fact, I soon 
realized that doing a PhD when based on a farm in present-day Zimbabwe was not going 
to be easy.  Besides the lack of intellectual stimulation, there were regular electricity 
power cuts, communication bottlenecks and ongoing fuel shortages.   
 
During the course of my research for the PhD I was able to establish contact with the 
African Institute of Agrarian Studies in Harare led by Professor Sam Moyo.   Professor 
Moyo is the foremost specialist on land issues in Zimbabwe, and regular informal 
conversations with him have been most rewarding.  I have also been privileged to join a 
research group at the Institute consisting of a number of locally based scholars and 
practitioners who are trying to understand land reform in the context of civil society.  I 
am grateful to Professor Moyo for inviting me to join this group, and for the hard work of 
his assistants Tendai Murisa and Eddah Jowah. 
 
I am also grateful to the various resource centres in Zimbabwe that allowed me access to 
their primary documents.  In particular, I think of SAPES Trust, SARDC, ZERO, 
ZWRCN, NANGO, ZIDS and MWENGO.  As well, I thank the many NGOs that assisted 
me in various ways in my research, despite the politically tense environment in which 
they operate.   
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A special thank you goes to my NGO employer for financing my tuition fees at Rhodes 
University and for giving extended leave to me for three months to finish writing up the 
thesis.   
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Fred Hendricks, for encouraging me to 
pursue my PhD despite my many years in sociological hibernation.  
 
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to Abigail Guvava. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction and Methodology 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to rigorous sociological theorizing about Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  This endeavour is pursued with specific reference 
to NGOs and land reform in contemporary Zimbabwe.   
 
In the realm of Zimbabwean social studies, there is a significant volume of literature 
about NGOs on the one hand and about land reform on the other.  In large part, though, 
these objects of study have been tackled as separate and disjointed areas of inquiry.  At 
least two focused attempts have been made to pursue a combined and systematic study of 
NGOs and land reform, notably in terms of policy advocacy.  But these studies never got 
off the ground because of the ongoing political sensitivities of land reform in post-
colonial Zimbabwe, and the serious challenges this poses for academic research and 
researchers (Sibanda 1994, Kanji et al. 2002).  Sibanda (1994) indicates that key 
informants for his proposed study on NGOs and land reform, soon after the promulgation 
in Zimbabwe of the controversial Land Acquisition Act of 1992, were ‘reluctant to share 
information with me’ (Sibanda 1994:p.4).  Kanji et al. (2002), in the face of the turbulent 
accelerated land resettlement programme in the country dating from the year 2000, speak 
about the ‘deterioration of the political situation’ (Kanji et al. 2002:p.2) as preventing the 
incorporation of Zimbabwe into their important comparative study involving 
Mozambique and Kenya.   
 
Without doubt, these diverging avenues of investigation within Zimbabwean studies – 
land and NGOs – have generated considerable theoretical and empirical insights.  
Significantly, however, the Zimbabwean literature has failed to address, and to come to 
grips with, key conceptual concerns found traditionally within the discipline of sociology.  
This theoretical weakness is also prominent within the broader academic literature on 
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NGOs.  Indeed, running through much of the prevailing NGO literature are functionalist 
and instrumentalist threads that fail to adequately capture the complexities and 
ambivalences of the social world and work of NGOs.   
 
The thesis seeks to fill this lacuna by developing a unique perspective on NGOs in the 
modern world that is firmly rooted in the sociological project.  In doing so, a rich array of 
sociological literature is drawn upon to theoretically inform (but not determine) an 
empirical investigation of NGOs in relation to land reform in Zimbabwe.  
Simultaneously, land reform in Zimbabwe from the mid-1990s onwards becomes the 
empirical setting within which grounded theorizing about NGOs is pursued.  The 
constant and controlled interplay between ‘the abstract’ and ‘the concrete’ defines the 
methodology that directs this inquiry of NGOs.   
 
 
1.1 Intermediary NGOs: Epistemological Reflections 
 
The term ‘NGO’ is an inherently negative, residual and nebulous term that seems to 
distract rather than contribute to meaningful theoretical discussions.  In the literature, 
NGOs are sometimes considered as comprising all non-state bodies, yet at other times 
they are located within a more specific ‘part’ of society such as the third sector, civil 
society or the not-for-profit private sector.   Definitions, taxonomies and typologies 
abound within the almost infinite NGO literature (Uphoff 1993, 1996; Vakil 1997).  Of 
particular significance in the contemporary Zimbabwean context is the controversial 
notion of civil society.   
 
Often, overbroad and sweeping claims are made about NGOs specifically or civil society 
more generally, so it is necessary to demarcate and delimit the NGO focus of this thesis.  
In his seminal study of rural NGOs in Latin America, Carroll (1992) distinguishes 
between grassroots organizations (for example, local peasant bodies) and (non-
membership) grassroots support or intermediary NGOs that forge links ‘between the 
beneficiaries [of their work] and the often remote levels of government, donor, and 
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financial institutions’ (Carroll 1992:p.11).  Membership-based intermediary bodies such 
as regional peasant bodies or sector-wide trade unions would be excluded from this.  This 
metaphorical use of  ‘levels’, which is always problematic within the social sciences, 
nevertheless highlights an important point about the in-between social field or location of 
non-membership ‘intermediary’ NGOs.  Intermediary NGOs have been provocatively 
labelled as ‘problematic organizations’ in that they ‘must live and work in situations of 
necessary ambiguity’ (Edwards and Hulme 1996:p.260).  As a specific kind of social 
form with particular organizational histories and trajectories, they occupy an ambiguous – 
and constantly negotiated and reconfigured – social space and are structurally located in a 
complicated ‘web’ of social relations as part victim and part maker.   
 
Intermediary NGOs are deeply embedded in contradictory processes of globalization and 
are implicated in them.  But whether in practice they act as ‘intermediaries’ (rather than 
say as ‘agents’, ‘representatives’ or even ‘instruments’ of others) is a contingent question 
requiring thorough historical investigation.  In fact, part of the ‘finely-balanced 
ambivalence’ of intermediary NGOs, to borrow a phrase from Morris-Suzuki 
(2000:p.84), is this tension – never resolved but rather managed in different ways – 
between their work as agents and their work as intermediaries.  Hence, the tensions and 
ambiguities that riddle the world of intermediary NGOs play themselves out in 
organizational practices that are historically specific and variable.  There is considerable 
diversity within the NGO ‘sector’ in terms of political and ideological dispositions.  
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that – generally speaking – intermediary NGOs tend to 
valorize global processes of a capitalist modernizing kind.  These globalizing processes at 
times enact closure, albeit unsuccessfully, on more localized and potentially empowering 
organizational and political initiatives.  This general trajectory of NGO practices is not 
structurally pre-determined but is the outcome of contingent social processes.    
 
The theorization of NGOs contained in the thesis is an alternative to a functionalist 
analysis in which NGOs exist in order to provide conditions for the reproduction of 
global capital.  It also does not entail an instrumentalist claim, in the sense that NGOs are 
mere agents or instruments of capitalism working at the behest of (or even on behalf of) 
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capitalist organizations as part of a coordinated and cohesive ‘conscious conspiracy’ 
(Manji and O’Coill 2002:p.579).  NGOs in this regard are said to have ‘a hidden agenda’ 
(Monga 1996:p.156), or at least to be part of a global ‘hidden hand’.  As Crewe and 
Harrison (1998:p.89) note: ‘Donors [and their NGO “creations”] are sometimes portrayed 
as strategically wielding the control they have over recipients for their own ends in a 
coordinated way to uphold the present capitalist system’.  Past debates within, for 
instance, Marxist state theory (notably the works of Miliband and Poulantzas) bring out 
the un-sociological and simplistic quality of these types of approaches (Miliband 1969, 
Poulantzas 1973).  Yet, the NGO story may still be a simple one, based on the common 
view, as often propounded by development practitioners themselves, that the sheer 
‘institutional survival [of NGOs] depends upon the status quo’ (Eade 2003:p.xi).  Indeed, 
the thesis highlights that NGOs, in ‘handling’ the tension between ‘the global’ and ‘the 
local’, seek to sustain themselves as viable organizational forms. 
 
Further, the argument that NGOs reproduce a global form of domination does not rest on 
conflating impact with intention.  In other words, even if NGOs deliberately sought to 
reproduce the conditions for capitalism, intention and cause cannot be read from (and 
thus reduced to) effect and impact in a kind of teleological depiction of social 
development and political change.  Thus, as Urry (2000:p.208) says, ‘we cannot know in 
advance what will happen to any individual action or what its consequence will be’.  The 
development ‘industry’, as it is often labelled, can be seen (without reverting to 
methodological individualism) as an ongoing product of ‘countless iterative actions’ by 
NGOs and others, and it seems almost ‘recursively self-producing’ as a set of global 
social relations and organizations (Urry 2000:p.206).  These iterative actions, 
simultaneously both ‘agency’ and ‘structure’, do not necessarily reproduce, reconfigure 
or reform ‘stable’ social structures but have the capacity to undermine, destabilize and 
transform them.  
 
Proper sociological probing of intermediary NGOs has to be shaped by different methods 
of analysis.  In this study, two overlapping methods of investigation are deployed, 
namely, deconstruction and reconstruction.  Deconstruction is absolutely critical to any 
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sociological analysis.  The development ‘system’, for example, has to be deconstructed in 
order to lay bare the social relations that give rise to this system and sustain it.  In doing 
so, the system is conceptualized as an abstract totality.  But deconstruction alone is 
insufficient.  Thus, it often results in unsophisticated instrumentalist (sometimes 
conspiratorial) arguments based on questionable dichotomies of essentialized categories 
such as ‘the developers’ and the ‘undeveloped’.  The developers are depicted as subjects 
and the engine behind development, and their power is over-privileged and reified, while 
the undeveloped are treated as mere recipients (or objects) of development (or 
underdevelopment).   
 
Order, coherence and direction are also valorized in these analyses, just as donors and 
NGOs likewise do in their (at least official) representations of development policy and 
practice, and for quite conscious reasons of their own.  For instance, official NGO 
documents (as public relations) normally focus on seemingly simple development success 
stories because ‘donors will not fund complexity, process, and ambiguity’ (Power et al. 
2003:p.98).  These representations, whether part of forward project planning or 
reflections of past practice, should not be conflated though with ‘actually existing’ 
development processes.   
 
The crucial epistemological point is that it is necessary to move beyond deconstruction 
analyses by reconstructing the concrete world of NGOs.  Although providing illuminating 
insights, deconstruction is ultimately one-sided and tends to reduce concrete totalities to 
abstract totalities.  Besides deconstruction, it is critical to reconstruct the development 
‘system’ as a concrete social totality (or development ‘industry’) as immersed in real 
historical processes.  Ignoring deconstruction altogether is also inadequate, as to leads to 
under-theorized studies of NGO concrete realities.  By combining deconstruction and 
reconstruction, the thesis is guided by the method of analysis set out by Marx (1973) in 
Grundrisse.  This epistemology underpins the thesis, but it is not followed slavishly.  
Nevertheless, the thesis is able to transcend what Mamdani (1996:p.11) in relation to a 
different object of study refers to as abstract universalisms and intimate particularisms.  
This refined methodology contributes significantly to filling the theoretical gaps in the 
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academic literature on NGOs.  Thus, the argument in the thesis that intermediary NGOs 
in the modern world are immersed in processes of global domination is based on a 
sociological method of investigation that is more intricate and convoluted than those 
regularly found in the prevailing literature on NGOs.  
 
 
1.2 Research Methodology 
 
Undertaking social research in contemporary Zimbabwe is exceedingly difficult because 
of the intense political conflict.  This is true for research on both land reform and NGOs, 
although for slightly different reasons.  The ruling ZANU-PF party claims in no uncertain 
terms that the internal opposition to its rule is financially backed and supported by 
external imperialist forces, notably the British government.  Any group that in any way 
liaises with the internal opposition is painted with a similar ideological brush.  In this 
regard, a number of urban-based civic NGOs were directly involved in the late 1990s in 
the events leading up to the formation of the main opposition party, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC).  ZANU-PF has subsequently claimed that the entire NGO 
‘sector’ is guilty of furthering the aims of capitalist imperialism.  Thus, a leading 
ideologue of the ruling party recently referred to NGOs in Zimbabwe as the ‘softer 
interventions’1 of imperialism compared to the harder military interventions.  This 
antagonism on the part of the Zimbabwean government came to the fore in the year 2004 
in the form of a controversial NGO Bill that sought to undermine the global funding of 
NGOs operating in the country.  This Bill was hotly debated in the Zimbabwean 
parliament, and President Mugabe opted not to sign and ratify it as law.  Further, the 
government has recently investigated a number of NGOs for what it considers to be 
dubious handling of foreign funds.  In this context, NGOs in Zimbabwe are very sensitive 
to releasing information pertaining to their policies and practices. 
 
                                         
1 Dr T. Mahosa, Media Commission Chairperson. Interview on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
Television News, 28th September 2005.  
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This is further complicated by the focus of the thesis on land reform.  Since the year 
2000, farm occupations and land redistribution throughout most of rural Zimbabwe have 
led to significant agrarian restructuring.  This process has been labelled colloquially as 
the Third Chimurenga2 and, more officially, as the accelerated land programme, and it 
has involved significant levels of violence with the seeming support of the government.  
The internal opposition claims that the farm occupations were propagated by ZANU-PF 
as a tactical means for consolidating its rural support base, and that the upper echelons of 
the ruling party have enriched themselves through land redistribution.  Although the dust 
raised by the Third Chimurenga has in large part settled, the accelerated programme in 
Zimbabwe continues to be highly controversial.  As a result, research undertaken on land 
reform is problematic and subject to constraint.  Further, the land programme impacted 
significantly on the work of numerous NGOs in Zimbabwe, particularly those involved in 
rural development or advocacy on land reform.  These intermediary NGOs form the 
empirical basis of the thesis.   Generally speaking, they prefer to keep any unofficial 
stance on land reform internal to the organization.  But, they have not adopted a 
principled closed-door policy on research emanating from outside.  
 
The academic literature on intermediary NGOs distinguishes broadly between ‘advocacy’ 
work and ‘development’ work.  Normally, any particular NGO specializes in either 
advocacy or development.  This is evident with regard to the intermediary NGOs in 
Zimbabwe studied in the thesis, and thus the conceptual distinction is upheld.  The 
available literature also adopts a restricted notion of NGO involvement in land reform by 
focusing exclusively on NGOs engaged in advocacy on land policy formation and 
implementation either individually or more usually through NGO networks and 
coalitions.  These are self-proclaimed ‘land-centric’ NGOs (rather than ‘rural 
development’ NGOs) but they do not fully embrace the range of NGOs involved in land 
reform.  Based on this restricted notion, it is often mistakenly assumed (and more often 
asserted) that the sheer number of NGOs in Zimbabwe involved in land reform is almost 
negligible.  Admittedly, rural development NGOs conceptualize themselves as 
                                         
2 Chimurenga is a Shona term meaning ‘war of liberation’.  The First Chimurenga refers to the struggles 
against land dispossession by indigenous people in the early years of colonialism, and the Second 
Chimurenga relates to the guerrilla war leading to independence in the year 1980. 
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development-centric rather than land-centric organizational forms.  Yet, their targeted 
interventions impact on agrarian processes in pronounced ways, if only unintentionally.  
For this reason, the thesis also incorporates development NGOs under the broad label of 
‘land’ NGOs.  The other main distinction found within the academic literature is between 
international and indigenous NGOs, and both types of NGOs are included in this study. 
 
The thesis looks at ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe from the mid-1990s onwards.  No attempt 
is made to draw and delimit a statistically representative sample of a defined universe, 
because the epistemology underpinning and guiding the analysis does not derive from 
hypothetic-deductive assumptions.  As well, in the light of the restraints on research on 
NGOs and land reform, obtaining the cooperation of a grouping of ‘representative’ NGOs 
– as understood in a positivist sense – is highly problematic and improbable.  The 
epistemological approach used for this study is based on ontological claims about social 
reality that go beyond positivism.  In particular, these claims highlight the contradictory 
and antagonistic qualities of social relations and how these relations become embodied in 
social and organizational forms.   The theoretical purpose of the thesis is to analytically 
‘capture’ the contradictory social relations as they become embedded in intermediary 
NGOs as specific organizational forms.   The empirical information is not designed to 
‘prove’ the existence of these antagonistic relations, nor could any kind or amount of data 
do so.  Instead, the data is meant to be highly suggestive of these relations, and serves to 
illustrate how these relations are expressed in (and as) intermediary NGOs.  Insofar as the 
research data ‘captures’ these relations it can be said to be ‘representative’ (Keat and 
Urry 1975). 
 
At the same time, the current restraints on research in Zimbabwe did impact on the 
extensiveness and intensiveness of the data.  Some NGOs were particularly receptive to 
the research, while others expressed serious reservations.  In the case of depth, the 
empirical data collected is somewhat uneven.  All NGOs provided at least public 
documents and, in addition, some NGOs released internal documents and granted 
interviews.  Any weaknesses in this regard have been overcome by in-depth case studies 
of two NGOs.  In terms of extensiveness, the data is from a wide cross-section of ‘land’ 
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NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe.  Compiling an accurate and up-to-date listing of 
NGOs in Zimbabwe is notoriously difficult, because many NGOs are fleeting in 
existence and others prefer to operate on an unregistered basis.  The most reliable listing 
currently available is a NGO Directory published by the Poverty Reduction Forum in the 
year 2004 (PRF 2004).  The intermediary ‘land’ NGOs studied were selected from this 
directory as well as from supplementary sources.  These NGOs operate in all land tenure 
regimes throughout most of Zimbabwe, including communal areas, ‘old’ resettlement 
schemes, freehold commercial farms as well as ‘new’ settlement schemes arising from 
accelerated land reform.  They include a mix of advocacy and development NGOs on the 
one hand, and international and indigenous NGOs on the other.   
 
Three main research techniques were used during the course of the research.  First of all, 
NGO documents were collected from source or from small resource centres based at 
NGO offices.  Secondly, semi-structured interviews were conducted with NGO 
personnel.  Thirdly, as an observing participant, the information for one of the two NGO 
case studies is based on my work experiences within the NGO over a number of years. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
The main body of the thesis begins with a discussion in Chapter Three of the dual 
challenges to sociology (and its traditional representations of social reality) in the form of 
globalization and postmodernism.  It is shown that these challenges can be addressed 
through a re-conceptualization of ‘modernity’ that sees the universal and the particular, 
and less abstractly the global and the local, as internally constitutive of each other but in 
an antagonistic tension. This leads to the admittedly awkward yet important sociological 
notion of ‘glocal modernities’ that is sensitive to both the spatial and temporal modes of 
being.  In this context, the discourses and practices of NGOs are discussed in Chapters 
Four and Five.   This entails an extensive review of the academic literature on NGOs in 
relation to the three key nodal points on which the prevailing NGO discourse hangs: civil 
society, development and democracy.  It is shown that intermediary NGOs function 
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within an ambivalent social field bounded by multiple kinds of accountability involving 
global donors, nation-states, and urban and rural communities.  In terms of understanding 
the organizational practices of NGOs, ‘form’ precedes ‘function’ and impacts on it.  
Hence, ‘function’ is not a historical and pre-determined.  Rather, it is the contingent 
outcome and effect of ‘negotiated’ practices within and along the porous borders of the 
social space of NGOs. 
 
In Chapters Six through to Nine, I shift the focus of the thesis away from general 
sociological theory to historical and comparative analyses of land reform (and agrarian 
reform more broadly).  In Chapters Six and Seven, I explore land reform from a global 
perspective.  A conceptual overview of ‘agrarian’ and ‘land’ reform is offered, including 
important distinctions between these two kinds of reform.  This is necessary in order to 
more clearly understand what the involvement of intermediary NGOs in land processes 
actually (or potentially) entails.  I also discuss the contradictory impact of current 
worldwide agrarian restructuring on the social reconstitution of rural underclasses and 
how this underpins the social reproduction strategies engaged in by these classes, 
including ‘uncivil’ action such as land re-occupations.  This rural politics, and how it 
interrelates to the more ‘civil’ forms of social practice engaged in by NGOs, is critical to 
conceptualizing NGOs and land reform.   
 
In Chapters Eight and Nine, I consider reform in Zimbabwe.  The main emphasis is on 
the current ‘period’ from 1995, although Chapter Eight looks at the earlier post-colonial 
years.  Policy makers in Zimbabwe have in large part articulated and addressed reform in 
the narrow sense of land reform and, notably, in relation to land redistribution and 
resettlement.  Much less overt attention has been paid to land tenure changes and land 
restitution, and to agrarian change more broadly.  As Chapter Nine shows, land reform 
from 1995 onwards must be understood in the context of a deepening social crisis that led 
to heightened opposition to the ruling ZANU-PF party and to the realignment of political 
forces.  This set the stage for the land re-occupation movement (the Third Chimurenga) 
that emerged in the early months of 2000 and that resulted in massive land redistribution.  
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The following four chapters focus on ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe.  In Chapter Ten, I 
provide a comparative and historical setting for examining ‘land’ NGOs in the current 
‘period’.  The comparative perspective entails reviewing literature on the role of 
advocacy NGOs in land reform throughout the South and East, and the historical 
perspective looks at development NGOs in Zimbabwe from 1980 to the mid-1990s.  
Chapter Eleven is concerned with advocacy NGOs in Zimbabwe from 1995 onwards.  In 
the late 1990s, there was (relatively speaking) an enabling environment conducive to 
NGO involvement in the land policy formation process and many NGOs took advantage 
of the space available though they were largely marginal to the process.   The emergence 
of accelerated land reform in the year 2000 caught these NGOs by surprise and put them 
in disarray.   Policy formation on land became a ‘presidential preserve’ and NGOs 
distanced themselves from land reform.   
 
In Chapter Twelve, I look at development-centric NGOs during the same period, but with 
particular emphasis on accelerated reform.  The land redistribution process has 
fundamentally altered the agrarian terrain within which these NGOs pursue their 
development work.  I focus on NGOs that traditionally operated in communal lands and 
‘old’ resettlement areas, as well as those that operated on White-owned commercial 
farms.  It will be highlighted that development NGOs in large part have adopted, or have 
been forced to adopt, a hands-off approach to the ‘new’ resettlement areas.  The reasons 
for this will be explored, including looking at organizational dispositions in the face of 
deepening social and political complexities.   This extensive overview of ‘land’ NGOs is 
followed in Chapter Thirteen by a more intensive focus based on two case studies of 
NGOs. 
 
The thesis ends with a theoretical exploration of NGOs.  The original theoretical 
perspective on NGOs that is presented in Chapter Fourteen arises from the epistemology 
based on deconstruction and reconstruction.  In this regard, the concluding chapter also 
highlights the ongoing significance to sociology of methodological claims made by Marx 
and Weber (Burawoy 2003). 
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Chapter 2  
Glocal Modernities, Land Reform and Intermediary NGOs in 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
This chapter offers a general overview of the thesis.  In so doing, it assists the reader in 
discerning the trajectory and coherence of the analysis of intermediary NGOs as it 
unfolds and develops in the thesis.  It also seeks to weave together the different threads of 
argumentation that are found in the thesis, and to highlight the linkages between the 
epistemological foundations, the theoretical claims and the empirical findings.  As well, 
the chapter emphasizes the important contributions of the thesis to sociological theory.   
 
The thesis provides a unique sociological understanding of intermediary NGOs in the 
modern world.  It does so by means of a conceptual corpus that is based upon diverse 
epistemological and theoretical strands found within the sociological tradition, 
particularly in the works of Marx and Weber.  On the one hand, I return to the 
epistemological reasoning of Marx based on reconstruction and deconstruction.  Marx 
argues that understanding a ‘social form’ involves ‘deconstructing’ it in order to reveal 
the contradictory social relations that give rise to it and that set its conditions of existence 
and possibilities of action.  In the thesis, an intermediary NGO is understood as a specific 
kind of social form.  The contradictory relation between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, in 
particular, is abstracted and singled out as a way of analyzing and making sense of the 
‘NGO form’.  After this, and again following clues from Marx, the ‘actually-existing’ 
concrete world of NGOs is ‘reconstructed’ as a rich totality of ‘determinations’, and as 
immersed in real socio-historical processes.  Deconstruction provides an ‘analytic 
history’ of NGOs as social forms, and reconstruction offers an ‘empirical history’ 
(Bologh 1979:p.139). 
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However, properly ‘reconstructing’ the ambivalent world of NGOs simultaneously 
involves moving beyond Marx by drawing upon the rich theoretical insights of Weber.  
As a first step, ‘reconstruction’ requires engaging with the considerable academic 
literature on NGOs, along with the dominant discourses through which these 
organizations are addressed conceptually.  The thesis identifies the three ‘nodal’ points of 
the prevailing discourses.  NGOs are part of ‘civil society’ and they aim to build 
democracy and facilitate development.  I offer a comprehensive analysis of these nodal 
points and, in a sociological manner, elucidate their complex interconnections. 
 
On this basis, it is shown that NGOs (in the South and East) occupy a tension-filled social 
field that is bounded by their ongoing relationships with global donors, local nation-states 
and rural communities.  The thesis emphasizes that NGOs ‘negotiate’ and manoeuvre 
their way in and through this social field.  This ‘negotiation’ necessitates organizational 
processes and practices within NGOs that are heavily laden with ‘meaning’, as elucidated 
by Weber.  Fully understanding NGOs means studying them ‘from within’, and this 
necessitates a heightened sensitivity to the ways in which NGOs make sense of their 
world.  In this regard, the conceptual corpus of the thesis incorporates Weber’s notion of 
‘the social’ as understood in terms of ‘meaningful social action’.   
 
In linking Marx and Weber together in this unusual manner, the thesis offers a fresh but 
rigorous sociological understanding of intermediary NGOs that ‘captures’ the many 
ambiguities and complexities of their world.  But the thesis goes even further, by 
providing a detailed empirical investigation of NGOs.  However, the sociological 
significance of the thesis does not rest on the formulation of ‘theoretical laws’.  Thus, the 
empirical enquiry is not designed to ‘prove theory’ based on a hypothetic-deductive 
epistemology.  Rather, the empirical investigation is meant to illustrate the sociological 
value of the epistemological and theoretical corpus that I develop in the thesis.   
 
The empirical entry point is NGOs and land reform in contemporary Zimbabwe.  The 
thesis examines global trajectories with regard to land reform, but highlights the unique 
specificities of Zimbabwe.  In particular, since the year 2000, there has been a radical 
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restructuring of agrarian relations in Zimbabwe that has involved massive land 
redistribution throughout the countryside.  This has involved the dramatic assertion of 
local initiatives against global messages and agendas.  This rural transformation has 
brought about significant challenges to the many intermediary NGOs involved in 
development work in the rural areas or in advocating for land reform.  These are referred 
to as ‘land’ NGOs.  The thesis discusses these NGOs from the mid-1990s onwards, and 
highlights continuities and changes since the year 2000.  The period from the year 2000 is 
officially known as the accelerated land reform period and, more colloquially, as the 
Third Chimurenga (or war of liberation).  The thesis examines how, during a period of 
sharpening contradictions between global and local processes, NGOs ‘negotiated’ and 
‘manoeuvred’ their way through their world by way of meaningful organizational 
practices. 
 
 
2.1 Deconstruction  
 
In providing a sociological understanding of NGOs as social forms, I delineate and 
delimit a problematic conception of NGOs that is very pervasive within the existing 
literature (Edwards and Hulme eds. 1996, Fowler 2000).  I label this as the ‘dominant 
conception’ and expose its serious limitations.   The dominant conception is a kind of 
sociological behaviourism that is in large part insensitive to the combined concerns raised 
by Marx and Weber.  On the one hand, unlike Marx, NGOs are not treated as social 
forms built upon contradictory ‘internal relations’ but are depicted in terms of the 
subject-object dualism.  This depiction is based on the notion of ‘external relations’ that 
portrays NGOs as constituted independently of other social ‘entities’, and as 
simultaneously interacting with other entities as subjects or objects.  On the other hand, 
unlike Weber, the dominant conception fails to grasp the ‘constructed’ and meaning-
soaked quality of the relationships between NGOs and the broader social world. 
 
Deconstruction is the first step in countering this sociological behaviourism.  This pursuit 
entails going back to the epistemological reasoning contained in the works of Marx.   In 
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so doing, the thesis understands NGOs as social forms, or as an organizational form that 
expresses contradictory social relations (Elson 1979).  In other words, NGOs are not 
simply ‘texts’ within a ‘context’.  Rather, the contradictory relations that exist ‘outside’ 
NGOs become infused within them.  This understanding arises from the analytical 
process of deconstruction that means going inside the form and laying bare the 
antagonistic internal relations that give social life to the organizational form (Holloway 
and Picciotto 1978, Corrigan et al. 1978).  In the specific case of intermediary NGOs, I 
highlight the contradictory relationship between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’.  In terms of 
concrete reality, this may not be the most important contradiction.   However, giving it 
analytical primacy provides a strong basis for theorizing about NGOs. 
 
The thesis seeks to theorize about NGOs in a refined sociological manner.  Because of 
this, I highlight and confront two key contemporary challenges to the sociological project 
in the form of ‘globalization’ and ‘postmodernism’.  These terms have ‘empirical’ and 
‘theoretical’ connotations, and it is important not to conflate these connotations.   The 
challenge to sociology of ‘globalization’ and ‘postmodernism’ revolves around the 
dominant representation within sociology of ‘the social’ as ‘society’, and in particular as 
bounded and sutured totalities in terms of the nation-state-society nexus (Urry 2000). 
 
In the case of ‘globalization’, the bounded status of ‘society’ is subject to questioning.  
On the one hand, there are claims about a de-centring of ‘the social’ away from 
seemingly bounded totalities in the form of nation-states to a more fragmented, 
amorphous and dispersed ‘social’.  On the other hand, there are claims about 
heterogeneity as exemplified by the defence by nation-states of the bounded status of 
their societies.  In the thesis, I argue that these diverging claims ‘capture’ the unevenness 
of ‘actually existing’ processes of globalization and that they highlight the contradiction 
between global and local processes as understood in terms of internal relations.  
‘Postmodernism’ raises doubts about the sutured quality of ‘the social’.  It argues that 
‘the social’ is not at present (nor was in the past) a unitary totality, and that sociology has 
enacted methodological closure on a set of social relations called ‘society’ that is 
inherently incomplete and indeterminate.  Hence, any ‘resolution’ of social contradictions 
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is invariably open-ended and is never marked by finality in the sense of the ‘end of 
history’.  The thesis accepts the significance of this particular claim.  However, 
postmodernism is not a coherent body of theory, and hence accepting this claim does not 
necessitate a more general commitment to ‘postmodernist theory’.  The claim is 
consistent with the epistemology of the thesis.  It thus highlights that the global-local 
contradictions in which NGOs are embedded are played out in ambiguous and contingent 
ways. 
 
Quite noticeably, recent re-visualizing of the ‘social totality’ has been particularly 
prevalent within Marxist discourse (Mouffe ed. 1992, Callari and Ruccio 1996).  The 
thesis contributes to the building of a sociological perspective on NGOs that draws upon 
elements contained within Marx’s epistemology.  In doing so, it rejects trends within 
Marxism (for example, world systems theory) that over-privilege the global moment in 
globalization processes and that fail to grasp, contrary to Marx’s epistemology, the 
contradictory aspects of globalization.  The thesis also valorizes the particular historical 
tradition within Marxism that, in line with Marx’s epistemology, shows a marked 
sensitivity to ‘contingent totalities’ rather than ‘deterministic totalities’, and that has the 
methodological propensity and capacity to incorporate Weber’s insights into its flexible 
framework.  As a result, the thesis seeks to embed the notion of ‘the social’ not just in 
‘society’ (or the nation-state-society nexus) but also in terms of Weber’s understanding of 
‘the social’ as ‘meaning’ and specifically meaning-laden action. 
 
Weber developed an interpretive sociology that demonstrated a pronounced awareness of 
subjective and intersubjective ‘meaning’.  This however did not entail ‘the social’ being 
‘removed into the sphere of ideas’ (Albrow 1990:p.257) as a response to Marx’s 
materialist notion of ‘the social’.  Rather, ‘meanings’ become deeply embedded within 
social action and, hence, Weber speaks of meaningful social action.  On this basis, he 
offers an interpretive understanding (or Verstehen) of social action.  Weber also seeks to 
integrate ‘meaning’ into a causal explanation of action, but recognizing the significance 
of ‘meaning’ does not invariably demand a commitment to (positivist) causality on the 
part of the sociologist.  For the purposes of the thesis, ‘meaning’ is highlighted because 
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making sense of the organizational practices of NGOs involves ‘capturing’ and bringing 
to the fore the meanings that NGOs give to their ambivalent and contradictory world.  
Thus, incorporating ‘subjectivism’ or the ‘problematic of the subject’ into the ‘stage’ of 
reconstruction provides an important countermeasure against a Marxist structuralism that 
might creep into an analysis of NGOs (Turner 1996). 
 
Theorizing about ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ raises questions about ‘modernity’ as a 
social condition.  Understanding modernity cannot be accomplished by a universalistic 
modernism that over-privileges globalizing trajectories or a particularistic postmodernism 
that over-privileges localizing trajectories.  Rather, the thesis argues that embodied in 
modernity are global and local moments that infuse and constitute processes of 
glocalization.  This notion of glocalization simply stresses that global processes 
invariably have a ‘local component’.  ‘Local’ social processes comprise initiatives and 
trajectories that emanate from within the confines of nation-states in the South and East.  
As a result, modernity is socio-spatially grounded but simultaneously engages with global 
processes and interests.  Further, the specific relation between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ 
is not fixed, as the form this relation takes is historically and socially contingent.  A 
contingent form can be referred to as a ‘glocal modernity’.  This notion implies the 
existence of alternative modernities, revolving around different articulations between 
global and local moments.  Hence, globalization may stimulate localizing initiatives and 
strategies, and it thereby reinforces particulars in what seems like an increasingly 
heterogeneous world order.  At the same time, though, universalizing processes may 
globalize and ‘domesticate’ the local (to de-localize it) and therefore make it over in 
‘their’ image.  Because of diverse glocalization processes dispersed throughout the 
modern world, there is a range of glocal modernities that may enter into conflict.  
Particularly prevalent are nationalist assertions, such as in Zimbabwe, which defend their 
‘road to modernity’ against American imperialism. 
 
The thesis shows how intermediary NGOs become immersed in these glocal modernities.  
As a specific kind of organization, they are a manifestation of glocalized relations 
because the tensions between global and local moments are expressed in their social 
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form.  Simultaneously, by their actions, NGOs are invariably involved in reinforcing or 
reshaping glocalization processes in a particular direction.  Unintentionally, NGOs 
manage and balance the tension between global and local moments through specific 
organizational practices.  In this regard, NGOs occupy an ambivalent social field that is 
regularly marked by opposing trajectories, and they seek to ‘negotiate’ and manoeuvre 
their way in and through this field. 
 
 
2.2 Reconstruction 
 
Epistemologically, a fuller understanding of the NGO world of necessary ambivalence 
entails the process of reconstruction.  In other words, after understanding intermediary 
NGOs as the organizational embodiment of glocal modernities on the basis of 
deconstruction, the ‘actually existing’ concrete world of NGOs must be reconstructed as 
a complex totality of many ‘determinations’.  Doing so involves forcefully engaging with 
the voluminous literature on NGOs, along with the dominant discourses through which 
these organizations are located conceptually.   
 
The thesis argues that there are two discernable ‘behaviourist’ trends within the literature.  
First of all, there is a ‘structuralist’ trend that incorporates a broad range of 
postmodernist discourse analysts and Left-leaning social theorists, and that begins and 
ends with (different forms of) methodologies of deconstruction.  This trend conceives 
NGOs as (un-reconstructed) abstract structural totalities and un-problematically asserts 
that they reproduce global forms of domination.  These theorists argue for a radical 
overhaul of the social system in which NGOs operate.  Secondly, there is an ‘empiricist’ 
trend that blindly bypasses deconstruction altogether.  This trend presents NGOs as (un-
deconstructed) concrete empirical totalities, and argues for targeted reform within the 
NGO ‘sector’.   
 
Despite the seeming disparities between these two trends, in their methodological 
treatment of NGOs they are both awash with behaviourist assumptions revolving around 
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external relations and the subject-object dichotomy.  As shown below, this leads to 
instrumentalist and functionalist forms of argumentation.  On the other hand, 
conceptualizing intermediary NGOs as a contingent form of contradictory social relations 
sidesteps these problematic arguments, because NGO ‘function’ is not posited a priori or 
concluded on a teleological basis, but is understood as mediated by NGO ‘form’.  
Contingent social forms that are riddled with contradictions can ‘move’ in any direction, 
depending on how the contradictions play themselves out under specific historical 
conditions.  In the case of NGOs, the global-local contradiction that is privileged for 
analytical purposes merely sets limits within which NGOs work.  
 
Generally speaking, the NGO literature locates intermediary NGOs within the parameters 
of a discourse that has three main ‘nodal points’, that is, civil society, democracy and 
development.  NGOs are part of ‘civil society’, but their involvement in building 
democracy and facilitating development in the South and East is the subject of significant 
controversy.  Dissecting this discourse is very revealing with regard to the analytical 
weaknesses of the ‘structuralist’ and ‘empiricist’ trends, and reaffirms the importance of 
the epistemological foundations of this thesis. 
 
In recent years there has been an academic fixation with the notion of civil society.  This 
has occurred at a time when there have been significant global challenges to state 
functions under the influence of neo-liberal thinking on the centrality of the market to 
economic growth and stability.  In making sense of ‘civil society’, considerable attention 
has been given to classical renditions of the concept, notably those by Hegel and Marx.  
However, contemporary theorizations wander significantly from Marx.  For Marx, civil 
society was a social form that entailed both class rule and class conflict, and was not a 
‘third sector’ lodged between the state and economy.  Rather, it included the economy 
and involved class relations.  As a result, the notion ‘civil society’ carries with it claims 
about both ‘contradiction’ and ‘domination’.  Unlike this, the structuralist and empiricist 
tendencies treat civil society as an instrument based on the subject-object dualism. 
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The empiricist trend offers a sanitized version of civil society by depicting it primarily as 
the Subject or universalizing logic inherent in capitalist societies that builds democracy 
by challenging (and strenuously acting against) the particularistic interests of the nation-
state and the communitarian character of ‘tradition’ in the South and East.  This 
democratic mission of NGOs is by far the predominant understanding within the NGO 
‘sector’ itself, but scholars associated with ‘anti-politics’ in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America and with post-Marxism in the West also propagate it in some form.  There is no 
sense of domination, and contradiction is in large part ‘externalized’ (or displaced) in that 
it becomes lodged between the subject (civil society) and the object (state and tradition) 
rather than embedded within civil society.  The structuralist tendency portrays civil 
society as the passive Object of others, as instruments of global capital in the 
international development system.  There is a keen awareness of domination (of ‘the 
global’ over ‘the local’), but the contradictory quality of these moments is not captured.   
 
Similar conceptual problems pertain to renditions of intermediary NGOs in the context of 
the notion of development.  In the empiricist trend, a ‘transportational paradigm’ 
predominates in which rural development entails the systematic transfer of various 
‘things’ from the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’ in the form of finances, technology, 
knowledge, social skills or even political strength.  NGOs (as both subjects and objects) 
are part of this mechanistic transfer system by receiving inputs and dispensing outputs.  
This liberal modernization paradigm is popular amongst NGOs themselves when 
representing, making sense of and justifying their world of development.  
Simultaneously, though, the empiricist approach calls for development reform because 
NGOs are subservient to the dictates of sincere but patronizing external donors.  
‘Participation’ by rural communities in the development process, although difficult to 
implement, is a civic value and duty.  It is portrayed instrumentally as the ‘civil society’ 
solution to development deficits in the rural ‘periphery’ and to state weaknesses in terms 
of service delivery.   
 
The structuralist trend includes a mix of Marxist world-systems theorists and 
postmodernist discourse analysts.  Ironically, it reaches similar conclusions vis-à-vis the 
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empiricist trend in conceptualizing the relationship between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’.  
Thus, as the thesis highlights, both trends privilege the notion of ‘domination’ (or at least 
benevolent ‘control’ in the case of empiricists) in analyzing capitalist development on a 
global scale.  Despite the varied forms of deconstruction on offer by Marxist and 
postmodernist theorists, both groups of analysts structurally dichotomize the development 
process into ‘the global core’ (or subject) and ‘the local periphery’ (or object).  
Intermediary NGOs are slotted into the development industry as carriers of global 
messages and implementers of global agendas, and are invariably involved in the 
reproduction of global capitalism.  Rural communities become unwilling victims of 
global impositions foisted upon them by ‘middle-class’ NGOs.  Participation becomes a 
means of incorporating agrarian lower classes into modes of social domination. 
 
In this context, it is not surprising that a ‘development impasse’ has stalked social and 
political theory for a number of years, including with specific reference to 
conceptualizing intermediary NGOs.  From a sociological perspective, the impasse arose 
because the prevailing modernization and Marxist approaches were involved in a form of 
explanatory overkill that reduced the complexities of development processes to grand 
meta-theories.  In doing so, these approaches neglected the specifically human 
component of development, that is, ‘the social’ as understood in terms of the Weberian 
notion of meaning.  Modernization and Marxist theories, as foremost examples of the 
‘empiricist’ and ‘structuralist’ trends respectively, regularly dish up instrumentalist and 
functionalist accounts of development NGOs.  A corresponding ‘impasse’ is also vividly 
clear in theorizations of NGOs in the context of civil society.   
 
Transcending these theoretical impasses entails reconstructing the social life of NGOs in 
a way that incorporates Weberian insights about meaning-soaked organizational 
practices.  Through this, it is possible to ‘capture’ conceptually the intricate world of 
ambivalence of NGOs and the concrete ways in which, organizationally, NGOs express 
and contain contradictory processes of glocalization.  Intermediary NGOs occupy a 
tension-filled structural field that is bounded by social interfaces that involve complex 
forms of accountability with global capital, local nation-states and heterogeneous rural 
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communities.  NGOs ‘handle’ or ‘manage’ social tensions in numerous different ways.  
Yet, in large part, tensions are managed (‘externally’) along the porous and fluid 
interfaces that delimit the social space of NGOs, and by means of (‘internal’) 
organizational practices.  As social forms, NGOs are not static ‘entities’, and thus the 
organizational means by which they ‘negotiate’ tensions has a feedback effect on their 
organizational structure. 
  
The Weberian notion of ‘meaning’ goes beyond mechanistic, functionalist and 
instrumentalist conceptions of NGO interfaces.  The thesis demonstrates that NGOs give 
meaning to these interfaces and act accordingly.  While these interfaces exist 
independently of ‘meaning’, privileging the notion of ‘meaning’ in the analysis of NGOs 
highlights the ‘negotiated’ and ‘constructed’ quality of interfaces.  Thus, for instance, if 
development NGOs are ‘in the pocket’ of global capital, then this historical trajectory is 
not simply imposed on ‘objects’ by ‘subjects’ but is a ‘negotiated’ organizational 
outcome.  In other words, if NGOs become ‘objects’ of others, then they do so for 
reasons of their own.  Or, if rural communities do ‘buy into’ development programmes or 
projects, they do so in terms of the meaning they attach to such outside interventions and 
how they may benefit.  In general, then, the meaning that NGOs give to their interfaces 
vary considerably from the meanings that global donors, nation-states and rural 
communities give to these same interfaces. 
 
This brings us to a central theoretical point.  The thesis argues convincingly that any 
analysis of intermediary NGOs should involve ‘capturing’ and making sense of 
organizational processes and practices within NGOs.  Any such ‘thick descriptions’ of 
NGO practices must by necessity entail a re-centring of the sociological investigation in 
such a way that the world of NGOs is seen from ‘inside the walls’.  Sociological 
behaviourism in either the structuralist or empiricist form assumes that NGO 
organizational practices can be understood independently of the meanings that NGOs 
give to their world, or that these meanings can be deduced or read from ‘outside’.  The 
thesis argues to the contrary, and shows that meanings must be read from ‘within’.  The 
‘context’ (or ‘outside’ world) structures and sets limits to the ‘text’ (the NGO).  But 
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NGOs act upon ‘the outside’ through organizational practices laden with their own 
meanings.   
 
In this way, the thesis shows that NGOs ‘handle’ the tensions between the global and the 
local in numerous ways.  In particular, I argue that NGOs tend to bring simplicity, order 
and closure to their world of ambivalence.  These ‘stabilizing’ activities become 
embodied within ‘actually existing’ organizational practices.  A predominant (though not 
inevitable) trajectory of these ‘stabilization’ practices pushes intermediary NGOs in the 
direction of privileging ‘the global’ and problematizing ‘the local’.  This means that NGO 
practices have the organizational effect of reproducing global forms of domination 
against the current of more local empowering initiatives.  I label this predominant 
trajectory as a ‘Glocal modernity’ rather than as a ‘gLocal modernity’ because of its 
globalizing effects.  This trajectory is not simply imposed upon NGOs, as it is a 
‘negotiated’ outcome.  More specifically, NGOs are disposed to this global trajectory 
because it allows them to prioritize their own organizational sustainability.  Hence, in the 
end, this Glocal modernity is their modernity.   
 
 
2.3 Glocalization and Land Reform 
 
The thesis looks specifically at NGOs in the context of land reform in Zimbabwe.  It does 
this by first discussing agrarian and land reform globally and also in particular reference 
to Zimbabwe.  I highlight the complex interplays and social tensions that exist between 
the global and local moments in these reform processes.  As a result, I refer to these 
convoluted and contradictory processes, in which intermediary NGOs are immersed, as 
‘agrarian glocalization’ processes.  On the one hand, there are pronounced 
homogenizing tendencies because of the globalization of agriculture and land reform.  On 
the other hand, agrarian glocalization entails the existence of ‘local’ differentiating 
effects, or complex historical variations of common global themes.  One such complex 
variation is the case of land reform in Zimbabwe. 
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The homogenizing tendency is embodied in the global shift away from state-centred land 
reform to society-centred land reform over the past few decades.  This arose in the 
broader context of a crisis of profitability in world capitalism during the 1970s that 
derailed ‘developmentalism’ as a statist mode of social engineering.  Subsequent global 
restructuring has had a pronounced neo-liberal thrust, although in recent years even 
global capital has called for a reinvigorated state.  Nevertheless, nation-states throughout 
the ‘periphery’ became subject to the imperatives of managing the global crisis through 
economic liberalization and deregulation, as exemplified by structural adjustment 
programmes.  Increasingly, agriculture in the South and East has been subordinated to the 
demands of a market-driven global capitalism.  Thus, agro-industrial transnational 
corporations dominate agricultural commodity chains in terms of both production and 
distribution.  As well, market-led land reform, involving the commodification and 
privatization of tenure regimes, has significantly altered agrarian relations of production 
in the South and East. 
 
The breadth and depth of these global intrusions into ‘the local’ have led to re-theorizing 
about the agrarian question.  Considering the existence of capitalism as an all-pervasive 
world system, it has been suggested that the classic agrarian question about the transition 
to industrial capitalism has been resolved globally, and that the agrarian question needs to 
be re-conceptualized in terms of the impact that this global system has on the 
reproduction of rural livelihoods in the peripheries (Bernstein 2003).  The argument 
about a universal resolution to the classic agrarian question is highly problematic because 
it goes contrary to the notion of ‘glocal modernities’ and posits a ‘final’ resolution to 
complex social processes.  Nevertheless, this re-theorization brings to the fore certain 
agrarian processes that are particularly relevant to the thesis.  More specifically, a serious 
(and pervasive) crisis of rural livelihoods exists, and rural communities constantly engage 
in ever more dispersed combinations of agricultural and non-agricultural survival 
strategies.  The indeterminate, disparate and fragmented activities of production and 
reproduction pose ongoing problems in properly conceptualizing the ‘rural underclasses’ 
in terms of the traditional notions of peasant and proletariat.   
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Yet, the globalization of agriculture has led to similar experiences and understandings of 
agrarian processes by the lower classes throughout the periphery.  Simultaneously, this 
has involved a revival, if not a resurgence (Petras 1998, Moyo and Yeros eds. 2005) of 
autonomous and organized action by the ‘semi-proletariat’.  The current political practice 
of the under-classes is diverse and multifaceted, but there is a marked ‘uncivil’ aspect to 
it.  ‘Uncivil’ in this context denotes action that is deemed illegitimate in terms of the 
constitution and laws of the nation-state, although it may be morally contested within 
broader society.  The most dramatic form of uncivil action has been the land occupations 
taking place in some parts of Latin America and Asia, most notably Brazil.  Theorists that 
are in large part supportive of this action argue (in an instrumentalist vein) that rural ‘un-
civilities’ provide an important counter-measure to the reactionary donor-driven civilities 
of NGOs, and that they contribute to social change by advancing the (stalled) national 
democratic revolution in the South and East. 
 
Certainly, at one level, globalization homogenizes the agrarian world as manifested in 
such processes as agricultural commodity chains, crises of rural livelihoods, social 
reproduction strategies and rural opposition.  Yet, globalization is a contradictory, 
discontinuous and uneven project and involves highly localized agrarian processes.   In 
particular, there have been numerous assertions of ‘the local’ against the ‘civilizing 
mission’ of capitalist agricultural globalization.  These include resistance by nation-states 
and governments to the anti-statist thrust of land reform as pursued by the World Bank 
and global capital; the defence of ‘traditional’ customary tenure by agrarian communities 
in the face of the formal privatization of land tenure; and ‘uncivil disobedience’.  As a 
result, glocalization processes pertaining to agrarian restructuring and land reform have a 
socially indeterminate and contingent texture.  At the level of the nation-state, these 
processes invariably take on historically specific forms.  This further means that 
‘resolutions’ to the agrarian question are historically unique and tentative. 
 
Events in Zimbabwe clearly demonstrate the relevance of the notion of ‘agrarian 
glocalization’.  The agrarian landscape in Zimbabwe cannot be ‘read from’ global 
homogenizing tendencies.  In varying degrees and ways, this is apparent in the earlier 
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independence years from 1980 to 1996 that fell under the Phase I land programme, as 
well as (under Phase II) in the years immediately preceding accelerated land reform 
(1997 to 1999) and the accelerated reform ‘period’ from 2000 onwards.  Both phases are 
marked by a significant global moment.  But, without wanting to overly dichotomize the 
two phases, the first Phase appears to fall in line with global trajectories and the second 
Phase is a reaction against such trajectories. 
 
During Phase I, the Lancaster House Agreement and the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme resulted in persistent global pressure on the post-colonial state and placed 
serious brakes on land redistribution and land tenure changes.  The prevailing thrust 
under market-led reform was capitalist modernization, including the indigenization of 
agricultural capital, and the respect for capitalist civilities and property rights.  This led to 
problems brewing within the rural areas, most notably a deepening crisis of rural 
livelihoods under unchanged tenure conditions in customary areas but also the unmet 
land needs of ex-commercial farm workers in the face of (albeit limited) land distribution.  
Throughout this Phase, and under conditions of nation building, the state sought to 
‘civilize’ society.  Yet, there were also regular acts of land self-provisioning by rural 
dwellers.   
 
Land events in Zimbabwe during Phase I are well documented in the academic literature.  
In going beyond the scope of this literature, this thesis revisits these events and highlights 
their significance in relation to Phase II developments.  In so doing, it singles out key 
trajectories pertaining to ‘contradiction’ and ‘domination’ as reoccurring themes of the 
thesis.   First of all, and despite the dominant thrust of Phase I, the thesis argues that the 
programme was characterized by considerable ambiguities revolving around the 
seemingly contradictory goals of agricultural productivity and historical justice.  
Contradictory tendencies became ingrained in the Phase II programme and continue to be 
played out, under different historical conditions, in the accelerated programme.  
Secondly, although in large part in line with global trajectories, the thesis shows that 
Phase I did not merely represent a form of global imposition and domination.  Rather, the 
main trajectory of Phase I was consistent with, for instance, the demands of white and 
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black agrarian capital in Zimbabwe, and Phase I was in many ways pursued on those 
grounds.  This ‘local’ moment of Phase I is privileged in the thesis, as it brings to the fore 
an important thread of continuity between the two phases.  
 
Phase II emerged in the face of increasing tension and conflict within both Zimbabwean 
state and society.  Initially, in the late 1990s, this Phase was marked by significant land 
policy dialogue and consultation but with a halting implementation process that, as in 
earlier years, failed to address the needs of the landless and land-short ‘peasantry’.  
Simultaneously, radical nationalist assertions on land reform continually raised the 
spectre of more far-reaching initiatives.  These contradictory messages from the ruling 
party and government occurred alongside, if not because of, serious structural problems 
in the national economy, massive political opposition emanating from ‘urban civil 
society’, and a growing rift between the Zimbabwean state on the one hand and the 
International Monetary Fund and the former colonial power of Britain on the other.  This 
set the historical and social backdrop for the accelerated reform period. 
 
The accelerated period derived from a combination of three tendencies.  First of all, there 
was the historical legacy in Zimbabwe of racially based landed property that remained 
unresolved twenty years after independence.  Secondly, ‘agrarian glocalization’, 
including global agricultural restructuring and policy failures by the Zimbabwean state, 
was impacting on agrarian livelihoods and the deepening struggle for social survival.  
Thirdly, a radical pan-African nationalism arose as a result of a combination of 
imperialist aggression, disinterest and withdrawal vis-à-vis Zimbabwe.  Of course, these 
conditions neither made the movement inevitable nor determined its historical 
specificities.  But they do show that global trajectories and local conjunctural events were 
significant in the emergence of the Third Chimurenga.   
 
An acrimonious debate exists amongst Left scholars within Zimbabwean social studies 
about state formation and political change in the accelerated period (Moyo and Yeros eds. 
2005; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004; Helliker 2004, 2005).  The debate revolves 
around different conceptualizations of the social crisis in Zimbabwe.  One side in the 
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controversy focuses on the global (imperialist) determinants of the crisis and the other 
side stresses the local (nation-state) determinants.  Engaging with the debate provides a 
heuristic entry point into the ambivalences and complexities of agrarian change in the 
accelerated period.  It raises specific questions about, amongst other things, the social 
composition of the land movement, the class basis (and bias) of agrarian change and land 
redistribution, the dynamics of local governance and agricultural production in the ‘new’ 
resettlement areas, and the authoritarian restructuring of the state.  In their own way, 
these (and other) aspects of accelerated reform became intertwined with the discourses 
and practices of intermediary ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe.  A common thread running 
through the debate about accelerated reform has been the ‘uncivil’ trajectory.  This 
uncivil character relates to the dramatic disrespect for existing agrarian property relations.  
This is particularly significant because it contrasts with the supposed ‘civility’ of ‘land’ 
NGOs.  Indeed, on the whole, NGOs in Zimbabwe operate within the confines of the 
prevailing legal regime.  Yet, the Third Chimurenga brought to the fore questions about 
what is ‘civil’ in the face of unjust (and racial) agrarian relations of production. 
 
 
2.4 ‘Land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe 
 
Accelerated reform brought about significant changes to the political and agrarian 
landscape in Zimbabwe.  These changes involved a dramatic assertion of ‘the local’ and a 
forceful restructuring of the ‘agrarian glocalization’ process.  As a result, they impacted 
immeasurably on the social field of advocacy and development ‘land’ NGOs by 
sharpening existing contradictions and bringing to the fore latent ones.  NGOs ‘handled’ 
this turbulent twist of events through a range of coping strategies and practices that 
served to ‘stabilize’ these organizational formations.  More broadly, this thesis shows 
how, from the mid-1990s onwards, intermediary NGOs in Zimbabwe negotiated and 
manoeuvred their way through the unfolding contradictions between global and local 
moments pertaining to land reform. 
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In this regard, I provide a brief comparative investigation of advocacy NGOs.  This 
comparison reveals that there is considerable diversity across the South and East, and at 
times NGOs have directly (and indirectly) supported peasant movements.  But, on the 
whole, the evidence suggests a significant degree of hesitancy and tentativeness amongst 
NGOs when it comes to advocating for land reform.  In the mid-1990s, NGOs in 
Zimbabwe recognized this reluctance amongst themselves.  With a broad brushstroke, 
some theorists claim that this emanates from the ideological disposition of ‘middle-class’ 
NGOs.  But the thesis shows that land reform is a high risk, contentious and complex 
policy terrain around which powerful interests coalesce, and there may be ‘organizational 
dispositions’ that lead NGOs to ‘manage’ this terrain by distancing themselves from 
advocacy.  A similar disengagement from land reform is found amongst development 
NGOs.  The fact that these NGOs conceptualize themselves as development-centric 
rather than as agrarian-centric NGOs is highly significant in this regard.  As a result, as 
seen in the history of NGOs in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1995 outlined in the thesis, they 
often slot themselves into existing agrarian structures of domination without seriously 
questioning or challenging these structures.  Again, the existence of ‘organizational 
dispositions’ that involve ‘stabilizing practices’ goes some way towards understanding 
these NGO inhibitions. 
 
Advocacy ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe in the years immediately preceding the accelerated 
programme engaged with government in a, relatively speaking, inclusive land policy 
environment.  For instance, they arranged and participated in land conferences, and they 
provided inputs into the Phase II policy formation process.  Yet, they were in large part 
ineffective as land advocates and often blamed ongoing state centrism for their 
marginalization.  But the thesis demonstrates that these NGOs also had their own serious 
weaknesses.  These weaknesses were not simply (‘external’) incapacities revolving 
around the practicalities of participating in lobbying processes.  There were also 
fundamental questions about (‘internal’) systems and procedures that could sustain these 
NGOs as organizational formations over the necessary long haul without experiencing 
‘fatigue’.  Further, as part of urban civil society and the push for democratic change in 
Zimbabwe, ‘land’ NGOs became immersed in party politics.  They were involved in the 
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formation of the official political opposition in 1999 and received the anti-imperialist 
wrath of the central state for doing so. 
 
Eventually, accelerated reform brought the world of advocacy NGOs crashing down.  
Land policy formation became dominated by the central state and thus ‘land’ NGOs have 
been largely excluded.  However, the thesis makes it clear that the accelerated period 
made explicit that which was already implicit in the social field of NGOs.  During the 
1990s, global donors (including the British state) and the Zimbabwean government had 
jointly spun a web of intrigue in which NGOs became entrapped.  The NGOs distanced 
themselves from both, and thus they were not in either (or any) camp.  They were, in a 
sense, seeking to bring their accountabilities into equilibrium, and thereby they became 
‘caught in the crossfire’.  Their world of advocacy was ‘stuck’ in the tension between ‘the 
global’ and ‘the local’, and in many ways this immobilized them.  However, the 
balancing act they performed was made simpler by the existence of a far greater social 
distance.  This was the distance they had forged, if only unintentionally, between 
themselves and the rural under-classes.  Urban-based advocacy NGOs did not directly 
incorporate rural inhabitants into their land advocacy practices, and hence these NGOs 
were not burdened by the great uncertainties and complexities that arise from a fully 
inclusive and participatory process.  As the thesis highlights, this had the effect of 
simplifying and stabilizing the world of ‘land’ advocacy NGOs. 
 
The thesis shows how the land ‘occupations’ during the accelerated period also had a 
dramatic impact on the world and work of rural development NGOs.  Initially, these 
NGOs stood back at a bemused distance from the ‘invasions’ or questioned the ‘un-
civility’ of these movements.  Certainly, they never sought to engage with them in any 
meaningful manner.  In general, the activities of NGOs working under all land tenure 
systems were heavily disrupted by the happenings set in motion by the occupations.   The 
land occupations made it extremely difficult for NGO personnel in the rural areas to 
move about and to hold meetings, and relationships with (in the past, benign) local state 
structures became politicized and marked by suspicion.  Relations with central 
government became even more problematic, as NGOs were accused of supporting the 
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political opposition in the rural areas.  As well, the deepening economic crisis, including 
hyperinflation, had detrimental effects on operational costs and staff security.  Major 
donors also refrained from funding any programmes that might legitimize the land 
invasions.   
 
Many development programmes in the ‘old’ resettlement areas (from the 1980s) and the 
customary areas were suspended or put on hold particularly during the early years of the 
accelerated period, and the emphasis in practice became short-term humanitarian relief 
rather than long-term sustainable development.  As the economic crisis deepened, even 
seemingly ‘developmental’ interventions focused increasingly on coping and survival 
methods for the rural lower classes.  In the face of major disruptions in their development 
work, these NGOs also engaged in various forms of organizational reflection, learning 
and strategizing.  The thesis clearly highlights that shifts toward humanitarian work and 
‘internal’ work have both served to maintain these NGOs as viable organizational forms.  
Problems for NGOs working on White commercial farms have been even more trying.  
These NGOs have seen many years of hard work ‘go up in smoke’ in a matter of months, 
and they have been faced with major dilemmas pertaining to involvement in the ‘new’ 
resettlement areas.  On the whole, NGOs have tended to distance themselves from these 
areas, but not necessarily because of ‘ideological dispositions’.  Rather, matters of 
complexity have come to the fore, such as ambiguous and turbulent forms of local 
governance in these areas.  The thesis shows that a ‘gung ho’ intervention in these areas 
may have put considerable strain on the organizational coherence and continuity of these 
NGOs. 
 
An investigation of advocacy and development ‘land’ NGOs in present-day Zimbabwe 
demonstrates that, in many ways, the organizational practices of NGOs and the outcomes 
of these practices are not simply forced upon NGOs ‘from outside’ and that they cannot 
be fruitfully analyzed in this way.  For example, limitations on space for manoeuvring, 
and weaknesses in impact, may be self-imposed and self-inflicted.  Indeed, these 
‘problems’ may contribute to the sustainability of intermediary ‘land’ NGOs as 
organizational forms.  Understanding this entails focusing on meaning-laden action 
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through which NGOs ‘mediate’ and ‘handle’ their tension-riddled world, and this ‘inside’ 
action cannot be directly read ‘from outside’.  As the thesis stresses, it is thus necessary 
once again to go inside the form, but now as part of the methodological process of 
‘historical’ reconstruction (rather than the earlier ‘logical’ deconstruction).   
 
Case studies of two ‘land’ NGOs, namely, Farm Orphan Support Trust (FOST) and SOS 
Children’s Villages (SOS), vividly highlight the theoretical significance of ‘the inside 
story’ and the Weberian notion of meaning.  FOST is an indigenous NGO that has close 
links with the (White) Commercial Farmers Union.  Traditionally, it has worked amongst 
farm labourers on White commercial farms.  The disabling environment arising from the 
accelerated programme saw FOST channelling its activities in a direction (i.e. relief) that 
does not readily maximize the achievement of its original vision and mission.  Yet, given 
the propensity of global donors for emergency relief work, FOST has been able to sustain 
itself organizationally while also remaining relevant to the needs of its ‘targeted’ group.  
In the face of accelerated reform, FOST has been able to ‘balance’ its development 
practice through ‘sensitive negotiations’ with both global donors and local power 
structures.  As a result, it has been able to ‘weather the storm’, and to manoeuvre its way 
through a restructured and volatile agrarian landscape in a manner that has not seriously 
jeopardized its organizational integrity.  
 
SOS is an international NGO that operates two farms.  One farm is commercially run and 
the other farm is a training centre for young people that go through the SOS system.  
Neither farm was ‘invaded’ but accelerated reform has fundamentally altered the 
surrounding agrarian terrain.  There are serious tensions within the organization, both 
between ideals and practices and within organizational practices themselves.  White farm 
management is not NGO-driven and remains insensitive to the organization’s vision.  
Management practices seem designed to ensure the sustainability of the organizational 
form as a site of employment rather than a site for development.  In maintaining the NGO 
projects through the accelerated period, managers were not seeking to maintain the 
interests of SOS as a NGO but rather the interests of an organization per se and their 
positions of immense privilege within it.  Management has been insulated from the 
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insecurities that arise from ‘chasing donors’ and has not sought to embed the NGOs in 
‘the altered local’.  The serious organizational dysfunctions at the farms exist not so 
much because of tension between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, but because of the 
‘unhealthy’ absence of tension.   
 
 
2.5 Theorizing about NGOs  
 
The empirical conclusions of the thesis highlight, amongst other things, that ‘land’ NGOs 
in Zimbabwe are perennially in a state of disengagement vis-à-vis land reform.  For 
instance, in the late 1990s, NGOs kept a safe distance away from the realm of land 
advocacy.  They refrained from sustained lobbying despite a comparably conducive 
policy environment for doing so.  Under accelerated reform, there has been a marked 
distance at the operational level, as evidenced by the hesitancy on the part of 
development NGOs in becoming embroiled in the ‘new’ resettlement areas.  In 
broadening this observation, it is clear that ‘land’ NGOs did not contribute to bringing 
about progressive agrarian change in Zimbabwe, and that they have mainly ‘gone with 
the ebb and flow’ of global initiatives.  As a result, their organizational practices were 
orientated towards reproducing a Glocal modernity that was insensitive to the assertion of 
a dramatic ‘local’ restructuring initiative. 
 
This important empirical finding of the thesis about ‘land’ NGOs and Glocalization does 
not seem to be significantly different from the kind of conclusions arrived at by 
‘structuralist’ and ‘empiricist’ scholars about intermediary NGOs and global domination 
more generally.  However, it is important not to conflate ‘empirical conclusion’ and 
‘theoretical perspective’.  Thus, the same empirical conclusion is consistent with different 
theoretical perspectives.  And, more fundamentally, the latter derive from specific 
epistemological and ontological claims.   
 
This study of ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe is particularly unique and significant because it 
is based on a convoluted methodology involving deconstruction and reconstruction that 
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clearly avoids instrumentalism and functionalism, and that is particularly sensitive to the 
sociologically rich notion of ‘meaning’.   In an important articulation of the thoughts of 
Marx and Weber, this thesis develops a methodology that seems able to capture the 
complexities and ambivalences of the world and work of NGOs.  It then goes on to show 
the sociological significance of this methodology by illustrating it with reference to ‘land’ 
NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe.  In large part, the thesis is a discursive endeavour and 
thus I do not claim that – in the study of Zimbabwe – a complete ‘reconstruction’ of the 
‘actually existing’ world of intermediary NGOs is provided.  Yet the thesis offers 
important pointers in the right direction.  The development and application of a 
methodology for understanding intermediary NGOs expresses the originality of the thesis 
in furthering the advancement of sociological thought. 
 
In this regard, the thesis shows how NGOs as social forms are immersed in contradictory 
processes of ‘negotiated’ glocalization that regularly entail ‘stabilizing’ practices that 
privilege organizational sustainability.  It also notes though that the outcome of these 
processes is historically contingent and specific.  For this reason, and unlike much of 
sociological behaviourism, the theoretical perspective informing this study does not rule 
out a priori the possibilities of intermediary NGOs, under specific historical conditions, 
pursuing a more gLocal modernity that undermines ‘the global’.  Thus, and this is the 
critical point, the theoretical approach has the methodological capacity to account for 
NGO diversity.   
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Chapter 3  
Challenges to Sociology: Globalization, Postmodernism and Glocal 
Modernities 
 
 
The contemporary world is marked by significant but uncertain social change, 
encapsulated in notions like ‘Empire’, the ‘New World Order’ and systemic transition 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, Wallerstein 2002, Balakrishnan ed. 2003).  These far-reaching 
economic and political changes have occurred alongside significant re-theorizing – and in 
fact have stimulated the production of this theoretical work – as social scientists grapple 
with the meaning and causes of these ongoing ambiguous changes.  As a discursive 
formation, sociology has historically been deeply interested in questions of social 
continuity and social change, and its broad and porous boundaries have invited (and 
enabled it to incorporate) a diverse range of methodological and theoretical positions 
(Urry 2000).  But there are two issues, namely globalization and postmodernism, which 
directly challenge the foundational tenets of sociology and thereby its current quest for a 
deeper understanding of the variable human condition.  These contemporary conditions 
and their theoretical representations, which at times are conflated in the sociological 
literature, seem to pull in opposing directions with the potential to tear sociology asunder.  
The issue of globalization will be discussed first. 
 
 
3.1 Globalization: Bounded Totalities and Thinking Big 
 
An international perspective, or a heightened sensitivity to global trajectories, is 
increasingly important in order to make sense of and explain more localized or particular 
phenomena, such as land processes in present-day Zimbabwe.  This might seem like an 
obvious and bland point.  After all, for many years intermediary NGOs have formed part 
of an all-embracing international development network, and global entities as diverse as 
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the World Bank and the World Social Forum have articulated international discourses on 
land reform.  Further, the so-called founders of sociology – Durkheim, Marx and Weber 
– offered analyses with a distinctively international-cum-comparative perspective, and 
influential contemporary sociologists such as John Urry and Anthony Giddens have done 
likewise.  But, social theorists often portray the contemporary ‘globalized condition’ of 
humanity as involving something radically different than long-standing international 
processes and necessitating more than standard historical-comparative commentaries.  
For instance, it is argued: ‘In the contemporary world economy, capital reaches the outer 
limits of the earth’s remotest islands and mountain villages; but it also colonizes the inner 
spaces of the lived world – leisure, nature, soma.’ (Morris-Suzuki 2000:p.74)  The 
outward and inward expansion defining the globalized condition is said to involve a 
marked discontinuity with the past, a ‘qualitatively new stage’ (Amin 1997:p.49), and 
hence requires an epistemological and theoretical revamping of sociology.   
 
The sociological project is the product of industrial capitalism, and is well known for 
propagating in different forms the distinction between tradition and modernity (or pre-
industrial and industrial), such as Durkheim’s comparison between organic and 
mechanical forms of the division of labour.  Sociology arose and developed after the fall 
of feudal systems and absolutist states, and thus within the confines of the modern nation-
state in Europe and its worldwide establishment and dominance as a political system 
through imperialism and colonialism.  Despite the historicity of the nation-state, the 
modern state per se – rather than merely a specific nation-state – through meta-narratives 
and hegemonic ideas takes on a naturalized and fixed form such that its ‘dissolution or 
disappearance becomes unimaginable’ (Migdal 2001:p.150).  Yet, as Pierson’s work 
vividly shows: ‘For all its universality in our own times, the [modern] state is a 
contingent (and comparatively recent) historical development.  Its predominance may 
also prove to be quite transitory.’ (Pierson 1996:p.35, his emphasis)  In large measure 
sociologists have studied human societies as modern (territory-based) nation-states and 
have understood the prevailing international social system as a simple world-system of 
competing but unequal nation-states. Thus, their central and distinctive concept, namely 
‘the social’, has (and in large part rightly so) revolved around and been reduced to 
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‘society’ as embedded within the nation-state.  In other words, a nation-state-society 
nexus has been privileged and even reified in sociological studies as a foundational 
premise.   
 
Urry argues, however, that processes of globalization ‘problematise the powers of 
society’ (Urry 2000:p.2) – transforming but not undermining them – and he argues for a 
post-societal sociology that focuses on the ‘social as mobility’ rather than the ‘social as 
society’.  Human society is no longer simply internationalized but is increasingly globally 
integrated and compressed and, therefore, global communities, networks, flows and 
mobilities are now constitutive of social relations and human subjectivities and ‘should 
be at the heart of a reconstituted sociology’ (Urry 2000:p.210).  As Urry expands, ‘social 
life, once organised within national societies, is now moving to virtual communities that 
transcend each society and their characteristic communities, solidarities and identities.’ 
(Urry 2000:p.73)  Admittedly, there is a wide diversity of views amongst sociologists 
about globalization and its forms, processes and impacts on contemporary state and 
society.  And, as discussed later, Urry clearly overemphasizes the extent of compression 
when it comes to the reach of global flows in the South and East.   Yet, as Featherstone 
and Lash rightly note: ‘A central implication of the concept of globalization is that we 
must now embark on the project of understanding social life without the comforting term 
“society”.’  Like Urry, they stress the need to make ‘an important step towards a trans-
societal perspective’ (Featherstone and Lash 1995:p.2).  However, discarding the term 
‘society’ would overstate the significance of contemporary social restructuring.  The 
main lesson is the need to offer a more sensitive rendering of the term in the light of 
global changes. 
 
This sociological reformulation would also entail re-considering state-centric approaches 
to international processes (Biersteker and Weber eds. 1996).  This would mean 
recognizing more fully the likelihood and reality of alternative locations of authority such 
as transnational capital circuits and emergent global civil societies, and thereby theorizing 
about the pluralization of organizational forms beyond and above the nation-state.  Luke 
for instance speaks of the ‘sovereignty-free “neo-world orders”’ that are emerging trans-
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nationally, and he argues that the nation-state is no longer reigning ‘with impunity even 
in realist time and space’ (Luke 1995:p.105).  De Rivero (2001:p.40) argues that 
international corporations are a new (non-state) transnational aristocracy; that world 
power is increasingly geo-economic rather than geo-political; and that nation-states have 
become a kind of administrative ‘surrogate’ for global capital.  As well, Bauman (1995:p. 
152) shows how the nation-state is presently being ‘simultaneously skimmed from above 
and sapped from below’ and that it is no longer the centre that holds together social 
relations or ‘the social’ in any bounded and systemic sense, if ever it was (particularly in 
the South).  Finally, Amin argues that national economies have become ‘segments of a 
globalized productive system’ with national capitalism thereby eroding.  Though 
‘national coherence is regressing’ this has not been replaced by a ‘worldwide coherence’, 
at least in terms of an international political form that regulates and manages the global 
economy (Amin 1997:pp.57, 33).  Rather, an international power vacuum exists, without 
a national or international body willing and able to take control.   
 
From these arguments, it would appear that global capital does not merely control events 
directly through comprador nation-states but also operates beyond the control of national 
politics and regulation in a more dispersed and uncontrolled manner.  Marcuse however 
qualifies this by arguing: ‘If states do not control the movement of capital or of goods, it 
is not because they cannot but because they will not – it is an abdication of state power, 
not a lack of that power.’ (Marcuse 2000:p.3 his emphasis)  Clearly it is important not to 
overplay the powerlessness of the nation-state, yet Marcuse’s argument takes it to the 
other extreme.  The key point is that traditional notions like state-led imperialism and 
neo-colonialism emanating from a defined global centre are problematic portraits of 
emerging global forms of domination.   
 
For sociology, it is critical to capture the uneven processes of globalization.  On the one 
hand, globalization involves a de-centring of the ‘social’ away from seemingly bounded 
social totalities in the form of nation-states to a more fragmented, amorphous and 
dispersed understanding of the ‘social’.  On the other hand, globalization entails nation-
states defending the bounded status of their societies, and thus the modern world is 
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marked by the assertion of local initiatives against globalizing trajectories.  Indeed, the 
nation-state has an ongoing relevance as a critical arena of conflict between global and 
local forces.  These contradictory moments in globalization are critical for making sense 
of the world of NGOs.  Also, globalization urges sociologists to ‘think big’ both 
ontologically and epistemologically.  The second issue, namely postmodernism, seems to 
point dramatically in the opposite direction.  
 
 
3.2 Postmodernism: Sutured Totalities and Thinking Small 
 
This point entails the postmodernist thrust that foundational epistemologies, grand 
narratives, the search for absolutes and mega-theorizing are inconsistent with the 
contemporary social condition.  The postmodern condition, it is claimed, is marked by 
emancipation from material constraint as well as by heterogeneity, diversity and 
contingency including the fragmentation of Subjectivity and Identity into subjectivities 
and identities.  Robertson notes, with regard to the apparent displacement of the universal 
by the particular from the perspective of postmodernists: ‘As the sense of temporal 
unidirectionality [in the form of grand narratives] has faded so, on the other hand, has the 
sense of “representational” space within which all kinds of narratives may be inserted 
expanded.’ (Robertson 1995:p.32)  Postmodernists argue that the fractured and un-
sutured post-modern condition cannot be understood and analyzed by employing 
traditional Enlightenment (or modernist) narratives about a rational order of things and 
using notions like the transcendental Subject.  Ferrara notes: ‘The decentered or 
centerless subject … is the banner under which the advocates of breaking away from 
modernity rally.  According to their view, it is not just the execution but the project of 
modernity as such that is misguided.  For it takes at face value foundational discourses 
which are at best rationalizations of historically contingent constellations of meaning 
endowed with the social power to shape our representations.’ (Ferrara 1998:pp.148-149, 
his emphasis)   
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In this sense, the history of sociological thought is not simply the history of 
understanding ‘the social’ as ‘society’, as mentioned above.  It has been, more 
specifically, about understanding the processes of modernity or the ongoing formation of 
‘modern societies’.  Yet, postmodernists claim that modern society is not and never has 
been a structured and unitary sutured totality, and thus the nation-state-society should not 
be understood in any realist sense.  In other words, modernist sociologists have enacted 
theoretical closure on a set of structured social relations called ‘society’ that are 
inherently unclosed, incomplete and indeterminate.  Considering the increasingly porous 
societal boundaries emanating from globalized flows, this problematizing of ‘society’ by 
postmodernists means that it is extremely difficult to see what holds societies together 
and orders them, as well as to identify their margins.  For postmodernists, there is both a 
de-centring and a de-totalizing of societies.   
 
Postmodernism has had a profound impact on mega-theory in the field of development, 
particularly given the major historical influence of Parsonian-type modernization theories 
and Marxist-based theories (such as underdevelopment, unequal exchange and 
dependency) in this field of inquiry.  Many of these traditional approaches have been 
revamped or discarded in whole or in part, and this has led to what has now become 
widely known – but not fully accepted – as the ‘impasse’ or even crisis in development 
studies (Schuurman ed. 1993).  Yet, it is shown later that postmodernism entails mega-
theoretical commitments of its own. 
 
Clearly, postmodernism distrusts any notion of an all-embracing organizing principle for 
human society.  Along with its pluralism and de-centring, this seems like a far cry from 
modernism both ontologically and epistemologically, resulting in a sociological agenda 
which retreats from grand theory and ‘thinks small’.  Postmodernism is not a unified 
theoretical perspective, and the particular postmodernist claim that social totalities are not 
sutured can be accepted without embracing postmodernist ‘theory’.  This particular claim 
is invaluable for this thesis because it highlights the indeterminate and contingent manner 
in which contradictory social processes unfold.    
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3.3 Postmodernism and Challenges to Marxism 
 
The impact of postmodernist thought within sociology has affected all traditional 
theoretical perspectives, but the thesis is particularly concerned with the acrimony 
prevalent within Marxism.  This acrimony has played itself out notably in terms of the 
status of ‘class’ vis-à-vis what has become known as the politics of identity or the 
‘politics of difference’ such as race, gender and ethnicity (Wilmsen and McAllister eds. 
1996).  Three general positions are discernable.  First of all, there are unreformed 
modernists and socialists such as Amin, who show a deep sensitivity to conditions in the 
East and South, and who argue that postmodernism is ‘an intellectual non-starter, in the 
sense that beyond its hype it offers no conceptual instruments capable of transcending the 
capitalist framework’ (Amin 1997:p.136).  In this regard, postmodernism misrepresents 
the modern condition, and it is simply another category of bourgeois thought that needs 
to be dismissed outright.   
 
These hardened Marxists claim that the popular dichotomy made between liberal and 
authoritarian regimes obscures and distracts from the more important (and more 
fundamental) differences between capitalism and socialism.  Liberal and authoritarian 
regimes both function within the parameters of capitalism, and an anti-neo-liberal agenda 
is not by necessity an anti-capitalist agenda.  These modernist theorists still believe in the 
grand narrative of human emancipation, and they find it ‘odd to hear the “left” say that 
the traditional political orientation of socialism is obsolete’ (Ehrenberg 1998:p.7) and that 
class politics is dead.  This is particularly perplexing considering the existence and 
strategies of – according to Ehrenberg – a well-organized and conscious dominant class 
pursuing global agendas.  This bourgeois class project is what Marcuse (2000:p.2) refers 
to as ‘really existing globalization’, as opposed to alternative, anti-capitalist, 
globalization processes.   
 
A second position involves the actual champions of the postmodernist cause, often called 
post-Marxists or Radical Democrats.  The postmodernist critique of Marxism entails the 
  47 
following points which are also relevant in many ways to other sociological traditions: 
preordained historical trajectories, fixed economic laws of development, grand class 
narratives, functionalism, reductionism, determinism, essentialism, scientism, 
structuralism and teleological explanations.  For instance, Mouffe talks about ‘the crisis 
of class politics’ in Marxist thought, and argues that social agents are not unitary subjects 
but manifest an ensemble of subject positions (Mouffe 1992b:p.225).  She argues for the 
valorization of pluralism in which differing forms of identity (as social relations and 
subject positions) are discursively constructed and are invariably unstable, ambiguous 
and contingent.  For Radical Democrats, this entails the creation of a ‘chain of 
equivalence among democratic struggles’ (Mouffe 1992b:p.225) in which no particular 
form of struggle (notably, class struggle) has a privileged status.  This further entails ‘a 
common political identity among democratic subjects’ (Mouffe 1992b:p.225) which is 
based on a radical democratic notion of citizenship that transcends the neo-liberal 
separation of social and political rights.   
 
This republican-type participatory citizenship would be founded in civil society including 
the ‘new’ social movements, and it is to become ‘the point of convergence for the current 
endeavour of rethinking the politics of the Left’ (Mouffe 1992a:p.4).  Citizenship is not 
the dominant identity, replacing class so to speak, but ‘is an articulating principle that 
affects the different subject positions of the social agent’ (Mouffe 1992b:p.235).  It also 
does not imply the pursuance of the same purpose or even promoting a common interest.  
Instead it is based on an ethical-political bond, which means subscribing to a ‘language’ 
and ‘rules’ of civil intercourse, and these include norms of conduct and civility (Mouffe 
1992b:p.233).  There are always competing ethical and political principles, so that any 
hegemonic language or rules are forged through struggle and are necessarily provisional.  
This idea of citizenship, of course, presumes a bounded undisputed nation-state-society 
nexus that globalization questions.  And some African scholars have argued that the very 
notion of citizenship as applied to the South and East is but a fancy and distant slogan for 
the urban and rural poor struggling against basic scarcities and authoritarian regimes 
(Monga 1996:p.88). 
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In arguing against classical theory, post-Marxists speak of the construction of a 
hegemonic conception of citizenship based on democratic equivalence because ‘common 
grounds for political action cannot be assumed’ as is done in structural Marxist analyses 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000:p.73).  In the construction of this citizenship, no particular identity 
becomes dominant but all are reconfigured in shaping a new (unspecified form of) 
society.  Radical democracy extends and deepens the foundations of bourgeois 
democracy but without determinacy and final closure on political agency, as this would 
mean the very negation of democracy.  This Radical Democratic position is not unlike the 
centrist Third Way fancied by social democrats once in power, such as the Labour Party 
in Britain.  This is a kind of middle road between capitalism and socialism that blends 
market and planned economies and entails ‘liberal communitarianism’ (McCracken 
2003:p.5).  Universal meta-narratives and dogmatic philosophies are discarded, and are 
replaced in the policy process by contingent pragmatism as part of post-ideological 
politics.  Thus, ‘large-scale redemptive politics of any kind are ruled impossible and it 
would seem “big” ideology is dead’ (McCracken 2003:p29).  This is a point made also by 
neo-liberal theorists. 
 
The Marxist substance of the Radical Democrats remains unclear, and Holloway suggests 
that post-Marxism is a symbol of profound disillusionment within Western Marxism over 
the past twenty or so years, as reflected for instance in Euro-communism.  He argues that 
this disillusionment ‘seeps into the core of the way we think, into the categories we use, 
the theories we espouse’, and that the ‘bitterness of history teaches us that it is now 
ridiculous to maintain the grand narrative of human emancipation ….  The best we can do 
is think in terms of particular narratives, the struggle of particular identities for better 
conditions’ (Holloway 2002:p.154) within the confines of a seemingly irreversible and 
unstoppable global capitalism.  In the next chapter, the transference of Radical 
Democratic discourses to the South and East in relation to ‘civil society’, and the likeness 
of these discourses to neo-liberal thought, will be discussed.  
 
The third position is less conciliatory than the post-Marxists to postmodernism but, 
unlike the committed modernists, is willing to engage seriously with postmodernist 
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thought.  For instance, Callari and Ruccio argue:  ‘[W]e detect in postmodernism certain 
trends that highlight the multidimensionality and openness of the social space 
characteristic of a reformulated Marxism and …we identify in it certain concepts and 
discursive strategies, such as the notion of a surplus of identities and the strategic 
imperative of deconstruction, quite compatible with the Marxist project of criticizing the 
unidimensionality of the bourgeois economic order ...and exposing it as a condition of 
class exploitation.’ (Callari and Ruccio 1996:p.3)  Callari and Ruccio argue that Marxism 
is in transition and not in crisis, and they label their reconfigured Marxist position as 
‘post-modern materialism’.  Postmodernists, they claim, have a one-sided view of 
Marxist thought and fail to fully recognize its ambiguous history.  On the one hand, there 
is the ‘modernist systematicity’ (Callari and Ruccio 1996:p.23) that entails a 
deterministic ontology based on order and structure, and that enacts closure on social 
spaces.  This (normally dominant) trend is what postmodernists dwell on, but Marxism 
cannot be reduced to it.  There is also the anti-systemic trend that stresses conjuncture, 
openness, formation and disorder, and this is also part of the history of Marxist thought.  
In that sense, the human condition is one of ambivalence caught in the antagonistic 
tension between what is systemic and what is contingent.  These two trends do not 
represent distinct traditions within Marxist thought, yet the work of specific theorists 
tends to emphasize either the ‘contingent’ or ‘structured’ social totality. 
 
Hegemonic discourses in society often mask or portray contingent ordering as structured 
ordering, and Marxists have at times been guilty of replicating this in their theoretical 
paradigm.  The historical tensions internal to Marxism are seen for example in the 
radically different treatment of ‘class’ by Poulantzas with his abstract a-historical notion 
of class structure contrasted to E. P. Thompson and his historically-rich idea of class 
formation in which experience, subjectivity and consciousness are part of the very being 
of class (Poulantzas 1975, Thompson 1968).  Further, the idea of a phenomenological 
Marxism that incorporates many of the ‘constructionist’ concerns of postmodernism has a 
long history in intellectual thought.  This brand of Marxism seeks in non-reductionist 
fashion to provide an analysis of the material world (of existence) and the non-material 
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world (of meaning) as one integrated world.  Postmodernists regular fail to offer such 
analyses because of their over-privileging of the latter.   
 
Callari and Ruccio believe that the Althusserian notion of ‘aleatory materialism’ captures 
the anti-systemic tendency within Marxism.  They largely accept the position formulated 
by Mouffe, including the heterogeneous (and thus de-centred) spaces of capitalism, the 
constructed nature of social identities and the lack of a single suturing of capitalist reality. 
Yet they still recognize class exploitation and hold to a class politics (Callari and Ruccio 
1996:p.40), but one that entails (following Gramsci) the autonomy of political struggles 
vis-à-vis the economy and that ‘negotiates’ with – rather than absorbs – non-class 
identities and struggles in open-ended processes.  Their highlighting of the anti-systemic 
trend in Marxism justifies the claim by Schuurman (1993b:p.190) that the postmodernist 
critique of the (supposed) representation crisis in modernist thought, and thus 
postmodernism itself, in fact arises from ‘a critical tradition within modernism’. 
 
More generally, and despite pronounced positivist and realist histories to the contrary, 
sociology has a long tradition of sensitivity to a number of postmodernist concerns, as 
found not only in the work of George Herbert Mead and Peter Berger but dating back to 
Weber.  Most sociologists for instance have long accepted the hermeneutic position that it 
is difficult to speak of an un-interpreted or extra-discursive social reality, and thus 
generalizing universalisms of the modernizing kind cannot be seen as anchored in some 
kind of unproblematic and unmediated social reality.  Indeed, the construction of social 
reality implies not only a linking of identity and practice, but a plurality of social 
realities.  Certainly, the emphasis by postmodernists on deconstruction is important, and 
other epistemological issues raised by them are pertinent to any sociological project.  
These include a disdain for ordering social phenomena a priori and desisting from 
teleological, essentialist and functionalist explanations.  
 
The epistemological orientation of this thesis displays a marked awareness of these 
postmodernist concerns and explicitly so.  Yet, it can be convincingly argued that grand 
theory is not only still feasible but that it remains necessary as a fundamental building 
  51 
block for sociological thought (Holloway 2003).  Indeed, it is incumbent upon 
sociologists to account simultaneously for ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in a unitary 
theory.  In the case of a sociology that is cognizant of Marx’s epistemology, this would 
entail going beyond the modernist systematicity that Callari and Ruccio speak about, and 
thereby analyzing the (re-constructed) contingent totalities that exist as the expression of 
contradictory social relations.  Theorizing about NGOs in this thesis involves ‘capturing’ 
the contradictory relations in which NGOs are embedded, and showing how this 
approach can account for the significant diversity that exists within the NGO ‘sector’. 
 
 
3.4 Postmodernism: Some Modernist Commitments 
 
Clearly, various tenets of postmodernism are highly questionable.  I have already argued 
that its depiction of modernist thought, notably Marxist theory, is problematic.  But the 
same could be said about its portrayal of modernist practice.  For instance, 
postmodernism downplays the sheer irrationality of modern enlightenment and ‘the dark 
side of modernity’, including colonialism and fascism (Pieterse 1995:p.47).  In general, it 
seems fair and safe to say that the ‘retreat’ from modernism has gone overboard, and that 
many postmodernist representations of contemporary social reality are moving ahead of 
that reality or beyond it.  In this regard, much of postmodernist thought is Euro-centric 
such that the purported emancipated post-material condition exists, if at all, in the North 
and not in the South (Schuurman 1993a). 
 
Thus, many postmodernist characterizations of globalization processes, such as the 
existence of unceasing voluntary mobilities of travel and tourism (Urry 2000), tend to 
universalize the particular (of the North) and seem distant from Southern realities (and 
likely from the realities of marginalized communities in the North).  Thus, Baker 
contrasts social movements in Latin America with Western movements particularly given 
the conditions of authoritarianism and scarcity in Latin America: ‘In the West, societal 
self-organisation has centred on post-industrial or post-material [or postmodernist] issues 
of consumption, lifestyle and identity, such as relations between the sexes and ecology.  
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For the bulk of Latin American social movements, however – particularly the base 
communities and neighbourhood associations – self-organisation also constituted a 
response to pressing material needs.’ (Baker 2002:p.77)  
 
It is certainly the case that, under conditions of cultural globalization, knowledge 
technologies and symbolic flows, there has been a certain ‘dematerialization’ of the 
economy and that the ‘new’ social movements in the West zealously preached about by 
post-Marxists aptly reflect this shift in their struggles over meaning and identity.  
Following Giddens, this is what Morris-Suzuki refers to as the change from emancipatory 
politics (or life chances) that focuses on material conditions and physical security to life 
politics or ‘epistemological’ politics involving questions of identity and life-style 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000:pp.66-67).  While such movements exist in the South, including the 
identity politics of aboriginal and ethnic groups, ‘[t]he very idea of “life politics” … 
becomes problematic when crossing this geo-economic divide’ from North to South 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000:p.69) because identity groups in the South struggle within the pre-
emancipated material realm.  This argument against postmodernism overplays the 
differences between an ‘emancipated’ North and an ‘enslaved’ South.  Yet, even in the 
most advanced capitalist nation, post-materialism (as a world of satisfied needs and self-
actualization) does not prevail as implied by postmodernists.   
 
In celebrating pluralism and the particular, it remains unclear how postmodernism can 
condemn modernism.  If anything, it should be willing to respect, if not celebrate, 
modernism as a particular worldview.  Further, singular perspectives (including 
postmodernism) tend to take on universalizing and totalizing modes when engaging with 
other perspectives.  And, although spatial in its depiction of the social world, the 
historical roots of postmodernism are embedded in modernism.  It also continues to 
employ modernist suturing categories such as economy and democracy, and sometimes 
uncritically.  If these are used unreflectively in a bourgeois modernist fashion, as Amin 
(1997) implies happens all too often, then a continuing Marxist presence of 
deconstruction – after all, that is what Marx did in analyzing the logic of capitalism – is 
necessary for postmodernism to maintain a critical biting edge (Featherstone and Lash 
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1995).  Lastly, postmodernism seems to involve a grand historical narrative of its own, 
moving from the traditional to the modern and ending with – and valorizing – the post-
modern.   
 
 
3.5 Spatial and Temporal Moments of the Modern Globalized Condition 
 
The relationship between the social conditions of modernism (or modernity), 
postmodernism (or postmodernity) and globalization is understood in numerous ways by 
sociologists.  Sometimes globalization is seen as the logical culmination of modernity, 
either causing it or being a necessary condition for its emergence; sometimes 
globalization loosely defined is said to predate modernity; sometimes modernity is 
associated with the glory days of the nation-state; and sometimes globalization is seen as 
equivalent to postmodernity as both conditions seemingly entail processes of 
heterogeneity.   
 
Particularly intriguing is modernism, postmodernism and globalization as regards their 
theoretical connotations.  Thus, in terms of ‘theory’, modernism tends to privilege a 
temporal ontology while globalization theory and postmodernism privilege a spatial 
ontology.  Thus, postmodernism valorizes particularistic social spaces and identities in 
the continual present and thus it ‘depends crucially on the denial of history’ (McCracken 
2003:p.28).  This dichotomy of ‘the temporal’ and ‘the spatial’ though should not be 
overemphasized.  For instance, modernism has always focused on universal processes 
and spatial distinctions, if only in an ethnocentric manner.  Nevertheless, Featherstone 
and Lash speak about the current ‘spatialization of social theory’ which involves giving 
priority to ‘the spatial over the temporal mode of analysis’ (Featherstone and Lash 1995: 
p.1).  The temporal mode is said to have dominated Western modernist social theory in 
the past.  Likewise, King says that ‘the criterial attributes of “modern” … are primarily 
temporal, not spatial.  Its meaning is defined not just in relation to “history” but to 
someone’s very specific history.  The question of space, of the place, location, society, 
country, nation-state, or life-space to which “the present or recent” refers, is taken for 
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granted and unproblematized, though it is evident … that that space is Western, if not 
European, and at least titularly Christian.’ (King 1995:p.109) 
 
Clearly, this has implications for the understanding of modernity or the ‘modern 
condition’.  Globalization theory in its spatiality enunciates what modernism always kept 
‘hidden’ in its temporal analyses, namely, its spatial Western-centric model of the world-
system.  As a result, modernity never designated the continual present, as this would 
entail constant updating and revising.  Rather, it referred to a particular historical epoch 
marked by Enlightenment and Rationality.  Thus, modernity as understood solely in a 
temporal sense obscures the spatial privileging of modernity in Westernity.  Once 
deconstructed, modernity is revealed as a spatially restricted and historically specific 
modernity.   
 
In terms of theories of development, King shows that ‘modernization’ theory as a form of 
modernism has both temporal and spatial dimensions in the sense that ‘the modern is 
measured not only diachronically, in relation to the past of one’s own (always Western, 
Northern) society, but synchronically, in relation to the present of someone else’s (always 
Eastern, Southern) society’ (King 1995:p.115).  Understood broadly, this theory in its 
various guises (both non-Marxist and Marxist) regularly addressed spatial issues quite 
explicitly, although invariably in an ethnocentric manner.  King goes on to argue that 
postmodernism with its emphasis on fragmentation and plurality is simply a theoretical 
recognition of the spatial dimension of modernity.  The temporal and spatial dimensions 
of the modern human condition will now be related to the distinction between the 
universal and the particular, or less abstractly, the global and the local. 
 
 
3.6 Modernity: Absolutism and Relativism  
 
The debates between modernists and postmodernists within social theory revolve around, 
amongst other things, the very notion of modernity.  Modernity has an existence 
independent of social discourse.  Yet, in a fundamental sense, modernity is socially 
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constructed, constituted and contested.  As a result, it is embedded in and manifests 
power relations.  Further, it has always been the subject, if only implicitly, of political 
debates and conflicts.  A key consideration is whether modernity should be understood in 
universal or particular terms, or even as some sort of ‘hybrid’ notion involving ‘the 
global’ and ‘the local’.  The last possibility raises the prospect that the difference between 
an ‘enforced particularism’ and an ‘abstract universalism’ involves a ‘fake choice’ and 
thus no choice at all (Hountondjt, as quoted in Mafeje 1992:p.9). 
 
Underpinning many theories of development and democracy is the teleological 
assumption that there is some kind of universal or absolute definition of ‘modernity’, 
such that modernity (from a neo-liberal perspective) is simply ‘interpreted as a simile for 
capitalism’ (Amin 1997:p.135).  The present condition in Africa is hence seen as an 
aborted or failed modernity project, whether understood in terms of un-development or 
underdevelopment.  Sometimes, it is labelled as a transitional phase or as a state and 
stage of becoming modern.  For example, the ‘migrant labourer’ as worker-peasant is 
lodged in a kind of conceptual halfway house prior to becoming a fully-fledged modern 
worker (Yeros 2001, 2002b).  Absolutist notions of modernity, including Marxist ones, 
have pronounced normative connotations which imply a preferred kind of social 
formation, and they de-historicize processes of social change.  Also, the distinct concepts 
of ‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’, as embodied in many universalizing paradigms, are 
often conflated.  Processes of Western modernization are equated with processes of 
modernity per se.  For example, globalization as a capitalist strategy for social and 
economic development has its theoretical expression in neo-liberalism as widely 
propagated at times by the World Bank.  Multilateral financial institutions and 
transnational corporations are perceived as ‘the embodiment of prosperity and modernity’ 
(de Rivero 2001:p.47), and they articulate a globalization discourse that entails some sort 
of post-Parsonian modernization theory.   
 
This modernist discourse is very much a grand narrative based on universalizing notions 
and, like all discursive strategies, it seeks to enact closure on alternative foundations of 
modernity.  Global processes in this discourse take on the (real) appearance of a (almost 
  56 
natural) universal but, in effect, they are the assertion of a totalizing (capitalist) particular.  
In this regard, globalization as a process seems to have ‘an existence independent of the 
will of human beings’ (Marcuse 2000:p.1).  Its proponents seek to ‘imprison’ the debate 
about globalization within the ‘narrow limits of the globalization vs nation-state binary’ 
(Sader 2002:p.97) rather than contemplate alternative forms of globalization.  
Globalization, from a neo-liberal perspective, is thus portrayed as not only inevitable but 
also as favourable to the human condition.  In effect, this implies that all (temporal-
spatial) particulars are simply expressions of the free-floating universal and that the 
universal exists independently of these particulars and indeed transcends them all.  Thus, 
each and every particular can be assessed on the basis of the universal in terms of a 
‘generalizing model of universalism’ (Ferrara 1998:p.11). 
 
A contrasting formulation would be a radical postmodernist argument based on an 
extreme pluralistic conception of modernity (a post-modern particularism).  This 
conception would recognize particularistic (singular and incommensurable) modernity 
projects and processes, such as ‘American’ and ‘African’ modernity, although clearly 
these projects are highly differentiated internally.  Intriguingly, this can be exemplified 
by political developments in Africa during the height of modernism.  African leaders of 
different political persuasions at independence declared that ‘democracy’ (as understood 
in the formal liberal democratic sense) was a foreign concept and ideology contrary to the 
African condition, and that the African spirit was founded on communalistic (and 
democratic) modes of social and political organization in pre-colonial societies.  Western-
style competitive multi-party politics were rejected in favour of African socialism and 
one-party states as the basis for social and economic progress: ‘These early modernisers 
of Africa, unwittingly denied Africa’s contribution to, and her embeddedness in the 
project of modernity, by denying her contribution to capitalist civilization.  For them, 
their continent was still immersed in the pre-modern.’ (Zack-Williams 2001:p.216)      
Monga notes this glorifying of the past under post-colonial conditions, as if Africans 
could ‘turn to their ancestors in order to explore other avenues of access to modernity’.  
He argues that this romanticism was designed by political leaders to ‘articulate the 
hegemonic discourse of domination’ (Monga 1996:pp.86, 80).   
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This is also a totalizing grand narrative, although a more regional or local one. Thus, 
Mafeje (1992:p.10) labels it as the ‘universalisation of African values and cultural traits’.  
Potentially, though, it smacks of a dead-end relativism that ultimately is self-refuting.  
This narrative also involves essentialist claims about the uniqueness and ‘exotic’ 
condition of Africa while sidelining social inequalities and class divisions much like 
statist developmentalist ideologies did in the early decades of post-colonial Africa.  
Monga speaks about how Africa has become ‘the El Dorado of wild thought, the best 
place for daring intellectual safaris’, and how this has led to an ‘intellectual exoticism’ 
with regard to Africa amongst certain scholars (Monga 1996:p.39).  Such relativist 
positions, involving in their extreme version an infinite multitude of unique particulars, 
privilege the particular (existing in and by itself) at the expense of the universal and 
present each particular as unmediated by the universal.  This ignores the deepening 
reality of the globalized condition of humanity, as well as the reconfiguration of the 
particular (in this case, the African condition) throughout colonial and post-colonial 
history.  Nevertheless, the privileging of local ontologies has a certain resonance to it and 
will be brought to the fore throughout this thesis. 
 
 
3.7 Internal Relations and Negotiated Modernity 
 
These two positions of absolutism and relativism valorize either one of the two 
(seemingly opposite) ‘poles’ of the universal-particular dichotomy and downplay the 
other ‘pole’, as if the relationship between universality and particularity was external and 
entailed ‘simple relations of mutual exclusion’ (Laclau 1996:p.46).  As Urry points out: 
‘Neither the global nor the local can exist without the other. They develop in a symbiotic, 
irreversible and unstable set of relationships’ (Urry 2000:p.210).  Thus, there is an 
internal relation of antagonistic tension and ‘negotiation’ between these two moments, or 
between elements in a largely un-sutured social process.  This in no way implies an ‘end 
of history’ thesis.  In other words, ‘we must reject the notion of a dialectic which 
reconciles everything in the end’ (Holloway 2002:p.159), and rather see the working out 
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of the ‘dialectic’ (or contradictory processes) as contingent, ambivalent and ongoing.  
This social tension between universal and particular moments is often manifested in a 
conceptual tension found in academic writings on Africa, as analysts seek to ‘synthesize’ 
or ‘amalgamate’ these moments.   
 
Hence, Monga vigorously questions the ‘exceptionality paradigm’ about Africa but 
simultaneously disputes the ‘geographic and temporal validity of the models used in the 
social sciences’.  He tries to provide a conception of democratization in Africa that 
captures ‘not only the specificity but … its original and “universal” substance’ (Monga 
1996:pp.183, 19).  Kaviraj and Khilnani label the universal/particular distinction as a 
‘strange paradox’ and argue: ‘Political institutions taken from the West are introduced 
into societies which have embedded forms of sociability that are very different from the 
common individualistic forms of the modern West.’  Universal concepts (for example, 
bureaucracy, civil society and democracy) that are derived from understandings of 
modern Western nations are used to study African societies, but ‘it is common knowledge 
that these words do not denote objects which behave in the same way as in the West’ 
(Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001:pp.4, 5).  The problem though is not simply a spatial problem 
but is also a temporal one, in the sense that African societies today are probably more 
akin to the early industrializing West than to the contemporary West.  Thus, making 
sense of the contemporary ‘African condition’ entails both temporal and spatial analyses. 
 
The particular-universal tension is found in the work of Chabal (1994), who strives to 
provide universal concepts for theorizing about contemporary Africa, as ‘politics in 
Africa must be conceived in universal rather than parochial terms’ (Chabal 1994:p.9).  In 
a later collaborative work (Chabal and Daloz 1999), he argues for a more endogenous 
and particularistic paradigm called ‘the political instrumentalization of disorder’ as a 
basis for capturing the specificities of social ordering and political functioning in Africa, 
yet in doing so he draws on universal concepts.  The emphasis is not on studying an 
exotic African modernity – or African modernity in and of itself – but rather modernity as 
it manifests itself in Africa.  This means that ‘modernity’ does not have a common 
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universal content or a unique particular content, but is invariably the historical expression 
of complex combinations of global and local processes.   
 
Hence, this thesis argues that the universal and the particular mutually constitute each 
other and that modernity must be understood in this light.  Ruling classes and parties, in 
their renditions of modernity, seek to privilege either the universal or the particular, or the 
global or the local.  Ruling class domination within particular nation-states does not 
simply reproduce global domination but rather reconfigures it and, in doing so, a specific 
form of modernity is projected and asserted.  Sociologists must appreciate then that 
modernity, whether in Africa or elsewhere, is a socially and historically negotiated 
process tied or linked to a locality or region and its fluid power relations.  Modernity is 
thus invariably socio-spatially grounded but simultaneously it articulates and engages 
with more global processes and interests.  In this sense, globalization is not just a macro-
process but is also a micro-process. It must be understood in the weak sense of 
heterogeneity (implying resistance to global processes) rather than in the strong sense of 
homogeneity (or capitulation to global processes) (Friedman 1995:p.78).  Certainly, at 
times, the articulation of global and local spaces bypasses the nation-state altogether and 
even ‘shrinks’ national civil societies.  Loyalties are broadly displaced and widely 
dispersed, and a singular and exclusive sense of the nation as embodied in the state 
becomes untenable.  Equating societies with nations and with nation-states is therefore 
increasingly called into question, with both a proliferation of sub-national and 
transnational identities.  
 
Urry captures this internal tension between the global and the local in referring to the 
proliferation of de-territorialized universal rights: ‘Overall, there is an increasing 
contradiction between rights, which are universal, uniform and globally defined, and 
social identities, which are particularistic and territorially specified.’ (Urry 2000:p.166)  
The local and the global play themselves out in historically contingent and variable ways, 
but the tension between the universal and the particular is most dramatically focused at 
the nation-state. After all, the nation-state as a particular appears to be increasingly 
challenged by the universal and thus asserts its particularity against the universal by 
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reconfiguring its own universality vis-à-vis sub-national particulars.  Luke thus notes that 
the ‘writs of sovereignty … de-emphasize the local [or sub-national] and demonize the 
global [or transnational] in order to legitimize their own national-statist construction of 
economic, political and social action.’ (Luke 1995:p.94)  The continuing importance of 
theorizing about the post-colonial state cannot be underestimated within political 
sociology. 
 
 
3.8 Glocal Modernities and Assertions of the Particular 
 
It would seem then that the notion of ‘glocalized modernities’ is particularly apt. 
Robertson discusses the notion of ‘glocalization’ and argues that ‘[m]uch of the talk 
about globalization has tended to assume that it is a process which overrides locality’.  
This talk ‘neglects the extent to which what is called local is in large degree constructed 
on a trans- or super-local basis’ (Robertson 1995:p.26).  The term ‘glocalization’ 
emphasizes that processes of globalization invariably have a local content.  The local is 
not a text within the context of the global, because the local and the global are internally 
and intimately related.  Globalization often stimulates localizing strategies and thus 
reinforces particulars in what seems like an increasingly heterogeneous world order.  
Simultaneously, though, universalizing processes seek to globalize and ‘domesticate’ the 
local (to de-localize it) and therefore make it over in their image.  Crewe and Harrison 
(1998) argue that the local is not an objectively provable physical entity.  ‘The local’ 
involves (although is not reduced to) social constructions and embodies social relations 
and meanings. 
In this context, it is worth quoting Gould at length based on his study of rural Zambia: 
‘Locality is commonly defined via a distinction with the nation…. [W]hat is important… 
is the way that physical and social space interact in its definition. … [T]he social 
constructedness of locality requires that it be seen in terms of a matrix of relationships 
that extend “outward” in both physical and temporal space.  People’s sense of locality 
encompasses “a consciousness of links with the outer world” … Actors invest powerful 
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interests in the production and maintenance of … “localized subjectivities” which … are 
integral moments in the production of the subject-citizens of a modern nation State… The 
production [of] locality is ….a “recursive” process, simultaneously the reproduction and 
the transformation of social relations, subjectivities and interests.’ (Gould 1997:pp.17, 18, 
19 emphasis removed)  The construction of ‘the local’ highlights its immersion in social 
processes.  The relation between the global and the local is not fixed, as the form this 
relation takes is historically and socially contingent and entails negotiation and 
compromise.  Although structural imperatives underpin the relation between the global 
and the local, this relation is not a simple structural one.   
The notion of ‘glocalized modernities’ undermines the idea of a single history to 
modernity.  This has been expressed in different ways.  Thus, Gould (1997) talks of 
‘situated modernities’, Comaroff (1996) speaks of ‘alternative modernities’, and 
Therborn (1995) refers to a ‘plurality of routes to and through modernity’.  Chatterjee 
(1997), in an insightful article, argues that universalized (read ‘English’) notions of 
modernity made the colonized nations mere consumers and objects of a destructive 
modernity rather than producers and subjects of ‘our modernity’.  She goes on to claim 
‘true modernity consists in determining the particular forms of modernity that are suitable 
in particular circumstances; that is, applying the methods of reason to identify or invent 
the specific technologies of modernity that are appropriate for our purposes.’ (Chatterjee 
1997:pp. 8-9)   
 
Modernity, as described earlier, is regularly understood in a temporal sense but is 
identified specifically with the so-called Age of Enlightenment.  Normally, this era is 
pictured as embracing a universal and impartial field for unhindered civility and 
reasoning.  Yet Chatterjee (1997) rightly argues that, in practice, this impartiality is 
superficial and it has entailed unequal access to discourses and the use of knowledge in 
the exercise of authority.  In this regard, Urry claims that the global constantly asserts 
itself in processes of social development and that there is a ‘privileging of the global 
ontology of detachment over the local ontology of engagement – it is to celebrate 
technology, intervention, expert management and the relative disempowerment of the 
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local people.’ (Urry 2000:p.46)  Thus, there is a ‘close complicity between modern 
knowledges and modern regimes of power’ (Chatterjee 1997:p.14).   
 
Although the relation between the global and the local is not invariably antagonistic, it is 
also true that modernity is not simply imposed but is the site and subject of social 
conflict.  King (1995:p.114 his emphasis) therefore says ‘[t]he question … is not only 
whose version of modernity we are operating with, but when and where that version 
comes to be fixed as a dominant global [or even national] paradigm.’  Colonized people 
were under foreign rule in part because they were considered un-modern, but they also 
employed modernist and enlightenment elements, such as the burden of reason and the 
desire for emancipation, to fight against colonial modernity (Chatterjee 1997, Mamdani 
1996).  In a sense, then, they were not necessarily resisting the imposition of a Western 
modernity but were trying to gain access to it on their own terms. This process could be 
labelled as re-interpreting or even re-inventing modernity. 
 
In the postcolonial world under conditions of globalization, the world is witnessing 
ongoing instances of particular modernist struggles waged against the universal, or 
against particulars masquerading as universals.  Amin argues that ‘far from expressing a 
rejection of modernity’, these movements are ‘in fact the consequence of the shattering of 
the promise of real modernization’ (Amin 1997:p.145).  Neville Alexander (2003:pp.8, 
1), in discussing the formation of regional economic and political blocs in the South and 
East, conceptualizes these as a ‘defensive strategy’.  He discusses in particular ‘the 
hegemonic project of neo-liberal conservatives’ in the form of NEPAD that is portrayed 
by its proponents as an African Renaissance.  Through NEPAD, Africa seeks to engage 
with and become more fully integrated into international capitalism to ensure continent-
wide progress and development but Alexander argues that this project is tied to the 
hegemonic ambitions of South African capitalism.  Nation-states such as the 
Zimbabwean state are also defending what they consider to be their bounded social 
totality and, in so doing, are ‘negotiating their sovereignty’ (Biersteker and Weber 
1996:p.11).  The ruling party in Zimbabwe labels neo-liberalism as a bogus universalism 
or a discursive imperialism that is insensitive to the modern peculiarities of the African 
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continent.  Instead, it offers to the world and to its citizens a pan-African and anti-
imperialist discourse encapsulated in the 2005 parliamentary slogan ‘the anti-Blair vote’.   
 
These ongoing developments, throughout the South, involve reconfigurations of the 
nation as a relational totality through simultaneous inclusionary and exclusionary 
practices of citizenship.  The external sovereignty that nation-states project and protect 
thus provides them with ‘a license to purify their domain of opposition, silence 
alternative voices, and eliminate dissent.’ (Inayatullah 1996:p.50)  This invariably 
‘reduces the space for critical resistance’ (Pieterse 1995:p.58 his emphasis).  National 
identities are inherently unstable and never a finished product, but national discourses 
function to fix the meanings of the nation so that they appear timeless and inevitable in 
what Doty (1996:p.143) labels as ‘conceptual double-time’: ‘[T]he inside/outside 
boundary is a function of a state’s discursive authority, that is, its ability, in the face of 
ambiguity and uncertainty, to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and 
who does not belong to the nation, and thereby to distinguish a specific political 
community – the inside – from all others – the outside.’ (Doty 1996:p.122)   
 
Fixing (or ‘defining’) meanings is intended to universalize that particular set of 
meanings, but it is invariably contested locally in a variety of forms.  Thus the modernist 
narrative of the Zimbabwean state is a nationalism of exclusion that seeks to sideline and 
undercut particular sub-national counter-narratives that involve a ‘multiplicity of 
collective memories’ (Monga 1996:p.66).  Certain sub-national groups, such as urban 
civic groups, are portrayed by the Zimbabwean state as local expressions, creations or 
puppets of global entities notably British imperialism.  These sub-national groups are 
thereby divested of all locality – and thereby legitimacy - and are effectively externalized 
and globalized.  The external sovereignty of a nation-state allows it to engage in 
international processes and to construct its own projects of statecraft ‘according to the 
resonance of their own meanings’ (Inayatullah 1996:p.50).  Yet the internal sovereignty 
of the state may be at the same time contested.   
 
  64 
Even social movements that entail authoritarian nationalisms and retrogressive ethnicities 
and that draw on idealized and essentialist notions of the past may comprise modernist 
responses to the globalizing present.  They entail the dominance of centrifugal forces at a 
time of global crisis notably in the fragile ‘peripheries’ of the world system (Amin 
1997:p.60), and thus lead to anti-democratic, regressive and negative nationalisms. As 
Chatterjee argues: ‘[W]hereas Kant, speaking at the founding moment of Western 
modernity, looks at the present as the site of one’s escape from the past, for us it is 
precisely the present from which we feel we must escape. This makes the very modality 
of our coping with modernity radically different from the historically evolved modes of 
Western modernity.’ (Chatterjee 1997:p.20)  Thus, premodernity, modernity and 
postmodernity are not necessarily temporal distinctions, because they can co-exist in 
spatial-cum-temporal alternative modernities.  Glocal modernities, in whatever form, 
often imply a de-centring of the world system and they may counter the unfettered 
consolidation of global hegemonies.  But, they are also asserted as particulars within a 
particular nation-state, and this implies that the universal and the particular are relative 
terms.   
 
Often, local particulars involve competing constructions of the nation, such as the ethno-
nationalisms in Eastern Europe and Africa (Wilmsen and McAllister eds. 1996).  These 
‘postmodern nationalisms’, as labelled by Featherstone and Lash (1995:p.12), are 
‘constituted in the name of the particular against the empty and unhappy shell of an old 
[exhausted] universal [state]’, whereas these now seemingly exhausted nation-state 
nationalisms were originally made ‘in the name of the universal against the particular’.  
But, to reiterate, situated particulars do not simply react to the universal as a text within a 
context.  Rather, the global and the local mutually reconstruct each other and thus 
localization becomes a necessary moment in globalization (Robertson 1995).  Hence, the 
global can never be free-floating and independent of the local, as if the global exists 
outside and beyond all localities and has systemic properties independent of the 
particular.  
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The notion of ‘glocal modernities’ ably captures the dynamics of this contradictory 
process.  As a result, it recognizes the spatial unevenness of globalization processes 
throughout the South and East.  But it also accepts the existence of global imperialist 
trajectories and global inequalities that characterize the modern world.   Thus, it does not 
emphasize ‘contradiction’ to the exclusion of ‘domination’.  It gives conceptual space to 
‘the local’, and has the capacity to make sense of the assertion of local particulars in the 
face of domineering global trends. 
 
 
3. 9 NGOs: The Global and the Local 
 
Glocal modernities are the expression of contradictory relations between the global and 
the local.   These are internal relations in that the global and the local constitute each 
other as moments in a tension-riddled social process.  Intermediary NGOs are invariably 
immersed in this process.  On the one hand, as a specific kind of organizational form in 
the modern world, they are a manifestation of glocalized relations.  On the other hand, 
their organizational practices impact on the re-constitution of glocal modernities.  Hence, 
as simultaneously both ‘object’ (and victim) and ‘subject’ (and maker), they have a 
‘stake’ in situated modernities.  Handling the tension between the global and the local 
(and, more abstractly, the universal and the particular) is inherent in NGO organizational 
practices, but this is rarely a conscious and deliberate process on the part of intermediary 
NGOs.  Yet the world and work of NGOs is saturated with meaning and intent, as they 
negotiate and manoeuvre their way in and through their ambivalent social field.  This 
‘negotiation’ occurs along the porous social boundaries and interfaces that mark and 
delimit their social world, and by way of organizational action.  The main interfaces 
involve global donors, nation-states and heterogeneous rural communities.   
 
In the academic literature, the predominant conceptual framework underpinning the 
analysis of NGOs rests or hangs on specific ‘nodal points’, namely, civil society, 
development and democracy (Tvedt 1998, Zaidi 1999).  NGOs are generally understood 
as part of ‘civil society’ and they aim to build democracy and facilitate development in 
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the South and East.  In seeking to ‘reconstruct’ the ambivalent world of NGOs as 
embedded in ‘actually existing’ historical processes, I offer a detailed analysis of these 
nodal points and elucidate their complex interconnections.  This entails a critical 
commentary on the prevailing literature, and with particular reference to the dominant 
‘paradigm’ of sociological behaviourism.  I provide this commentary in the following 
two chapters. 
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Chapter 4  
 Civil Society, Democracy and the Nation-State 
 
 
In the academic literature and amongst NGOs themselves, civil society in Africa is 
discussed primarily in relation to democracy rather than development, and particularly 
rural development.  This is consistent with arguments made about the incipient or stunted 
character of rural civil societies, as propounded by social theorists such as by Mamdani 
(1996).  He argues that post-colonial societies in Africa have been deracialized and that 
this has opened up space for civil associations in urban areas.  But democratization in the 
rural areas has lagged far behind because of ongoing despotic forms of authority in the 
countryside.  ‘Development’ is at times linked to civil society and democratic processes 
when it comes to matters such as policy advocacy on rural poverty and ‘good 
governance’ conditionalities attached to development aid (NGLS 1996).  In this chapter, 
however, civil society is discussed mainly with regard to democracy and national politics.   
 
 
4.1 The Current Fixation with Civil Society 
 
Like many concepts found within political and social theory, ‘civil society’ is particularly 
‘slippery’ (Edwards 1998:p.1).  The concept has descriptive, analytical and normative 
connotations.  It is also used in a multitude of ways by a diverse range of schools of 
thought, and often ambiguously.  In fact, it has been argued that civil society is ‘an 
ideological rendezvous for erstwhile antagonists’ (Khilnani 2001:p.11).  For instance, 
Ehrenberg (1998:p.6) claims, with reference to the United States, that ‘[a] conservative 
political climate has stimulated the recent interest in “civil society”‘.  Elsewhere, the term 
has been taken up with much gusto by radical scholars.  The historical roots of the 
concept show that it is linked to processes of Western modernity and, indeed, it is seen as 
‘constitutive of modern democratic politics’ (Mouffe 1992b:p.227).  Strident proponents 
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of the concept claim that civil norms and politics have displaced a more communitarian 
type of sociability prevailing in the pre-modern, pre-colonial or pre-capitalist world.  
 
The current fixation with the notion of ‘civil society’, and the positioning of NGOs 
within it, arose within the context of an anti-statist moment globally along with the push 
towards capitalist neo-liberalism.  Prior to this, the term ‘civil society’ was largely 
moribund, and interventionist nation-states in the decades immediately after the Second 
World War were accepted if not celebrated.  This anti-statism soon achieved ‘near-
canonical status’ (Ehrenberg 1998:p.1).  It resulted from successful struggles against 
communist rule in central-eastern Europe, from the downsizing and restructuring of the 
Keynesian welfare state in liberal capitalist nations of the West, and from sustained 
opposition to authoritarian and military states throughout the South and East.  Arguments 
in support of a minimalist state, and for civil society as a builder of democracy and 
development, emerged from ‘[t]he Reagan-Thatcher popularization of free market, anti-
state policies, the serious debt crisis in Latin America, the fiscal and administrative crises 
of underdeveloped countries, the overall retreat of the state, and the end of the Cold War’ 
(Zaidi 1999:p.205).   
 
In this historical context, civil society was designed to recover for society a range of 
powers and activities that nation-states had usurped in the previous decades.  Clearly, 
then, there is a certain historicity to the usage of ‘civil society’ by NGOs in Africa and 
elsewhere.  As Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001) argue, ‘political theorizing happens under the 
pressure of historically specific predicaments’.  This may even entail some degree of 
‘intellectual desperation… It is not surprising, therefore, that once the idea of civil 
society gains a certain currency, it would be pressed into service by authors [and NGO 
practitioners] desperately seeking solutions to their specific historical problems in Third 
World contexts.’ (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001:pp.3-4)  In this way, civil society may not 
necessarily arise organically, but may in a significant sense be reconfigured if not 
implanted from outside with the ‘connivance’ of insiders.  It will be argued, ironically, 
that despite the revival of civil society under anti-statist conditions, the concept is 
regularly understood in statist terms or in a state-centred manner.  This is based on the 
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civil society-state couplet that, in turn, hinges on the subject-object dichotomy.  As noted 
below, this thesis conceptualizes civil society – like NGOs more specifically – as 
embodying and expressing contradictory social relations. 
 
 
4.2 Civil Society in Classical Theory 
 
The idea of civil society has deep historical roots in European political philosophy and 
theory.  It is sometimes contrasted to a state of nature (for example, Hobbes), more often 
to community (for example, Tonnies) and, most often, to the nation-state (for example, 
Locke, Hegel and Marx).  The last contrast is particular relevant to the thesis.  
 
Hegel was the first philosopher to distinguish explicitly between civil society and the 
state.  In general, he argued that the egotisms and inequalities of an unbridled civil 
society under modern (individualistic) competitive capitalist conditions were 
productively managed by the universal nation-state ruling over and pacifying ‘uncivil’ 
society, thereby making it more ‘civil’ (Baker 2002).  At times, though, Hegel 
conceptualized this universality as already inherent in civil society and it was simply 
‘made explicit’ and ‘recognized in the state’ (Khilnani 2001:p.24).  Hegel saw the 
cleavage between the universal and the particular as being resolved within the confines of 
the bourgeois order.   
 
In Marx’s view, any such notion of universality was a mere pretence or ‘a false universal’ 
(Ehrenberg 1998:p.2), and the nation-state merely served the particularistic interests of 
the bourgeoisie with its economic dominance firmly rooted within civil society.  In fact, 
in Marx’s words, ‘this slavery of civil society is the natural foundation on which the 
modern state rests’ (quoted in Femia 2001:p.136).  Therefore, the separation between 
state and civil society mystified class domination.  Simultaneously, the state was an 
institutional expression of relations of domination within civil society.  ‘Bourgeois’ civil 
society, with its particularistic class-based bickering, could only be overcome by the 
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universalizing and emancipating role of the proletariat, as ‘the living negation of civil 
society’ (Ehrenberg 1998:p.3), in overthrowing the capitalist nation-state.   
 
More recently, Gramsci, in rejecting economic determinism, characterized civil society as 
the associational realm (relatively autonomous from the economy) and the social space 
that the state seeks to penetrate, and therein perpetuate its hegemony by manufacturing 
consent.  Walzer (1992:p.102) concurs: ‘The production and reproduction of loyalty, 
civility, political competence and trust in authority are never the work of the state alone’.  
In this regard, the nation-state is unable to reproduce the conditions of its existence if 
distanced and alienated from civil society.  Gramsci conceived civil society in an agency-
centred way relative to earlier structuralist accounts (like that of Marx).  He thus claimed 
that civil society had the potential, as a theatre of struggle, to be a liberating zone of 
counter-hegemonic resistance to state power by the popular classes (Baker 2002).  His 
account though is largely functionalist, in that he saw strong civil societies as existing to 
reproduce liberal capitalist democracies without exploring their historical origin 
(Burawoy 2003).  However, contemporary usages of the concept of civil society show a 
marked deviation from the more classical approaches.  
 
 
4.3 Civil Society as Radical Anti-Politics 
 
In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the years immediately preceding the end of 
communist rule, radical scholars and movements viewed civil society (at least initially) as 
counter-hegemonic, but not in terms of impacting directly on the state whether in a 
reformist or revolutionary manner  (Baker 2002).  Rather, in the face of totalitarian rule, 
civil society was an end in itself, or a form of autonomous social democracy involving 
pluralist and not monist self-organization and self-management, including economic 
democracy.  This social organizing was completely divorced from any totalizing politics 
from above, and was encapsulated in the notions of ‘the self-limiting revolution’ and 
‘anti-politics’.  Any democratizing of the state through civil society was understood 
simply as a by-product in what was essentially a society-centric notion of civil society 
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(disinterested in seizing state power) rather than a state-centric notion.  The relationship 
between this notion of civil society, liberal democratic institutions and socialist 
democracy was however never properly articulated.   
 
A Latin American Left-leaning discourse on civil society arose during the 1970s and 
1980s, and it also entailed a positive notion of civil society as ‘anti-politics’.  Years of 
military rule in countries such as Uruguay and Chile highlighted the need for the defence 
of civil and political liberties, and the re-discovery of civil society by the Left arose from 
both tactics and theory.  Civil society was seen as popular resistance and counter-
hegemonic, but – in a post-Marxist vein – much of the class content of Gramsci’s 
formulations was ignored or downplayed.  For instance, the authoritarian state was seen 
as simply dominating society by constituting and structuring it, rather than civil society 
also dominating the state through a specific form of class rule.  The struggle was 
perceived as between democracy and authoritarianism, and without any notion of 
revolutionary subjects waging war against capitalism.  Seeking state power was seen as 
problematic because of military coups, so a gradualist construction of popular hegemony 
within civil society as a sort of anti-politics became the only option.  Civil society could 
open or maintain a political space outside state control for popular initiatives instead of 
necessarily placing demands on the nation-state.  
 
In the case of both communist Europe and authoritarian Latin America, Baker claims that 
Marx was turned on his head: ‘[C]ivil society came ... to represent the realm of freedom 
which the very annexation of civil society by the state, and the subsequent “totalisation” 
of power, had precluded.  The Marxian defence of the oppressed of civil society through 
the state had become the defence of the state-oppressed through civil society.’ (Baker 
2002:p.32)  Yet, the society-centred nature of this formulation was more radical than the 
domesticated liberal version of civil society that arose or was re-popularized later, 
including throughout much of Africa.  The radical version of civil society involved a 
distinctive social movement approach to civil society (which was also taken up by post-
Marxists in Western Europe) but some writers have argued that it is potentially 
destructive of civility (Femia 2001:pp.145-146).  Nevertheless, this approach stressed 
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self-organization and a concern with popular hegemony; it rejected state politics and 
emphasized autonomy from not just the state but also from corporatist institutions and 
political parties; and it advocated internal democracy involving the re-socialization of 
power as part of an ongoing and revolutionary anti-politics.   
 
In a sense, this radical politics privileged civil society at the expense of the state, rather 
than propagating a notion of civil society against or simply orientated toward the state.  
According to anti-politics, ‘the accepted wisdom of the ruling party ideologies of 
modernity that the state is sovereign undermines the politics of everyday life… Thus it 
was from this normative position, and not just out of pragmatism, that flowed the 
rejection of traditional state-directed oppositional strategies, whether revolutionary or 
reformist.  What was sought after was nothing less than the democracy of civil society.’ 
(Baker 2002:p.89)  More recently, the Zapatismos movement in southern Mexico 
epitomized this view of civil society.  But it has rarely been articulated in academic 
discourse since the early 1990s.  However, Holloway’s intriguing theory about changing 
the world through social revolution but without taking state power entails a society-
centric notion of revolution.  And it draws heavily on the non-instrumentalist notion of 
civil society as radical anti-politics (Holloway 2003). 
 
 
4.4 Domesticating Civil Society: Liberalism and Post-Marxism 
 
Over the past few decades, the notion and usage of ‘civil society’ has been in large part 
domesticated by liberalism.  The liberal concept has achieved hegemonic status within 
the global development ‘industry’, and intermediary NGOs throughout the South and 
East wax eloquently about it.  It is based on an instrumentalist or thing view of civil 
society as a formidable weapon for democratizing the nation-state, rather than viewing 
civil society as an end-in-itself.   Building counter-hegemony or at least civil opposition 
is deemed appropriate under authoritarian conditions for promoting the transition to 
liberal capitalist democracy.  However, in the process of consolidating democracy during 
the post-transition period, civil society is considered less worthy of mobilization and 
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must be constrained so as not to disturb a ‘peaceful transition’.   Civil society must 
simply prod the reformed state so that it lives up to its democratic mandate, and ensure 
that the liberal status quo and the market economy are preserved against authoritarian 
counter-moves.  Thus Bratton (1994:p.13) notes how the ‘conclusion of a political 
transition can have demobilizing consequences for civil society’.  The social processes 
and linkages between civil society and democracy, however, remain elusive or are 
unspecified in the liberal civil society literature.  As well, well-researched comparative 
studies of transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic government indicate that 
transitions to – and consolidations of – democracy are much more complicated and 
contingent than this literature seems to suggest (Casper and Taylor 1996).   
 
This civil society approach sees democracy per se as almost external to civil society and 
lodged rather (in a statist fashion) in political parties and government.  Further, civil 
society and its organizations have no legitimacy independent of their democratization 
role, and their strengths and weaknesses are defined purely in terms of this role vis-à-vis 
the state (Baker 2002).  Indeed, the liberal capitalist state, and intriguingly the capitalist 
market, are not made problematic but are treated as historical givens, and are considered 
as the very foundations of a strong and vibrant civil society.  The post-Marxist position 
that seeks to build democracy from within the capitalist system is not considerably 
different in this regard.  Thus, Walzer (a Radical Democrat) argues for a more ‘critical 
associationalism’ involving an independent rather than a deferential civil society, and he 
claims that the state ‘frames civil society… It fixes the boundary conditions and the basic 
rules of all associational activity… Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil 
society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.’ (Walzer 
1992:pp.103, 104, 105)   
 
In contemporary thinking, in both liberal and post-Marxist perspectives, civil society is 
‘by definition, participatory’ (Bratton 1994:p.3) and it therefore has pronounced 
voluntarist and moral connotations.  In liberal democratic and pluralist theory, democracy 
proper is seen as enacted by the state, but civil society has a regulatory role and is critical 
for ensuring that the state implements its democratic programmes.  ‘Civil society’ was 
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initially revived amongst radical thinkers in the capitalist West in the late 1960s as they 
became disaffected with Marxism and the old Communist parties in Western Europe, and 
turned to the new social movements for political inspiration.  The Radical Democrats 
though have abandoned Marx’s concerns with the bourgeois and class nature of civil 
society, and they speak about the particularistic pluralisms of ‘post-modern’ civil society 
largely devoid of economic relations.  Civil society becomes ‘the realm of consent’ where 
citizenship is actively expressed (Bratton 1994:p.4).  Or, as Walzer puts it, civil society is 
‘the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relationship networks – 
formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology – that fill this space.’ (Walzer 
1992:p.89; Edwards 1998)   
 
Unlike in the case of Marx, civil society is not the problem for Radical Democrats but is 
rather the solution, because it deepens and consolidates the democratic basis of the 
bourgeois liberal state through a more popular sovereignty. Thus, the ‘expression of civic 
interests does not extend to efforts to gain and exercise control over state power’ (Bratton 
1994:p.4) but simply to influence it from the outside in a sort of revisionist politics.  In 
both the liberal and Radical Democrat versions, power is reified and is located in (and 
reallocated between) the state and civil society in a sort of zero sum power equation.  
Civil society is clearly viewed in instrumentalist terms in building democracy.  In specific 
relation to NGOs as part of civil society, this would mean that they ‘either insert 
themselves … within the liberal critique of the state’s actions, or else limit their activity 
to the sphere of civil society – which, defined in opposition to the state, also ends at the 
boundaries of liberal politics.’ (Sader 2002:p.93)   
 
This approach ‘turns the civil society “solution” away from problems posed to society 
arising from “below” (i.e. untrammelled individualism) and exclusively towards threats 
from “above” [the state]’ (Baker 2002:p.8).  But it also involves turning Hegel on his 
head.  Whereas Hegel saw the state as moderating and reconciling the particulars of civil 
society, this domesticated approach sees civil society as the ‘incarnation of reason’ 
(Nyimande and Sikhosana 1995:p.31) and the universalizing mode of social organization 
and guarantor of democracy, much like ‘free’ marketers depict the capitalist market.  This 
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is what Baker (2002:p.159) calls a ‘de-economised version of civil society’.  This version 
demonizes the modern state but obscures its bourgeois form, as did the radical civil 
society perspective in Eastern Europe and Latin America.  Capitalist society becomes 
compartmentalized, fragmented and partitioned out according to the tripartite realms of 
the economy, the state and civil society, and thus its totalizing logic, even if not 
understood as fully sutured, is not analyzed or engaged with in political theory and 
practice.  Civil society, as Marx understood it, is thereby sanitized and cleansed because 
the concept now ‘masks the class nature of its components’ (Sader 2002:p.93) and it 
manifests ‘a preference for reform over revolution’ (Bratton 1994:p.1).  
 
As Nyimande and Sikhosana put it (1995:p.28) from a classical Marxist position, ‘the 
state and “civil society” cannot simply be seen as [externally related] opposites but a 
complex articulation of the rule of the bourgeoisie under modern conditions’.  In other 
words, in a position consistent with the argument of this thesis that NGOs are the 
embodiment in organizational form of specific sets of contradictory social relations, 
classical Marxism conceptualizes civil society (and the state) as a form of social relations 
and thereby transcends the object-subject dichotomy inherent in the dominant civil 
society discourse (Corrigan et al. 1978).  In terms of this discourse, fragmentation and 
discontinuities prevail within civil society, and ‘no single agent of human liberation can 
even be theorized’ (Ehrenberg 1998:p.6) about in a renewed grand narrative or 
constructed through a reinvigorated practice.   
 
Thus, the dominant – liberal and post-Marxist – view depicts civil society as the 
universalizing logic inherent in liberal capitalist societies that opposes the particularistic 
interests of the state, and thus it becomes the driving force behind processes of 
democratic modernity.  This conceptualization of civil society is based on a sociological 
behaviourism that treats ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’ as externally related and interacting 
as subjects and objects.  It fails to deconstruct ‘civil society’ under capitalism, and 
underplays the moment of social domination contained within it.  Contradictions internal 
to civil society become displaced and take the form of tensions between civil society and 
the state.  This approach offers an un-deconstructed ‘empiricist’ account of civil society.  
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In contrast, as suggested above, I claim that civil society invariably embodies 
antagonistic social relations, and is marked by both ‘contradiction’ and ‘domination’.   It 
stands within, rather than outside, capitalist social relations and the inequalities these 
entail. 
 
 
4.5 Civil Society in the South and East – Against the State and Tradition 
 
Considerable debate exists amongst social scientists about the applicability of the concept 
of ‘civil society’ to nations of the South and East, and about the pervasiveness and 
strength of civil societies in these regions.  For instance, liberal modernization theories 
regularly imply that the unavailability of civic forms of sociability and civil norms 
prevented indigenous peoples from responding in a modern rational way to the civilizing 
mission of colonialism, and that this explains in part the uncivil and violent forms of 
resistance to colonial rule.  Mamdani’s influential work (1996) on citizens and subjects 
insinuates that, under colonialism, civil society in Africa was spatially restricted to the 
urban centres amongst colonizers and the indigenous petty-bourgeois class.  If civil 
society is understood as involving modern associational life based on ‘un-coerced human 
action’ (Edwards 1998:p.3) and on notions of equality, contract and autonomy, then 
indigenous civil society during colonialism probably was the ‘domain of the elite’ 
(Chatterjee 2001:p.174) seeking to replicate Western modernity in its own lives but on its 
own terms.   
 
Many social historians and anthropologists claim though that such civility was also 
common in pre-colonial societies in India and China.  Yet, even this claim takes as a 
given the Eurocentric definition of civil society that remains hegemonic within Western 
academic and NGO circles (Hann and Dunn eds. 1996).  Goody notes that ‘there is a kind 
of moral evaluation attached to the very concepts of civility [and civil society], 
rationality, and enlightenment, qualities that are seen as contributing to the so-called 
European miracle and that are necessarily unique to the West.’ (Goody 2001:p.153)  In 
other words, like modernity itself, civility and civil society are socially contested notions 
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that often reveal more about the (ethnocentric) designator than the (uncivil) designated.  
Certainly, the concept of civility is open to alternative renditions of modernity, such that 
some writers argue for the existence of ‘indigenous traditions of “civility” if not “civil 
society”’ (Kaviraj 2001:p.322).   
 
For post-colonial Africa, the space for indigenous urban civil society has opened up, yet 
the rural population has remained relegated to ‘the fringes of civil society’ because 
democratization has been a largely urban phenomenon (Sachikonye 1995:p.6).  However, 
anti-colonial nationalist movements, both in their pre- and post-independence guise, have 
played a critical role in restricting and confining civil society in Africa.  This is the case 
not only with reference to customary power in rural society, as Mamdani (1996) has 
convincingly shown in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, but even amongst the urban 
population.  Friedman, for instance, highlights the antagonistic relation between civil 
society and anti-colonialism in his analysis of the emergence of the concept within the 
anti-apartheid movement in the late 1980s.  He argues that it breaks ‘with a powerful 
strain in resistance rhetoric’ (Friedman 1992:p.83) that had sought to submerge pluralistic 
interests in the name of ‘the struggle’, although he doubts the sincerity of its usage by 
anti-apartheid activists.  Nevertheless, theorists like Kaviraj claim that ‘[t]he secret of the 
immense power of the [post-colonial] nation-states was not the inheritance from 
colonialism but from their national mobilization. Through the national movements, these 
elites laid claim to a right to mobilize all sections of society, and extended the state’s 
influence over all spheres of social life.  This is one significant paradox of post-colonial 
“civil society” or rather its absence… Thus the historical circumstances in which colonial 
nationalism laid hold of the state and became the state of the nation … were not 
propitious for the continued growth of a “civil society” after independence.’ (Kaviraj 
2001:p.314)   
 
The post-colonial developmental ideology, as a universalizing clarion call for nation-
building and national reconstruction, was used as a key basis for demobilizing and 
controlling civil society as part of a centripetal social engineering process.  A robust civil 
society was unnecessary because the dominant political party claimed to constitute and 
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embody the nation, and thus an alternative form of universality (namely civil society) was 
redundant for purposes of social transformation.  Even non-civil communal sociability in 
agrarian areas was harnessed and controlled by the post-colonial state, very much like it 
was under colonial times (Mamdani 1996).  The post-colonial state in Africa has sought 
to subordinate any legitimacy found in local institutions to its own ends, and this has 
involved reconfiguring traditional sociabilities (or re-inventing tradition) and co-opting 
the civility of modern associabilitities into its nation-building agendas.  Yet, as Bratton 
shows, a range of voluntary and autonomous civic organizations arose in post-colonial 
Africa, including trading networks, women’s groups and farmer organizations in the rural 
areas. But he argues that civic norms like reciprocity ‘are difficult to construct under 
conditions of mass economic privation and great social inequalities’ (Bratton 1994:p.9) 
and that civic-type groups tend to incorporate neo-patrimonial relations within their 
internal structures.  
 
In discussions of civil society in Africa, the concept is not only contrasted to the state.  It 
is also compared, in typical modernist and modernization language, to communitarian 
forms of social organization (‘the community’) that predominated in pre-colonial Africa 
and that continue to structure (in particular) rural social realities.  This is the import of the 
notion, as found in African studies, of ‘patrimonial’ (patron-client) relations as a kind of 
restructured communitarian relation (Chabal and Daloz 1999).  The existence of 
‘patrimonial’ relations in contemporary Africa, in contrast to what supposedly exists in 
‘developed’ nations, is highly questionable.  Often, this ‘patrimonial’ designation is 
employed in a Eurocentric manner in propagating the claim that Africa is mired in 
traditional practices that result in local democratic deficits. Thus, the dominant 
perspective on civil society perceives these traditional loyalties, which are called 
‘identitarian solidarities of a sub-national character’ (Khilnani 2001:p.28), as 
retrogressive particulars that work against civil society formation.  They can undermine 
the ‘unequivocally progressive’ (Kaviraj 2001:p.297) and universalizing content of civil 
society and its democratic endeavours vis-à-vis the nation-state.   
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At times, ‘the communal’ falls outside the very boundaries of ‘the social’ (and is 
therefore unsocial or even antisocial) and is part of the ‘pre-history’ of Africa.  Thus the 
tripartite division of modern societies into the economic, the political and the social 
involves a definition of ‘the social’ by civil society ideologues as autonomous and 
contractual modern sociability rather than as imposed and totalizing solidarities as found 
(it is argued) in pre-modern ‘un-sociability’.  As Kaviraj (2001:p.305) notes: ‘It has been 
argued that the proper working of a modern constitutional state requires a distinction not 
merely between state and other [civil] organizations in society, but the sphere of non-state 
organizations being governed by Gesellschaft-like [civil] principles.’  
 
The nation-state in Africa is seen as an instigator or at least an accomplice in reproducing 
Gemeinschaft-like or communal identities in agrarian areas through reinvented forms of 
tradition.  This means that civil society is up against not only modern authoritarianism 
but also pre-modern communalism, both of which entail totalizing compulsions and 
commitments contrary to contractual civility. Civil society also becomes a mechanism for 
transforming rural un-civilities into more modern civil forms of sociability.  This point is 
particularly relevant to rural development in contemporary Africa.  The development 
industry sees participatory development as, amongst other things, a basis for encouraging 
modern forms of social organization in rural Africa.  Yet, traditional associations – 
reified as ‘culture’ by the development industry – undermine this modernist endeavour.  
Often, the causes of the development crisis in Africa become wholly internal to Africa 
and are thus de-globalized. They are reduced to the weaknesses of national civil societies 
or, in other words, to civil societies that have not fully universalized themselves 
(spatially) within the confines of a particular nation-state.  This goes contrary to the thrust 
of this thesis, which seeks to embed an understanding of ‘land’ developments in the 
tensions between ‘the local’ and ‘the global’. 
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4.6 Civil Society, NGOs and the Nation-State in Africa 
 
Discussions of NGOs, civil society and the state in contemporary Africa are prominent 
within the ‘empiricist’ trend of sociological behaviourism.   In the ‘empiricist’ literature, 
it is commonly argued that a wave of democratization has swept across the African 
continent in recent years, notably with the rise of multi-party states during the 1990s 
(AACC and MWENGO eds. 1993).  The literature on Africa is replete with references to 
the role of civil society in general and NGOs in particular (as instruments) in this process 
of political democratization.  Thus, there is talk about a ‘revitalised’ civil society ‘flexing 
its muscles’ (Zack-Williams 2001:pp.217, 218); about a ‘rich network of civil society 
structures’ in southern Africa growing ‘in strength and experience’ (Molutsi 1999:p.188); 
about civil societies being at ‘the cutting edge’ of the democratization process in Kenya 
and Uganda and how NGOs have been central in ‘pluralising and strengthening civil 
society’ (Okuku 2002:pp.81, 82); and about the ‘rebirth of civil society’ analyzed as a 
‘political anthropology of anger’ to capture ‘the emotional dimension of the protest 
movements’ (Monga 1996:pp.10, 11, 147).  At times, NGO analysts have spoken in very 
glowing if not glorifying terms, such as Nyang’oro who claims that it is ‘now taken for 
granted that NGOs are probably the leading agents in the democratization process.’ 
(Nyang’oro, 1999:p.3)  Others like Ndegwa (1996), who discusses ‘the two faces of civil 
society’ in Kenya, are much more cautious in their assessment of NGOs and 
democratization, and they are sensitive to considerable variation in the historical 
experiences of intermediary NGOs.  This thesis is particularly cognizant of the existence 
of significant historical diversity in the experiences of NGOs, and it seeks to develop a 
perspective that is able to account for this diversity. 
 
Much of the literature focuses on the relation between state and society, and it uses the 
term ‘civil society’ instrumentally in a state-centric fashion as a (potential) force in 
democratizing the authoritarian state under African conditions.  There is a symbiotic 
relationship between a strong civil society and a strong state, and thus a ‘weak’ state is 
not in the interests of NGOs and civil society in the push for democracy. There is, 
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however, conceptual confusion around the notions of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states.  
Questions arise as to whether, despite its heavy-handed interventions within the realm of 
civil societies, the African state is currently weak or strong.  In general, theorists on state 
and society in Africa claim that the state is weak.  Therefore, van de Walle speaks of the 
state as ‘small and underdeveloped’ and ‘relatively weak and vulnerable’ (van de Walle 
2002:p.76), and Mandaza says that it is ‘so weak and dependent that it develops anti-
democratic tendencies’ (Mandaza 1994:p.269).  In specific relation to the agricultural 
sector, the state is marked by ‘institutional incapacity, bureaucratic inertia … and the 
inability of state institutions to initiate or implement policies’ (Puplampu and Tettey 
2000:p.251).   
 
MWENGO (2000b:p.47), as a regional NGO body in southern and east Africa, agrees 
wholeheartedly.  It thus claims that NGOs in Africa perceive the state ‘as inefficient, 
ineffective and unable to make any meaningful contribution to their development 
initiatives.’  In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the scope of state 
activities, which may be broad, and the power of the state, which may simultaneously be 
quite limited (Fukuyama 2004).  The weaknesses of the African state are sometimes seen 
as rooted in its particularistic (and uncivil) neo-patrimonial qualities, in which the spoils 
of the state are subject to the whims and wishes of elite groupings or ‘big men’ in African 
society (Chabal and Daloz 1999).  The role of civil society in the context of a weak (and 
authoritarian) nation-state is to build a ‘strong’ (and more modern) democratic state. In 
terms of the dominant perspective, civil society thereby challenges the authoritarian 
leanings of the state in Africa and seeks to change it, normally through influencing 
electoral politics as for instance during the twilight years of the Kuanda regime in 
Zambia.   
 
In the post-transition period of democratic consolidation, civil society recognizes the 
need to work alongside the state: ‘[T]he strength of civil society, and of NGOs in 
particular, lies not in opposing the state but co-operating with it’ (Ikiara 1999:p.68).  In 
stressing the synergy between a strong state and a strong civil society in forging 
democracy and development, there are ‘real dangers … in nurturing a strong civil society 
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while ignoring the weakness of an ineffective state’, and thus it becomes important, when 
possible, to deepen the organizational capacity of the state both nationally and sub-
nationally (Whaites 1998:p.344).  As Robinson puts it, ‘if state capacity is weakened by 
cutbacks in administration and by fostering greater market penetration in areas 
traditionally under its mandate, there is a distinct possibility that NGO efforts to exert 
more influence over public policy and the allocation of public resources will be 
undermined.’  Hence, the needs exists ‘to preserve the capacity of the state to determine 
the policy agenda and to formulate policy while being flexible and involving NGOs and 
interest groups in policy implementation and policy dialogue.’ (Robinson 1994:pp.42-43)  
International NGOs – with considerable bilateral donor support – often seek to build 
institutions of state governance and administration as part of their development 
initiatives. 
 
The claim that civil society in Africa invariably challenges the authoritarian state and 
builds democratic institutions tends to conflate the normative and descriptive 
connotations of the civil society notion.  In other words, civil society is romanticized.    
Concrete developments in Africa indicate that the specific relation between the state on 
the one hand and civil society and NGOs on the other is contingent on national, political 
and historical dynamics. The range and intensity of political relations that exist or have 
existed between the nation-state and NGOs in Africa is almost unlimited.  States 
collaborate with, co-opt, regulate and repress NGOs; and NGOs co-operate with, support, 
mobilize against and oppose states (Hadenius and Uggla 1996).  Even when NGO-state 
relations are cordial there will likely be only limited formal consultation on national 
development plans.  Yet normally there are ongoing informal arrangements between 
NGOs and certain line ministries based on goodwill and trust established over the years.   
 
NGOs (as part of civil society) increasingly recognize the need for forms of synergy and 
connectivity amongst themselves and they see the symbiosis, at least in principle, 
between development and rights.  For example, in Kenya, developmental NGOs realize 
that ‘almost all development provisioning programmes tend to spawn some problems that 
require the assertion of certain rights. … Similarly, rights advancement groups have 
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discovered that one cannot enforce rights in conditions of poverty.’ (Ngunyi 
1999:pp.133-134)  The latter point means that rights activists often need to directly 
address the material conditions of the working classes in order to ‘embed’ themselves 
amongst these classes.  NGOs that may co-operate and strategize on certain matters often 
disagree on approaches to the state.  This for instance is evidenced on the question of 
state legislation and registration of their organizations, issues that are very much alive in 
most countries of sub-Sahara Africa.   
 
Some NGOs propose almost complete independence from the state for fear of loss of 
their identity and autonomy and because of political restrictions on and conditioning of 
their space, while others argue for a minimalist state and enlightened policy and 
legislation that provide a strong enabling environment for NGOs.  Also, some NGOs, 
such as development agencies and those building peace at times of heightened ethnic 
conflict, see little option but to engage with the state on an almost ‘partnership’ basis.  
Their ‘non-governmental’ status thus becomes highly dubious.  Simultaneously, other 
NGOs such as those that monitor human rights abuses or state corruption may find 
themselves in an almost perpetual position of disengagement from the state. Thus, NGOs 
(like civil society groups more generally) seem to sometimes straddle the options known 
as ‘voice’ and ‘exit’, depending on the conjuncture.   
 
Nevertheless, in most of southern and eastern Africa, governments in recent years have 
claimed that NGOs are violating the conditions of their registration and are seeking to 
occupy political space that is best left to political parties.  On the other hand, NGOs claim 
that governments continue not simply to co-ordinate or regulate their activities in a 
minimalist manner but rather in a sinister way try to co-opt and if necessary repress them.  
NGO practitioners and activists argue that states should think otherwise, and that ‘the 
contribution of civic organisations to social development should be explicitly recognised 
by government, and their legitimacy enshrined in the constitution of each country’ 
(Yaansah and Simon 1997:p.131).  In this way, states should recognize NGOs as full 
partners in the development process and consequently accord them democratic and legal 
space.  NGOs argue that they will flourish in an enabling policy and legal framework 
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enacted by the state, and thus ‘sound laws and regulations can play a crucial role in 
empowering the NGO sector, and in continuing to enhance its ability to respond in an 
accountable and professional manner to the needs of society.’ (Stuurman 1997:p.9) 
Without a benevolent legal regime for registration and incorporation, NGOs are subject 
to arbitrary actions by the central state and are not given the legal space and the right to 
pursue their goals of social equity and justice.  
 
Civil society itself is sometimes romanticized by NGOs as inherently democratic and 
progressive in form and content.  It was critical to the dislodging of colonial regimes in 
Africa and elsewhere and it is now seen as a necessary condition for the advancement of 
modern pluralism and democracy.  Thus Stewart notes ‘civil society is eulogised as the 
ultimate medicinal compound, capable of curing ills from ethnic conflict to authoritarian 
regimes.’ (Stewart 1997:p.16)  In this regard the struggle for justice and emancipation is 
conceived as a simple dichotomy between an undemocratic state and a democratic civil 
society.  Yet, Okuku (2002:pp.82, 83) argues that ‘African civil society may be capable 
of no more than modest, tentative and often reversible contributions to democratisation’ 
and ‘civil society may be a significant reservoir of authoritarianism and anti-democratic 
values’.  Potentially, a strong civil society may be anything but democratic and 
progressive.  As this thesis argues with specific reference to intermediary NGOs, civil 
society in its formal organized sense is a diverse and contradictory social realm that is 
riddled with internal tensions and conflicts revolving around sectional and particularistic 
interests.  While altruistic, equalizing and democratic values may not be intrinsic to civil 
society, the mandate of NGOs as intermediary organizations is to bring about and embed 
these qualities within broader civil society.   
 
The robustness and strength of civil society is open to historical and national variations 
and derive not from the sheer number and size of civic groupings but from their 
pluralistic, competitive and interlinking nature along with their capacity to define, defend 
and assert their space vis-à-vis the state.  The critical qualities of civil society necessary 
for the development of political democracy include, according to Hadenius and Uggla 
(1996:p.1623), ‘organizational plurality and autonomy, a democratic structure, [and] a 
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broad popular base’.  In this regard, whether they are developmental or advocacy groups, 
NGOs are supposed to empower grassroots communities, pluralize the civil society 
environment and thereby capacitate it: ‘The ultimate aim of the work of NGOs must be to 
strengthen civil society and not competition with the state or among themselves for the 
delivery of charity.’ (AACC and MWENGO eds. 1993:p.84)   
 
However, NGOs sometimes seem to have contrary trends and results.  Dzimbiri speaks of 
‘deep rooted and endemic problems in the NGO community in Malawi.  The result of this 
is a loss of commitment and support by members and consequent fragmentation of the 
NGO community and weakening position of this important sector of civil society.’ 
(Dzimbiri 1999:p.157)  A more general critique is offered by Jaffer as secretary of the 
NGO Coalition for Eastern Africa: ‘In an African context, the space for small 
community-based initiatives to promote voluntary action for local change is drowned out 
by the cacophony of large, policy-oriented, advocacy-pushing, service provision NGOs 
whose budgets may well outstrip those of government departments.’ (Jaffer 1997:p.66)  
There continues to be a strong need for building alliances and coalitions within the NGO 
sector, for synergy and connectivity, and for a more inclusive, responsive and responsible 
approach to civil society more generally. 
 
The portrayal of civil society and NGOs in the ‘empiricist’ literature on Africa highlights 
many of the general claims made in this thesis about the liberal and Radical Democratic 
conception of civil society.  African ‘civil societies’ are in large part conceptualized 
instrumentally, and are seen as critical players in advancing democracy initiatives against 
the retrogressive particularisms of the nation-state and rural un-civilities.  Although 
tensions within civil society are recognized, the contradictions between civil society and 
these particularisms are invariably brought to the fore.  Ultimately, civil societies are the 
universalizing logic that can rectify serious state weaknesses and bring modernity to the 
rural areas throughout the African continent.  The thrust of this thesis clearly debunks this 
perspective, as I seek to highlight the contradictory quality of the world and work of 
intermediary NGOs and their ‘retrogressive’ tendencies. 
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4.7 Civil Society, NGOs and the Global Development System 
 
A similar instrumentalist argument about civil society also exists in relation to the 
worldwide development system, particularly as advanced by the ‘structuralist’ trend 
within sociological behaviourism.  Global capital has for many years sought to 
restructure the political economies of nations in the South and East.  This has been seen 
in the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programmes) of the 1980s, in the New Policy 
Agenda of the 1990s (Clayton ed. 1994) and in more recent ‘good governance’ policies 
(Federico 2004) designed ‘to create conditions for international capital accumulation 
across the world economy’ (Zack-Williams 2001:p.213).  The notion of ‘good’ 
governance, based on liberal democratic premises, is a universalizing notion and implies 
that certain policies are valid without spatial and temporal restrictions (Arrighi 
2002:p.18).  This entails, at least in part, bypassing the nation-state and thus sidestepping 
its sovereignty in order to expand the benefits of sovereignty to the sub-state level 
(Inayatullah 1996).  However, the most recent approach of the multilateral bodies sees a 
revitalized and reactivated role for the state as part of a process of state and institutional 
reform in enhancing liberal democratic structures and the value and effectiveness of 
development aid (Stern 2002, Coady et al. 2004). 
 
Yet the development industry, led by multilateral financial institutions such as the World 
Bank – ‘the bank of the North’ according to Amin (1997:p.54) – is also seeking to 
reconfigure postcolonial societies through a ‘process of social re-engineering’ (Jenkins 
2001:p.251).  The preferred weapon of mass reconstruction is civil society, including 
civic NGOs with good governance programmes on human rights, constitutionalism, anti-
corruption and transparency.  This is what Kaviraj calls a ‘robust, businesslike 
constructivist argument’ made by external forces involving ‘institutional graft’, and he 
argues that this ‘theory of forcible conversion of peoples into unknowing users of 
Western political theory is unrealistic’ (Kaviraj 2001:p.312).  Edwards speaks of the 
possibility of similar dangers in this form of engineering, particularly if the external 
agenda not only entails establishing enabling conditions conducive to the development of 
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civil society but also involves forcibly shaping the form and content of civil societies.  He 
says that this might ‘corrupt the authenticity of civic action’ and claims that 
‘[i]nstrumentalising civil society erodes its potential to be a motor for change, since – as 
the prisoners of someone else’s agenda – civic groups are less likely to take risks, 
innovate, and challenge’ (Edwards 1998:pp.7, 11).  And, quite possibly, civic groups will 
be seen by the nation-state as ‘agents of foreign interests’ (Bratton 1994: p.9), especially 
considering their dependence on foreign funding.   
 
The instrumentalist argument about donors using civil society for their own agenda is a 
common one and not restricted to Africa.  For instance, in relation to Latin America, 
Sader speaks of ‘the use of NGOs as agents for neoliberalism within civil society’ (Sader 
2002:p.92).  With regard to Africa (particularly South Africa, Ghana and Uganda), Hearn 
claims, in true instrumentalist fashion, that ‘donors have been successful in influencing 
the current version of civil society ... so that a vocal, well-funded section of it, which 
intervenes on key issues of national development strategy, acts not as a force for 
challenging the status quo, but for building societal consensus for maintaining it.’ (Hearn 
2001:p.44)  From this perspective, then, the aid community has adopted an 
instrumentalist conception of civil society and the ‘structuralist’ trend has simply bought 
into this conception.  
 
Therefore, global capital has played a key role in fashioning civil society ‘to suit its own 
unique culture and purposes’ (Jenkins 2001:p.251) in bringing about desired economic 
and political adjustments in Africa.  To quote Jenkins (2001) in detail: ‘Foreign-aid 
programmes of advanced capitalist “northern” countries have identified civil society as 
the key ingredient in promoting “democratic development” in the economically less-
developed states of the “south”.  The logic runs roughly as follows.  Development 
requires sound policies and impartial implementation. These can only be delivered by 
governments that are held accountable for their actions.  Accountability, in turn, depends 
upon the existence of “autonomous centres of social and economic power” that can act as 
watchdogs over the activities of politicians and government officials…. [A]id to the 
“democracy and governance sector”, as it has increasingly come to be known within the 
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profession, must be earmarked to support ... individual associations [civil society]’ 
(Jenkins 2001:p.252).  The ‘structuralist’ trend reproduces this ‘logic’ in theoretical garb, 
without detailing the mechanisms and processes by which it unfolds. 
 
Recent World Bank publications clearly show that democratic governance means 
initiating and supporting neo-liberal economic policy reforms. The World Bank has 
abandoned its minimalist view of the state in the South and East, and calls for a more 
‘activist’ state in implementing reforms (World Bank 1998, 2002).  It seeks to build the 
organizational capacity of nation-states and thereby enhance their regulatory and 
supportive functions vis-à-vis the reforming national economies. Yet, this puts ‘greater 
responsibility on the shoulders of African elites and governments … for the failure of 
their economies to recover’ (Arrighi 2002:p.4).  In this regard, civil society can be a 
disciplining tool like the clock in early industrial capitalism, and like colonialism, this 
external agenda seems far from civil and liberating.  This analysis of global capital and 
civil society by the ‘structuralist’ trend in sociological behaviourism deconstructs the 
international development system and neatly reveals the structures of global domination, 
but it does not move beyond this.  It reifies the power of ‘the donors’ and over-privileges 
instrumentalism.  Contradictions between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ are ignored.  
 
 
4.8 ‘Uncivil’ Society and Democratic Change  
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether democratic change in Africa is necessarily 
linked to civil society and NGOs.  Are other forms of sociability, even if mostly uncivil 
from the perspective of the prevailing legal and constitutional norms, not worthy of 
consideration in promoting progressive social change?  Monga argues that there has been 
an urban bias in theories of democracy and that ‘[p]olitical scientists are all too ready to 
view the democratic process as an exclusively urban phenomenon’.  There is what he 
calls the ‘rural passivity argument’ that assumes political inertia amongst the rural 
population (Monga 1996:pp.27, 29).  This takes us back to the notion of glocal 
modernities.  As noted earlier, untarnished communal forms of social organization and 
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action do not exist in contemporary Africa.  Yet forms of sociability that do not rigidly 
conform to the principles of modern civil society and that involve therefore ‘uncivil’ 
forms of mediation between state and society should nevertheless be seen as ‘ways of 
coping with the modern’ (Chatterjee 2001:pp.172-173) and as forces for modern change.   
 
This is the import of Gould’s excellent study of rural Zambia.  For example, he notes how 
under colonialism, rural Zambians were involved in ‘an extended and intensive 
engagement with colonial power’.  In this context, he argues that many rural people 
‘entered into an intense and prolonged struggle to capture the essence of colonial 
modernity, and to make it over in African likeness.  If resistance to the penetration of 
modern ideals and practices often reflected … a simple desire of African societies to 
protect their autonomy, it is equally so that some … strove to co-opt these very images 
and institutions to enhance their personal or corporate powers of negotiation.’ (Gould 
1997:p.5 his emphasis)  Clearly, the engagement by pre-modern societies with modern 
processes was an ambivalent form of struggle.  Just as tradition has been constantly re-
invented, so has modernity been reconfigured and restructured in a multitude of ways.  
The point is that these alternative modernities may not only be fundamentally different 
from ‘the well-structured, principled and constitutionally sanctioned relations’ between 
state and civil society (Chatterjee 2001:p.178), but they might involve outright violations 
of the law such as land invasions and destruction of property. 
 
Rural inhabitants, for instance, may engage in actions ranging from ‘political mendicancy 
to spontaneous violence’ (Kaviraj 2001:p.317), and these may not only lie outside the 
niceties of associational civility but they may undermine and resist it.  According to 
Bratton (1994:p.5), associational life of a civic kind ‘will be stunted in a context of 
political violence, in the absence of the rule of law’.  As Edwards (1998:p.6) neatly puts 
it, ‘[i]t is difficult to be civil if you are starving’.  These uncivil actions should not be 
romanticized as heroic forms of peasant struggle, particularly if they manifest violent and 
undemocratic tendencies.  But it is not uncommon to find all un-civic forms of action 
degraded and even condemned outright by ‘civilized’ groups in a seemingly knee-jerk 
fashion.  This point will come to the fore in the discussion of intermediary NGOs in 
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contemporary Zimbabwe in the context of the uncivil Third Chimurenga.  The work of 
‘land’ NGOs was almost torn asunder by this land movement, and NGOs had to handle 
the ambivalences of their world in an increasingly turbulent social field. 
 
 
4.9 Civil Society and NGOs: Beyond Instrumentalism and Functionalism 
 
In the academic literature on NGOs, civil society is generally conceived in largely 
instrumentalist terms.  The ‘structuralist’ trend (Amin 1997, Hearn 2001, Sader 2002) 
sees civil society as an ‘instrument’ of others in reproducing the interests of global forces 
and in so doing it over-privileges ‘domination’ in the relationship between global capital 
and civil society.  The ‘empiricist’ trend (AACC and MWENGO eds. 1993, Stuurman 
and de Villiers eds. 1997, Nyang’oro ed. 1999) conceives civil society as an ‘instrument’ 
for democratization vis-à-vis the state and pre-modern sociabilities and, as a result, over-
privileges ‘contradiction’ in the relationship between civil society and the nation-state.  
Both trends engage in a form of sociological behaviourism based on external relations 
and the subject-object dichotomy.   
 
In the case of the ‘empiricist’ trend, this involves a methodology limited to examining 
un-deconstructed concrete totalities.  Civil society is a weapon to be forged and used 
against authoritarian states and for building liberal capitalist democracies.  The 
functionality of civil society is constantly reiterated.  Indeed, overall, the ‘empiricist’ 
trend appears to be more interested in evaluating and assessing the effectiveness of civil 
society – and NGOs more specifically – than in offering an understanding and 
explanation of NGO practices.   Thus, civil society may be weak, it may be divided and, 
at times, it may be retrogressive and anything but civil.  Yet, ultimately, it serves one 
purpose and one purpose only – the building of democratic nation-states.  If it fails to 
serve this purpose, then it must be recalled, subjected to maintenance and honed.  This 
instrumentalist-cum-functionalist conceptualization of civil society is also prominent 
within the ‘structuralist’ trend when it examines civil society as wholly subservient to the 
  91 
international development system.  This is based on a methodology that restricts analysis 
to un-reconstructed abstract totalities.  
 
Neither trend within sociological behaviourism is particularly useful in understanding the 
complex world and work of NGOs.  Intermediary NGOs are a specific form of 
contradictory social relations and they are embedded in a social field of ambivalence.  
Depicting in an ‘instrumentalist’ fashion the social interfaces that delimit the world of 
NGOs fails to properly ‘capture’ the ways in which NGOs seek to manoeuvre their way 
in and through their ambivalent world through organizational practices richly endowed 
with meaning.  As a result, a sociological analysis of NGOs must go beyond a 
functionalist framework that identifies the effectiveness of civil society in furthering 
foreign interests or in establishing liberal democracy.  Failure to do this leads on a regular 
basis to teleological accounts of NGO practices.  It is thus imperative that sociology 
understands the genesis of organizational effects, and this involves ‘going inside’ the 
world of NGOs and offering ‘thick descriptions’ of their organizational practices.  Such 
an analysis highlights the fact that ‘organizational effects’ are the outcome of contingent 
and ‘negotiated’ processes in which NGOs are actively involved. 
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Chapter 5 
Development, Agrarian Communities and Global Donors 
 
 
NGOs, particularly rural NGOs, are said to ‘do’ development or at least to intervene or 
engage in development.  In fact, NGOs that work in rural areas have been designated as 
Non-Governmental Development Organizations or NGDOs (Fowler 2000).  They are 
defined in the NGO literature – and by themselves – in a development-centric manner 
rather than in an agrarian-centric manner.  The ‘empiricist’ trend within the literature 
bypasses the deconstruction ‘stage’ in its investigations and offers a (‘un-deconstructed’) 
positivist portrait of concrete NGO realities.  In doing so, it rightly highlights the 
dependence of NGDOs on external funding and agendas.  Simultaneously, though, it does 
not integrate this into a broader critical analysis of the international capitalist 
development system.  The social interface between NGOs and agrarian communities is 
articulated in terms of the notion of ‘participation’, and development deficits within these 
communities are highlighted.  This trend argues for development reform to maximize the 
effectiveness of intermediary NGOs. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘structuralist’ critique of NGOs, which involves the intellectual 
work of Marxists and postmodernist discourse analysts, relies heavily on 
‘deconstruction’.  This deconstruction is necessary for probing the fundamentals of 
development, for locating ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ as a starting point for analysis, and 
for locating NGOs in capitalist modes of glocal modernities.  From the perspective of this 
thesis, deconstruction points in the right direction and is highly suggestive of dominant 
trajectories within the development industry.  Yet, deconstruction alone over-privileges 
functional instrumentalism and the unfettered domination of global interests.  
Regrettably, these theorists remain trapped within ‘deconstruction’ and fail to 
‘reconstruct’ development processes.  Like the ‘empiricist’ trend, they are not in a strong 
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position to highlight the negotiated and ‘constructed’ quality of these contradictory 
processes and the complex meaning-laden social interfaces they entail.  
 
 
5.1 Marxist Deconstruction: World-Systems Theory 
 
World-systems theory is a form of Marxist deconstruction that analyses capitalist 
development on a global scale.  Quite rightly, this theory claims that an understanding of 
the African political economy must be located in the ‘structural and conjunctural 
processes of the global economy’ (Arrighi 2002:p.19).  World-systems theorists trace the 
development tragedy in contemporary Africa back to the crises of profitability and 
legitimacy of worldwide capitalism that arose in the 1970s.  Sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular has become increasingly marginalized in terms of the trajectories in productive 
investment of the international economy, and the ‘likelihood that the region is going to be 
developed by capitalism seems smaller than ever.’ (Saul and Leys 1999:p.1)  This has led 
to a cycle of dependence.  Africa’s continued dependence on primary exports as a source 
of trade and foreign currency is seen as a kind of ‘archaic integration’ into the world 
economy (de Rivero 2001:p.126).  Under the neo-liberal trajectory of world capitalism, 
nation-states in Africa (and elsewhere in the South and East) are now almost completely 
subordinated to the universalizing logic of the capitalist market.  Hence, African 
economies are incorporated into the global economy but in a subservient manner.  This 
means that African nations as part of the world periphery are not auto-centred and are 
‘integrated in the global system in a passive way (they “adjust” to the system, without 
playing any significant role in shaping it)’ (Amin 2002:p.42).   
 
Amin argues that development is not ‘a goal of capital’s strategies… These strategies 
involve adapting to, profiting by … the growth or stagnation of peripheries, and since 
there are no attractive investments in this situation, dominant capital finds its profit in 
managing the Third World debt.  Finding a solution to the problem is not on the agenda, 
simply because this is not in capital’s interest.’ (Amin 1997:p.34)  This is why de Rivero 
(2001) speaks about the crisis of development, and about quasi-nation states notably in 
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Africa ‘that cannot develop’, that are in a ‘stabilised stage of non-viability’ and for whom 
development is simply a ‘distant myth’ (de Rivero 2001:pp.24, 121, 18).  This world-
systems analysis over-privileges the significance of global forces vis-à-vis national and 
local dynamics.  Yet, it rightly makes problematic the prospects for development in 
Africa and thereby the significance of NGOs in that development.  In other words, 
despite their strident claims to the contrary, NGOs are not in a position to facilitate 
sustainable development if development in Africa is ‘not on the cards’ because of an 
ongoing global cycle of dependence. 
 
 
5.2 Postmodernist Deconstruction and Discourse Analysis 
 
Similar to world-systems theory, postmodernist deconstruction seriously questions the 
prospects for development under conditions of global capitalism and, by implication, the 
facilitating role of NGOs in processes of development.  In this regard, the basic 
distinction that Crewe and Harrison (1998) make between development as a notion and 
development as an ‘industry’ is important.  The development industry includes the 
institutions, policies, practices, methods and tools of development.  It is not unusual for 
particular development agencies to use a diverse range or even a ‘smorgasbord’ (Eade 
2003:p.x) of methods and tools, particularly if they conceive them as value-free.  
Development as a notion refers to the fact that development is seen as a value or as 
inherently good without though necessarily specifying or giving any particular content to 
it, such as ‘democratic’, ‘gender-equitable’ or ‘sustainable’ development (Meszaros 
2001). 
 
In fact, the term ‘development’ appears as a morally innocent and totally innocuous term: 
after all, who would not want to see something ‘develop’?  Thus, the term ‘development’ 
as used in the sociology of development implies a normative change (or a progression) 
from an undesirable social condition to a more desirable social condition.  There seems 
no disagreement on this point, either from bourgeois or socialist theorists.  Thus, a senior 
economist with the World Bank argues, ‘the very definition of development entails a 
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value judgment about things that are worth promoting’ (Essama-Nssah 2004:p.509).  Or, 
as the socialist Amin puts it, the concept of development is ‘by nature ideological’: ‘It 
enables one to judge results according to criteria that have been drawn up a priori’ (Amin 
1997:p.14). 
 
Of course, the divergences emerge when specifying those development ‘criteria’ or 
giving the value of development a specific content.   Development as an ideal is often the 
subject of deconstruction by postmodernists engaged in discourse analysis.  This may 
entail deconstructing the notion independent of any particular content or deconstructing a 
particular version of development (invariably ‘neo-liberal development’ as propagated by 
various organizations).  Often the distinction between development per se and a 
particular version of it is not clearly made, and development takes on a monolithic and 
unitary form.  The two are conflated, and a critical deconstruction of ‘neo-liberal 
development’ leads to sweeping arguments against any form of development.  Discourse 
analysts also sometimes fail to distinguish between development as an ideal and 
development as ‘industry’, and the former is reduced to the latter.  Criticisms of the 
industry lead to overall critical appraisals of development.   
 
An analysis by Collins and Dutton (n.d.) provides an example of discourse analysis.  
They look at the notion of ‘human development’ as used by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and argue that it is a modern form of disciplinary 
power based not on external coercion but on self-governance by subjects.  The  
‘developing subject’ as embodied in the UNDP discourse occupies the central location in 
the development process and is a free subject able to exercise choices to maximize the 
goals of human development.  The subject experiences differences and crises in its lived 
world as deprivations that can only be overcome if it avails itself ‘to a process whereby 
its condition can be improved and its inferior position rectified’ (Collins and Dutton 
n.d.:p.11).  This process of development is synonymous with progress; and the ‘temporal 
and spatial positioning’ of the subject is ‘framed as linear and advancing’ (Collins and 
Dutton n.d.:p.12).  Development as freedom is often restricted by state and tradition, and 
thus the active and participatory subject must overcome these obstacles.  As subjects with 
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human rights (and thus seemingly as citizens), development subjects also have duties and 
this entails ‘a degree of accountability, culpability and responsibility’ (Collins and Dutton 
n.d.:p.13).  In a sort of ‘blaming the victim’ ideological twist, any continuing 
development deficits ultimately rest with the development subjects themselves.’3  
 
Sociologically, deconstruction by discourse analysis is very much part of the well-known 
debunking motif.  Deconstruction highlights the ‘constructedness and interactive 
character’ of development processes (Booth 1993:p.57) and the linkages between 
multiple forms of language, knowledge and power.  It serves to demystify and destabilize 
specific development ideas and practices as it seeks ‘for the hidden metaphors in some 
central concepts within the Enlightenment discourse’ (Schuurman 1993a:p.26).  It also 
shows that the development processes within which intermediary NGOs are immersed 
tend to privilege a global ontology at the expense of a local ontology.   Yet, the problems 
inherent in deconstruction should not be underestimated, including a-historical analyses 
that reify the power of the ‘developers’ and that unproblematically read development 
realities from (de-constructed) development discourses.  In other words, postmodernist 
deconstruction alone fails to provide investigations and insights into the concrete social 
world of development.  It remains wholly in the realm of discourse where ‘the global’ 
dominates ‘the local’ without hindrance.  All forms of deconstruction, including both 
discourse analysis and Marxism, conceptualize NGOs as largely passive and reactive 
instruments of global interests. 
 
 
5.3 The Un-Sociology of Development 
 
Based on a form of sociological deconstruction that is consistent with the epistemological 
premises of this thesis, Kaplan (1999, 2003) provides a fascinating account of building 
organizational capacity in development.   In doing so, he argues that NGOs enter into 
development processes that are already firmly established.  In other words, development 
has no beginning and no end.  Further, development does not have a necessary fixed 
                                         
3 See Pithouse (2003) for a deconstruction of World Bank poverty discourse.   
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route (or trajectory) with a pre-defined endpoint. To speak then of an undeveloped social 
state or a (fully-developed) developed state is simply un-sociological.  The term 
‘underdevelopment’ as employed by Marxists seems even more nonsensical.  Imposing 
upon ‘the social’, as the special subject matter of sociology, a condition and trajectory of 
development is more an ideological exercise than a sociological endeavour. 
 
Although Kaplan does not pursue this line of thought fully, the indirect implication of his 
argument is that social change does not invariably entail the ‘development’ of social 
relations, if ‘development’ means ‘progression’, ‘growth’ or ‘evolution’.  Kaplan (1999) 
thus depicts relations between ‘actors’ within the realm of development as entailing 
phases marked by dependence and independence prior to interdependence.  The 
‘development’ of social relations involves contradictory processes that are more cyclical 
than linear in their trajectory.  Sociologically, social relations do not develop in a value-
laden sense from a state of un-development or even underdevelopment to a state of 
development.  There is no such thing as ‘good’ social relations and ‘bad’ social relations.  
The main point is that the term ‘development’ tends to distract from the sociological 
quest to understand (rather than moralize about) the trajectory of social relations. 
 
The notion of ‘development’ (like ‘growth’ and ‘evolution’) as employed in sociology 
has been appropriated from the natural sciences, as the works of classical sociologists like 
Comte and Spencer show (Perroux 1983).  As an organic metaphor, it has limitations in 
terms of making sense of the complexities of social reality.  For instance, it implies that 
social change is like processes of natural history, and this has led to deterministic 
conceptions of social change.  Thus, ‘development’ as a metaphor conceals more than it 
illuminates or, as Sinaceur puts it more generally, ‘there are some metaphors which mask 
and obstruct thought; others are more heuristic’ (Sinaceur 1983:p.8).  He rightly argues 
that development is ‘a line of thought that has compromised research in the social 
sciences by giving dominating powers the pretext of civilizing intentions’ such that its 
appropriation into sociology has ideological connotations (Sinaceur 1983:p.5).  This is as 
applicable to Marxist theories, as manifested by Soviet imperialism, as it is to liberal 
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modernization theories.  Indeed, the master dichotomy between ‘the modern’ and the 
‘pre-modern’ underpins the classical sociology of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. 
 
Given the predominance of liberal theories of development, the ideological impact 
largely entails universalizing Western notions of modernity. This of course is vividly 
evident in Parsonian modernization theory, based on the distinction between undeveloped 
and developed nations (with the latter invariably being Western nations). The 
contemporary neo-liberal theory of development, as a revised (mostly un-sociological) 
version of Parsonian theory, simply conflates capitalism with development and sees them 
as co-terminus processes in which development becomes subservient to capitalist 
expansion and is a logical outcome of it.  At times, policy changes and institutional 
adjustments are required to ‘plane down’ the ‘rough edges’ of capitalism (Amin 
1997:p.142) and thereby ensure a more balanced and equitable development.   
 
 
5.4 Development: Universalizing Project and Social Engineering 
 
‘Development’ is also embedded within grand universalizing projects involving the core 
and the periphery.   The core is over-privileged as the unquestioned engine of world 
history to which the periphery can only respond.  This weakness is evident in the 
(Marxist) world-systems analysis outlined above.  But it is also vividly expressed in neo-
liberal conceptions.  Development thus emanates from the core and the universalizing 
project is not made problematic but is accepted as a de-historicized – almost inevitable if 
not natural – given.  In the case of liberal modernization theory, any social, economic and 
political differences in the periphery (compared to the West) are understood 
independently of the contradictory processes of worldwide capitalism.  The differences 
are depicted as ‘shortfalls’ in development and democracy in the peripheries. They 
become localized deficits (and are thus de-universalized) and are the causes of un-
development.  Only the centre can reduce or rectify them, and it does so as part of its 
zealous modernist mission of universality.   
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Both modernization and Marxist theories have been subject to this kind of ‘unilinear 
social science’ in constructing binary opposites that essentialize and dichotomize the 
development process into ‘us’ the developers (or subjects) and ‘them’ the undeveloped or 
the to-be-developed (the objects). These polarizing distinctions include core/periphery, 
modern/traditional and capitalist/pre-capitalist, and the lead term (i.e. core, modern and 
capitalist) is given both ‘analytical value’ and a ‘universal status’.  The other terms are 
‘residual’ if not ‘deviant’ and ‘pathological’ and can only be understood in terms of what 
they are not (Mamdani 1996:p.9).  The power and knowledge of the developers are 
reified and objectified as if attached to and stored in their political and economic 
positions. Thus, particular histories and development processes (in the peripheries) are 
explained as (incomplete) expressions of an overarching universal that is said to be 
developed and complete, and this universal is almost the very embodiment of what it 
means to be human (or fully human) in the contemporary world.  It is not surprising then 
that there are pan-African sociological analyses with pronounced radical nationalist 
inclinations that essentialize the African past and that seek to make Africa a centre of 
reference (and of world history) and the engine behind its own development through 
endogenous rather than exogenous processes (Chivaura and Mararike eds. 1998).  
 
As a form of social engineering, development entails a clearly identifiable route 
(development as process) moving inextricably toward a pre-defined end-situation 
(development as product).  The product is considered to be already latently present in the 
structures of the undeveloped state, and it is the purpose of development policy and 
practice to enliven these hidden potentialities, to make them manifest and then bring them 
to the fore in all their glory.  Therefore, development is ‘the interpretation of a literal 
process: something develops in the sense of unfurling, becoming visible piece by piece.  
That which slowly becomes visible is, however, already embedded in the structure (the 
“genes”). The result of the “development process” is thus fixed – it is merely a matter of 
speed.’ (Schuurman 1993a:pp.26-27)  Thus, once the genes are known and once 
development as end product (or value) is established, it is simply a matter of directing 
development along the fixed (evolutionary) path through a range of (value-free) 
development interventions.   
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This means that development no matter how ‘radically’ defined (for example, 
development as empowerment) cannot entail anti-systemic change because the process of 
becoming simply reveals latent systemic properties and is not a process of social 
transformation involving a fundamental shift in social and power relations (Tandon 
1995).  This seems to be the case, unless one holds to a very narrow conception of the 
parameters of social systems or to an unproblematic and romanticized transition of 
gradualism as posited by Radical Democrats.  In the context of critically appraising 
modernization and growth theories as well as Marxist theories of underdevelopment and 
dependency, Aina proposes a ‘paradigm of development as empowerment and 
participation.’ (Aina 1993:p.23)  Yet participation and empowerment are now defining 
components of the dominant, system-maintaining, development paradigm of neo-
liberalism.  The term ‘development’ hides, obscures, undercuts and displaces more anti-
systemic notions such as ‘transformation’ and ‘revolution’.  This is shown in post-
colonial Africa when, at political independence, radical nationalist and socialist states 
overnight became developmental states and, in so doing, articulated social and economic 
development as a benign process requiring social consensus and demobilization of ‘the 
masses’ and of whatever civil and uncivil organization existed.  Even a de-radicalized 
version of civil society would have been viewed as anti-development and retrogressive in 
this context. 
 
 
5.5 Un-Deconstructed Development and the Empiricist Trend 
 
Development reformers (whose work is found within the ‘empiricist’ literature) focus 
specifically on the industry – including its strengths and weaknesses – but they rarely 
question the need for development.  They bypass the deconstruction stage.  The 
Enlightenment assumptions underlying development are taken by these analysts as 
givens, ‘in which rationality, the search for objective truth, and a belief in a movement 
towards modernity are paramount’ (Crewe and Harrison 1998:p.15).  Often, then, the 
linkages and the discontinuities (and even chasms) between development as a value and 
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development as an industry are not properly investigated.  This empiricist trend entails 
low-order theory that does not articulate a grand narrative or meta-theory and, because of 
this, it tends to de-politicize the development process.  In many ways, this reflects the 
position of NGOs themselves, as they seem unable to theorize about their own 
development practices but rather rely on more descriptive accounts.  
 
The empiricist NGO literature involves either case studies or broad comparative 
approaches that seek to analyse the accountability, performance, effectiveness and impact 
of NGOs (Potter ed. 1996, Tvedt 1998 and Fowler 2000).  A functionalist orientation 
predominates, particularly revolving around the notion of the ‘comparative advantage’ of 
NGOs vis-à-vis the state in bringing about social and economic development (Riddell and 
Robinson 1995).  For instance, the functionality of NGOs in poverty alleviation, in the 
provision of social services and in facilitating rural change is normally assessed.  The 
pros and cons of NGOs are hotly debated, on which basis recommendations for 
development reform arise.  Such reforms, in employing a phrase from Fowler (2000), 
involve ‘changing the rules of the game’ rather than changing the game altogether.  
NGOs are portrayed as instruments of donors, and the latter are depicted as the pied piper 
to whom NGOs are (almost) fully accountable despite any wishes and intentions to the 
contrary.  The relations between development NGOs on the one hand and rural 
communities and global donors on the other are normally understood in causal, positivist 
and instrumentalist terms. 
 
Thus, the mechanistic and positivist ontology of ‘things’ seems to predominate within the 
empiricist trend.  Development entails the systematic transfer of various ‘things’ called 
resources from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have-nots’, be they in the form of finances, technology, 
social skills or even political strength.  Development is brought in or engineered from 
outside – and by outsiders – through specific targeted interventions: without such 
interventions, no development occurs.  NGOs (as both subjects and objects) are seen as 
part of this mechanistic transfer system, occupying an intermediary (but not necessarily a 
mediating) position.  They receive inputs and produce outputs, and they thereby become 
a critical part of an extended casual chain of social development.  This has been labelled 
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as the ‘transportational paradigm’ of development (Long and Villarreal 1993:p.145).  It is 
a paradigm popular amongst NGOs themselves when representing, making sense of and 
justifying their world of development.   
 
Notions of participatory development add complexity to the resource transfer system and 
change passive beneficiaries into (at least ideally) active subjects, but in the final analysis 
participation is largely seen as another means or instrument for making the system more 
efficient and functional.  Kaplan (1999) as a development consultant has sought to widen 
the terms of the traditional empiricist NGO literature by going beyond the ‘thing’ 
ontology.  In doing so, he shows a deep sensitivity to processes, flows and motions as 
marking the ontology of ‘the social’.  He outlines the essence of a development 
intervention, namely, ‘the facilitation of growing awareness and consciousness such that 
people are able to take control of their own lives… This inevitably implies also an 
activist stance: that is, assistance with confronting the manifestations and dynamics of 
power, however they may manifest.  If a development intervention does not succeed in 
this, then it can hardly be said to have been developmental.’ (Kaplan 1999:p.12)  
Development, then, is not about the delivery of resources in an instrumentalist sense but 
is rather about facilitating resourcefulness or ‘about enabling people to become more 
conscious, to understand themselves and their context such that they are better able to 
take control of their own future’ (Kaplan 1999:p.22).   
 
The radical activist conclusions that Kaplan arrives at are in many ways similar to other 
writers, like Biggs and Neame (1996) and Fowler (1993), who offer less holistic analyses 
of NGOs in the realm of social and economic development.  These writers provide 
tantalizing insights into development and NGOs, such as the view of Biggs and Neame 
that development involves ‘the articulation of a series of local struggles and processes’ 
that NGOs must ‘tap into’ (Biggs and Neame 1996:p.43).  In this regard, NGOs are 
conceptualized as involving themselves not only in service delivery but also as 
confronting the structural causes of poverty and focusing on matters of social justice and 
change.  NGOs, it is said, should focus less on shifting funds and other resources from 
one part of the world to another and more on reshaping social relationships and 
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institutions.  This is clear from Fowler’s intriguingly labelled ‘onion-skin approach’ that 
entails ‘an outer layer of welfare-orientated activity that protects inner layers of material 
service delivery that act as nuclei for a core strategy dedicated to transformation.’ 
(Fowler 1993:pp.334-335)  In the end, though, NGOs in Africa pursue rural development 
without seriously questioning social and political structures and they normally adopt a 
hands-off approach to questions of land reform.  In fact, it is argued that NGOs are 
essentially social service providers, and that they should leave advocacy to membership-
based civil society bodies that are more accountable to and representative of the 
grassroots (Edwards 1998).  
 
The ‘empiricist’ literature though literally abounds with references to social justice, 
democracy, equity and the like, and even to empowerment and transformation.  Whether 
largely supportive of NGOs or more critical of their developmental role, questions about 
democracy and good governance are often central to ‘empiricist’ discussions of NGOs.  
In fact, the New Policy Agenda of the bilateral and multilateral agencies – including the 
World Bank – involving aid conditionality set by donors also entails human-rights based, 
‘bottom-up’ participatory approaches to development.  At least at the level of rhetoric and 
policy formation, it is unlikely that these agencies would find much fault with Kaplan’s 
far-reaching analysis and his conclusions.  Indeed, Edward’s (1999) analysis of NGO 
performance in South Asia, written whilst working for the World Bank in Washington, 
testifies to this point. In general, then, the empiricist NGO literature works within the 
confines of a development reform agenda. 
 
This reform agenda also involves intermediary NGOs (and civil society more broadly) in 
developing the capacity of the nation-state.  For instance, the work of Save the Children-
UK is based ‘on a model which aims to make maximum use of the potential synergy 
between “technical support” to [state] line ministries ... or … “working with government 
from above” … and grassroots pressure allied to indigenous NGOs and movements … or 
… “working with government from below”… Both elements in the model are essential if 
government capacity is to be strengthened effectively and responsibly’ (Edwards 
1994:p.71).  International NGOs are in a relatively strong position to provide material 
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and technical assistance to line ministries without jeopardizing their autonomy, but they 
lack the legitimacy to represent local grassroots groups on a genuine basis.  Capacity 
building that entails working alongside other civil society groups is best led by but not 
done alone by indigenous NGOs. Nevertheless, working from above without working 
from below may strengthen state capacity but may not necessarily promote democratic 
development.  And working from below without working from above may strengthen the 
state by making it more accountable but will not maximize its technical efficacy.  
According to the empiricist literature, both kinds of work are required in an integrated, 
complementary and coordinated fashion.  Multilateral financial institutions, particularly 
the World Bank, are increasingly calling for ‘working from above’ partnerships between 
(donor-financed) intermediary development NGOs and the state in the formation and 
implementation of development policies conducive to tackling poverty. 
 
 
5.6 Development Impasse 
 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the theoretical inadequacies of the 
dominant trends in the literature on NGOs.  On the one hand, there is an ‘empiricist’ 
literature that is under-theorized and that investigates development NGOs within the 
confines of an un-deconstructed concrete totality.  Yet, implicit in this literature are 
familiar epistemological assumptions about the trajectory of development and progress 
that underlie liberal modernization theories.  On the other hand, there are deconstruction 
approaches that offer important sociological insights, but which ultimately ‘fit’ NGOs 
into an understanding of ‘development’ as an un-reconstructed abstract totality.   In this 
regard, it is notable that, for decades, meta-theories in the form of liberal modernization 
theories and Marxist paradigms dominated analyses of social and economic development.  
Munck speaks of the ‘political overdetermination of development theory’ because these 
theoretical approaches were constantly used in the service of political agendas whether 
imperialist or revolutionary.  He also suggests that their failures were ‘due less to their 
conceptual inconsistencies than to their collapse as political strategies’ (Munck 
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1993:p.114).  This has led to what has become called the development crisis or impasse 
in development theory. 
 
Modernization theory arose after the Second World War and was significantly influenced 
by Parson’s general theory of social action and value-orientation.  But Parson’s 
interpretation of Weber (on whom he based much of his work) did not adequately focus 
on the sociological question of ‘meaning’ as in a strictly Weberian understanding of 
social action, and in the end his modernization theory is more grounded in positivism.  
Parson’s distinction between irrational and rational modes of social action led to a 
normative and teleological foundation for development studies in which pre-modern 
forms of sociability and association were seen as un-genuine and antithetical to the 
modern development process.  Weber linked instrumental rationality and civil-type social 
relations – rather than communal relations – to modernity.  But Parsonian modernization 
sociology, unlike Weber, had an uncritical faith in the ‘emancipatory telos of modernity’ 
(Gould 1997:p.11) and like Rostow’s economic growth theory it idealized American 
society as the seeming end of history.  Sinaceur (1983:p.6) speaks of this type of 
development theory as an example of the theory of poverty (in the ‘undeveloped’ world) 
masking the poverty of the theory.  
 
Marxist development studies arose in the 1960s, particularly amongst scholars like Andre 
Gunder Frank who studied Latin America.  There is a diversity of approaches within 
Marxism, including dependency, modes of production and world systems theories, and 
the crisis in development theory largely affected this school of thought (Schuurman ed. 
1993).  Unlike classical Marxism, neo-Marxists did not argue that capitalism and 
imperialism had a historically progressive role in terms of worldwide development.  
Rather, much to their credit, they highlighted the contradictory structure of international 
capitalism that led to the underdevelopment and dependency of nations in the periphery 
despite endogenous and auto-centric import substitution strategies.   Many of the debates 
within Marxist development theory have revolved around the causes of 
‘underdevelopment’, firstly, in terms of the primacy of production vis-à-vis circulation 
and, secondly, with regard to the primary of class relations vis-à-vis core-periphery 
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relations.  Neo-Marxists have been criticized for many of the points raised earlier when 
discussing postmodernism, notably essentialism, determinism, economism and an almost 
full-fledged structuralism in which ‘structure has absorbed the subject’ (Slater 
1993:p.101).   
 
 
5.7 Significance of Neo-Liberal Development Thinking 
 
The impasse in development theory emerged in the context of the wane of socialism and 
the rise of postmodernism.  During the 1980s there arose almost a vacuum in 
development theory, and neo-liberal thought ‘turned the crisis to its advantage’ 
(Schuurman 1993a:p.11).  There seems little doubt that neo-liberal development thinking 
has impacted significantly on development discourses and practices, although its 
assumptions are highly contested within the academic literature (Amin 1997, de Rivero 
2001).  Despite the pronounced ‘post-modern shift in social theory’, modernization as 
found in neo-liberalism is still ‘the predominant descriptor of the directionality of social 
processes’ (Gould 1997:p.19 his emphasis).  Neo-liberal modernization theory is very 
much rooted in modernism, and it carries with it the ‘untenable metaphysical starting 
points’ (Schuurman 1993a:p.22) of Parsonian social theory.  Development thus continues 
to be conceptualized as a linear evolutionary pattern with an intrinsic telos and fixed end, 
despite increasing recognition amongst social and political theorists of the contingencies 
and uncertainties of the trajectory of the contemporary world system (Wallerstein and 
Editors 2002).  Neo-liberal modernization theory was initially unsympathetic to the 
nation-state, notably in the 1980s.  This is evident from the SAPs that reduced state 
intervention in the national economies of the South and East and, unintentionally, also 
reduced state capacity and effectiveness.  But, with much gusto, neo-liberalism (in its 
revised form) now calls for a symbiotic synergy between state, market and civil society.   
The dominant civil society quasi-paradigm, as discussed in the previous chapter, does 
likewise, at least implicitly.  The revised paradigm emphasizes the capacity of state 
functions rather than simply the scope of these functions.  
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Fukuyama, a leading neo-liberal theorist, argues that in the South, particularly in Africa, 
there has been insufficient local demand for political and economic reform.  In a highly 
Eurocentric manner, he asserts (rather than demonstrates) that ‘[w]ell-meaning developed 
countries have tried a variety of strategies for stimulating such local demand, from loan 
conditionality to outright military occupation.’ (Fukuyama 2004:p.30)  The World Bank 
argues that SAPs and loan conditionalities failed in the past because nation-states, with 
their corrupt and patrimonial inclinations, refused to reform despite commitments to the 
contrary.  Development aid is now given only to nation-states with solid institutional 
structures and ‘good governance’, and that are firmly on the road to reform. With respect 
to incapacitated nation states, notably those in sub-Saharan Africa, multilateral financial 
institutions like the World Bank transfer capacity-building knowledge and support state-
building initiatives rather than provide direct development aid that will be 
misappropriated or have limited impact (Stern 2002, Coady et al. 2004).  Stimulating 
civil society is seen as critical to promoting and sustaining state reform.   
 
As Gould (1997) notes: ‘Societies which don’t respond to the prescribed kick-start of 
market liberalization … are no longer dealt with by “the international community” in 
terms of “modernization”.  Such countries are targeted for investments in improving 
“governance” and, if this fails to improve their debt-servicing behavior, they may be 
eligible for humanitarian assistance if and when their endemic crises flare up in an 
outburst of ethnic or ecological catastrophe. … For the time being, development – i.e., 
“becoming more like us” – is beyond reach.’ (Gould 1997:p.20)  Yet, development, 
modernization and progress as intertwined processes are still taken as givens within neo-
liberal thought.  Hence, what is made problematic by neo-liberals is not the development 
process itself but obstacles to its implementation in the form of ‘bad governance’.  This 
falsely implies that the problems blocking development are primarily (if not solely) 
rooted in the periphery (and are thus ‘de-globalized’), that ‘the developers’ understand 
most fully the problems besetting the periphery and that these outsiders have readily 
identified the solution to the development deficits.  To the contrary, world systems theory 
correctly highlights the significance of the global moment in bringing about 
‘underdevelopment’ in the South and East.  Thus, World Bank propagation of civil 
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society-induced reforms may only serve to entrench global forms of domination (Amin 
1997, Petras 1997). 
 
 
5.8 Transcending the Impasse: Neo-Weberian Insights and Development Interfaces 
 
Marxist theorists continue to offer critical appraisals of modernization theory, now in its 
current neo-liberal version.  In the context of studies of globalization, they also continue 
to provide the most powerful grand theoretical narratives for understanding world 
capitalism.  And these narratives continue to have a certain resonance for and within 
development studies.  Yet, to remain transfixed within the confines of the debate between 
neo-liberals and neo-Marxists would involve being caught in a ‘realist’ trap that simply 
reproduces and intensifies the development impasse.  In this regard, the very existence of 
an ‘impasse’, or the form it assumes, may be contested within the development literature. 
From the particular sociological perspective contained within this thesis, the impasse 
arose because development theory failed to integrate ‘the social’ into its analyses.   More 
specifically, development theory was insensitive to a Weberian notion of ‘the social’ in 
the sense of meaning-laden social action.  As Gould notes, over the past two decades 
‘sociological interests have re-emerged within mainstream Development Studies’ (Gould 
1997:p.xi).  This re-orientation involves a sustained focus on the critical sociological 
notion of ‘meaning’.  The development thoughts of modernization and Marxist theory, 
with their grand realist meta-theories involving an unhealthy concoction of empiricist and 
structuralist ingredients, have always involved a form of explanatory overkill.  In doing 
so, these theories have tended to ‘neglect or even deny much of what is specifically 
human about human societies: action and interaction, history, culture and the “social 
construction of reality”’ (Booth 1993:p.50).   
 
Neo-Weberian notions are critical in the reconstruction ‘stage’ of development studies, 
particularly in overcoming instrumentalist and functionalist analyses that conceptualize 
development (and the development industry) as some sort of rigid linear hierarchy and 
(mechanistic) conveyor-belt process.  Meaningful social action is important for making 
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sense of the social interfaces that mark (actually existing) processes of development and 
democratic change, and it elucidates how NGOs interface through ‘negotiation’ with 
global donors, agrarian communities and nation-states.  To talk about for instance the 
‘puppetization’ of NGOs by donors (Zaidi 1999:p.211) may be an appealing metaphor 
but it is not a compelling argument.  It reduces the NGO and donor interface to 
unadulterated relations of domination, manipulation and imposition.  It leaves us at the 
‘level’ of (un-reconstructed) abstract totalities in the case of Marxists and (un-
deconstructed) concrete totalities in the case of the empiricist NGO literature. 
 
Development interfaces should not be seen as watertight boundaries between fixed 
groupings and involving one-way flows of development aid resources (for example, 
technology, information and power) between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  Development practice 
entails socially constructed and negotiated processes rather than the simple execution or 
mechanical imposition of already-specified plans of action employing fixed methods and 
with expected outcomes.  The boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are fluid and porous.  
Further, they are reconstituted and reconfigured on a continual basis.  They thus entail 
two-way (and not one-way) processes of meaning and knowledge construction, and 
involve a nexus of negotiated exchanges that give participants potential space to 
manoeuvre.  As Long and Villarreal argue with specific reference to the development 
interface in the rural areas, interfaces ‘are characterised by discontinuities [and not 
always linkages] in interests, values and power, and their dynamic entails negotiation, 
accommodation and the struggle over definitions and boundaries.’ (Long and Villarreal 
1993:p.143) 
 
By studying such interfaces, it is possible to see ‘the processes by which policy is 
transformed, how “empowerment” and room for manoeuvre is created by both 
intervenors and “clients”, and how persons are enrolled in the “projects” of others 
through the use of metaphors and images of development.’ (Long and Villarreal 1993:p. 
143)  Development interfaces involve reconfigurations of (relations of) power, 
knowledge and meaning along and across the interface, and interfaces are marked by flux 
and ambiguities.  Studying interfaces involves a process of de-centring, based on the 
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recognition that interfaces entail ‘two way processes’ or ‘exchanges’.  Admittedly, these 
NGO interfaces are not ‘equal’ exchanges because they invariably entail power relations.  
Yet, power relations are not unbridled forms of domination devoid of ‘meaning’.  Power 
at NGO interfaces is expressed in and through meanings that are ‘carried’ to these 
interfaces.  As a result, and irrespective of the NGO interface being considered, one 
particular ‘side’ of the interface should not be over-privileged analytically.  Traditionally, 
the more powerful ‘side’ has been given ‘causal primacy’.  De-centring does not imply 
that the analysis should be re-centred elsewhere.  Nevertheless, this thesis highlights the 
importance of valorizing the perspective of NGOs themselves in order to ‘capture’ the 
meanings that they bring to their social interfaces.   
 
The world of NGO interfaces cannot be ‘read’ from ‘structural’ analyses of relations of 
domination in an unmediated fashion independent of NGO organizational practices.  
And, unlike the ‘empiricist’ trend, these NGO practices cannot be ‘read’ as forms of 
action unmediated by the meanings embodied in these practices.  It is important then to 
move constantly between the deconstruction and reconstruction ‘stages’ as this allows the 
sociologist to seriously consider the meaning-laden NGO world ‘from within’.  In a 
similar vein, Booth argues (1993:p.61) that it is critical to bridge the yawning gap 
between ‘local action studies and macro-structural analysis’ and, in doing so, to analyze 
even the micro-foundations of macro-structures.  Hence, in terms of the structure-agency 
dichotomy and debate within the social sciences, the question is not simply the relative 
autonomy of action vis-à-vis structures but also how meaningful action is involved in the 
constitution and reconstitution of structures.   
 
It may appear that NGOs are ‘puppets’ of donors and that donors are in complete control 
of the development wheel, but this ‘impression’ is skin-deep and fails to unravel ‘hidden’ 
processes of negotiated meaning.  Indeed, from the perspective of NGOs and the 
meanings they give to their world, it may be that they are in control.  By not resisting 
donor conditionalities (including development methods and forms of accountability and 
reporting), they are ‘working the system’.  They are sustaining their organizations if not 
necessarily providing sustainable development in rural communities. Crewe and Harrison 
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(1998:p.157) suggest that compliance (when it occurs) by rural under-classes to 
development initiatives from outside may be understood in a similar light, and that 
compliance lies somewhere between conscious manipulation of the poor by NGOs and 
the internalization of external (de-localized) values by these classes.  These recipients of 
NGO practices may give the impression that NGOs are in full control.  While NGO 
practitioners may be stressing capacity building and self-reliance of rural communities, 
these communities may be considering ‘development’ as just another means of socially 
(and physically) reproducing themselves.  In this sense, rural under-classes are actively 
engaged in strategizing and they seek to localize development projects – including 
‘modern’ and ‘rational’ technologies – by adopting, internalizing, appropriating, 
reconfiguring and inserting them into their own worlds based on their own sets of 
malleable values and interests (Gould 1997).  Of course, at times, development practice is 
an imposition on rural communities and thus they may have limited or no room to 
negotiate, manoeuvre and strategize.   
 
In this context, the treatment of the global donor and agrarian community interfaces by 
the ‘empiricist’ NGO literature is explored below.  This literature fails in large part to 
address the negotiated quality of these two interfaces, and it represents actually existing 
development as a ‘transmission-belt methodology of knowledge-based development 
assistance’ (Ellerman 2003:p.27).  These NGO interfaces are increasingly referred to in 
the development industry as ‘partnerships’.  This notion entails a re-conceptualization of 
the development industry.  The foundation of the industry is now said to be vertical 
divisions marked by equity, rather than horizontal divisions defined by power 
differentials.  In this regard, partnerships are understood within the industry as a technical 
means for maximizing management efficiency and enhancing downward accountability 
instead of a political question directly addressing relations of power (Crewe and Harrison 
1998:p.90).  Again, this clearly treats interfaces instrumentally, as ‘partnership’ becomes 
another means for making the industry more effective.  Like other notions used by NGOs, 
the term ‘partnership’ involves a simplifying dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and 
seeks to suture and manage the relationship in a conceptually uncomplicated, 
organizationally efficient and risk-free manner.  This ‘partnership’ representation of 
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NGO interfaces thus privileges simplicity, ordering and coherence.  Yet, in terms of 
actual development practice, the notion of ‘partnership’ raises the prospect that NGO 
interfaces involve intense processes of negotiation no matter the outcome. 
 
 
5.9 Global Donors-NGO Interface 
 
At first sight it might appear that the relationship between donors and NGOs is marked 
by mutual dependency.  On the one hand, NGOs need ongoing donor funds to sustain 
themselves.  Simultaneously, donors need NGOs so that funds can be readily disbursed 
and hence visible progress in the field made and reported on.  However, the ‘empiricist’ 
literature repeatedly stresses the imbalances built into the aid system and how, without 
external funding from donors, the vast majority of NGOs in the East and South would be 
functional non-entities.  It is thus argued that NGOs are ‘a creation of funding agencies’ 
(Zaidi 1999:p.204) and that they are instruments of donor agendas.  Foreign aid agencies 
are said to control both the form and content of the aid system in which NGOs are 
immersed.  Yet, it would seem that NGOs work the system by being led ‘by what will 
attract funding, rather than by what most needs to be done’ (Rowlands 2003:p.9).   
 
This NGO practice is recognized within the NGO literature, but it is presented as an 
almost forced capitulation of NGOs to domineering donor interests rather than as a 
negotiated outcome beneficial to both parties.  Thus, donor dependence is described in 
the literature as the Achilles heel of NGOs.  The negative implications of this donor 
dependency is at times vividly shown when foreign donors decide to bypass NGOs and 
fund grassroots groups (or even the nation-state) directly; when donors withdraw their 
funding completely in protest against an authoritarian regime; or when political reforms 
demonstrate that outside financial assistance on notably political governance and human 
rights is no longer warranted.   
 
External aid to NGOs in the South and East comes in varied and often complex forms.  
Official aid, which for NGOs has increased in importance in recent years, comes from the 
  113 
Northern tax-base and is disbursed through bilateral and multilateral agencies.  Private 
aid from voluntary donations and investment income is channelled through various non-
governmental bodies including charities, foundations and northern NGOs.  Grants from 
bilateral donors are often tied to the national interests of the nation-state they represent.  
Thus, any regional policy shifts by northern nation-states, for example from regime 
change to regime stabilization, may undermine NGOs and the democratic project of civil 
societies in the effected region.  Many northern NGOs also receive official aid but are no 
longer field operational in Africa.  Rather, they disburse aid to southern or indigenous 
NGOs, particularly those involved in rural development.  An adviser to northern NGOs 
argues that these bodies, with few exceptions, are ‘under important pressures to behave in 
new ways’.  This compromises their autonomy and independence: ‘These are pressures 
coming from the new policy agenda, and it is my feeling that they do not allow … 
[northern NGOs]… to behave in ways that contribute to improving social capital [or 
social energy] in regions such as southern Africa.’ (Sogge 1997:p.48)    
 
Other non-governmental donors focus on the democracy and governance NGO sector.  
The agenda of these donors is often uncritically upheld by local NGOs and this may 
hinder organic change.  For instance, in the case of Kenya and gender issues, 
‘“globalised” notions of rights’ have been applied ‘uncritically especially on issues that 
relate to the empowerment of rural women’ (Ngunyi 1999:p.130).  Some NGOs at times 
receive grants or subsidies from central government but current budgetary realities and 
the debt crisis severely inhibit this in Africa at least.  NGOs are also contracted by 
government to provide certain social services.  They frequently receive limited 
contributions from the corporate sector and other donations in cash or kind.  As well, they 
may engage in their own trading and income-generating projects.  However, in much of 
south and east Africa, the regulatory, fiscal and tax regimes are not conducive to these 
alternative forms of funding.  This compromises the financial sustainability of NGOs, as 
‘the building of an indigenous funding base is essential to sustaining the capacity of 
NGOs.’ (Yaansah and Simon 1997:p.138)  
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The ‘empiricist’ literature highlights a range of donor practices that seriously inhibit good 
performance amongst NGOs.  Project financing and the focus on tangible outcomes by 
donors push development NGOs to work with more accessible clients who already have a 
degree of capacity, thereby likely excluding the poorer and more marginalized segments 
of agrarian communities.  Often the same output criteria used for NGDOs, namely short-
term tangibles, are applied uncritically and un-problematically in assessing and judging 
human rights and advocacy NGOs.  Donors need to focus more on organizational 
outcomes and to reinforce the institutional capacity of NGOs.  This involves not just 
increased funding but important procedural matters pertaining to timing, strategic 
planning and continuity.  This would contribute to easing the withdrawal pains of a NGO 
as it winds down one project and turns to another.  This does not undermine or negate the 
project concept, but it means ‘more flexible arrangements in which any one project can 
become part of a program or a development sequence. Donors could also make 
institutional support dependent on more active client rotation and organizational 
outreach.’ (Carroll 1992:p.164)  Many donors are reluctant to continue financing any 
specific NGO or project for an extended period of time in order to discourage 
dependency and complacency.  But longer-term programme financing is seen as critical 
and would entail continual dialogue about objectives and strategies and not just a 
specification of outputs and targets.  In the case of Zambia, ‘[t]he short donor cycles… 
result in local NGOs having to settle for short planning horizons, no security for 
employees, and thereby not being able to attract the necessary local expertise.’ (Mudenda 
1999:p.170)   
 
Donors sometimes view NGOs as strictly temporary until more ‘genuine’ membership-
based organizations can take over. Yet NGOs continue to complement and reinforce 
membership organizations in areas where they are vulnerable or weak. Carroll argues: 
‘Projects should be designed with specific reporting requirements based on criteria for 
building beneficiary capacity.  Longer-term commitments, moral or contractual, will not 
impair donor supervision or grantee accountability if the arrangement is well phased and 
provides for periodic reviews and adjustment.  What is important is to maximize the 
capability of the “worthy” … [intermediary NGOs]… to develop their full potential in an 
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atmosphere of greater security and in which ... [NGO]… leaders are less preoccupied by 
fund-raising and routine reporting.’ (Carroll 1992:p.165)   Donors should strengthen the 
institutional capacity of NGOs and also give them the organizational, financial and 
technical skills to effectively assist in local grassroots organizational development.  If 
not, then indigenous NGOs become and remain as ‘local managers of foreign aid money, 
not managers of local African development processes’ (Nyang’oro 1993:p.47).  
 
The quality of aid therefore is of particular concern in the empiricist literature, including 
the growing significance of official – rather than private – aid to NGOs.   Quality is 
defined as ‘the product of ideas, conditions and modalities of development finance when 
set against the requirements of good practice in development work.’  (Fowler 2000:p.39)  
Good donor practice may vary across development goals and activities, but quality is 
expressed as ‘an ability to tailor assistance to the specific requirements of different good 
practices in different situations.’ (Fowler 2000:p.39 emphasis removed)  The common 
short-term nature of project-based funding rather than core funding undermines 
sustainable social change and separates the impact of development from the whole 
system that provides it.  This makes it difficult to assess the quality of aid.   
 
Impediments to improving aid quality currently are, amongst other things, the struggle 
over defining an overhead; the cleavage between investments in capacity building for 
project delivery on the one hand and for strengthening NGOs as civic groups in good 
governance on the other; and the mendicant stance of many NGOs.  Also, donors often 
provide funding in terms of sectors and, as a result, major investments in NGOs 
correspond to the divisional structures of donors (or example, water or education).  This 
leads to a homogenized development monoculture and inhibits the multi-dimensional 
integrated area approaches of NGDOs that may show their comparative advantages as 
agents of social development.  Yet, donors themselves in the face of falling aid levels in 
real terms also are concerned about aid quality, and the sharpened emphasis on this rather 
than volume has lead to greater donor concern with ‘monitoring, reporting and 
accounting procedures, and to an increased channelling of resources into strengthening 
capacity and training people’ in NGOs (Archer 1994:p.31). 
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The effectiveness and credibility of aid is being reduced for various reasons and there 
may be diminishing grounds for justifying its continuation, at least in its current form.  
For example, there is pressure to disburse aid so that the volume of funding is not 
reduced or cut altogether, and thus the donor culture values approval of disbursement 
over development impact.  Further, sometimes aid is allocated not for poverty alleviation 
purposes but to penetrate potential markets for domestic business.  Also, a sense of 
powerlessness in dealing with donors drives governments to treat aid in a fungible 
manner.  A key to reform is ‘to create a system that ensures and enforces authentic 
negotiation of truly shared agendas and objectives within mutually agreed parameters’; 
and the system must have ‘objectives and commitments that are jointly and fairly shared, 
owned in and by the South and East and transparently governed.’ (Fowler 2000:pp.43, 44 
emphasis removed)   
 
This means creating a space between the (national) interests of northern donors and the 
funds they disburse so that negotiations can take place on a more level playing field 
where the ultimate objectives of poverty alleviation and social equity are prioritized and 
guarded by shared governance.  This might entail development funds positioned at an 
equal distance from the institutions that provide, use and are affected by them.  There is 
also need for reform involving negotiation of more equitable relations in terms of mutual 
and balancing rights and obligations of each party (or ‘partner’) in an open and 
transparent manner (Fowler 2000).  The ultimate aim then is to somehow shift the 
balance of power and to ensure that all stakeholders in the international aid system, 
including donors, NGOs and the rural under-classes, become full and equal partners. 
 
This ‘empiricist’ analysis of NGOs and donors rarely questions in any significant manner 
the ideal of development, even as understood in a neo-liberal sense.  While certain 
problems between donors and NGOs do exist, these are not seen as structural or systemic 
problems but can be properly tackled through reform (fine-tuning) or ‘changing the rules’ 
of the aid system.  It is thus unlikely that development reformers would agree with the 
conclusion of de Rivero (2001:p.114) that ‘[i]nternational aid, the daughter of the myth of 
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development, is paradoxically the clearest testimony of non-development’.  In an 
instrumentalist fashion, donors are perceived by the ‘empiricist’ trend as all-powerful.  
But, at the same time, they are largely depicted as benevolent in seeking to bring about 
social and economic development in the South and East.   
 
 
5.10 Agrarian Communities-NGO Interface 
 
As a result, donors (that is, ‘the global’) are not labelled as problematic from the 
perspective of NGOs.  This designation is rather reserved for the rural under-classes or 
agrarian communities in the South and East (that is, ‘the local’).  There exists the ongoing 
clarion call amongst donors and NGOs for ‘participation’ and even ‘empowerment’ of 
rural communities in development programmes.  The ‘local’ is often presented by global 
donors as not fitting properly into the global development paradigm or system, or as not 
acting like a modern entity, and thus it requires fixing.  In other words, the instrument of 
development is missing its mark because the ‘mark’ (‘the poor’) is not cooperating.  
Development – to be effective – has to be de-localized or globalized.  As Crewe and 
Harrison note, ‘[a]ccounting for failure and improving practices usually entail looking to 
the recipients, the supposed beneficiaries who are not behaving as expected’ (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998: p.15).   
 
This rural deficiency takes on many forms and is expressed in different ways.  It is 
regularly argued that the social capital of rural communities needs to be strengthened 
through capacity building (by experts), or that rural social and organizational forms need 
to take on more modern or civil forms, or that communities need to participate more fully 
in the development process.  Quite often, the deficiency is linked to the notion of culture.  
Developers view culture as a timeless (anti-development) pre-modern entity that 
continues to structure rural community life.  It is used as a simplifying notion to make 
sense of development problems, particularly those problems that seem to have no easily 
understood or ‘modern’ cause, and thus culture becomes a residual analytical category 
(Crewe and Harrison 1998).  Culture is seen as rooted in communal forms of social 
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organization and it severely inhibits modern economic rational self-interest based on 
individualism.  It is also invariably equated with the use of outmoded and unscientific 
(indigenous) technologies and knowledge-systems, and it often blocks the introduction of 
modern (value-free) technologies into rural economies and households.  Developers – 
donors and NGOs – propagate utility-maximizing rationality and sophisticated 
technology as symbols of an impartial and unquestioned universal modernity.  As a 
result, ‘general solutions manufactured from the outside are offered to problems which 
are highly localised’ (Edwards 1993:p.78).   
 
In this regard, it may appear that ‘tradition’ (or culture) is defined in temporal terms as 
‘pre-modern’ sociability as part of some evolutionary schema.  But, in effect, ‘tradition’ 
has spatial connotations in that modernity is located outside ‘the local’ and has to be 
brought into the rural community, or at least the developers have to nurture the genes of 
modernity (for example, individualism) latent within the community.  For instance, ‘the 
value of knowledge is predetermined by the source of knowledge’ (who holds it) not 
‘according to its utility for users when put into practice’ (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 
p.96).  Even if a particular modern technology is not accepted by and within ‘the local’, 
the technology itself – based on modern (outside) expertise – is never questioned.  
Culture, as pre-modernity, is respected and even celebrated by developers.  For example, 
it is said that indigenous knowledge-systems are sensitive to environmental sustainability 
and can be incorporated into development programmes, and that outside technologies 
must be appropriate to local socio-cultural systems. This approach, though, continues to 
reify and essentialize ‘culture’ as a pre-modern survivor (or hang over) in a modern age, 
and it views ‘culture’ instrumentally as a way of making development more effective and 
amenable to local acceptance. The current emphasis on participation and empowerment 
must be seen in the same light. 
 
Participation has now become a defining value of neo-liberal development, and is 
conceived as critical to democratic and equitable development.  Participation, as a civic 
value and duty, seems to be the volition-based ‘civil society’ solution to rural 
development deficiencies, much like civil society is the answer to national democratic 
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deficits.  In the empiricist NGO literature, participation is traditionally seen as a key 
comparative advantage of NGOs vis-à-vis the centralized top-down development 
strategies of the nation-state.  NGOs have been idealized as having an almost inherent 
capacity to activate and mobilize local communities in ongoing development processes.   
 
Participation is viewed in a multiplicity of ways, but normally it is seen as a goal in itself, 
as an associated goal or as the enhancer of other goals (Carroll 1992).  As a basis (or 
means) for the success of a specific development programme, it entails (ideally) the 
active involvement of community members in initial decisions, implementation and 
resource mobilization.  As a goal, participation entails building the institutional capacity 
of community groups in an ongoing manner, but (in the end) this is just another means 
for promoting (in this case, sustainable) development.  Further, intermediary NGOs 
involved in rural development are often criticized for their non-accountability vis-à-vis 
the rural under-classes, and thus participation is also linked to maximizing downward 
accountability and enhancing NGO legitimacy by more directly serving if not 
representing the agrarian poor (Ebrahim 2003).   
 
In all these ways, participation is viewed instrumentally and is seen to overcome 
problems existing in rural communities.  In other words, the primary agenda of NGOs is 
to ‘“adjust” the poor to fit in (and thus benefit from)’ standardized NGO programmes 
(Power et al. 2003:p.91) or what Ellerman calls ‘universal best practices’ (Ellerman 
2003:p.32).  NGOs also seek ways of building their capacity and sometimes adjusting 
themselves to ‘fit’ the poor.  This implies that the problems located along the interface 
between NGOs and the rural under-classes are simply localized problems marked by 
skewed incapacities and maladjustments.  Rectifying this entails a process of internal 
reflection and evaluation within NGOs as well as the introduction of more refined 
participatory methodologies and tools, including organizational development theory 
(Plowman 2003), appreciative inquiry frameworks (Postma 2003), bottom-up 
organizational learning (Power et al. 2003) and participatory rural appraisals (Chambers 
1994, Johnson and Wilson 2000, Aune 2003, Leurs 2003). 
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It is recognized, though, that rural communities are not homogeneous and consensual 
entities but are heterogeneous and often arenas of social conflict. As a result, 
participation if not pursued properly may simply reproduce existing agrarian power 
relations.  In this context, participatory methodologies have been aptly described as 
‘double-edged swords’ (Ngunjiri 2003:p.227).  This has important implications for any 
development intervention, as the development aid system may simply be intervening in 
and escalating struggles within the community.  Cornwall notes with regard to gender 
divisions: ‘The question of who participates and who benefits raises awkward questions 
for participatory development.  The very projects that appear so transformative can turn 
out to be supportive of a status quo that is highly inequitable for women… [T]he 
marginalization or exclusion of women from participatory projects remains an issue… 
Women’s involvement is often limited to implementation’ (Cornwall 2003:pp.1328-1329, 
her emphasis) (Razavi and Miller 1995).  At times, then, NGOs have been guilty of 
deepening social stratification in a community, of consolidating the position of rural 
power-holders and of creating political conflict.  Thus, development projects can ‘lead to 
a myopia which may foster negative forces of exclusion, oppression and structural 
violence’ as happened in Rwanda (Thomas-Slater and Sodikoff 2003:p.144). 
 
An active rather than a passive role by NGOs as facilitators in the form of sensitive 
guidance is said to be critical for overcoming these potential problems.  It is therefore 
incorrect to see NGOs as possessing all the scientific and social knowledge needed for 
development but it is equally mistaken to see rural communities as the repository of all 
the wisdom that they need.  Rather, ‘the secret of effective external assistance is not only 
permanent consultation and two-way information flows but also a process that empowers 
the members of a local organization to analyze their own situation, figure out what the 
problems are, what options are available to resolve them, and how to choose workable 
options.’ (Carroll 1992:p.115)  NGOs may threaten the autonomy and genuineness of 
local groups while they wean rural groups from dependence on the services they provide; 
and they may enable these groups to deal autonomously and effectively with external 
power holders in society.  In other words, a hands-off, non-interfering stance is not an 
antidote to possible dependency or manipulation by outsiders: ‘Given Latin American 
  121 
social history, the fear of domination, paternalism, and co-optation is real, but 
sympathetic alliances, stimuli, teaching, protection, and prodding must not be 
downgraded.  They are essential elements in the organizational flowering process.’ 
(Carroll 1992:p.156)   As Kaplan (1999) argues, moving artfully along the complicated 
road to symmetrical interdependence between intermediary NGOs and grassroots bodies 
in rural communities is the critical issue, rather than encouraging dependence or 
independence.   
 
There is also considerable debate in the literature about which rural groups normally 
exhibit more promising participatory forms of local organization, either informal or more 
formally constituted groups.  Some argue that ‘building new institutions without taking 
existing social structures in account tends to be difficult; the main effect may be to bring 
confusion and social unrest to a community’ (Hadenius and Uggla 1996:p.1625).  At the 
same time, working with ‘traditional’ networks particularly those based on kinship 
structures may reinforce and exacerbate existing social cleavages.   Irrespective of the 
groups ‘targeted’, capacity building of groups is the crucial bridge between social service 
and social change roles: service provision is downward action toward the agrarian poor 
while social change involving mobilization and advocacy is the flow of energy from the 
grassroots upward.  Service provision can only be a sustainable and cumulative process if 
community-based institutions can effectively manage and control their resources.  And 
effectiveness in social change depends on a core of tangible benefits around which 
community mobilization and organization can take place.   
 
This is particularly noteworthy in present-day southern Africa ravaged by economic 
dislocation and the AIDS pandemic, and when the agrarian poor are preoccupied with 
bread and butter issues and the struggles of daily living.  NGOs, particularly those 
involved in governance, rights, research and information activities, need to demonstrate a 
clear functional utility by fulfilling basic human needs in order to legitimize their 
continued relevance and to enhance grassroots participation in their operations.  Indeed, 
there is a discernable trend as NGOs that advocate and mobilize increasingly recognize 
the need to provide tangible services in response to demands of the agrarian poor.  
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Simultaneously, development NGOs that provide tangible products increasingly see the 
importance of capacity building and social change.   In this sense, at times there appears 
to be a convergence between advocacy and development NGOs.  Despite this, most skills 
training in NGOs continue to focus on financial, administrative and technical subjects 
and much less on micro-organizational institution building within rural communities. 
Such incremental capacity building is only possible when donor-supported projects or 
programmes sequentially contribute to ongoing capacity development, but this rarely 
takes place.   
 
 
5.11 Beyond Participation? 
 
Participation has moved beyond the restricted notion of local participation by agrarian 
communities to broader questions about citizenship and rights.  As a first step, this has 
involved a shift away from a paternalistic mode of participation in which the rural under-
classes are passive objects to stakeholder participation in which these classes are active 
subjects.  This is designed to maximize project efficiency or enhance grassroots 
responsiveness in development programmes.  In turn, this has led to a conception of far-
reaching radical participation where agrarian residents are treated as citizens that develop 
their political consciousness and capabilities, and articulate and demand their rights 
(Cornwall 2003).  This would entail conceptualizing participation as what Fowler (2000) 
calls a ‘non-discretionary civic right’ or what has been referred to by another NGO 
activist from Africa as ‘a prenegotiated social contract with the community where the 
issues of democratic practice, accountability to that community and transparency of 
action of NGO personnel and its policy have first been resolved.’ (Jaffer 1997:p.74)  
 
Considering the asymmetrical power relations prevailing within the NGO and 
development networks, such a right may be difficult to assert and defend.  After all, the 
entire international aid system revolves around a series of conditions set by donors, 
whether at project or programme level or in terms of the broader economic and political 
conditions in the form of SAPs and good governance agendas.  Yet, ‘people’s 
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conditionalities’ as a basis for participation in development interventions have been 
proposed and even adopted at NGO conferences.  Dias, for example, argues that ‘there 
seems little reason why “project-affected peoples” cannot demand a set of “people’s 
conditionalities” invoking existing obligations under international human rights law, to 
protect themselves from being treated as an expendable resource in the development 
process.’ (Dias 1994:p.55)  What resources people have for projecting and implementing 
their own views of conditionality remain unclear. Yet, this focus on developmental 
‘rights’ for the agrarian poor seems to entail the formation of fully-fledged rural civil 
societies. 
 
In this regard, many intermediary NGOs are focusing increasingly on facilitating 
grassroots participation in local-cum-national policy formation processes involving 
lobbying, advocacy and mobilizing practices.  As well, while development interventions 
may seem largely technical in form and content, they invariably entail political matters 
that need to be addressed.  The progress of any development intervention may depend 
significantly on tackling these matters in a proactive and strategic manner.  Thus, ‘the 
development work of NGOs is by its very nature political…  NGOs do recognise that 
their work is necessarily political’, but without (at least overtly) being partisan in party 
political terms (Mbogori 1999:p.v).  In a weak sense, this means that engaging in any 
area of rural development (for example, access to water) invariably raises questions about 
government policies in that area.  In a strong sense, it involves the recognition that 
relationships in agrarian communities are relationships of power.  Participation is often 
perceived by development NGOs as a basis for empowering rural communities vis-à-vis 
national power holders.  MWENGO (2000b), as a resource body for NGOs in southern 
and East Africa, outlines various strategies for influencing state policy, and these include 
the media, legislation and litigation but also more broad-based civic alliances and mass 
action.  Urban-based advocacy and rights NGOs conceptualize the articulating of 
development rights and demands by rural under-classes in terms of the logic of the 
prevailing hegemonic civil society ‘paradigm’ discussed earlier.     
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What, though, about ‘empowerment’?  NGOs often speak about empowerment, although 
this is propagated in very nebulous, ill defined and broad terms such that doing anything 
with or for rural communities seems – almost mechanistically and automatically – to 
empower them.  Yet organizations like the World Bank are theorizing about the term.  
For instance Essama-Nssah as a senior economist with the Bank says that empowerment 
is now ‘the organising concept underpinning development thought, policies and 
programmes’ and that empowerment, much like participation, grants people ‘the right 
and the ability to act within a specified domain’ (Essama-Nssah 2004:p.509).  Again, like 
the notion of participation, this locates the blockages hindering development within ‘the 
local’.  Poverty is seen as a ‘capability deprivation’ or ‘capability failure’ amongst the 
poor, and development is designed to address this problem though ‘local ownership’ of 
development involving poor people as ‘full partners in the development process’ 
(Essama-Nssah 2004:pp.512, 515, 527).   
 
Empowerment in development, no matter how understood, objectifies power as a 
commodity that can be inserted from outside – or made manifest from within – by 
knowledgeable and benevolent outsiders.  Power is understood in the limited sense of the 
‘capacity’ (to use the language of the World Bank) to make decisions and act within the 
confines of existing relations of power, or what Lukes (1974) refers to as the ‘power to’.  
This empowerment does not challenge hidden and more fundamental forms of power 
(such as the ‘power over’) on which the global development system rests (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998). 
 
 
5.12 NGOs: Re-Constructing and Re-Centring Their World 
 
Intermediary NGOs are not cognizant analytically of the tension between the universal 
and the particular, or the global and the local.  But, because of their ‘intermediary’ 
position in the development system and industry, they acutely sense and experience this 
tension.  This tension in the world of NGOs does not simply entail discontinuities 
between intent and practice, that is, between on the one hand the idealism embodied in 
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the visions and missions of NGOs seeking a just and equitable world and, on the other, 
the pragmatism of engaging in organizational practices (sometimes implying just getting 
‘the job’ done and on schedule) that tend to uphold an unjust and inequitable world 
system.  Rather, the tension also leads to ambivalences, inconsistencies and 
contradictions internal to organizational practice, as NGOs are pulled (and pull 
themselves) in opposing directions based on conflicting loyalties and accountabilities 
arising from their ambivalent social field.  The existence of multiple social 
accountabilities revolves around nation-states, global donors and agrarian communities. 
This makes the ‘actually existing’ practices of NGOs, both in the offices and in the field, 
messy and muddy or at least marked by ambiguity and confusion.  
 
NGOs ‘handle’ or ‘manage’ these tensions in numerous different ways, and how and why 
they do so is always historically specific.  Yet, in large part, they are managed 
(‘externally’) along the porous boundaries of their social space and by means of 
(‘internal’) organizational practices.  In going beyond de-construction and seeking to re-
construct the world of NGOs as concrete organizational forms immersed in contradictory 
social processes, this thesis has brought to the fore the Weberian notion of ‘meaning’.  
The notion of ‘meaning’ goes beyond mechanistic, functionalist and instrumentalist 
conceptions of the interfaces that delimit the world of NGOs.  It thus highlights the 
‘negotiated’ quality of the NGO interfaces with the nation-state, global donors and 
agrarian communities.   
 
A sociological understanding of these complex interactions entails transcending the 
treatment of intermediary NGOs in terms of the object-subject dichotomy, in which 
inputs enter NGOs (as objects) and outputs are produced by NGOs (as subjects) in terms 
of effects.  At worst this might involve treating NGOs as ‘black boxes’ in which the 
internal mechanisms that translate inputs into outputs are left uninvestigated.  At best, it 
means failing to conceptualize how the ‘input-output’ process (as part of the ‘negotiated’ 
process) is involved in the very makeup and constitution of NGOs as organizational 
forms.  Ultimately, it is critical that any analysis of intermediary NGOs involves 
‘capturing’ and making sense of organizational processes within NGOs.   
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Any such ‘thick descriptions’ of NGO practices must by necessity entail a re-centring of 
the sociological investigation in such a way that the world of NGOs is seen from the 
perspective of NGOs themselves.  In other words, it is crucial that sociologists 
understand the meanings that NGOs give to themselves, to their world and to their 
‘partners’ in contradictory processes of ‘democratic development’.  These meanings 
cannot be deduced or asserted from ‘outside’ but must be read ‘from within’ in the form 
of, so to speak, an insider’s perspective.  Social interfaces are soaked with conflicting 
definitions and meanings.  The meanings that global donors, agrarian communities and 
nation-states give to their interfaces with NGOs may be considerably different than the 
meanings that NGOs themselves carry with them.   
 
Thus, associated with ‘development’ is a range of different meanings and potentials, and 
these include contradictory conceptions of development ‘effect’ and ‘impact’.  For 
example, in the case of the NGO-agrarian community interface, the rural ‘poor’ may 
choose to (or not to) be ‘integrated’ into a development process facilitated from ‘outside’ 
on any number of different ‘rationale’ grounds.  Byrceson for instance notes: ‘Farmers 
may view projects without lasting results … as beneficial to progress if some community 
members’ life chances are improved.’ (Bryceson 2000c:p.321)  And Carroll argues that 
active participation by communities ‘represents a cost to individuals, which is not likely 
to be incurred unless there is a perceived benefit.’ (Carroll 1992:p.92)  How NGOs and 
the rural under-classes view ‘participation’ may differ considerably.  From the 
perspective of NGOs, participation as an ideal is seen as adding value by contributing to 
sustainable and equitable development.  Yet, simultaneously, it adds complexity to their 
work such that, in practice, it is often downgraded in importance.  Hence Carroll adds: 
‘Service delivery can be reasonably effective without much active involvement by the 
beneficiaries.’ (Carroll 1992:p.93)   
 
It will be argued later that NGOs seek to handle the tensions between the global and the 
local that they experience by trying to bring simplicity, order and closure to their world of 
ambivalence.  These ‘stabilizing’ activities become embodied within ‘actually existing’ 
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organizational practices.  Acts of stabilization are not simply found or reflected in the 
official representations of NGO work that regularly wax eloquently about simple 
development successes.   Rather, they are ingrained within the everyday work of NGOs.  
The predominant trajectory of these ‘stabilization’ practices push intermediary NGOs in 
the direction of privileging ‘the global’ and making problematic ‘the local’.  This was 
brought out in my discussions about the discursive practices of NGOs that focus on civil 
society, democracy and development.  I have labelled this trajectory as a Glocal 
modernity rather than a gLocal modernity.  This trajectory needs to be conceptualized as 
a negotiated outcome rather than as an imposition.  In the end, then, this Glocal 
modernity is ‘owned’ by NGOs: it is their modernity.   
 
The discussion so far provides the epistemological and theoretical backdrop for the 
balance of the thesis.   The remaining chapters provide a rich array of historical and 
comparative material that is designed to illustrate rather than prove the sociological 
argument about NGOs that is developed in the thesis.   The main empirical focus of the 
thesis is land reform and NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe.  The next four chapters 
(Chapter Six through to Chapter Nine) look at land reform in the modern world in 
relation to both global and local (Zimbabwean) developments.  They provide the agrarian 
context within which intermediary ‘land’ NGOs can be understood and ‘measured’.  The 
next four chapters (Chapters Ten to Thirteen) detail the world of ‘land’ NGOs in 
Zimbabwe from the mid-1990s onwards.  There is an extensive discussion of both 
advocacy and development NGOs in processes of social change, along with two case 
studies that offer ‘thick descriptions’ of the work of ‘land’ NGOs in the face of the 
accelerated land reform programme. 
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Chapter 6 
Global Land Reform Policies 
 
 
In the next two chapters I explore land reform from a contemporary global perspective.  
Chapter Six deals with questions of global land policies, and Chapter Seven concerns 
global land struggles.   In this chapter, a conceptual overview of ‘agrarian’ and ‘land’ 
reform is offered, including important distinctions between these two kinds of reform.  
This is necessary in order to more clearly understand what the involvement of 
intermediary NGOs in land reform actually (or potentially) entails.  The chapter discusses 
a neo-liberal trajectory of reform that has become prevalent in the East and South, 
although its impact has been highly uneven.  The historical roots of this reform trajectory 
will be outlined, along with current debates about market-led reform and agricultural 
performance.   
 
 
6.1 Agrarian and Land Reform  
 
There are four main conceptual points about land and agrarian reform that need to be 
highlighted for purposes of this thesis.  First of all, it is crucial not to conflate these two 
kinds of reform and, especially, not to reduce (broader) agrarian reform to (narrower) 
land reform.  Although these reforms are significantly intertwined as part of complex 
rural-cum-national social processes, they are not synonymous.  A considerable portion of 
the academic literature about land reform, including on Zimbabwe, regrettably fails (at 
least explicitly) to make this conceptual distinction, and thus the terms ‘agrarian’ and 
‘land’ are often used interchangeably.  Because of this, claims in the sparse literature on 
the role of NGOs in agrarian and land reform are sometimes obscure.  This will be 
highlighted in Chapter Ten. 
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Two recent works, to which I intermittently refer later in the chapter, are very suggestive 
of the distinction and its relevance.  First of all, in their broad overview of contemporary 
rural restructuring in the South and East, Moyo and Yeros note that land and agrarian 
matters are often ‘treated synonymously’ by scholars (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.24), 
particularly with regard to regions where large-scale farming and landlordism 
predominate such as in much of Latin America and in southern Africa.  In these regions, 
where land-short peasants exist in significant numbers, it may be easily (but erroneously) 
concluded that wide-sweeping land reform (for example, land redistribution) is of such 
critical importance that such reform largely resolves social inequalities and productivity 
constraints within the agrarian political economy.  Yet, the implementation of land 
reform programmes regularly takes place within the confines of non-egalitarian agrarian 
systems.  Historical events in Latin America, Asia and Africa clearly demonstrate that 
land reforms ‘may disturb the relations of production only marginally, if at all.  
Redistribution of land may take place, but the differentiations within the agricultural 
community survive and may indeed be perpetuated.’ (Sobhan 1993:p.19)   
 
A second important work is by Mafeje (2003) with specific respect to Africa.  He 
distinguishes between agrarian and land reform by arguing that, in non-settler societies, 
significant alienation of land did not occur during the colonial integration of peasant 
economies into the world economy.  Thus, in West Africa, where there was considerable 
foreign investment but a limited settler presence, out-grower and contractual schemes – 
involving for instance cocoa –  thrived based on an ‘autonomous’ peasantry with ready 
access to land.  As a result, a land problem does not exist in post-colonial West Africa but 
a gnawing agrarian question does, although other writers dispute this. 4  Nevertheless, as 
suggested above, tackling the land question in former settler societies (like South Africa 
and Zimbabwe) does not resolve the broader agrarian question.  Kepe and Cousins thus 
argue that, in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, land reform ‘[a]lthough necessary 
… will only be effective if embedded within a broader programme to restructure the 
agrarian economy.’ (Kepe and Cousins 2002:p.2)   
                                         
4 For instance, Moyo (2004) has noted increasing land concentration and alienation in post-colonial Africa 
outside of former settler capitalist societies, and this has thereby led to a marked land question in these 
societies. 
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Land reform, such as set out explicitly in the current constitution of South Africa, 
normally involves three components, namely, land redistribution, land restitution and 
land tenure changes.  However, the particular mix of these components is open to 
significant historical variation and is a product of social struggle.  Subsequent to the 
recent turbulent events in Zimbabwe, a regional group of land specialists has argued that 
land tenure reform in southern Africa is ‘a less immediate issue’ than land redistribution 
(TT 2003:p.2).  Yet, the form that land tenure takes within resettlement areas is of critical 
significance in structuring access to (and possession of) land and the social organization 
of production.  Sometimes these different aspects of land reform pull in opposing 
directions as, for example, when (under market-led reform) privatized land tenure is 
promoted at the expense of pursuing a more re-distributive thrust;5 or when re-
distribution occurs on a significant scale but questions of land tenure rights in existing 
customary lands (as in southern Africa) are not addressed.    
 
Agrarian reform, on the other hand, deals with the broader political economy in the 
countryside.  It relates to ‘the transition to capitalist production in the rural areas’ and the 
extent to which ‘capitalism penetrated and transformed agriculture and proletarianised the 
rural population’ (Hendricks 2000:p.41).  On a global scale, this ‘transformation’ has 
been remarkably variable and uneven.  And, within particular localities, it has led to 
highly differentiating effects on rural communities and to complex kinds of class 
formation.  Generally speaking, questions about class formation revolve around the 
notions of ‘peasantry’ and ‘proletariat’.   
 
For those rural inhabitants still involved in peasant-based production, the agrarian 
question involves confronting such day-to-day problems as ‘extractive state policies, lack 
of infrastructure, lack of proper market facilities, exploitation by middlemen and 
unscrupulous traders, all of which militate against [peasant-led] accumulation from 
below’ (Mafeje 2003:p.23).  For members of the rural proletariat, the question involves 
                                         
5 Moyo (2004:p.16) points out that a pronounced emphasis on land tenure reform in contemporary West 
Africa has led to land dispossession and the growth of an agrarian capitalist class at the expense of 
increasingly land-short peasants and landless proletarians. 
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their engagement on a casual or permanent basis as ‘farm workers’ with capitalist 
agricultural enterprises.  Yet, most rural families wear more than one hat, as they are 
simultaneously involved in a diverse range of (urban and rural) production and work 
activities that defy easy class categorization.  Nevertheless, it is clear that agrarian reform 
entails ‘economic’ issues pertaining to forms of production and accumulation in the rural 
areas.  These issues also articulate with ‘political’ issues involving class relations and 
alliances between the peasantry and the (urban and rural) proletariat (Hendricks 2000, 
Bernstein 2003).  
 
From a classical Marxist position, ‘the resolution of the agrarian question is tied up with 
industrial transformation’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.24).  In this regard, Moyo asserts 
that it is ‘generally agreed’ by scholars that the African continent as a whole has a 
significant agrarian question marked by ‘an aborted agrarian transition’ (Moyo 2004: 
p.14), the ‘narrow spread of agrarian capitalism’ (Moyo 2004:p.67) and the ‘widespread 
growth of technological backward agricultural petty commodity production’ (Moyo 
2004:p.67).  The transition to capitalism in the ‘peripheries’ has without doubt entailed 
the ‘logic of the extension and intensification of commodity production’ (Bernstein 2003: 
p.206 emphasis removed) within the parameters set by expansive global capital relations.  
But, at the same time, this transition has been characterized by the incompleteness of 
primitive accumulation and industrial development.  As a result, the process of ‘de-
agrarianization’ (Bryceson 2000a:p.3) has been inhibited and this has led to the 
‘truncated nature’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.8) of proletarianization and the reproduction 
of socio-economic conditions sustaining the rural ‘semi-proletariat’.  
 
Historically, the agrarian question was concerned with the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, with the focus initially on Europe and later on colonized nations under the 
impact of imperialism.  Bernstein (2003) labels this as the ‘agrarian question of capital’ 
(and specifically of industrial capital).  In an intriguing analysis, he claims that this 
transition has occurred globally and that the agrarian problem has been resolved at this 
level.  However, stalled capitalist industrialization in the ‘peripheries’ has left the classic 
question unresolved in these regions but now largely redundant given the existence of 
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capitalism as an all-pervasive world-system.  Regrettably, Bernstein’s analysis assumes 
an a historical conception of the agrarian question based on de-localized globalization 
processes, and is insensitive to how the question invariably has a local content and 
‘resolution’ based on the notion of ‘glocalization’.   
 
Clearly, arguments about ‘stalled transitions’ do not imply that agrarian petty commodity 
production in the South and East somehow lies outside (or beyond) the system of 
capitalist production and reproduction.  Rather, they highlight the failure of industrial 
take-off (particularly in Africa) and, as argued later, the unlikelihood of this occurring in 
the foreseeable future considering the prevailing development crisis throughout much of 
the South and East.  In this sense, the debates about the agrarian question have 
recognized the heterogeneity of global processes, and are ‘an antidote to the grandiose 
claims that globalization has brought about a “dramatic transformation” in world society’ 
(Hendricks 1995:p.46).  Accordingly, ‘[a]ttending to agrarian questions in the global 
South may … aid in the project of displacing a settled sense of universal history’ (Moore 
2005:p.70) and thereby lead to alternative renditions of the trajectory of actually existing 
agrarian processes.   
 
 
6.2 Land Reform: Labour, Contingency and Struggle 
 
Bernstein (2003) further claims that the agrarian question needs to be significantly re-
conceptualized and he speaks about an ‘agrarian question of labour’ in the light of the 
subordinated integration of the South and East in international commodity chains and 
markets under the neo-liberal trajectory.  Given that ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ are internally 
related and constituted, seeking to separate them as Bernstein does is highly problematic.  
Nevertheless, his revised analysis brings to the fore the ‘fragmentation (or fracturing) of 
labour’ (Bernstein 2003:p.211) in the ‘peripheries’, with ‘ever more disparate 
combinations of wage- and self-employment (agricultural and non-agricultural petty 
commodity production)’ (Bernstein 2003:p.217) as reproduction strategies.  In some 
localities, this entails declining involvement by rural under-classes in increasingly 
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unreliable and unproductive agricultural activities.  These strategies of social 
reproduction are often embedded in diverse forms of political conflict within and beyond 
agrarian settings. Interestingly, many years earlier Barraclough (1990) labelled this 
‘fragmentation’ of labour as the ‘peasant question’ (at least from the perspective of the 
peasantry), because it involved ongoing (and desperate) modes of survival, and thereby 
‘maintaining and possibly improving inadequate and precarious livelihoods’ 
(Barraclough 1990:p.3).  The highly differentiated forms of social reproduction in rural 
areas seriously complicate class analysis, particularly in relation to the ‘peasantry’ 
(Hendricks 1995).  
 
In terms of Bernstein’s argument, contemporary agrarian reform may need to be 
significantly (but not wholly) de-linked conceptually from the classic concern with 
spurring on industrialization, because primary accumulation for capitalist 
industrialization ‘could not possibly come from the depressed African agricultural 
economies’ (Mafeje 2003:p.30).  Certainly, there are serious structural constraints 
inhibiting industrialization on the basis of surplus extraction from the rural under-classes 
(involving value transfers to urban industry). Nevertheless, addressing the ‘agrarian 
question of labour’ (like the classic question) involves contending with existing modes of 
domination (‘political’) and relations of production (‘economic’) in the rural areas in a 
manner (and to an extent) that land reform alone cannot accomplish.   
 
The second point about agrarian and land reform is that this reform (even conceptually) is 
rooted in political struggle, and thus it is subject to discursive argumentation and 
contested meanings.  For instance, it is common in the literature on land reform to find 
broad distinctions between (and evaluations of) state-led reform, market-led reform and 
popular-led reform, or between top-down and bottom-up reform.  These reform strategies 
arise from (and become infused in) protracted historical struggles in the South and East as 
moments in class conflicts ranging from national struggles for hegemony to localized 
struggles for survival.  ‘Reform’ hence takes on specific, contingent and alternative 
discursive meanings.    For example, Hall (2004) notes in relation to present-day South 
Africa that land reform is prone to different discursive representations such that, 
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simultaneously, it is ‘about the deracialisation of capital, the promotion of smallholder 
agriculture, direct poverty reduction by transferring assets to the poor, human security 
and secure tenure, and historical justice’ (Hall 2004:p.214).  Therefore, land is invariably 
(and variably) ‘coded’ and takes on social and political significance in this way.  This is 
not to suggest (or to justify) the necessity for some kind of postmodernist relativist 
conception of land reform.  Instead, consistent with my earlier arguments about the 
negotiated and contested quality of ‘development’ (or ‘agrarian’) interfaces, I seek to 
highlight how discursive constructions (including those articulated by NGOs) are 
materialized in struggles over agrarian and land reform or displace those struggles. 
 
My third point stresses the importance of identifying global trajectories in land reform in 
the contemporary world as part of a modernist sociological project.  In this regard, 
Bernstein – in a study of agrarian reform in contemporary Africa – aptly speaks of 
‘general themes from which specific histories create complex variations’ (Bernstein 
2005:p.82).  While it is possible to outline specific agrarian paths (or ‘variations’) based 
on particular socio-historical-national contexts (such as present-day Zimbabwe), this does 
not distract from the existence of general agrarian ‘themes’ or processes (regionally and 
globally) that structure and effect specific trajectories.  This is particularly evident in 
relation to the African continent (as a ‘region’) in the context of the current phase of 
globalization.  According to a workshop on land tenure held in Addis Ababa in January 
2000, the various land programmes initiated by African nation-states during the 1990s 
were ‘directed at remarkably similar issues and problems’ as were ‘the preliminary 
prescriptions emerging from specific country-level processes.’ 6  
 
Lastly, it is critical to emphasize that, in terms of social change, there are no ‘final 
solutions’ (Palmer 2000:p.286) (or resolutions) to agrarian and land questions based on 
teleological assumptions about the end-of-history.  ‘Resolutions’, if they exist at all, are 
historically conjunctural, tentative and variable, and the questions are never fully and 
finally laid to political rest.  Only ruling classes and political regimes propagate this myth 
                                         
6 ‘Final Statement of the Workshop on Land Tenure Networking in Sub-Saharan Africa, Addis Ababa, 24th  
- 26th January 2000’, Appendix 1, in Toulmin and Quan eds. (2000:p.290). 
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of closure on land reform.  Thus, any ‘resolution’ is inherently ongoing, open-ended and 
subject to non-linear (and even cyclical) changes in the face of political struggle.  During 
the course of the following discussion, the socially indeterminate texture of land reform 
will be brought increasingly to the fore. 
 
 
6.3 State-Centred Land Reform 
 
It is not my intention to offer a historical ‘periodization’ of land and agrarian reform on a 
global scale, nor is it necessary for purposes of the thesis.  However, it seems clear that 
over the past half-century there has been a global shift from a state-centred reform 
process to a society-centred process, and that this change is ongoing.  This shift involves 
a move from ‘developmentalism’ to ‘neo-liberalism’, in which the nation-state functions 
to promote market-led restructuring of society.  At first sight the transition seems linear, 
steady, unrelenting and purposeful but, ultimately, it involves diverse, fragmented, 
contingent and uncertain struggles occurring locally, regionally and internationally.   The 
product of this process – a neo-liberal trajectory – also seems coherent and wholly 
dominant.  But it is bedevilled by numerous contradictions and inconsistencies, and is the 
‘object’ of strident forms of rural opposition.  Further, even the proponents of neo-
liberalism (notably, global capital) have been recently rethinking neo-liberalism.  This 
global ‘transition’ should not be overstated.  But highlighting it provides a broader 
context for discussing land and agrarian changes globally. 
 
In the early 1990s, Sobhan (1993) argued that after two decades in which agrarian and 
land reform was a global non-event, ‘[v]otaries [or enthusiasts] of agrarian reform’ had 
been reduced to ‘a fringe group of romantic throwbacks left over from the 1950s and 60s’ 
(Sobhan 1993:p.3).  The two decades after World War II, when a state-centric model of 
social order and change dominated the global scene, witnessed a range of land reforms 
throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, with a particular emphasis on land 
redistribution.  These reforms sometimes occurred during (and because of) insurgent 
peasant rebellions or they were initiated by post-colonial nationalist elites, reform-
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minded military juntas or the lower ranks of landed classes.  Often, reforms were meant 
to ‘pre-empt future peasant militancy’ (Sobhan 1993:p.36), notably in Latin America, and 
these initiatives were normally backed by metropolitan capitalist states (the United States 
especially) in the face of Soviet imperialism.  In fact, during this time it was ‘quite rare’ 
for extensive land reforms to be carried out ‘under a system of democratic institutions’ 
(Dorner 1999:p.4).  In general, land redistribution during the 1950s and 1960s impacted 
insignificantly on the prevailing agrarian modes of domination and relations of 
production in the South and East.   
 
There was, nevertheless, a pronounced global recognition and acceptance of land reform 
(at least of land redistribution) as a critical element in the prevailing state-led (and -
dominated) developmentalist project.  Further, as Bryceson (2000b) notes, this was a 
‘period’ of ‘peasant agricultural “modernization”’ in that ‘peasant agriculture became the 
key growth sector during the 1960s’, at least in Africa.  But ‘[d]espite improved world 
market prices for peasant commodities’, the ‘agricultural modernization effort had to be 
subsidized.  The African state, in conjunction with foreign donor contributions, took the 
lead.  State intervention expanded exponentially in the 1960s and early 1970s,’ and this 
included the formation of a range of parastatal marketing agencies for rural commodities 
and services: ‘Modernizing peasant agriculture meant subsidizing it in the form of 
lowered input taxes, pan-territorial producer pricing, and lower consumer goods prices.’ 
(Bryescon 2000b:pp.48, 49)  A policy focus on peasant agriculture throughout the South 
and East was to continue beyond the 1960s, but this post-War ‘moment of 
developmentalism incorporated – or at least coincided with – the last significant 
examples of redistributive land reform in the modern period’ (Bernstein 2003:p.208). 
 
The post-war emphasis on land reform had dissipated by the early 1970s because, 
amongst other causes, it ‘fell out of favour with donors’ (Adams 1995:p.1).  This reason 
is of particular importance, since international funding agencies have consistently and 
significantly influenced the ebbs and flows of land reform in the ‘peripheries’.  Toulmin 
and Quan thus note that donors, in relation to Africa, have often ‘short-circuited debate’ 
on national land programmes through ‘a combination of conditionality (strings attached 
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to loans and aid) or manipulation of the policy process’ (Toulmin and Quan 2000:p.4).  
Or, as Quan put it with specific regard to land tenure reform, ‘the World Bank and other 
Western donors have tended to dominate debate … particularly in sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(Quan 2000:p.36).  This was particularly telling in the context of the shift away from 
state-centric regulatory regimes to ‘free-market’ SAPs.   
 
Land reform was in large part displaced during the 1970s and 1980s (a second ‘period’) 
by a more exclusive fixation with social development as propagated by international 
capital.  The World Bank played a significant intellectual and policy-formation role in 
this regard, and it propagated the idea that poverty ‘was to be alleviated by the vertical 
downward extension of “modernisation”’ (Gibbon 1992:p.194).  Gibbon et al. (1993) 
refer to this as ‘(capitalist) modernisation from above’ which, in relation to agrarian 
reform policy, effectively ‘equated development with medium and large-scale producers 
increasing output’ (Gibbon et al. 1993:p.3) despite the overt emphasis by the World Bank 
on enhancing the ‘untapped’ productivity of small-scale farmers.  By means of SAPs 
implemented in the South and East, ‘policies and relations’ between nation-states and 
their peasant populations became increasingly ‘mediated by international capital’ 
(Bryceson 2000b:p.53).  
 
These policy efforts to promote ‘modern’ (capitalist) farming have been called 
‘productionist interventions’ in the rural political economy as opposed to more 
‘distributional measures’ (Bernstein 2003:p.206).  During the 1970s and 1980s, as neo-
liberalism seemed to gain global ground on statism, these distributional strategies 
included ‘policy palliatives and resource commitments targeted at delivering resources to 
the poor.  These programmes range from Food for Work Programmes to various 
nutritional improvement, skill-enhancing and service-delivery programmes targeted at the 
poorest sections of the rural population.  Such programmes may be incorporated into a 
wider Integrated Rural Development Programme.’ (Sobhan 1993:p.113)  Thus there 
existed (and there still exists) the implementation (often by NGOs and other civic bodies) 
of targeted and integrated anti-poverty development strategies designed to uplift peasant 
agriculture.   
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These agrarian measures were enacted without any serious commitment to land reform.  
Therefore, in a foreword to a recent publication on civil society and land reform, the 
leaders of two international agencies noted that ‘the “redistributive” land reform agenda 
was largely forgotten until very recently’7 (Ghimire ed. 2001:p.vii).  For instance, ‘[a] 
critical issue in Uganda agriculture addressed by neither of its [structural] adjustment 
packages’ during the 1980s was ‘that of the land question’ (Gibbon et al. 1993:p.74).  In 
other words, during this critical phase in the (ambivalent) global move away from a state-
centred model of social regulation, ‘development’ was not clearly articulated and pursued 
within the context of a fully comprehensive agrarian and land agenda.  With regard 
specifically to land reform, any noticeable emphasis was placed on land tenure changes 
(based on unsophisticated privatization models) rather than on land redistribution. 
 
 
6.4 Society-Centred Land Reform 
 
Yet, since the early 1990s, reform has experienced a deliberate global return (a third 
‘period’) and it has once again been incorporated (much like the 1950s and 1960s) into a 
broad development strategy.  As Bruce Moore (2001) argues, there has been ‘a re-
focusing of national and international agendas on the revival of agrarian reform and 
resource tenure for agricultural communities as well as for fisher folk and coastal 
communities, forest dwellers, pastoralists and other traditional resource users.’ (Moore 
2001:p.5)  Land reform is also taking centre stage, notably tenure changes.  The agrarian 
and land reform strategy though is now more society-centred.  There is a particular stress 
on the market-civil society nexus in the context of a neo-liberal trajectory that effectively 
has spelt the end of developmentalism.  The reform strategy is also taking place in the 
face of the crisis of livelihoods encapsulated in the notion of the ‘agrarian question of 
labour’.   
 
                                         
7 The two leaders are the president of the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the director 
of the United Nations Institute for Social Development. 
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Much of the agrarian reform (or ‘development’) agenda entails a community-based 
defensive ‘sustainable rural livelihoods approach’ (Bryceson 2000c:p.315) that seeks to 
help rural under-classes to reduce vulnerability (and maximize sustainability) by risk 
management through for example the diversification of income-generating activities and 
food-security measures.  As discussed earlier in the thesis, this entails a focus on forging 
‘civil society’ (or building ‘social capital’) in the countryside based on anti-statist, 
participatory and holistic methodologies, and with the active involvement of development 
NGOs. Yet, the ‘[e]mphasis on building “social capital” may be counter-productive, 
representing donors’ attempts at making do with declining physical resource transfers [or 
aid], rather than reflective of the actual needs of rural dwellers. The build-up of human 
capital rather than social capital [civil society] is the fundamental issue in view of the 
labour redundancy currently experienced by the world’s peasantries.’ (Bryceson 2000c: 
p.317)  The livelihoods strategy is a less all-embracing and pro-active agrarian 
development strategy compared to the programme in the immediate post-War era.  It is 
largely a short-term localized coping strategy that fails to vigorously address the long-
term globalized marginalization of the rural under-classes under the neo-liberal trajectory 
through robust national development programmes in the South and East. 
 
Clearly, donor capital is once again playing a crucial role in instigating this land reform 
package.  Hence, in the case of southern Africa, ‘recipient governments have become 
suspicious that donors, by insisting on a range of conditions – a “pro-poor” focus, the 
willing buyer, willing seller principle, maintaining economic stability – are using support 
to land reform as a neo-colonialist “Trojan Horse”, which in some cases is also 
perpetuating racial imbalances in land ownership.’ (TT 2003:p.12)  This neo-liberal ‘pro-
poor’ strategy though is not based on an unbridled free market approach as during the 
earlier SAP period.  There emerged during the 1990s ‘mounting evidence of the pitfalls 
of this approach’ (Toulmin and Quan 2000:p.2).  This led to re-evaluations on the part of 
international donors and nation-states that resulted in a renewed emphasis on (for 
instance) the facilitating role of a reconfigured state in social and economic development.  
Toulmin and Quan, in the specific context of Africa, hence speak about a new ‘paradigm’ 
on agrarian and land reform that is more human-centred and is based on good governance 
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ideals of pluralism and de-centralization.  The de-centralization of African nation-states 
was propagated and implemented during the second ‘period’, but successful subsidiarity 
never materialized (Toulmin 2000, Wunsch and Olowu 1995).  Accordingly, the 
available literature (on land reform in Africa) constantly highlights ‘the singular lack of 
community participation in the decision making process’ and how ‘policy and 
institutional arrangements have been driven from the top’ (Mutefpa et al. 1998:pp.7, 8).   
 
This ‘new’ approach stresses the significance of variable local (and not flattening global) 
solutions to securing access to land and natural resources, such that (as discussed below) 
‘the last few years have witnessed a reassessment of conventional wisdom regarding 
[customary] land tenure’ (Toulmin and Quan 2000:p.5).  However, Quan goes on to note, 
in the case of the World Bank, that this ‘new’ paradigm is ‘not always or necessarily 
reflected in practice by its operational divisions’ (Quan 2000:p.36).  Nevertheless, as 
suggested above, marked tension between donors and nation-states in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been recently noticeable.  This is due in large measure to the insistence by donors on 
civil society participation in land policy reform exercises and the general reluctance on 
the part of politicians and bureaucrats to relax their grip on the centralized (and regularly 
authoritarian) reigns of power (Palmer 2000).  As a result, ‘donors have found it 
increasingly difficult to justify the allocation of aid resources to land reform in the region 
[of southern Africa]. This reluctance is due to the lack of viable policies and programmes 
and is also a response in policy trends – in practice if not in rhetorical terms – away from 
the pro-poor agenda [by nation-states] that donors feel should be the focus of land reform 
policies.  Land grabbing by elite groups is evident across the region’ (TT 2003:p.3).   
 
However, this ‘new paradigm’ – even on paper – does not entail a paradigmatic shift 
beyond the neo-liberal trajectory that emerged during the context of social crisis in the 
early 1970s.  It is best described as a revised neo-liberal ‘paradigm’, and thus it continues 
to make ‘development’ equivalent to market capitalism.  ‘Development’ in Africa under 
the neo-liberal trajectory and its links to the current global processes of agrarian and land 
reform are discussed in the next two sections of this chapter.   
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Bryceson makes the telling observation that peasants are ‘the losing partners’ in their 
relationship with international capital. Domination over the peasantries under neo-
liberalism may be ‘more distanced’ because it is based on international financial 
institutions and global markets which act through national governments, but it entails – 
relative to the earlier state-centred period with centralized post-colonial states – ‘more 
sophisticated and insidious power’ (Bryceson 2000c:pp.323, 300).  The globalization of 
agriculture and agrarian restructuring under ‘neo-liberalism’ has not led to the dissolution 
of the peasantry but certainly this under-class has been increasingly dispossessed, 
marginalized and left for dead.  Later discussions though indicate that the peasantry is not 
taking things lying down, and thus their ‘domination’ by global capital is a hegemonic 
domination that is infused with counter-hegemonic struggles in an array of forms. 
 
 
6.5 Global Capitalism: Emergence and Management of Crisis 
 
The thesis looks specifically at NGOs and land reform during the third ‘period’ marked 
by a revised or restructured neo-liberalism.  Accordingly, this chapter highlights key 
issues pertaining to agrarian and land reform during this ‘period’, with particular 
reference to the African continent.  The contemporary phase of capitalist globalization 
was discussed in Chapter Three from a largely theoretical perspective.  This section of 
the chapter schematically addresses (from a world-systems viewpoint) the historical 
development of the African political economy in the context of neo-liberal globalization, 
and how this has impacted on agrarian and land reform.   
 
The prevailing condition in sub-Saharan Africa has been described as a development 
crisis of epic proportions or as a disaster or tragedy.   Over the past few decades, Africa 
has been integrated into the global system in a way that effectively reduces its 
significance to the world economy at least in terms of productive investment and world 
trade.  It is important to consider the external determinants of this crisis in order to make 
sense of the ‘true collapse’ (Arrighi 2002:p.8) of Africa and of what ‘development’ really 
means (or does not mean) for the ‘non-viable national economies’ (de Rivero 2001:p.9) 
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and the under-classes of sub-Saharan Africa.  These nations exercise only negative 
sovereignty because they cannot achieve the basic well-being or physical reproduction of 
their populations.  Internalist and state-minimalist analyses of the African crisis, as 
propagated by the strident ideologues of the neo-liberal development persuasion, speak 
about state reform involving good governance, institutional adjustments and liberal 
democracy as a basis for the ‘re-launching of development’ (Amin 1997:p.98).   
 
But it has been argued that ‘[d]evelopment no longer depends on democratic national 
efforts and decisions’ (de Rivero 2001:p.7).  An internal focus fails to lodge the crisis 
firmly in an analysis of the global economy.  Yet, simultaneously, Africa’s present-day 
agricultural crisis and its ongoing agrarian and land questions – even if understood in a 
world-systems context – cannot be ‘attributed exclusively to a (malign) exterior’ 
(Bernstein 2005:p.87).  Hence, a sensitive understanding of agrarian processes in Africa 
cannot be reduced to either external (for example, neo-liberalism) or internal (for 
example, nationalism) determinants or a combination thereof based on a positivist notion 
of ‘external’ relations and interaction, because the global and the local are (as discussed 
in Chapter Three) ‘internally’ fused as part of the same process of ‘glocalization’. 
 
The strong expansion of world capitalism after the Second World War and on into the 
early 1970s enabled many nation-states in Africa to pursue, under the influence of United 
States hegemony and as a bulwark against communism in the face of militant anti-
colonial struggles, a modernizing and industrializing bourgeois-nationalist catch-up 
strategy that became widely known as developmentalism.  This modernist strategy of 
state-led development, according to Amin (2002), was imposed upon the dominant 
imperialist forces of world capitalism by a range of international anti-hegemonic 
struggles, and it was subsequently implemented by the emerging nation-states in the 
South and East.   This strategy involved significant state intervention (or state-centrism), 
and it sought to construct auto-centred national development economies with a strong 
manufacturing sector.  Albeit based initially on surpluses from the agricultural sector 
(along the lines of primitive accumulation) and involving a subservient incorporation into 
the global economy as exporters of raw materials like agricultural products and minerals, 
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it led to an emphasis on import-substitution driven industrialization.  Yet, 
industrialization never took off and much of the sub-Saharan region remains a prisoner of 
this international ‘outmoded division of labour’ (Amin 1997:p.148).  Hence, the chances 
that capitalism, as currently structured, will develop the region are increasingly 
improbable. 
 
The world system, and not just Africa, entered into a ‘structural crisis’ in the early 1970s 
(Wallerstein 2002), and this swiftly derailed developmentalism, although it is unlikely 
that significant industrialization would have taken place despite the crisis (Amin 1997).  
This social crisis is normally labelled as ‘a crisis of profitability and of legitimacy’ 
(Arrighi 2002:p.9).  The crisis, Amin stresses (1997), is not however a crisis of 
capitalism. Crises are endemic to capitalism, and capitalist crises emerge only if and 
when strong anti-systemic forces arise and coalesce.  The 1950s and 1960s, as a ‘period 
of prosperity’ that drove developmentalism in Africa, witnessed a great worldwide 
expansion of trade and production (and thus intensified international competition) under 
the influence of state-led Keynesian economic policies and institutions at national levels.   
 
In this context, Amin speaks of the crisis that emerged during the 1970s as manifesting 
itself ‘in the fact that the profits derived from production do not find sufficient outlets in 
the form of lucrative investments capable of further developing productive capacity.’ 
(Amin 1997:p.x)  There was a decline in the level of productive investment and a growth 
of excess financial capital.  Simultaneously, Keynesian national programmes were 
increasingly questioned as counterproductive economically, and neo-liberal and anti-state 
policies arose over time to manage (and not solve) the crisis by, for instance, ‘finding 
other outlets for this excess of floating [short-term and idle] capital (Amin 1997:p.x).  
Global capital was able to maximize speculative financial profits by such processes as 
liberalization of international capital flows, floating exchange rates, privatization and 
deregulation, and American balance-of-payment deficits.   
 
During the 1980s there was also ‘a major reversal in the direction of global capital flows’ 
as the United States government ‘started to compete aggressively for capital worldwide, 
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to finance a growing trade and current account deficit’.  This ‘reflated both effective 
demand and investment in North America, while deflating it in the rest of the world.  At 
the same time, this redirection enabled the United States to run large deficits in its 
balance of trade that created an expanding demand for imports of those goods that North 
American businesses no longer found profitable to produce.’  (Arrighi 2002:pp.12, 13)  In 
large part, these imported goods tended to be industrial and not agricultural products. 
Despite this, Africa was unable to satisfy the import demands of North America in an 
increasingly competitive environment amongst nations of the South and East.  Also, 
African nations could not compete with the United States in the world financial markets 
and for foreign capital investment, yet they were particularly dependent on foreign 
productive investment compared to Asia and Latin America.  Meanwhile, the 
maximization of speculative financing also occurred through (excessive) borrowing by 
the South and East, and this led to significant indebtedness. Initially, this seemed 
advantageous to African states, as the excess liquidity was recycled as loan capital on 
favourable conditions at a time of reasonable economic growth under developmentalism 
(Arrighi 2002).   
 
With regard to the 1970s, Gibbon notes: ‘Within the general context of increased lending, 
the concern with poverty [based on a modernization paradigm] reflected an opportunity 
to disburse additional funds, while in the process securing the political stability of LDC 
[Less Developed Countries] governments committed to modernisation.’ (Gibbon 1992: 
p.197)  The loans also assisted African governments in paying for the rising costs of 
imports.  The banks collected their interest on these loans through refinancing schemes 
based on stringent (structural) adjustments imposed and supervised by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (de Rivero 2001).  Yet, these loans soon became ‘crippling 
burdens’ (Saul and Leys 1999:p.6) with the emergence of high interest rates, particularly 
in conjunction with the deteriorating terms of trade for primary products and the 
weakening of world demand for Africa’s export commodities. 
 
The Washington Consensus, involving the Bretton Wood institutions notably the World 
Bank and IMF, was primarily designed to manage this crisis and to dictate to the South 
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and East its role in the containment: ‘The development-friendly regime of the preceding 
thirty years was officially liquidated and Third World countries were invited to play by 
the rules of an altogether different game – that is, to open up their national economies to 
the cold winds of intensifying world-market competition’ (Arrighi 2002:p.13).  
Governments had little option but to comply, as rejection would ensure the international 
credit unworthiness of the nation.  The IMF and World Bank ‘were converted into strict 
supervisors of an adjustment designed to oblige the debtor countries to reorganise their 
economies and to pay their creditors’ (de Rivero 2001:p.55).  These multilateral 
institutions were ‘instruments’ (Amin 1997:p.97) of global capital in ensuring that the 
economies of the South and East were subordinated ‘to the constraint of servicing the 
high external debt’ (Amin 2002:p.48) and thereby paid their international creditors (both 
banks and governments).  At the same time, the nations in the ‘periphery’ became subject 
to the imperatives of managing the global crisis through economic liberalization and 
deregulation: ‘The restructuring programmes imposed in this context are not at all what 
their name, structural adjustment, would suggest.  The idea behind them is not to change 
structures in a way that might allow a new general boom and market expansion, but only 
to make conjunctural adjustments that obey the short-term logic of assuring the financial 
profitability of the surplus capital.’ (Amin 1997:p.x)   
 
SAPs emerged as a basis for adapting or adjusting national economies of the South and 
East to the new conditions of worldwide accumulation.  In the agricultural sector this 
included, amongst other actions, the dismantling of marketing parastatals through the 
privatization and commercialization of distribution and trading activities (including with 
reference to peasant commodity marketing), and the abolition or downsizing of peasant 
producer subsidies provided by the state.  Such actions were designed to assert Africa’s 
cash crops more vigorously into the global economic division of labour by increasing 
‘export-crop producer prices and so exports’, and thereby ‘improving debt-service 
capacity’ (Raikes 2000:p.75).  But, in so doing, SAPs ‘more fully exposed peasants to 
international market forces’ (Bryceson 2000a:p.27) and led in part to their decline but 
also to their reconstitution: ‘SAPs and economic liberalization policies represented the 
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convergence of the worldwide forces of de-agrarianization and national policies 
promoting de-peasantization.’ (Bryceson 2000c:p.305)   
 
SAPs brought about ‘a regression in the possibilities for development’ (Amin 1997:p.20), 
notably in Africa.  The comprehensive work by Gibbon et al. (1993) examines the impact 
of SAPs on agriculture and the rural under-classes in sub-Saharan Africa during the 
1980s and, in doing so, they note ‘a general weakening of the state’s capacity to deliver’ 
goods and services to its urban and rural populace (Gibbon et al. 1993:p.18 emphasis 
removed)  In this respect, international capital effectively turned the heat on the state 
institutions that they had spent so many years building up and left the rural under-classes 
exposed (Raikes 2000).  Further, as suggested earlier, Gibbon et al. (1993) pinpoint an 
important (unstated) intention underlying the SAPs by arguing that ‘the stated objectives 
of a smallholder focus and poverty eradication was qualified in certain basic respects.  
Firstly, priority to smallholders did not imply that only they should be given attention.  
The role of large private farms in providing a major share of marketed output … was 
clearly recognised.  Any strategy also had to include these “highly productive 
enclaves”… Another important qualification was related to the strategic position of larger 
farmers within the promotion of smallholder agriculture.  In production-oriented 
strategies larger farmers could be used to “spearhead the introduction of new methods”. 
… It is not entirely cynical to read the strategy design [of the World Bank] as one that 
gives priority to commercial medium- and larger-scale farmers, who will introduce new 
methods and whose achievements will trickle down to the less prosperous smallholders.’ 
(Gibbon et al. 1993:pp.104-105)  Regrettably, during the course of SAPs, consistent 
trickling dissipated into irregular drips.   
 
Thus, Gibbon et al. provide a wealth of empirical data to show that, beyond any doubt, 
SAPs had a devastating impact on African agriculture and the social reproduction of 
small-scale farmers.  Ironically, with regard to such countries as Zambia, food production 
and security improved but this ‘reflected slippage or lack of implementation’ of SAPs 
(Gibbon et al. 2003:p.100).  SAPs were also designed to improve agricultural exports in 
order to pay off the burdensome international debts.  Yet, under SAPs, there was an 
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underperformance of traditional export crops, while agrarian capital increasingly 
branched into lucrative non-traditional export commodities like horticulture (and 
continues to do so).  SAPs are generally recognized as having reinforced Africa’s 
continued dependence on primary exports.  The external debt became increasingly 
unsustainable and continues to burden the development initiatives of nation-states in 
Africa (Saul and Leys 1999).   
 
 
6.6 Global Capital, World Agriculture and Land Reform 
 
As a result of its uneven development, global capitalism during the 1990s further 
‘subordinated agriculture to its logic worldwide, but without creating, by necessity, home 
markets capable of sustaining industrialization’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.14) in the 
South and East, thus forestalling capitalist development in these regions.  A corollary to 
this is the subservient integration of the ‘periphery’ into the global but ‘centrally based 
corporate agro-industrial complex’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.17) in terms of production 
and marketing systems (Puplampu and Tetty 2000).  This has been called the 
‘globalisation of agriculture’ involving an ‘increasingly unequal global playing field’ 
(Fortin 2005:pp.3, 14).  World agriculture has become increasingly corporate and 
industrial (thus the notion of agro-industrial corporations), and the peasantries are not 
incorporated and absorbed into this but are rather marginalized and displaced.   This 
current process entails a ‘shift in power from the national to the global, with increasing 
vertical regulation of global agricultural commodity chains, and the setting of 
increasingly rigorous and demanding rules and parameters of the international trade 
regime by countries in the North’  (Fortin 2005:p.5).   
 
Hence, market forces continue to be unleashed almost randomly and state support for 
peasants (in terms of both production and reproduction) continues to be chipped away at, 
thus reproducing semi-proletarianization and poverty in ways seemingly functional to 
global capital.  In this sense, agrarian political economies in the South and East are 
‘globalised but marginalised’ (Moyo 2002:p.10).  The current market-led agrarian reform 
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package, as with earlier state-led models under Cold War conditions, is a manifestation of 
geo-political and localized class conflicts.  Yet the systemic crisis in African agriculture 
has been clearly experienced unevenly, and it has involved deepening differentiation 
within the underclasses, further land concentration and alienation, and the greater 
involvement of petty bourgeois elements in expanded agricultural accumulation.   
 
While agricultural policy throughout Africa often speaks about ‘modernizing’ the 
peasantry, land tenure systems in which the peasantry live and work remain ‘largely 
unchanged’ (Bernstein 2005:p.78) and there is the ‘growing exclusion of smallholders 
involved in export crops’ (Fortin 2005:p.5).  Indeed, as Raikes argues, neo-liberal 
restructuring ‘removes the conditions for modernization policies [vis-à-vis the 
peasantries], while positing itself as a vehicle for modernizing peasant agriculture.’ 
(Raikes 2000:p.64)  In fact, current agrarian and land reform throughout Africa 
unashamedly seems more in line with creating the conditions for the expansion of a class 
of petty capitalist farmers.  Agrarian restructuring in a pro-capitalist fashion, which has 
also been evident during earlier periods of agricultural modernization globally, is also a 
threat to the rural underclasses and may lead to de-peasantization.  Most recently, it has 
been noted, to some degree, in post-apartheid South Africa (Hall 2004). 
 
In this regard, a ‘policy cycle’ or a ‘cyclical pattern of land reform’ in southern Africa 
has been noted.  This involves initially a firm political commitment by the central state to 
(for example) land redistribution on equity grounds of reducing poverty, and then a 
pronounced switch to emphasizing economic goals of agricultural productivity in which 
agrarian capital interests ‘obtain ascendancy over the medium to longer term’ (TT 2003: 
p.5).  Often, this involves ‘a form of accumulation from above which is bureaucratic and 
compradorial in character’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.62).  It is manifested even with regard to 
the renewed emphasis by, for instance, the World Bank on land redistribution.8  In this 
‘market assisted approach to land reform’ based on grants to nation-states (Moyo 2004: p. 
101), the World Bank sets certain preconditions for acceptable land redistribution, 
                                         
8 This point is based on the 2003 Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction: A World Bank Policy 
Research Report. See Fortin 2005. 
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including respect for the rule of law, participation of civil society, reducing poverty and 
decentralization.  Yet, land redistribution is not motivated by equity concerns, but it 
‘appears to be promoted by the Bank as a mechanism for increasing productivity’ (Fortin 
2005:p.13).  Thus, insofar as it does not achieve this objective, the World Bank would 
seemingly scuttle land redistribution.  
 
According to Amin, the prevailing dominant development paradigm, of which agrarian 
and land reform forms a part, makes development ‘synonymous with market expansion’ 
(Amin 1997:p.xii).  Yet, as noted above, Africa has only a limited base for industrial 
growth and expansion, with small domestic markets for internal consumption and the 
inability to compete against industrial imports and through exports.  Saul and Leys claim 
though that the aim of global capital is ‘not to develop countries but to exploit profitable 
opportunities’ (Saul and Leys 1999:pp.3-4) and the quest is not for production per se but 
conditions of production that maximize profit (Amin 2002).  Global capital is searching 
for secure opportunities with high rates of return (under ‘good governance’) but without 
necessitating massive investment in infrastructure and without entailing broad-based 
capital accumulation processes.  Increasingly, Africa is not the investment destination.   
In this regard, development of Africa seems like a pipedream.   
 
According to world systems theory, the global crisis along with the pronounced neo-
liberal trajectory meant that nation-states of the South and East now had to be 
subordinated to the universalizing logic of the market.  Economic and social 
‘development’ would be more exocentric but at the same time (ironically) involve 
increasing exclusion from the global economy.  This process entails the ‘erosion of the 
autocentered nation-state’ and its ‘recompradorization’ (Amin 1997:pp.3, 23).   
Furthermore, it involves a crisis for nation-states because their social and political 
reproduction is increasingly de-linked from their national economies (or national spaces), 
and this reproduction becomes more and more intertwined with the logic of increasingly 
global economic management and accumulation processes (or globalized economic 
space).  Despite the fact that the imports and exports of African nations amount to an 
insignificant proportion of world trade, these nations are not marginalized but rather are 
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deeply integrated into the global economy if for instance the ratio of extra-regional trade 
to Gross Domestic Product for Africa is considered.   
 
The depiction of global processes outlined is in large part from a world systems 
perspective.  This perspective is important because it identifies and highlights key 
homogenizing tendencies in capitalist globalization, including agrarian and land 
processes particularly relevant to this thesis.  Yet, the grand narrative is problematic, 
because it remains insensitive to local initiatives and how particular nation-states in the 
South and East assert themselves against globalizing tendencies.  In other words, ‘the 
global’ does not simply smother and muzzle ‘the local’.  This will become clearer in 
Chapters Eight and Nine when discussing land reform in Zimbabwe.  
 
 
6.7. Market-Led Reform, Land Tenure and ‘Customary’ Security 
 
As mentioned earlier, agrarian and land processes have (interrelated) economic and 
political elements embedded within them.  The academic literature is currently obsessed 
with analyzing and evaluating neo-liberal (or market-led) land reform from an 
‘economic’ perspective involving questions about efficiency, rationality and 
performance, or (more generally) about agricultural productivity (Meliczek 1996).  These 
debates have taken place despite the global historical record showing that ‘decisions on 
whether to proceed with land reform are essentially political’ (Adams 1995:p.2).  One of 
the productivity controversies is about farm size and economies of scale, and hence about 
the differences in agricultural performance – for purposes ranging from food security to 
foreign exchange earnings – between primarily large-scale commercial enterprises and 
smallholdings farmed by semi-proletarians.  Moyo, who is a radical proponent of land 
reform, labels claims about the inefficiencies of small-scale peasant production as 
‘socially constructed’ (Moyo 2004:p.78) rather than based solidly on economic findings.   
 
This particular controversy revolves around the matter of land redistribution as one 
component of land reform.  In doing so, it raises questions about the suitability of ‘the 
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market’ as a re-distributive mechanism and how land markets relate to land tenure 
changes.  A further debate has occurred around land tenure more specifically, and this 
raises sensitive issues in the South and East about global imperatives and the external 
imposition of land programmes.   In particular, this debate focuses on the pros and cons 
of privatized freehold land rights as a basis for agricultural growth.  In the case of Africa, 
it revolves around a range of contested assumptions about customary land tenure, private 
land tenure and land markets (Fortin 2005).   
 
Historically, peasants have been largely excluded from engaging in land markets.  Rather, 
under the dominion of customary tenure systems, they have been deeply incorporated 
into labour and commodity markets.  Customary tenure under colonialism (and on into 
post-colonial societies) became a ‘statist land tenure system’ (Shivji 2000:p.46) in that 
radical title was vested in the nation-state based on the notion of eminent domain.  Also, 
at political independence, many African states nationalized land ‘to assert the power of 
the state over traditional chiefs and allow the appropriation of land for development’ 
(Quan 2000:p.33).  In post-colonial Africa, this appropriation has often taken place 
because of demands emanating from lucrative (wildlife-based) eco-tourism.  At least de 
jure, then, access to ‘customary’ land in many African nations is at the discretion of the 
President or state, and such land can be (and has been) expropriated by the state for 
various public (and private) purposes.  Thus, occupants of customary land have only ‘a 
secondary right of access and use’ (Cousins 2000:p.155).  For this reason, Shivji argues: 
‘It is curious how the feudal notion of the identity between sovereignty and property [or 
between governance and ownership] in the absolute monarch reappears in the 
bureaucratic or authoritarian state.’ (Shivji 2000:p.48)  This is related to Mamdani’s 
(1996) argument about ‘fused authority’ in the African countryside.  
 
Customary tenure is denigrated by ‘free-marketers’ for leading to the unsustainable use of 
land and also for inhibiting agricultural efficiencies.  On the other hand, private tenure is 
said to entail tenure security, which results in agricultural investment and enhanced 
productivity.  This position is consistent with (if not drawing on) strongly entrenched 
views in the post-World War II ‘peasant studies’ literature about the inherent weaknesses 
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of agricultural production as embodied in peasant labour and accumulation processes 
(Bryceson 2000a).  Such assumptions about peasant productivity are now being widely 
criticized in the academic literature.   Indeed, production systems under customary tenure 
are being lauded despite the negative implications of fused authority (Cousins 2000, 
Lund 2000, Platteau 2000, and Mafeje 2003).  In this regard, redistribution of land may 
even lead to tenure uncertainties for resettled farmers (with mere de facto leasehold rights 
on state land) who previously lived under (relatively speaking) secure customary tenure.  
This depiction of customary tenure will be critically appraised. 
 
Lund (2000) speaks about the existence of ‘multiple tenures’ in customary regimes in 
Africa, in that ‘several users may have access to different resources on the land’ (Lund 
2000:p.16).  This entails ‘shifting, recombining and constantly-negotiated practices’ 
(Lund 2000:p.1) within rural communities.  Rights to land and natural resources are 
relative, shared, inclusive and diverse, including short-term use rights and longer-term 
rights of transfer for individuals, families and larger groups.  Hence, ‘[b]y 
conceptualising land rights in terms of degrees of use and control, it is possible to see 
privatisation as a process rather than a situation’ (Lund 2000:p.6) in which privatization 
either does exist or does not (Barraclough 1990).  In fact, there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that, at least in Africa, (autonomous) informal privatization has for an 
extended period been embedded in customary systems of tenure and has occurred 
independently of formal titling initiatives.   At times, this has led to a form of land 
market, including rental agreements like land-borrowing, land pooling and land 
exchanges (Quan 2000).   
 
On the other hand, state-directed land titling (based on a market reform agenda) entails a 
process of more pronounced exclusion, as groups and individuals without secure title (for 
example, women and pastoralists) have their secondary- or use-rights over land and 
natural resources on the (now) titled land (at least formally) extinguished (Hilhorst 2000).  
Yet, according to Platteau (2000), these ‘basic use rights seem to be sufficient to induce 
landholders to invest’ under customary tenure (Platteau 2000:p.57).  The causal argument 
that links private tenure, almost by definition, to investment and productivity may be 
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spurious.  Further, agrarian dynamics other than tenure often impact more significantly 
on investment choices and agricultural efficiencies.  Lund concludes by arguing that ‘it is 
not being “private” which makes a land holding certain’ (Lund 2000:p.18) as other forms 
of property relations and of tenure (i.e. customary tenure) have greater legitimacy and 
acceptance amongst rural under-classes.  In this regard, (actually-existing) security of 
tenure is ‘in practice secured not through law and administration, but maintained through 
open-ended, on-going processes of negotiation, adjudication and political manoeuvre.’ 
(Cousins 2000:p.166) 
 
Likewise, Mafeje (2003) argues that customary tenure based on ‘the African mode of 
social organization’ (Mafeje 2003:p.19) – revolving around kinship relations – provides 
‘inclusive and variegated’ (Mafeje 2003:p.3) usufruct rights that continue to ensure 
widespread access to land for petty commodity producers.  In his study of sub-Saharan 
Africa, he argues that much of the scholarly work on land tenure is Euro-centric in that 
(collective) customary land tenure is seen as a ‘major barrier to agricultural development’ 
(Mafeje 2003:p.1) because it does not entail exclusive individual (ownership of property) 
rights with title deeds derived from bourgeois individualism.  This Euro-centrism is based 
on the (now much maligned) ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis that customary land tenure 
regimes are ‘communal’ in the broad sense of involving open access to land and natural 
resources in an unbridled and destructive manner.   
 
On the contrary, it is claimed that ‘common property resources’ in Africa (or pool 
resources outside the boundaries of ‘private’ land holdings in customary areas) normally 
involve shared rights that are properly defined, recognized and regulated.  These 
resources include fuel, edible plants and medicinal products, and they ‘make a vital 
contribution to the livelihoods of many rural households’ (particularly the land-short) and 
‘help rural people manage risk, reduce vulnerability and enhance security’ (Cousins 
2000:pp.151, 161).  This dependence of rural under-classes on ‘natural capital’, including 
the commodification (or marketing) of the African commons, is particularly relevant as a 
source of off-farm goods and income in the context of the crisis of agricultural 
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livelihoods.9  Full privatization of customary lands – if based on the Western notion of an 
all-embracing singular right to property – would, by necessity, undermine the existence 
of such pool resources.  Therefore, properly maintaining and managing common property 
must be part of any serious tenure reform programme.  In general, then, the customary 
property regime is largely ‘inclusive’, thereby ‘comprising bundles of individual, family, 
sub-group and larger group rights and duties in relation to a variety of natural resources’ 
and it is ‘nested’ at these different levels of social organization (Cousins and Claasens 
2004:p.139).   
 
These arguments in favour of customary tenure are often linked to claims about the 
efficiencies of small-scale farming.  They need to be seriously qualified, as they border 
on romanticizing traditional tenure regimes, understood almost ahistorically.  Under pre-
colonial regimes, these regimes may have been productive and just.  Yet, in southern 
Africa, colonialism spatially confined these regimes, reorganized them internally, and 
linked them to the labour demands of capital.  This resulted in major distortions and 
inefficiencies.  For example, use rights in customary areas in South Africa are often under 
regulated, ill defined and insecure, and have not led to significant productive investment 
or commercialization.  Further, certain categories of customary residents, notably women 
and youth, are regularly land-short or landless.  This has implications for land distribution 
and resettlement, because resettlement schemes based on insecure permit systems may 
over time lead to similar problems.  This is evident in the case of resettlement areas from 
the 1980s in Zimbabwe, where there is increasing pressure on grazing land for crop 
purposes. 
 
Mafeje also maintains that state-directed individualization of land propagated to boost 
agricultural production is subject to resistance by smallholders in defence of their 
customary tenure, or otherwise individual titling becomes subservient to customary social 
organization and tenure.  In addition, land titles are sometimes simply used by petty 
capitalists to ‘secure loans to finance business ventures outside agriculture’ (Mafeje 
                                         
9 Rural entrepreneurs are also engaging in the commodification of natural resources as a basis of capital 
accumulation.  
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2003:p.9) and titling does not necessarily enhance agricultural production.  Further, 
privatization of tenure undermines the radical title of the state over land as well as the 
authority of traditional authorities (or other local power-holders), and thus state bodies 
may resist it. 
 
The case of post-colonial Kenya is often noted in the academic literature as 
demonstrating the inadequacies of formal titling. In Kenya, an ‘ambitious attempt to 
replace the indigenous tenure system with Western-style property rights [that are 
exclusive and absolute] has failed. Community-based patterns of allocation and 
inheritance have persisted even where all land is nominally under individual freehold.’ 
(Cousins 2002:p.2)   In a similar vein, Gibbon et al. argue that in Kenya ‘the main 
outcome of titling was the [formal] exclusion of certain categories of customary tenants 
from occupation rights’ but that ‘most holders of customary rights retained recognisable 
claims to land in practice’ (Gibbon et al. 1993:p.19 their emphasis).  Hence, formal 
titling has increased landlessness and inequalities in agricultural income, and has led to 
de-peasantization but not de-agrarianization.  For Cousins, who tends to romanticize 
small-scale farming, ‘communal tenure does not constrain productivity’ (Cousins 2002: 
p.2). 
 
The ‘free market’ conception of customary land tenure was particularly prevalent during 
the SAP period but, subsequently, the ‘new’ agrarian and land ‘paradigm’ that Toulmin 
and Quan identify is more sensitive to customary tenure systems, at least on paper.  In 
offering a critique of the ‘evolutionary theory of land rights’ that (in the end) 
recommends the formal titling of customary land that has been informally individualized 
and privatized through the impulses of land scarcity and market forces, Platteau (2000) 
argues that customary tenure must in some form be institutionally recognized.   In other 
words, without ‘falling into the snare of romanticism’ about the equity of customary 
social systems (Platteau 2000:p.72), these systems need to be respected and built upon to 
enhance justice and security within rural communities, and to avoid the imposition of 
titling upon communities by the exclusionary practices of the state.  Currently, the World 
Bank accepts that under certain circumstances customary tenure provides secure land 
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rights.  However, this acceptance is not based on social considerations of equity and fair 
play (on social value) but on economic efficiency grounds and cost/benefit analyses (on 
economic value).  Further, the World Bank still conceptualizes individualistic land rights 
as representing the most modern form of landholding (Fortin 2005).  Hence, the ‘new’ 
paradigm of reform – at least in terms of land tenure – seems not to have moved 
significantly beyond the formulation stage.   
 
Customary tenure in southern Africa cannot be dismissed outright as based on a 
traditional mind-set.  Its modern form has been significantly structured by the colonial 
period.  It may be that re-localizing this form of tenure under modern democratic 
conditions might have some resonance in the face of the global imposition of market-led 
tenure reform.  In the meantime, though, it is critical to emphasize that the prevailing 
social system in which customary land in Africa is nested has deep historical roots and is 
based on agrarian regimes of political domination and social inequality.  Despite the 
social levelling that may thrive, customary systems nevertheless entail significant forms 
of class, gender and generational inequalities.  Therefore, land tenure reform in southern 
Africa ‘threatens powerful vested interests’ (Adams et al. 2000:p.137), including 
traditional leadership structures that are patriarchal in their implications for women and 
access to land.  As a result, land tenure is ‘not simply a legal relation of access to land, 
but it reflects important class relations within rural areas as well as relations between the 
state and the people.  Land tenure therefore cannot be altered as a simple act of will by 
the state, but only through struggle.’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.67)  In this context, it is 
important now to consider the question of class differentiation within the rural under-
classes and the global struggles that are emerging around land reform. 
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Chapter 7 
Global Land Reform Struggles 
 
 
This chapter considers struggles pertaining to global land reform.  I pinpoint the 
contradictory effects of worldwide agrarian restructuring on the social reconstitution of 
the rural under-classes and how this underpins a multiplicity of social reproduction 
strategies and struggles engaged in by these classes, including ‘uncivil’ action such as 
land re-occupations.  This rural politics, and how it interrelates to the more ‘civil’ forms 
of organizational practice engaged in by NGOs, is critical to conceptualizing NGOs and 
land reform in relation to contemporary Zimbabwe 
 
 
7.1 The ‘Peasantry’ and Class Reformation 
 
Deborah Bryceson (2000a), after discussing the post-World War II academic literature on 
the peasantry, suggested that ‘[p]easant theory is on the retreat’ (Bryceson 2000a:p.29); 
that it was critical to bring peasants ‘back into theoretical and policy debates’ (Bryceson 
2000a:p.30); and that the ongoing reproduction of the peasantry in Latin America, Asia 
and Africa through contradictory processes of formation and dissolution seemed to give 
them an ‘enduring presence’ (Bryceson 2000a:p.6).  She concluded her extensive 
literature review by speaking about the multifaceted survival strategies of the peasantry 
under conditions of global neo-liberalism that make the peasantry – conceptually – ‘more 
elusive than before’ (Bryceson 2000a:p.30).  This elusiveness, deriving in large part from 
the indeterminate, disparate and fragmented activities of production and reproduction of 
localized peasantries, has been employed as a springboard for postmodernist conceptions 
of the peasantry as a host of multiple and divergent identities that defy class analysis.  
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Indeed, the literature on agrarian societies uses a range of (often nebulous) concepts to 
identify the agrarian under-classes.  And many of these terms clearly distract from 
properly integrating class analysis into an understanding of the agrarian political 
economy.  These include terms such as ‘the rural poor’, ‘small-scale farmers’ and 
‘smallholders’ as used by many academics, donor agencies and NGOs.  For instance, the 
term ‘smallholder’ as propagated by the World Bank is ‘an incoherently broad concept’ 
(Gibbon et al. 1993:p.147) and a ‘huge residual category’ that masks the fact that it 
comprises ‘a highly heterogeneous group … engaging in a series of quite distinct, but 
overlapping, production forms’ (Gibbon et al. 1993:p.132).  Other writers have sought to 
capture Bryceson’s ‘elusiveness’ by offering a class portrait of a structurally 
differentiated peasantry that is also deeply sensitive to contradictory and unstable social 
processes that underlay class reconstitution.  This heterogeneous character of the peasant 
‘class’ has been noted for some time, including with reference to Zimbabwean society 
(ZIDS ed. 1983).  The significance of ‘looking inside’ the peasantry and identifying 
forms of social stratification is particularly important epistemologically.  As Llambi 
(2000) highlights, ‘[t]o speak of “peasants” or “the peasantry” in general runs the risk of 
reification, giving agency to an abstract category’ (Llambi 2000:p.181).   
 
This thesis does not provide a definitive analysis of class formation in the countryside, 
including with regard to ‘the peasantry’.  This is not to reject class analysis as important 
for making sense of agrarian and land reform.  Rather, in the thesis, I have deliberately 
chosen to prioritize analytically the relation between ‘the global’ and the ‘the local’.  
Clearly, ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ are internally differentiated, including along class 
lines.  Any analysis of social class must, like my conceptualization of ‘the global’ and 
‘the local’, understand class in relationship terms and classes as mutually constitutive of 
each other.  In this regard, Hendricks (2003) argues that ‘classes are social relations’ that 
become expressed in ‘many interconnected social realities’, and that ‘[t]he lived 
experience of people in a class and the structural relation of classes are very different’ 
(Hendricks 2003:p.4).  Capturing rural under-classes conceptually is exceedingly 
difficult, and the theories outlined below simply provide conceptual leads.   
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Mafeje (2003) says that ‘African peasants, unlike the classical peasantry, are not “land-
rooted”.  They are highly mobile as petty commodity producers, migrant workers and 
petty traders in agricultural commodities, in a continuing struggle for survival.’ (Mafeje 
2003:p.12)  In branching into non-agricultural activities, the peasantries – almost by 
necessity – have to compete with the landless proletariat by way of casual labour and 
self-employed activities.  The diversity and fluidity of their livelihood strategies make it 
very difficult to spatially delimit the boundaries of the lives of peasants.  Thus, NGO 
‘projectization’ based on the notion of a fixed locality often fails to capture the 
impermanency and mobility of peasant existence.  In this respect, Moyo and Yeros 
(2005a) prefer the term ‘semi-proletariat’ to ‘fix’ the in-between, ambiguous and 
fluctuating socio-economic position of the peasantry. They claim that this group of small-
scale agriculturalists operating in an integrated system of subsistence and commodity 
production embedded firmly within capitalism ‘does not constitute a class ... but inherent 
in it are the antagonistic tendencies of proletarian and proprietor’ (Moyo and Yeros 
2005a:p.25).  The subsistence moment of peasant production involving access to 
community-land and family-labour gives ‘peasants’ a degree of autonomy (a fall-back 
position), yet the commodity moment makes them vulnerable to external national and 
global forces, including market fluctuations (Bryceson 2000c:p.300).   
 
According to Neocosmos (1993), the peasantry in sub-Saharan Africa is differentiated 
between the – seemingly arbitrary distinctions – of rich, middle and poor, with only the 
middle peasantry embodying pure petty commodity production as neither hirers nor 
sellers of labour-power.  The reproduction of the class strata of the peasantry through 
accumulation and survival strategies is uneven and unstable, involving contradictory 
processes involving the formation and the dissolution of the peasantry (Bryceson 2000b).  
Semi-proletarians, involving the functional dualism of the peasant-worker grouping, 
engage in a mixture of farm-based petty commodity production and (urban or rural) wage 
labour.  However, this is not a transitional state (on the road to ‘the modern’) but 
continues to be a pervasive socio-economic condition in the South and East (Yeros 
2002b, Moyo and Yeros 2005a).  Thus, Neocosmos (1993) argues against the theory of 
linear proletarianization based on some notion of a universal and pre-determined 
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trajectory of modernization.  Rather, he speaks about the ‘relatively stable combination of 
“worker-peasants”.  This combination must not be seen as just a temporary stage on the 
ineluctable road to full proletarian status, but as a necessary product of current social 
relations which could thereby “dissolve” in either direction’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.56).  
 
Global restructuring always has uneven and contradictory effects on the agrarian political 
economy and peasant class formations.  For instance, SAPs intensified landlessness (and 
thus proletarianization) but also increased the demand for land and land-based natural 
resources because of the diminished prospects for off-farm sources of income.  In this 
regard, SAPs simultaneously likely contributed to re-peasantization.   During the past two 
decades, the crisis of livelihoods has greatly intensified in the rural areas of the South and 
East, with social reproduction of the peasantry dependent on dwindling contributions 
from both agriculture and off-farm employment/self-employment.  The processes of 
agrarian capital formation discussed earlier, including the conversion of land uses to high 
earning non-traditional uses (for example, wildlife) and exports (for example, 
horticulture), has served only to further marginalize the peasantry.  In this regard, in 
seeking (even tenuous) access to land, the rural under-classes are often inclined to 
‘reproduce functional dualism on their own’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.32 emphasis 
removed), and to maintain their subordinate class position, as a desperate – but rational – 
survival option.  The negative notion of the peasantry as ‘not a class’ is not particularly 
helpful when it comes to (static) analyses of class structure (or class as social relations), 
yet at work here are (ambivalent) processes of class reformation and the reconstitution of 
the under-classes under neo-liberalism.  These processes of class formation and 
differentiation are regularly not overtly expressed but are manifested in generational, 
gender, regional and ethnic conflicts (Bernstein 2005). 
 
 
7.2 Peasant Struggles  
 
In 1993 Soblan argued that ‘[t]he political mobilization needed to realize radical reforms 
in the contemporary developing world remains elusive’ (Sobhan 1993:p.133).  Nearly ten 
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years later, in an analysis of potential anti-systemic movements internationally, the well-
known world-systems analyst Wallerstein (2002) failed to make any reference to the 
peasantry and its forms of political organization.  This may be in part because many rural 
movements appear ‘predatory’ (for example, in Chad and Liberia) rather than ‘principled’ 
like during anti-colonial struggles in Mozambique and Angola, and thus their participants 
seek to gain access to economic resources rather than to state power. Other scholars are 
cognizant of intensifying rural conflicts but fail to offer a peasant-focused analysis.  
Hence, ‘the early 1990s have witnessed the revival of ethnic interpretations of rural land 
conflict’, and this has been particularly notable with regard to Africa.  Rural strife is seen 
in terms of ‘ethnic chauvinism or individual pecuniary gain’ (Buijtenhuijs 2000:pp.119, 
120).   
 
Yet analysts with a probing sensitivity to agrarian social processes are increasingly 
speaking about a rural resurgence, or even rural movements, across the South and East 
(Moyo and Yeros eds. 2005).  Petras, in specific relation to Latin America, has 
consistently and exuberantly spoken about ‘the rising influence of peasant movements’ 
(Petras 1998:p.1) that operate autonomously from political parties, that have a national 
socio-political (and not just rural) agenda and that seek to forge alliances with urban trade 
unions in the struggle against neo-liberal regimes.  He suggests that these peasant-led 
movements are ‘challenging the traditional belief that the urban working class leaders are 
the designated vanguard of historical change’ (Petras 1998:p.8).  Similarly Moyo (2002), 
in surveying the African scene, argues that peasant organizations are ‘re-emerging on the 
continent ... as a potential force in a possible endogenous movement for alternative forms 
of development’ (Moyo 2002:p.1).  And in their important contribution to the politics of 
agrarian reform in the ‘peripheries’, Moyo and Yeros (2005a) refer to the peasantry (or 
semi-proletariat) as ‘the leading forces of opposition to neoliberalism and the neocolonial 
state’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.9).  These claims, however, over-privilege peasant 
movements as forces for change in the modern world and incorrectly assume that 
peasants are necessarily progressive in their politics.  
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The current politics of peasant underclasses is highly contingent, diverse and 
multifaceted, often involving both farm and workplace experiences and grievances (in 
both rural and urban settings), and thus adding considerable complexity to matters of 
political consciousness that a range of organizational forms – like ‘progressive’ trade 
unions and political parties – have failed to (or chosen not to) grasp and articulate. Even 
membership-based farmer associations have ‘generally fallen hostage to bourgeois 
elements within them, which have eschewed advocacy of land issues and development 
policies aimed at smallholder accumulation’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.42).  Therefore, it 
has been argued that lower class peasants in Africa are ‘subject to exploitation by local 
rich peasant/business elites, usually with political connections, who intermittently or 
permanently gain control of “peasant” institutions like primary cooperatives and use them 
for their personal or network enrichment.’ (Gibbon et al. 1993:p.139)   
 
In this respect, autonomous peasant mobilization is difficult and scarce, and formal 
peasant organizations (for example, farmers’ unions) often become no more than 
‘appendages of middle class driven development and democratisation agendas’ (Moyo 
2004:p.115), including those managed by NGOs.  Raikes claims that the ‘benefits from 
development projects … are usually captured by the wealthy and political influential’ 
amongst the rural classes, ‘even when they are advertised as “small-farmer” or “poverty-
oriented”.’ (Raikes 2000:p.67)  While there is a degree of empirical truth to these claims, 
such ‘anti-NGO’ arguments tend to depict the role of NGOs instrumentally in imposing 
global agendas on the rural under-classes. 
 
Members of the peasantry are highly differentiated in terms of their specific positions in 
the spheres of exchange, circulation and reproduction and – in these spheres – 
relationships are highly atomistic, individualized and competitive.  As a result, class 
solidarity amongst the peasantry is difficult to develop, and ‘prospects for the emergence 
of popular democratic organisation, as opposed to manipulable forms of populist 
response’ like those noted above ‘are slim.’ (Gibbon et al. 1993: p. 140)  There has been 
a pronounced political vacuum in the countryside and, in many parts of the South and 
East, peasants and rural proletarians have jointly filled this lacuna through autonomous 
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action either on a spontaneous or more organized uncivil basis.  Although this political 
practice arises from localized historical sedimentation that is rich in traditional and 
cultural longings, it is not retrogressive and ‘backward looking’.  Rather, it revolves 
around ‘modernist demands for access to land and productive resources, democracy and 
social justice’ (Moyo 2002:p.5). 
 
When action by peasant groups has taken on nationwide political significance, as it has 
notably in Latin America recently (predominantly Brazil), this has sometimes involved a 
pronounced anti-statist position.  Hence, there has been an avowed rejection of either 
working with the nation-state or more dramatically of capturing state power.  Rather, 
emphasis has been placed on independent and democratic self-mobilization within rural 
civil society as epitomized by the Zapatista uprising in Mexico.  Theorists such as Moyo 
and Yeros claim that this anti-politics position is problematic for various reasons.  First of 
all, and quite crudely, they argue that civil society is generally co-opted as a ‘tool of 
neoliberalism’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.43).  Further, and quite correctly, they claim 
that the nation-state continues to be a critical nexus of power in processes of social 
transformation and that the internal contradictions of the state have been productively 
exploited by rural movements as seen for instance in the Philippines.   
 
Rural opposition has transcended the confines of the nation-state and has taken on a more 
global dimension.  The militant international peasant federation, Via Campesina, has 
recently made its presence felt at international gatherings of global capital.  Such 
international movements have been made possible by the globalization of agriculture 
under the neo-liberal trajectory (referred to above), as this leads to similar experiences 
and understandings of agrarian processes by the peasantry throughout the South and East.   
Via Campesina has developed its own global agricultural policy based on the notion of 
‘food sovereignty’.   This point is not meant to overestimate the ‘homogenizing trends’ of 
globalization and to downplay its local ‘differentiating effects’ on rural realities and the 
peasantry (Llambi 2000:p.176). Rather, it highlights the glocalization of contemporary 
agrarian restructurings and struggles.  In other words, agrarian globalization invariably 
has a local content and local processes of ‘agrarian glocalization’ take on diverse forms. 
  164 
 
The importance of rural peasant action in contemporary social change, such as in the 
‘wind’ of democratization that swept through much of Africa during the 1990s, has 
undoubtedly been underestimated by those analysts10 who have a pronounced urban civil 
society bias (Moyo 2002).  Yet, simultaneously, it is important not to overestimate the 
existence or significance of this political action.  The crisis of rural livelihoods may (or 
may not) lead to intensified political struggles by the rural under-classes or, if it does, 
these struggles may be survivalist and inward looking rather than expansive (and 
offensive) forms of class struggle directed at the nation-state or at transforming society. 
Therefore, Bernstein is ‘more cautious’ (than Petras, Moyo and Yeros for instance) about 
the existence of ‘a global tidal wave of land struggles’ (Bernstein 2003:p.217).  He argues 
that ‘there is little experience in modern African history of popular rural political 
organization on a broader scale centred on agrarian and land issues’ (Bernstein 2005:p.88 
his emphasis) compared to Latin America and Asia.  For Bernstein, the most common 
confrontations are localized defensive actions against land dispossession arising from, for 
example, infra-structural or development projects but without any clear ideology and 
political programme, with the recent case of Zimbabwe being an exception.   
 
By independence in Africa, generalized commodity production was established 
throughout the sub-Saharan region in the sense that the ‘basic social relations and 
compulsions of capitalism were internalized in “peasant” production.’ (Bernstein 
2005:p.75)  This conceptualization is of significance if it implies that ‘the peasantry’ does 
not stand outside capitalism, and it takes us back to the discussion in Chapter Three about 
the social reach of capitalism.  Seth (2003) like Bernstein argues that capitalism has 
encompassed the globe such that any opposition to capital exists in the ‘interstices of 
capital’ (Seth 2003:p.48).  Thus, opposition is not external to capitalism but is subsumed 
within it.  The social groupings (for example, the peasantry) forming the basis of anti-
systemic organizations (such as the rural movements) do not exist in a state of expulsion 
from capitalism but operate within the hegemonic confines of capitalism.  This goes 
contrary to the argument of Moyo and Yeros, who claim that rural semi-proletarians and 
                                         
10 The work by Nyang’oro ed. (1999) is particularly relevant in this regard. 
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proletarians are the most significant force for change in the contemporary globalized 
world  ‘not by virtue of being exploited by capital, but by being expelled from it’ (Moyo 
and Yeros 2005a:p.55) through contemporary agrarian restructuring.  This is a fascinating 
theoretical point that regrettably is left undeveloped.  Yet, if ‘capital’ is understood as a 
set of contradictory social relations, their argument falsely depicts semi-proletarians as 
being in some form romantically ‘outside’ (expelled from) capital and thus not subject to 
the beat of its imperatives (Holloway 2003). 
 
 
7.3 Uncivil and Civil Action 
 
The global history of agrarian and land reform shows that reform of any significance is 
unlikely to take place in the face of largely demobilized rural under-classes.  Presently, 
this demobilized condition of rural civil society is particularly noticeable in Africa.  Even 
in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, where a seemingly active land movement once 
existed, it has been argued that the ‘absence of a clear cost to the state of not pursuing a 
radical programme of restructuring in rural areas’ (Hall 2004:p.225 her emphasis) 
explains the negligible land reform since the end of apartheid over ten years ago.  Such a 
cost would include the cost of instability enacted by the pervasiveness of rural 
mobilization of an uncivil kind (Soblan 1993).   
 
This uncivil action is often seen in stark contrast to the civil action of NGOs (Kaldor 
2002).  Efforts by development NGOs ‘to improve environmental security, alleviate 
poverty, and improve land and labour productivity tend to focus on small-scale “in-situ” 
palliatives in marginalised peasant lands.’ (Moyo 2004: p.112 my emphasis)  And land-
centric NGOs involved in land advocacy tend to ‘pursue clinical land reforms under 
neoliberal structures and policies’ and, in doing so, they conform to ‘the “proper” [civil] 
procedure and content of “oppositional” politics in accordance with the liberal formula’ 
(Moyo 2004:p.11).  In other words, it is strongly suggested that NGO action is often 
inconsistent with, and even in contradiction to, more radical uncivil initiatives by 
peasant-led bodies.  However, the relationship between land reform, peasant activism and 
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NGO practice is a highly complex one and is open to considerable historical and spatial 
variations.  Thus, the claim that NGOs (as instruments of ‘others’) have almost invariably 
‘bought into’ neo-liberalism ‘hook, line and sinker’ will be subjected to scrutiny later in 
the thesis.  
 
Rural opposition entails a range of uncivil strategies and actions, including the land 
occupation tactic.  Under neo-liberalism there has been a ‘shrinking of “civilized” 
political space’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.39) as defined by global capital.  Previously, 
civil politics embodied property-friendly politics but now it also includes market-friendly 
politics.  The use of land occupations falls squarely within the ‘uncivil’, even in terms of 
the former notion of the civil.  This is a significant point that Yeros (2002b) develops 
extensively in his doctoral thesis, where he examines historically the globalization of 
civil society, or what he calls ‘civilization’.  He argues that uncivil rural political practice 
has led to social revolutions and extensive agrarian reforms since World War II.  It has 
been the ‘uncivil’ agency of ‘the landless and land-short’ (rural proletarians and peasants) 
that ‘has been the basic source of agrarian reform historically’ (Moyo and Yeros 
2005a:p.53), and therefore - on a global basis - popular-led agrarian reform has driven 
state-led and market-led agrarian reforms.  This is a stance that is repeatedly substantiated 
in an edited volume (Ghimire ed. 2001) that looks at civil society and land reform in the 
South and East.  Recent studies in a number of African countries have also shown the 
form and extent of uncivil rural action.  A brief overview of three studies is now 
provided, as uncivil action has been a defining mark of the contemporary land movement 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
Amanor argues that land in Ghana is effectively owned not by the state but by chiefly 
authorities that, as ‘customary custodians’ (Amanor 2005:p.105), officially represent the 
rights of peasantry in land, and this inhibits the formation of independent peasant 
associations.  The peasantry is ‘weakly organized’ (Amanor 2005:p.116) and formal 
efforts to legally defend their land interests are repulsed by the state.  Thus, peasant 
struggles to enhance their livelihood options are often more spontaneous and uncivil.  
The establishment of forest reserves and modern agribusinesses for export-orientated 
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activities has increasingly commoditised land and led to land expropriation and, as their 
‘moral right’ (Amanor 2005:p.114), peasants have sought to repossess or access this land 
for agricultural and natural resource usages.  This has included the destruction of timber 
saplings and informal timber marketing activities, the cutting of plantation seedlings and 
illegal harvesting of fruits at night, as well as ‘squatting’ or occupations on portions of 
expropriated land.  Amanor argues that peasants have found themselves pitted against a 
broad alliance of chiefs, the state and corporate interests.   
 
In a study of Malawi, Kanyongolo focuses specifically on (largely unorganized and 
uncoordinated) land occupations.  Customary land tenure systems have been constantly 
devalued as a productive form of land investment, and land reform has favoured large-
scale commercial farming based on freehold title that has further entrenched dominant 
class interests. An in-cohesive and demobilized civil society, notably urban-based NGOs 
that espouse liberal rhetoric and trade unions with weak rural structures, has failed to 
offer progressive support for rural ‘counter-systemic actions’ (Kanyongolo 2005:p.126) 
that have been often censored by the state.  Employing notions emanating from critical 
legal theory, Kanyongolo shows how occupations go contrary to market-driven land 
reforms and are effectively de-legitimized by the legal and judiciary regimes, rather than 
being considered as a ‘legitimate democratic strategy for redressing injustice’. 
(Kanyongolo 2005:p.118)  The spatial distribution and social composition of land 
occupations in Malawi shows considerable diversity, such that ‘land occupiers have not 
always been poor peasants’ (Kanyongolo 2005:p.129) but at times have included 
traditional power elites as participants or supporters. The land movement in its internal 
organization also tends to reproduce the patriarchal structures of rural society and 
occupations adjacent to the industrial centres raise the prospect of alliances with the 
urban proletariat.   
 
Sihlongonyane’s work on South Africa looks at the land occupation tactic in the context 
of the neo-liberal policies of the ANC that stress production rather than equity and that 
seem ‘antithetical to the alteration of agrarian power relations’ (Sihlongonyane 
2005:p.148) or even to more limited land redistribution.  This tactic, along with a range 
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of informal market activities, is in many ways a survival strategy employed by the 
landless and unemployed in both peri-urban and rural areas, and is particularly beneficial 
to women as it enhances their access to land and natural resources.  Civil society since 
the end of apartheid has been in large part demobilized and has subsequently failed to 
significantly push for land reform from below. Yet a loosely organized but fragmented 
constellation of community-based organizations and progressive NGOs is emerging and 
this includes the militant (but now largely defunct) Landless People’s Movement.  This 
struggle though is ‘largely defensive in nature’ and ‘is not underwritten by a coherent 
political programme for social change’ (Sihlongonyane 2005:p.157).  Sihlongonyane 
argues that land seizures as a form of grassroots pressure for agrarian change should not 
be conceptualized as a ‘blanket strategy’ (Sinlongonyane 2005:p.159) but should be 
employed selectively alongside other tactics including negotiation.  
 
The argument about the significance of uncivil action relates back to the discussion in 
Chapter Four about uncivil society and democratic change.  It is thus consistent with 
well-argued claims made by theorists based in the South and East about indigenous forms 
of ‘civility’ and alternative roads to modernity (Kaviraj 2001).  Indeed, Chatterjee argues 
that the ‘squalor, ugliness and violence of popular life’ cannot be imprisoned ‘within the 
sanitized fortress of civil society’ and that there might be some ‘strategic use of illegality 
and violence’ (Chatterjee 2002:pp.70, 71).  As well, Yeros in his thesis raises serious 
doubts about the prospects of ‘civil solutions to neo-colonialism’ (Yeros 2002b:p.161).  
Similar to points in the previous section, he argues for example that in Africa the main 
trade union federations and the (often petty-bourgeois dominated) peasant farmers’ 
associations capitulated to civilization or became civilized, such that the ‘rural grievances 
of the semi-proletariat ... remained in uncivil terrain’ (Yeros 2002b:p.213).  Further to 
this, the ‘civil domain, by definition, cannot be broadened by civil society. The onus lies 
on progressive uncivil politics in the periphery’ (Yeros 2002b:p.249).  Likewise, Petras is 
particularly dismissive of NGOs (and urban civic bodies generally), and quite 
simplistically labels them as ‘instruments of neoliberalism’ (Petras 1997:p.7) that 
undermine the anti-system struggles of radical rural movements.  He rejects the anti-
statism of civil society formations and highlights ‘the conflict between classes over state 
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power at the national level’ (Petras 1997:p.15).   
 
 
7.4 The National Democratic Revolution? 
 
Many radical theorists analyze land reform, rural struggles and state power in terms of 
the notion of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).  In doing so, they conceptually 
link the agrarian question to the national question, both of which are said to be 
unresolved in the South and East.  Neocosmos has labelled these questions as the ‘two 
fundamental democratic questions in Africa today’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.9 my emphasis).  
He highlights the ‘internal’ side to the democratic equation by focusing on the 
subservient position of the peasantry vis-à-vis the authoritarian nation-state in sub-
Saharan Africa.  With apartheid South Africa foremost in mind, he argues that ‘[t]he land 
question can only be resolved adequately through a democratic resolution to the agrarian 
question.  While in most countries of the region, a thoroughly democratic land reform 
(including land redistribution) is necessary, such a reform needs to address the issue of 
the democratisation of state power in the absence of which the land question itself (let 
alone the agrarian question) cannot be thoroughly resolved’ (Neocosmos 1993:pp.65-66).   
 
Regimes of domination in rural southern Africa, including in post-apartheid South Africa, 
normally entail an awkward mix of local authorities particularly in customary areas.  On 
the one hand, there is ‘traditional’ despotic ‘fused power’ (Mamdani 2000:p.103) 
(involving legislative, executive, judicial and administrative authority) based on re-
configured institutions of chieftaincy.  On the other hand, there are ‘modern’ forms of 
agrarian rule such as democratically elected local government administrations and ruling 
political party structures.  Feudal landed property and political formations based on 
serfdom never existed in Africa, and thus the peasantry, generally speaking, ‘did not 
confront an immediate overlord in the form of a landlord’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.24).  
Mamdani highlights in post-colonial African society the need for ‘an agenda of 
[democratic] reform of the customary power subjugating the peasantry, the power that is 
the core institutional legacy of the indirect rule state.  The initiative to reform customary 
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power … remains in the grasp of a re-articulated, reborn, state nationalism’ (Mamdani 
2000:p.106) such as the National Resistance Movement that took state power in Uganda.  
In this context, it is clear that land reform has pronounced national democratic 
ramifications in that it is ‘concerned with direct oppressive relations between the state 
and the peasantry’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.24) that initially arose under colonialism.  But the 
‘democratic resolution’ of land reform and the NDR more generally, is also said to have a 
pronounced ‘external’ dimension. 
 
Therefore, Moyo and Yeros stress that the failed transition to ‘mature’ capitalism in the 
‘periphery’, despite decades of post-colonialism, has been marked by unfulfilled national 
sovereignty and self-determination entailing the incompleteness of the NDR.  Full-scale 
NDRs have not occurred because of the subordinated placement of the ‘peripheries’ in 
relation to the imperialist centre, as shown by the pronounced inability of these nation-
states to fulfil ‘even the minimum of modern social demands, namely the guarantee of the 
costs of social reproduction’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.38) and by their ongoing 
economic crises, political instabilities and repressive tendencies.  However, the 
authoritarian form of nation-states in the South and East has been used by global capital 
(and its intellectual representatives) ‘to vindicate the debunking of the nationalist project’ 
(Shivji 2004:p.7).   
 
An exclusive state nationalism is thus contrasted to an all-embracing and expansive civil 
society, and the latter is conceptually linked to a (supposed) universal, apolitical human 
rights discourse on constitutionalism and democracy.  Simultaneously, nationalism (and 
the national question) is de-linked and torn asunder from meaningful democratic change, 
and is thereby conceptualized as ‘the problem’.  Shivji (2004) seeks to re-establish the 
connection: ‘There is no doubt that democracy is the central question of the African 
Revolution today but the question is how is this related to, or configured with, the 
National … Question.’ (Shivji 2004:p.9)  In so arguing, Shivji re-centres the analysis on 
the ‘external’ (and from his perspective the most critical) determinant of the democratic 
deficiency in the South and East, that is, imperialism.  
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For many radical nationalists, it would appear that full national self-determination (and 
ultimately the NDR), along with a democratic and just resolution of the agrarian and 
national questions, are by definition ruled out in the South and East by the very existence 
of capitalist imperialism, and this is based on some version of a one stage theory of 
(prolonged) social revolution.  Hence, Shivji argues that the ‘quintessence’ (Shivji 2004: 
p.2) of nationalism is anti-imperialism, that ‘anti-imperialism is what defines 
nationalism’ and the ‘national question’ in Africa ‘remains unresolved so long as there is 
imperialist domination’ (Shivji 2004:p.3).  In this regard, land reform and the anti-
hegemonic rural struggles this entails become part and parcel of the ongoing nationalist 
struggle against imperialist globalization.  However, sometimes implicit in such analyses 
is a somewhat a-historical and idealized (and possibly romanticized) notion of a fulfilled 
NDR as a necessary and eventual end product of social struggle, instead of an 
understanding of ‘actually existing’ NDRs embodied in historically-variable social 
formations. This teleological depiction of history, entailing forward movement that will 
ultimately progress along a particular pre-determined trajectory, is epitomized for 
instance by Moyo and Yeros’ (2005b) sub-title to their recent work on Zimbabwe, 
‘towards the National Democratic Revolution’. 
 
The concomitant argument by radical nationalists that the next phase of the NDR under 
neo-liberalism requires a programmatic alliance between progressive urban and rural 
underclasses (Petras 1997, 1998) seems to be their answer to the historical Leninist 
(strategy and tactics) question of  ‘what is to be done?’, and it is consistent with their 
(almost) deterministic notion of the social totality.  This classic prescriptive politics 
clearly goes contrary to what they would likely consider to be ‘postmodernist’ renditions 
of the dilemmas currently facing the Left internationally.  For instance, Hardt and Negri 
(2000) identify a nebulous multitude as the agency of emancipation in the contemporary 
world, and they speak of an amorphous global authority (Empire) and simultaneously 
downplay the significance of the nation-state as a centralized authority.  As a result, they 
are bitterly criticized because ‘strategic guidance’ is not forthcoming (Callinicos 
2003:p.136).  Likewise, Holloway fails – in fact refuses – to chart the strategic way 
forward.  He claims that ‘the knowing of the revolutionaries of the last century has been 
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defeated’ (Holloway 2003:p.89), and that the old certainties of the Left are no longer 
tenable.  In other words, changing the world is an open-ended and indeterminate process.  
In that sense, the Leninist question may be the wrong question altogether.  More 
importantly, seeking to slot agrarian reform and rural politics into a pre-conceptualized 
trajectory of social revolution is epistemologically problematic.   
 
 
7.5 ‘Land’ NGOs: For Modernism and Against Modernist Systematicity 
 
Chapter Six and Seven have analyzed the current international state of affairs with regard 
to agrarian and land reform.  They traced the historical emergence and trajectory of a 
neo-liberal ‘model’ of development generally and land reform more specifically.  The 
term ‘trajectory’ has been regularly employed in these two chapters so that the existence 
of neo-liberalism globally is not overplayed and seen as omnipresent.   Further, this 
global restructuring has entailed significant forms of local restructuring throughout the 
South and East in terms of agrarian relations, class reformation and rural livelihoods.  
Thus, ‘the global’ has not simply been imposed as a free-floating process on ‘the local’ 
from ‘outside’.  Rather, an uneven and contradictory process of glocalization has been 
occurring in the ‘periphery’.  In particular, there have been numerous assertions of ‘the 
local’ against the ‘civilizing mission’ of capitalist agrarian globalization.  These include 
resistance by nation-states and ruling parties to the anti-statist thrust of land reform as 
propagated by the World Bank and other global donors, and to imperialism more broadly; 
the defence of ‘traditional’ customary tenure by agrarian communities in the face of the 
formal privatization of land tenure; and spontaneous and organized forms of rural 
opposition by the increasingly marginalized rural under-classes, including dramatic land 
movements.  As a result, ‘agrarian glocalization’ is invariably an open-ended social 
process that has no fixed or common trajectory and end-point.  The form and route it 
takes is open to remarkable historical and spatial variation.  
 
Intermediary NGOs and land reform must be understood in this context.  On the one 
hand, because of the existence of ‘complex variations’, there are ‘common themes’ 
internationally in the form of the globalization of agriculture, the restructuring of agrarian 
  173 
relations and land reform trajectories.  These commonalities arise from the contemporary 
form of the globalization of capitalism.  Thus, likely more than ever before, there is a role 
for modernist ‘grand theory’ within the sociological project.  There is every reason for 
developing a theory of NGOs that has the epistemological and conceptual capacity to 
‘capture’ the common themes while also addressing the complex variations.   On the 
other hand, if glocalization is uneven and discontinuous in the case of agrarian and land 
reform, then any sociological conceptualization and understanding of intermediary ‘land’ 
NGOs must surely reflect this.  If ‘land’ NGOs are ‘caught up’ in glocalization, then the 
work of these NGOs is invariably marked by contradiction and ambiguity.  Hence, to 
argue that glocalization is characterized by ‘tensions’ between ‘the global’ and ‘the 
local’, and then to claim that ‘land’ NGOs are simply instruments of a hegemonic neo-
liberalism, is to impose a ‘modernist systematicity’ on the world of NGOs and to bypass 
an opportunity to offer a sensitive reading of their world of ambivalence. This thesis 
seeks to render such a reading.  In order to fully accomplish this, I need to detail land 
reform in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 8 
Post-Colonial Zimbabwe: Land Policies and Struggles 
 
 
The next two chapters look at land reform in Zimbabwe.  Since the year 2000 large-scale 
land redistribution and resettlement have underpinned land events in Zimbabwe, and 
these processes have involved ‘the first radical shift in agrarian property rights in the 
post-Cold War world’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005a:p.3).  This chapter outlines the historical 
emergence and development of this ‘radical shift’ by tracing the trajectories of agrarian 
and land reform in post-independence Zimbabwe from 1980 to the mid-1990s.  The 
following chapter considers the years immediately preceding the ‘radical shift’ and the 
years that mark this shift.  This historical and social context is necessary in order to 
understand the involvement of NGOs in land reform in present-day Zimbabwe.   
 
Land reform was exceedingly limited during the first two decades of independence, and it 
was largely insignificant as a strategy for poverty alleviation and historical redress.  The 
period from 1980 to 1996 falls under what is known retrospectively as the Zimbabwean 
state’s Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) Phase I.  This phase included 
the first ten years of independence during which the Lancaster House Agreement was in 
effect, and the more recent timeframe of ESAP that was launched in October 1990.  The 
fact that both Lancaster House and ESAP entailed significant global pressure on the post-
colonial state highlights the fact that land reform in Zimbabwe has been in large part 
externally driven (Mbaya 2001).  LRRP Phase II was introduced in 1997 and continues 
to this day albeit in a revised accelerated form.   
 
For the first fifteen years of independence, the ruling political party deliberately sought to 
demobilize its social base as part of a modernizing developmentalist project.  As a result, 
by the mid-1990s both urban and rural organizations ‘had been well civilized to the 
requirements of neocolonial capitalism’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.181; Yeros 2002b).  
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Yet, this was a highly ambiguous process, because during the early 1990s ‘“national 
unity” around a broad developmentalist agenda began to unravel’ (Raftopoulos and 
Phimister 2004:p.358).  The contradictions embedded in Zimbabwean society during this 
period were manifested vividly in the agrarian and land reform strategy.  This reform 
strategy, including the contentious topic of land redistribution, was neither designed nor 
implemented in a linear and coherent fashion.  Rather, the process was halting and 
inconsistent, and subject to a multitude of political and economic pressures.  The 
Zimbabwean nation-state never articulated (let alone pursued) a unified and holistic 
agrarian programme, and its actions in many ways reproduced the colonial-based 
‘dualistic’ character of land-holdings in the rural areas.  Existing agrarian modes of 
accumulation, relations of production, labour processes and property relations were left 
untouched. 
 
Land events in Zimbabwe during Phase I are well documented in the academic literature.  
This thesis goes beyond the scope of this existing literature by highlighting the 
significance of Phase I events to Phase II developments.  It singles out two trajectories 
pertaining to ‘contradiction’ and ‘domination’ as reoccurring themes of the thesis.   First 
of all, and despite the dominant thrust of Phase I, the programme was characterized by 
considerable ambiguities revolving around the seemingly contradictory goals of 
agricultural growth and historical equity.  These contradictory tendencies became 
embedded in the Phase II programme and continue to be played out, under different 
historical conditions, in the accelerated programme.  Secondly, although in large part in 
line with global trajectories, Phase I did not simply represent a form of global imposition 
and domination.  Rather, the main trajectory of Phase I was consistent with, for instance, 
the demands of white and black agrarian capital in Zimbabwe, and Phase I was in many 
ways pursued on this basis.  This ‘local’ moment of Phase I is privileged analytically in 
the discussion of Phase I (Lancaster House and ESAP) as it brings to the fore an 
important thread of continuity between the two phases.  
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8.1 Lancaster House: Resettlement Progress and Agricultural Performance 
 
Writing in 1990, land-specialist Robin Palmer argued that ‘a curious silence’ fell over 
land reform in Zimbabwe ‘for much of the 1980s’ but that it appeared poised to bounce 
‘back into the limelight’ (Palmer 1990:p.163) with the expiry of the Lancaster House 
Agreement in 1990 and, consequently, the formal lifting of legal and procedural 
constraints on land acquisition.  The compromise agreement reached in 1979 between the 
British Government and the Zimbabwean liberation movement at the Lancaster House 
conference meant that, on the one hand, land could not be unilaterally expropriated by the 
post-colonial state during the first decade of independence.  In this regard, from the outset 
‘the issue of land was intricately linked with the whole question of sovereignty. The 
Constitution effectively insulated private property rights in land from government 
interference and, therefore, the exercise of sovereignty.  The issue of land acquisition and 
redistribution was insulated by the Constitution from democratic politics and the exercise 
of state power.’ (Tshuma 1997:p.44)   
 
The constitution relegated land reform to market-based contractual methods and the 
state’s actions were subservient to this.  For its part, the former colonial authority 
promised to underwrite half of the costs of resettlement on land purchased on a willing 
buyer-willing seller basis, and these costs would include the market value of land plus 
infra-structural developments on the resettled farms.  Relatively speaking, significant 
resettlement activity occurred from 1980 to 1986.  This took place at a time when land-
hungry peasants with high expectations began occupying both private and public land as 
‘squatters’, and when commercial farms abandoned during the war of liberation were 
readily available on the land market.  By 1985, 40,000 households had been resettled on 
2.2 million hectares of (often arid and marginal) land and by the mid-1990s this had 
increased to 71,000 households on 3.5 million hectares, all of which were well below 
government targets.  For instance, the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982 
set a target of resettling 162,000 families between 1982 and 1985 (Tshuma 1997:p.70). 
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For resettlement purposes, the government devised two main schemes.  Model ‘A’ 
schemes gave individual households 5-6 hectares of arable land plus common grazing 
areas. An accelerated version of this scheme – involving minimal pre-settlement infra-
structural provisions – existed in the early 1980s to meet the challenges posed by the 
squatter ‘movement’.  Model ‘B’ schemes involved co-operative farming arrangements 
originally consistent with the state’s early post-independence socialist rhetoric but most 
of these schemes were eventually discontinued because of various inefficiencies (Masuko 
1995).  By 1996, 93% of all schemes were Model ‘A’ schemes.  These schemes were 
never properly integrated into traditional authority structures but, otherwise, they seemed 
similar to customary areas.  The schemes fell on land now owned by the state, and access 
to land involved an insecure permit system rather than a well-documented leasehold 
arrangement.  Hence, it would seem that resettlement involved the communalization of 
land in Zimbabwe.  By the early 1990s, and because of financial constraints, the state had 
adopted the ‘least cost’ approach (GoZ 1998a) to infra-structural development in 
resettlement areas, providing initially only land demarcation services and a few water 
points.  In 1998, the resettlement process during Phase I was described by the 
government as ‘essentially rehabilitative’ (GoZ 1998a) because it involved the placement 
of squatters, the destitute and displaced persons.  This is a surprising description, for 
reasons that will become clearer later.  
 
The agricultural rationality and performance of the resettlement schemes, as part of the 
redistribution exercise more generally, were questioned from their very inception.  For 
instance, during the 1980s, White commercial farmers (through the Commercial Farmers 
Union or CFU) constantly queried the merits of any drastic or radical land redistribution 
programme, and hence they were involved in ‘slowing down the whole process of 
resettlement’ by arguing that ‘too rapid land reform would undermine white confidence, 
… threaten vital export earnings of strategic crops and result in significant job losses.’ 
(Palmer 1990:pp.170, 171)  This entailed not only direct lobbying of the Zimbabwean 
state on agricultural and land policy, but also contributing more generally to ‘an 
atmosphere of risk-aversion by stressing the importance of commercial agriculture’ 
(Herbst 1990:p.56) relative to peasant holdings (Sachikonye 2003).   
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This ‘big farm’ ideology comes across in von Blanckenburg’s (1994) important empirical 
study of White commercial farmers in Zimbabwe during the early 1990s and, indeed, the 
author goes to great length to dress this ideology in theoretical garb.  He thus concludes 
that resettlement in Zimbabwe is ‘a negative rather than a positive experience’ (von 
Blanckenburg 1994:p.12), that the export performance of large farms is of ‘strategic 
importance’ (von Blanckenburg 1994:p.27), and that the agricultural performance in 
resettled areas is ‘weak’ (von Blanckenburg 1994:p.32).  Simultaneously, however, other 
scholars more sympathetic to land redistribution and small-farm productivity have argued 
that the acquisition of over three million hectares of commercial farmland during the 
1980s did not lead to ‘production losses’ within the commercial sector and that in fact the 
exact opposite took place (Moyo 2000a:p.16).  Reform proponents considered most large 
farms owned by Whites as under-utilized, and there were ongoing proposals to subdivide 
many of these farms and apportion the subdivided units amongst aspiring Black 
commercial farmers as a way of balancing equity and growth concerns.  
 
The rationale of the state’s agrarian policies vis-à-vis resettlement areas has been 
subjected to scrutiny.  It has been argued for instance that resettlement has been largely ‘a 
political and welfare strategy’ rather than a serious ‘economic programme for agricultural 
development’ (Karumbidza 2004:p.18).  Thus, like the ‘communal’ areas, the state fused 
sovereignty and property on resettled farms, as settlers (normally males) were granted 
obscure permits with (at least de jure) tenuous access to land.  Yet the creation of new 
forms of property rights and entitlements in resettled areas was not constrained by the 
1980 constitution (Tshuma 1997:p.51), and thus the government of Zimbabwe could have 
instituted longer-term and more secure leasehold agreements to possibly enhance 
investment by the resettled farmers.  The state sought rather to ‘uplift’ the agriculture of 
peasant ‘settlers’ through modern ‘technocratic means’ (Tshuma 1997:p.74) that asserted 
the un-productivity of ‘traditional’ agricultural ways.  In this way, resettlement areas 
were envisaged by the Zimbabwean government to be sites of rational planning and 
sound land husbandry, although this rarely occurred in practice.  Further, it was not long 
before significant class differentiations became pronounced on resettled farms, 
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particularly from the late 1980s when equity concerns became less significant and the 
intended beneficiaries of resettlement increasingly switched from the ‘communal poor’ to 
capable and experienced ‘master’ farmers. 
 
The constraints imposed upon the government by the Lancaster House Agreement during 
the 1980s do not fully explain the nature of the land reform programme, including its 
truncated character.  Of course, serious financial bottlenecks associated with market-
based land acquisition did arise, and indeed by the mid-1980s the government had 
already implemented some austerity measures and sought IMF support.  Therefore, land 
acquisition soon became ‘a hostage of measures intended to reduce budget and balance of 
payments deficits’ (Tshuma 1997:p.58).  Yet, in line with the arguments of the CFU, the 
state (or at least significant ministries and politicians within it) ‘demonstrated hesitancy 
in transforming or restructuring the LSCF [large scale commercial farming] sector which 
was viewed as “the goose laying the golden egg”’ (Karumbidza 2004:p.12).  As well, the 
post-colonial state was engrossed with statist methodologies of ruling, and this distanced 
and insulated the state from rumblings within rural civil society about the inadequacies of 
land reform.  Further, the immediate post-independence boom in peasant agriculture (in 
customary areas), including marketed maize, misled government into thinking that 
agricultural productivity would be significantly enhanced without ongoing re-distributive 
measures (Palmer 1990).  In fact, the ‘boom’ when not disaggregated obscured 
significant class and spatial disparities in production amongst the peasantry (Karumbidza 
2004). 
 
 
8.2 SAP: Declining Redistribution and Capitalist Modernization 
 
The macro-economic strategy pursued by the Zimbabwean government during the 1980s 
was a tightrope of ‘growth with equity’.  It has been convincingly argued that, already by 
the mid-1980s, the ‘centre-piece of agrarian reform’ (Tshuma 1997: p. 56) for the 
government had shifted from land redistribution to increasing agricultural productivity, 
and thus growth took precedence over equity concerns.  This agrarian trajectory 
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continued beyond the 1980s in the hard face of the neo-liberal structural adjustment 
programme (ESAP) introduced by the Zimbabwean government in late 1990.  This 
programme led to an ‘increasingly market-oriented conception of Zimbabwe’s land 
question’ (Moyo 2000a:p.11) and it was ‘the major constraint’ on land redistribution 
from 1990 onwards (Moyo 2000a:p.9).  Hence, during much of the 1990s, there was an 
‘interlude’ in resolving the land question (Sachikonye 2003:p. 231).   
 
The central state also seemed disengaged from land reform, as ‘political pressures ... were 
less intense than before…. Opposition parties were fragmented and weak, and thus 
unable to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent party.  Until 1998, there was little 
organised pressure from peasants and the landless’ (Sachikonye 2003:p.231).  In this 
regard, Moyo (2000e) describes the period from 1987 to 1996 as entailing declining 
redistribution and intensive policy reformulation.  He notes, amongst other things, that 
numerous land policy and legislative reforms were pronounced, that laws to enhance 
compulsory acquisition were developed and tested (without success), that the limited land 
purchased was financed by the central state’s own (inadequate) budgeted allocations, and 
that Black commercial farming was increasingly promoted. 
 
Therefore, if redistribution did re-appear in the limelight during the 1990s, it did so in a 
particular guise and with a distinctive productivity (and not a historical re-dress) thrust.  
Simultaneously, tenure changes continued to take a backseat although this matter was the 
main focus of the 1994 Rukuni Commission into appropriate agricultural land tenure 
systems.  In terms of the recommendations of the Commission, the state accepted (but 
never implemented) the introduction of leasehold rights with the option of freehold title 
(for productive farmers only) in resettlement areas in order to, in the words of the 
Minister of Lands (K. Kangai) ‘encourage capital investment’ (Wkshop 1996:p.4).  But 
Kangai argued, contrary to the Rukuni Commission, that existing tenure in communal 
areas ‘should be maintained and strengthened’ (Wkshop 1996:p.5) and thus that the state 
should not relinquish its de jure ownership of land.  The government did not have a 
coherent land programme that integrated reorganized land tenure regimes into the 
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resettlement process in either the place of origin or destination of resettlement, that is, the 
customary and resettlement areas respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the overall productivity approach of the state was in line with the 
CFU’s ongoing emphasis on productivity considerations in resettlement.  As well, ESAP 
neatly served to justify or legitimize agricultural accumulation amongst an aspiring Black 
landed class.  This ‘accumulation from above’ occurred despite the emergence of a new 
(and potentially more trans-formative) Land Policy from 1990 involving the acquisition 
of 5 million hectares of land, and as reflected for example in changes to the constitution 
and in the 1992 Land Acquisition Act.  Much to the dismay of White commercial 
farmers, this policy allowed for the block designation of farms for resettlement and for 
compulsory acquisition of farms in all natural regions (including prime land with good 
climatic and soil conditions) and not just underutilized land.  The 1992 Act was meant to 
speed up the land redistribution programme, but legal standards of fairness and 
transparency still had to be adhered to and this bogged down the process.  Further, all 
land obtained –  by whatever means – still required some form of payment by the state, 
but now this would only be ‘fair’ compensation.  One possible implication of this became 
dramatically clear under the accelerated programme in the year 2000, as far-reaching land 
redistribution seemed to ‘cry out for’ the suspension of the rule of law. 
 
Under ESAP, export-dependent accumulation strategies were stressed and this was to the 
marked advantage of large-scale White commercial farmers with their near monopoly of 
the agricultural export market.  Indeed, soon after independence, (predominantly White) 
agrarian capital branched into non-traditional high-earning export crops like horticulture 
plus wildlife eco-tourism as part of extroverted economic liberalization processes (Moyo 
2000c).  Meanwhile, during ESAP, the peasant under-classes in the customary areas were 
largely left to fend for themselves, as the state effectively became a ‘facilitator’ rather 
than a ‘guarantor’ of smallholder agricultural development (Chipika et al. 1998:p.71).  
During the 1980s, the state had sought to modernize communal lands through irrigation 
schemes, forestry projects, grazing schemes and other development interventions. It also 
tried to implement a highly regulated agrarian regime and it gave targeted assistance to 
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smallholder agriculture (to ‘modernize’ them) through the provision of credit, research 
and extension, and marketing infrastructure.   
 
This engagement was based on diverse state practices.  For example, while the state held 
in part to a ‘big farm’ path to modernization, it also entertained the view that small-scale 
farming was potentially productive.  Thus, the peasantry was portrayed as rational 
producers who would respond favourably to incentives.  From the viewpoint of the 
government, any support from outside required interventions that would ‘modernize’ 
peasant agriculture beyond typically subsistence levels. This ‘modernization’ (with the 
assistance of multilateral and bilateral agencies) had the effect though of ‘controlling the 
peasant production processes by locking them into state capitalist enterprises’ (Tshuma 
1997:p.113).  The peasant ‘boom’ (or ‘miracle’) mentioned above has often been 
attributed to this interventionist regime, but the ‘institutional support regime was at best 
minimal’ (Karumbidza 2004:p.1) and at worst incoherent.  Those ‘progressive’ (or 
‘miracle’) farmers located in the communal lands during the 1980s, and whose further 
accumulation strategies were seemingly being blocked by the dysfunctions of customary 
tenure, became eligible for resettlement in terms of the emphasis on productivity. 
 
 
8.3 Customary Areas: Peasant Farmers and ‘Traditional’ Leadership 
 
This statist regime, although weak on the ground, was further eroded by ESAP’s 
restructuring of the agrarian economy.  ESAP was highly typical of SAPs found 
throughout Africa, including public service reforms, tightening of monetary policy, 
enhancing the export incentive system and promoting foreign investment (Thorpe and 
Vehris eds. 1995).  This macro-economic package though was unevenly implemented.  
The sector reforms specifically within agriculture involved the commercialization and 
privatization of commodity marketing boards (for instance, cotton and maize), the 
deregulation of prices of key crop inputs, and the downsizing of agricultural extension 
services.  In general, ‘smallholders’ were severely disadvantaged by these reform 
measures because, for example, credit from the state agricultural financial corporation 
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dried up and prices of inputs such as fertilizer skyrocketed.  But ESAP had a differential 
impact within agrarian communities and it led to a ‘worsening’ of social inequalities 
(Chipika et al. 1998:p.33).  While richer farmers in ‘communal’ lands further ventured 
into cash crops like cotton and tobacco, critical production constraints inhibited poorer 
farmers.  The latter responded, by amongst other measures, hiring out their labour to 
richer farmers, extending their lands under cultivation in a desperate measure to maintain 
output, and relying increasingly on natural resources as sources of food.  They also 
‘leased’ out their de facto private land (i.e. arable plots) and, in so doing, commodified 
their land-use entitlements (Tshuma 1997:p.97).   
 
Land rehabilitation-cum-reorganization of the ‘communal’ (or customary) areas was 
never vigorously pursued in a quest for productivity or equity within the countryside 
(Mbiba 1999).  Yet, the first Five Year Development Plan (1986-1990) highlighted the 
need for the restructuring of communal area agrarian systems.  This implementation 
failure also runs counter to constant claims of intent by the state, including by the 
Ministry of Lands and Agriculture in 1992 that ‘resettlement alone can never fully solve 
all the problems of the communal areas… The implementation of the programme has to 
be carried out in tandem with the programme of communal area reorganization’ (quoted 
in von Blanckenburg 1994:p.37).  Therefore, throughout the period from 1980 to 1996, 
the peasants in the communal lands remained ‘captured’ under a (colonial-style) fused 
authority revolving around an awkward ‘institutional mélange’ (Tshuma 1997:p.90) that 
included elected Rural District Councils (RDCs), traditional chieftainships and local 
ruling party cell structures.  Rural councils represented the devolved authority of the 
central state at district level, and village and ward development committees operated 
under them as the most basic units of decentralization.   
 
This decentralization was meant to incorporate peasants into the modernizing process in a 
participatory mode.   But in practice beneficiary participation was ‘seriously curtailed’ 
and development committees ‘have proved to be incapable of producing development 
plans’ (Makumbe 1996:p.47).  RDCs themselves had limited financial autonomy in 
relation to the central state, and they were ‘basically incapacitated and weak agents of the 
  184 
centre’ (Makumbe 1996:p.85).  Thus, paradoxically, decentralization was a highly 
politicized process that strengthened the state at the expense of rural civil society, and 
this ‘facilitated’ central government ‘penetration of the periphery for purposes of control 
and manipulation of the local people’ (Makumbe 1998:p.53).   
 
The 1988 Rural District Councils Act sought to provide overarching district authorities 
incorporating commercial, communal and resettlement areas.  This was implemented in 
various parts of the country during the 1990s but was not particularly successful in 
ensuring a functional integrated rural authority structure.  Nevertheless, councils and their 
development committees had formal authority over land allocation and disputes.  Rural 
local authorities were never properly integrated into resettlement schemes and the 
dominant on-ground ‘authority’ was resettlement officers, who were generally labelled as 
being ineffective in their duties. Hence, the Secretary of the Rukuni Commission, V. 
Vudzijena, noted in 1995 that the ‘planning and administration of resettlement schemes is 
over centralised’ and the RDCs had been reduced to simply issuing trading licenses 
(Wkshop 1995:p.12).    
 
The central state had an ambivalent approach to chieftainship structures.  Despite the 
significant contribution of many chieftainships to the war of liberation, the government of 
Zimbabwe initially sought to marginalize these structures only to then upgrade their 
judicial authority from 1990.  Rural councils and traditional bodies represented ‘two 
parallel systems of authority’ (Chaumba et al. 2003a:p.587), although many chiefs were 
directly involved in the affairs of the RDCs and their development sub-committees.  
Ruling party structures continued to play a role in administration and development 
activities in communal lands, but this was uneven and ad hoc.  Traditional authorities 
regularly involved themselves in land administration and for this and other reasons they 
were often at ‘loggerheads’ with elected councils (Chaumba et al. 2003a:p.587).  For 
instance, ‘outsiders’ were being given land in grazing areas at a price by chiefs or the 
kraal head but without approval from the land authority (the council).  This at times 
caused conflict between long-established communal residents and these ‘illegal settlers’ 
(Zishiri 1998). 
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By the mid-1990s, and consistent with the recommendations of the 1994 Rukuni Report, 
the state was considering abolishing the village development committees of the RDCs 
and further enhancing the administrative power of the traditional authorities including 
over land matters.  For the RDCs, this was nothing short of sacrilege.  Thus S. Chikate of 
the Association of RDCs argued in 1995 that ‘our traditional leaders are not known for 
accountability’ and that the chieftainship represents ‘a system that goes back even beyond 
the dark ages’ and should not be promoted in ‘our modern day Local administration’ 
(Wkshop 1995:p.43).  
 
 
8.4 The Indigenization of Agricultural Capital  
 
Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean state’s resettlement efforts continued to show significant 
commitment to commercial farming, particularly in light of the drive for indigenization.  
By the late 1990s, there were about 8,000 Black small-scale commercial farmers on over 
1.2 million hectares outside the communal and resettlement areas (Moyo 1999a:p.19).  
These Black petty bourgeois farmers were represented by the ruling party-aligned 
Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU).  At a workshop in 1995, the president of the ZFU 
stressed the importance of individualized land tenure and its supposed linkages to 
enhanced investment and productivity.  He thus argued that ‘the rights to land utilization 
within the smallholder farming areas’ are an ‘outstanding issue in the agrarian reform in 
Zimbabwe’, and that a ‘secure tenure system’ in both communal and resettlement areas 
would ‘increase the competitiveness of these sectors’.  He further argued that communal 
farmers were a ‘heterogeneous mix of productive and unproductive farmers’ and, as a 
result, the ZFU in its workshop deliberations had ‘recommended a selective titling 
process in favour of productive farmers’ (Wkshop 1995:pp.1, 7).   
 
By the mid-1990s, about 500 Blacks had acquired medium and large farms (some by 
dubious means) through leasehold (of state land), lease-to-buy schemes and mortgage 
loans from the agricultural financial corporation.  These farms averaged over 1,000 
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hectares each.  This meant that nearly 10% of commercial farms were Black-owned.  A 
few years earlier, Palmer had noted that ‘[f]or some members of government … land 
redistribution might now signify taking land for themselves, rather than giving it to 
peasants’ (Palmer 1990:p.175).  There is indeed evidence to suggest that the resettlement 
policy at times furthered the economic ambitions of the indigenous elite, including those 
lodged within the state (Moyo 1999a). Black economic nationalism was facilitating 
agricultural accumulation strategies in the name of indigenization, and this process took 
advantage of the 1990 Land Policy’s marked silence on social and equity concerns.  
Although this was never government policy, there have been concerted ‘attempts to use 
the state to promote the formation of a black agrarian bourgeoisie’ (Tshuma 1997:p.9).   
 
It appears then that Phase I of the LRRP was characterized by a shifting but ‘narrow 
racial and class monopoly over land’ in Zimbabwe (Moyo 2000a:p.6), and that 
acquisition and redistribution during the 1990s were shaped by the class interests of the 
Black landed class (Tshuma 1997) which was emerging during the 1980s.  However, 
because of the still limited entry of Blacks into capitalist agriculture, ‘the racial aspect of 
the land question continues to dominate over the class aspect’ (Tshuma 1997:p.134).  In 
other words, land dispossessed under colonialism was still in large part in the hands of 
Whites. In this way emergent Black agrarian capitalists could claim they were acting to 
redress the long-brewing land grievances of Blacks.  This embourgeoisement of land 
reform was clearly to the detriment of significant sections of the peasantry, but it was 
acceptable to the central state insofar as it promoted (or at least did not jeopardize) the 
post-colonial nation-building project.  It would seem, then, that land reform was never 
intended to transform social relations but has been propagated and implemented by the 
state intermittently to defuse rural opposition and to stabilize the countryside (Tshuma 
1997).  In the early 1990s it could be rightfully claimed that the ongoing land inequalities 
in Zimbabwe had, to date, not ‘affected substantially’ the socio-political stability of the 
nation (von Blanckenburg 1994:p.127).  By the late 1990s, this no longer appeared to be 
the case, as a land ‘movement’ had emerged in rural Zimbabwe in the context of an 
‘organic’ crisis (Moore 2003). 
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8.5 Brewing Problems: Farm Labourers and Land Short Squatters 
 
Two issues in particular need to be highlighted as problems brewing with respect to the 
resettlement programme, namely, the position of farm workers and land short squatters. 
Throughout much of the period under discussion, land reform discourses ignored 
agricultural labourers.  Moyo et al. (2000b:p.189) argue that agricultural workers ‘fell 
between the cracks’ of the ‘dual economy thinking’ that informed state policy and 
practice under colonialism and on into independent Zimbabwe.  This thinking focused on 
the articulations between the urban economy and the communal (or ‘reserve’) economy 
as epitomized by the migrant labour system, and it in large part conceptually bypassed 
the commercial farm sector.  Failure to give sufficient attention to a ‘third’ economy has 
often been replicated in scholarly analytical works.  This includes Mamdani’s (1996) 
study of despotic forms of rule in post-colonial Africa, as he excludes commercial 
agriculture from his notion of the uncivil rural realm.  Serious analysis of Zimbabwean 
farm workers has appeared in recent years, most notably by Rutherford (2001) who 
argues that these workers lived and toiled under an oppressive ‘domestic government’ 
system in which they (almost literally) ‘belonged to the farmer’.  Akin to Mamdani’s 
notion of fused authority in customary areas, Black agricultural labour was subjected to a 
despotic authority involving White property and White sovereignty. 
 
Thus, the Zimbabwean state rarely intervened in the affairs of domestic government and 
much of state policy was devoid of any explicit reference to this large category of rural 
proletarians.  In fact, at times these agricultural labourers were deliberately marginalized 
from policy regimes, including with regard to resettlement.  The 70,000 families who had 
benefited from the resettlement programme by the mid-1990s included 
(disproportionately) only 3,000 farm worker households.  In the late 1990s, 2 million 
people lived in commercial farm compounds, and this amounted to nearly one-third of the 
population – 6.5 million – in customary areas (Moyo et al. 2000b:pp.182, 183).  The 
Zimbabwean government often labelled agricultural labourers as foreigners without 
totems, and thus they were not true sons and daughters of Zimbabwean soil and this 
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disqualified them from the land programme.  Further, especially in light of the 
productivity thrust, these workers were derided as unproductive, and seemingly incapable 
of being ‘modernized’, because they were wholly dependent on a boss and they lacked 
the necessary development ethos and initiative for resettlement purposes (Moyo et al. 
2000b). 
 
In the case of communal land shortages, it has been argued that ‘the land cause had never 
been abandoned’ by the semi-proletariat or peasantry (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.182) and 
that the landless constantly pressurized the state for reform through, amongst other 
tactics, ‘uncivil’ land occupations.  This is despite the fact that ‘[n]o independent peasant 
organisation’ vis-à-vis the ruling party ‘survived or emerged’ after independence 
(Sachikonye 1995:p.132).  Initially (from 1980 to 1985) there was low profile but high 
intensity occupations (Moyo 2001) that received at times substantial support from the 
central or local state elite.  The government tolerated occupation of abandoned and 
(officially) acquired farms but disapproved of occupations on utilized commercial land.  
On occasion, though, the government was forced to acquire some prime land as 
‘squatters’ refused to move.  But as independence progressed, and as the initial equity 
thrust of land distribution tapered off because of the increasing embourgeoisement of the 
ruling political party and the fiscal crisis of the state, a rift began to grow between 
ZANU-PF and its rural (peasant) base.   
 
Low intensity occupations (Moyo 2001) from 1985 to 1996 continued on into the ESAP 
period, but the response of the state was to treat the occupants as squatters and to have 
them vigorously removed.  ZANU-PF lost its patience and severely sanctioned peasants 
who sought ‘to gain access to land outside procedures established by the state’ (Tshuma 
1997:p.67).  The land occupations during the 1990s reached a climax in 1998 with high 
profile and high intensity community-led occupations.  Moyo argues that controversies 
about the spontaneity or contrived character of land occupations in Zimbabwe represent a 
‘facile debate’, as ‘[r]arely in the past twenty years have occupations been spontaneous, 
since they were mostly planned through the liberation movement, local MPs or political 
party functionaries.’ (Moyo 2001:p.321)  The land occupations from 1980 to 1999 
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involved loosely organized and fragmented forms of un-civility, and differed 
significantly from the recent land movement or Third Chimurenga occupations in this 
regard.   
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Chapter 9 
Land Reform in Contemporary Zimbabwe 
 
 
The social crisis that developed in Zimbabwe during the late 1990s set the backdrop for 
the accelerated land programme.  This programme explicitly addresses land reform of a 
re-distributive kind but it has raised a host of other issues pertaining to land and agrarian 
reform.  Recent reform will be conceptualized with reference to the significant 
restructuring of state and society in contemporary Zimbabwe.  By mid-2005, or just five 
years after the beginning of the Third Chimurenga, the government of Zimbabwe was 
confidently and stridently claiming that the ‘the people now had the land’ and that the 
land question had finally been resolved.  This was the ‘permanent panacea to the land 
issue’ that the government had been seeking, as articulated by the Minister of Lands in 
January 1997. 11 
 
 
9.1 The Acrimonious Zimbabwean Debate 
 
Moyo and Yeros (2005b) argue that the land occupation movement in present-day 
Zimbabwe is ‘the most notable of rural movements in the world today’; that it has 
obtained ‘the first major land reform since the end of the Cold War’; that it has been ‘the 
most important challenge to the neocolonial state in Africa’ under neo-liberalism (Moyo 
and Yeros 2005b:p.165); and – seemingly more controversially – that it has a 
‘fundamentally progressive nature’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.188).  Their depiction of 
the Third Chimurenga, both in their earlier individual work and later in their more 
comprehensive collaborative project, has been the subject of an important but 
acrimonious debate amongst Zimbabwean Left scholars about state formation and 
                                         
11 K. Kangai, speech given at the Ecumenical Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, 30th January 1997,  Harare (ZERO LAND FILES). 
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political change (Moyo 2001; Yeros 2002a; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004; Moore 
2004; Raftopoulos 2005).    
 
Critics of Moyo and Yeros claim that their statements about the Third Chimurenga entail 
– almost perverse – value judgments made by ‘patriotic agrarianists’ (Moore 2004:p.409) 
or ‘left-nationalists’ (Bond and Manyanya 2003:p.78) who fail to conceptualize 
analytically or even highlight empirically the increasingly repressive character of state 
nationalism in contemporary Zimbabwe, designated as an ‘exclusionary’ nationalism 
(Hammar et al. eds. 2003), an ‘exhausted’ nationalism (Bond and Manyanya 2003) or an 
‘authoritarian populist anti-imperialism’ (Moore 2003:p.8).  Raftopoulos and Phimister 
argue that this authoritarianism involves an ‘internal reconfiguration of Zimbabwean state 
politics’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.377) and now amounts to ‘domestic tyranny’ 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.356), and they speak about a ‘number of African 
intellectuals on the Left’ (including Moyo and Yeros, but also Ibbo Mandaza) who have 
‘leapt to the defence of ZANU PF’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.376) and its re-
distributive economic policies.  For their part, Moyo and Yeros claim that their critics 
(who they call neo-liberal apologists for imperialism or ‘civic/post-nationalists’) demote 
the significance of national self-determination and the agrarian question in Zimbabwe as 
expressed in the recent land movement by focusing on the movement’s excessive 
violence and eventual co-option by the ruling party and state.  They therefore argue that it 
is essential to conceptualize the land occupations in the context of a re-radicalized (and 
revitalized) state nationalism and the ongoing movement of the National Democratic 
Revolution (NDR) under post-colonial conditions.  
 
This debate amongst the Left, which has been the explicit subject of a number of recent 
papers, has pronounced political overtones, and is indeed linked at times by the 
protagonists to the current tensions (almost chasm) within the national politics of 
Zimbabwe.  This conflict involves ‘competing narratives of Zimbabwe’s national 
liberation history’ (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003:p.17) such that, currently, ‘history is 
at the centre of politics in Zimbabwe’ (Ranger 2004:p.234).  It also involves 
fundamentally different conceptions of the current crisis.  On the one hand, there is a 
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nationalist discourse that speaks of a land crisis and that stresses national sovereignty and 
re-distributive policies.  In terms of this discourse, Raftopoulos (2005) says that land 
‘became the sole central signifier of national redress, constructed through a series of 
discursive exclusions’ (Raftopoulos 2005:pp.9-10).  This process of exclusion entails 
sidelining and undercutting sub-national counter-narratives found in what the state would 
label as the more ‘marginal’ spaces of Zimbabwean society, including rural Matabeleland 
and the urban trade union movement (Alexander et al. 2000; Raftopoulos 2001).  On the 
other hand, there is a more liberal discourse that refers to a governance crisis and that 
emphasizes human rights and political democratization (Hammar et al. eds. 2003; 
Sachikonye 2002), and that involves a ‘managerial, modernising nationalism’ 
(Rutherford 2002:p.1).  
 
The first discourse focuses on the external (imperialist) determinants of the crisis and the 
latter on its internal (nation-state) determinants (Freeman 2005).  Yet both discourses 
have roots in the notion of the NDR, with the former prioritizing the ‘national’ (in 
struggling against imperialism) and the latter the ‘democratic’ (in struggling against an 
authoritarian state) (Moore 2004).  For example, Mandaza (who has links with the ruling 
party) says that during the late 1990s post-nationalist forces in alliance with foreign 
elements were engaged in a subterranean ‘social crisis strategy’ that sought to make 
Zimbabwe ungovernable, and that the (supposedly radical) intellectual representatives of 
these forces sought to prioritize issues of governance and democracy ‘at the expense of 
addressing the National Question’.12  Thus, the civic nationalism of these theorists (such 
as Raftopoulos) is portrayed as civil society warring against the state, and as seeking to 
undermine economic (re-distributive) nationalism rightly propagated (according to 
Mandaza) by a beleaguered nation-state under the onslaught of imperialism in the 
periphery.   
 
Labelling each other as either left-nationalists or neo-liberals amounts at one level to 
intellectual misrepresentation and character assassination.  But it is also suggestive of 
                                         
12 The ‘Scrutator’ in The Zimbabwe Mirror, 28 April to 4 May 2000. All quotations from Mandaza in this 
chapter are from this column 
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important theoretical differences within the Left.  For example, Raftopoulos has been 
influenced by a Leftist ‘culturalist’ tradition including the works of Stuart Hall and E. P. 
Thompson and he might consider himself a Radical Democrat, whereas the joint work by 
Moyo and Yeros is more inclined towards a modernist class perspective.  I argue that the 
debate brings to the fore the many tensions, contradictions and ambivalences embodied in 
the socio-political processes characterizing present-day Zimbabwe, and raises 
fundamental questions for social scientists about how to conceptualize the ‘social 
totality’.  For instance, Raftopoulos fails to offer rigorous class analyses (Helliker 2004) 
yet Moyo and Yeros have an overly structured conception of the totality (Helliker 2005).  
In this regard, the debate on Zimbabwe offers a false dichotomy of contemporary 
developments.  With particular relevance to the thesis, both ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ 
(or ‘the internal’ and ‘the external’) are critical for ‘capturing’ the heightened 
contradictions and deepening crises that mark contemporary Zimbabwe.   
 
 
9.2 The ‘Zimbabwean Crisis’ and the Agrarian Question of Capital 
 
All scholars on Zimbabwe seem to concur that the nation is currently experiencing a 
social crisis of unprecedented and epic proportions.  This is considered to be almost 
axiomatic and a foregone conclusion, and hence ‘by any measure’ Zimbabwe is said to be 
in crisis (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003:p.3).  A voluminous ‘crisis’ literature on 
Zimbabwean society has arisen in the past few years, and this is despite the nebulous and 
obscure connotations of the term ‘crisis’ as often employed by socio-political theorists.  
Most accounts of ‘the’ crisis have been in the main descriptive, yet there are also more 
serious efforts to theorize about the crisis. The crisis has been given a range of shorthand 
labels, including ‘organic crisis’ (Moore 2003) following Gramsci’s conceptual 
framework, and even ‘the Zimbabwean Crisis’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004).  As 
well, its historical and causal roots have been differentially traced in the academic 
literature (Bond and Manyanya 2003; Raftopoulos 2003) with the epicentre lodged 
somewhere in the early, mid or late 1990s.  
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It often remains unclear though ‘what’ or ‘who’ is in crisis, but most usually the crisis is 
reduced to a crisis for the political regime.  Thus the common account is that, by the late 
1990s, there emerged crises on both the economic and political fronts.  On the one hand, 
there arose an ESAP-related macro-economic crisis that resulted in a contraction of the 
economy and rampant inflation.  On the other hand, a broad-based political opposition in 
the urban areas (trade unions, civics, the NCA and the MDC) was questioning and 
challenging the hegemony of the ruling ZANU-PF party and its particular rendition of 
‘the nation’.  Hence, in the face of crises of profitability and legitimacy, the ruling party 
found itself ‘in a corner’.  Yet, the state was now ‘unencumbered by the conditionalities’ 
of ESAP and it became increasingly authoritarian (Raftopoulos 2002:p.418).   
 
The crisis reverberated within the ruling party, government and state.  This was spurred 
on by the openly political demands for financial compensation by the ruling party aligned 
(but largely marginalized) war veterans13 in 1997, to which the government of Zimbabwe 
generously ceded.  This unbudgeted fiscal expense along with the financially draining 
intervention in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo made it exceedingly 
difficult for the government to meet stringent donor conditions to reduce the budget 
deficit. The government failed to honour its external debt load, and this resulted in global 
capital (the IMF) withholding any further balance-of-payments support.  In other words, 
in 1999, the government defaulted on its loan repayments and the IMF suspended any 
further aid (Dansereau 2003).  By March 2002, arrears to the Bretton Woods institutions 
exceeded an astronomical 1.3 billion U.S. dollars.   
 
The political regime sought to solidify and if necessary restructure its support base and, 
in so doing, to forge new political alliances in a desperate effort to stay afloat.  The loss 
of the constitutional referendum in February 2000 however was ‘the straw that started to 
break the ZANU-PF camel’s back’ and was the direct catalyst for the Third Chimurenga 
(Moore 2001:p.255), although the incessant demands for land reform from an ‘aroused’ 
peasantry may not have been far from the minds of the political elite (Moyo and Yeros 
                                         
13 ‘War veterans’ were veterans of the war of liberation against the Rhodesian government in the 1970s, or 
the Second Chimurenga. 
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2005b).  Hence, by the year 2000, in the face of imperialist aggression or at least 
disengagement, the ‘balance of class forces within the ruling party was tipped in favour 
of radical nationalist solutions’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.188) to agrarian and land 
reform. Within the state there was a ‘political hardening of the radical nationalist social 
forces and an escalation of demands to resolve land reforms as a matter of sovereign 
right, pride and reparation, rather than as a mere matter of poverty alleviation’ (Moyo 
2000e:p.5) or even, for that matter, agricultural productivity.  Therefore, besides the 
strident local opposition to the ruling party in the late 1990s with which the state sought 
to contend, there was a significant global moment that influenced the manner in which 
the government sought to handle the deepening crisis. 
 
When the land movement emerged in the year 2000, the supporters of illegal land 
seizures in the ‘command structure’ of ZANU-PF and the state were able to dominate 
(but not without resistance) over those favouring more legalistic compulsory acquisitions 
(Moyo 2001:p.328).  The ruling party’s election slogans for the year 2000 and beyond – 
‘the anti-Blair vote’ and ‘the land is the economy’ – encapsulated the moments of the 
social crisis, as these moments involved an attempt by ZANU-PF to ‘rebuild a fading 
hegemonic project’ (Moore 2003:p.8) and to solidify its external and internal sovereignty.  
The latter slogan implied that the state’s rural restructuring would revive the imploding 
economy and stimulate primitive accumulation, although most critics dispute such causal 
links (Moore 2001).  State nationalism had been re-radicalized (or ‘hardened’), but this 
involved a degree of ‘continuity’ (Yeros 2002b:p.243) with the nationalism of the post-
independence period as well as a significant narrowing of the notion of citizenship.  Of 
particular interest to this thesis is how this crisis articulates with the ‘agrarian question’. 
 
Moore (2001, 2003) argues that Zimbabwe has historically faced a three-fold impasse, 
namely, a stalled primitive accumulation process, the dilemma of incomplete nation-state 
formation and truncated democratization.  This three-fold impasse over the longue duree 
set the broad structural pre-conditions for the current crisis in Zimbabwe but did not 
invariably give rise to crisis.  More medium-term (and historically-specific) trajectories 
such as ESAP, subsequent macro-economic policies from 1996 to 1999, the rise of 
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political opposition in the 1990s as well as unique conjunctural events were also 
necessary.   Often, economic renderings of the crisis label ESAP as the final cause of the 
crisis, and thus blame is apportioned out according to whether ESAP is conceptualized as 
a globally imposed SAP or a home-grown programme or a combination of both.   
 
ESAP ‘signified a clear break with the protectionist and interventionist approach to 
economic development’ (van der Walt 1998:p.96), but by the late 1980s Zimbabwe had 
not reached a condition of economic crisis to the same depth as many other African 
nations so as to necessarily warrant a SAP.  As a result, it is sometimes suggested that 
ESAP was ‘engineered’ by ‘a domestic political coalition’ including the private sector 
bourgeoisie and ‘influential elements of the bureaucratic and State-linked bourgeoisie’ 
(van der Walt 1998:p.97).  Nevertheless, Moore (2001:p.260) argues that ‘the absence of 
ESAP in and of itself would not have erased Zimbabwe’s post-independence conundrum, 
although a strong state – which ESAP helped destroy – is necessary to surmount its 
“transitional” problems.  ESAP has aggravated these tensions, but it did not cause them.  
In contributing to deindustrialisation, ESAP has worsened the problem of primitive 
accumulation’ and thereby inhibited the resolution of the classic agrarian question (of 
capital).  Even prior to ESAP, the Zimbabwean state was not effectively tackling the 
impasse.  For instance, all-embracing primitive accumulation never occurred in Rhodesia 
because settler colonialism ‘deferred’ it, but more importantly the post-colonial 
Zimbabwean state has ‘continued that suspension’ from the moment of independence 
(Moore 2001:p.259). 
 
In Zimbabwe, as in other settler societies in southern Africa, processes of primitive 
accumulation are marked by the interrelated moments of ‘race and the agrarian question’ 
(my emphasis).  Thus, ‘[c]apitalist agriculture has been dominated by white settlers who 
carried out their process of primitive accumulation by forcibly taking “native” land and 
denying African farmers not merely commercial opportunities, but also a chance to 
become capitalist land owners.’ (Moore 2003:p.2)  However, the truncated character of 
primitive accumulation, in the sense of the lack of an all-pervasive transition to capitalist 
agriculture as a strong basis for ‘industrial take-off’, has not been inconsistent with the 
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Black embourgeoisement of agricultural capital in post-colonial Zimbabwe.  Indeed, the 
explicit economic ambitions linked to the indigenization lobby groups of the 1990s have 
now come to directly ‘dominate the state’s political imperatives’ (Raftopoulos and 
Phimister 2004:p.362).   
 
This ongoing process of the embourgeoisement of the state is linked historically to the 
petty-bourgeois character of the nationalist liberation movement in the decades preceding 
independence.  After independence, the Black petty-bourgeoisie was in large part ‘shut 
out of the white private sector’ and thus it began immediately to ‘redirect its 
accumulation strategies through the state’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.172) by using state 
power and resources to gain a foothold in the economy while also touting economic 
indigenization within the financial and agricultural sectors (Mandaza 1994).  During the 
1990s ‘the aspiring black business class emerged as a vocal lobbying group’ (including 
the Affirmative Action Group and the Indigenous Business Development Centre) and it 
used the neo-liberal thrust of ESAP as ‘a springboard’ for its accumulation and political 
strategies (Raftopoulos 2000b:pp.23, 25).  The Third Chimurenga has further enhanced 
opportunities for accumulation by Black agrarian capital and, as a result, primitive 
accumulation has increasingly revolved around de-racialized class formation.  
 
The accelerated land reform programme (since the year 2000) seems to be increasingly 
sensitive to the economic demands of the Black agrarian bourgeoisie and to the need for 
political stability to facilitate agricultural productivity.  This has overridden the initial 
‘equity’ thrust of the programme.  All parties to the debate on Zimbabwe agree to this.  
But, ‘agrarian nationalists’ such as Moyo (Moyo 2001, Moyo and Yeros 2005b) claim 
that, initially, the new agrarian structure in the Zimbabwean countryside, particularly in 
light of the expansion of peasant holdings arising from land redistribution, had the 
potential to broaden the home market as a basis for a more articulated pattern of 
accumulation involving an introverted agro-industrial production system, and thereby 
contributing to the resolution of both agrarian and national questions.  Other writers 
supportive of land reform express less optimism about this (Bernstein 2005:p.91).  Yet 
there is a degree of agreement and recognition that the reform process deracialized forms 
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of domination in the countryside (i.e. ‘domestic government’) and may have given 
(some) peasants a further livelihood strategy for social reproduction purposes.  
 
Critics of ‘agrarian nationalists’ argue that agrarian issues, in the sense of supportive 
mechanisms for peasant productivity (in both customary and resettlement areas), still 
need ‘to be defined and addressed’ despite (if not because of) accelerated redistribution 
(Sachikonye 2003:p.238; Mbaya 2001).  In fact, they argue that the accelerated 
programme has led to further de-industrialization and has not stimulated primitive 
accumulation.  In this context, Raftopoulos argues that a key aspect of the current 
economic crisis ‘relates to the problems created by the land occupations, and the massive 
financial, infrastructural and extension support required by the new settlers to transform 
the settlements into sustainable productive resources.’ (Raftopoulos 2002:p.426 my 
emphasis)  Moore (2001, 2003) claims that accelerated reform was never located within a 
broad macro-economic strategy because it was driven by political imperatives.  Further, 
and contrary to the ruling party’s sloganeering about ‘the land is the economy’, the 
economic crisis in the late 1990s was not even rooted in the unresolved land question.  
Like Neocosmos’ argument in the previous chapter, these theorists emphasize the 
importance of democratization in kick-starting primitive accumulation, nation-state 
formation and the resolution of agrarian questions.   
 
This discussion highlights the tensions and contradictions embodied in the land reform 
process between a quest for historical justice and a pursuit of agricultural growth.  This 
tension has existed throughout the post-colonial period, and has been played out in a 
variety of forms depending on the prevailing historical conditions.  How the nation-state 
has ‘handled’ the contradictory tendencies has impacted significantly on the ‘resolution’ 
of agrarian questions, whether understood in terms of the ‘agrarian question of capital’ or 
the ‘agrarian question of labour’.  Indeed, in the context of contemporary Zimbabwe, 
both questions remain ‘unresolved’. 
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9.3 Pre-Accelerated Reform: Compulsory Acquisition and Policy Formation 
 
Numerous workshops (Wkshop 1995, Wkshop 1996) were held in 1995 and 1996 that 
focused on the 1994 Report of the Rukuni Commission on land tenure systems in 
Zimbabwe, and the presentations and discussions at these workshops give important 
insights into the state of play of agrarian and land reform in the concluding months of the 
period from 1980 to 1996, particularly from the perspective of the state executive.  One 
workshop will be noted here.  This was held in April 1996 for high-ranking officials of 
various state ministries, particularly those ministries involved in land (and related) 
affairs. The Secretary of the Ministry for Lands and Water Resources admitted that the 
land question – specifically land redistribution – was ‘largely unresolved’, and he noted 
the many ‘futile attempts’ that had made to resolve it, even in terms of the more forceful 
approach as contained in both the 1990 Land Policy and the 1992 Land Act.  According 
to him, though, his Ministry had now embarked ‘on a programme to develop a 
comprehensive land reform and management strategy to ensure a lasting panacea’ 
(Wkshop 1996: p.2).  
 
This vigorous process of policy development was particularly prevalent during the 1997 
to 1999 period although it did not amount to much on the ground.  At the same workshop, 
the Minister for Lands, K. Kangai, reiterated that the 1990 Policy had shifted the 
emphasis from ‘social considerations’ (or equity) to ‘efficient agricultural utilisation of 
land’, and that the government was determined to ‘promote emergent black large scale 
commercial farmers in order to ensure continuity in production’ (Wkshop 1996:p.3).  
Further, the state functionaries attending the workshop concluded that ‘commercial 
considerations must take precedence over social and political issues’ (Wkshop 1996: 
p.36) particularly when it came to the selection of resettlement beneficiaries.  
 
The years from 1997 to 1999 were marked by significant ambiguities in state policy and 
practice on land reform.  On the one hand, there was extensive land policy formation 
action within the state, as well as intensive ‘policy dialogue activities’ and intermittent 
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‘high profile negotiation[s]’ (Moyo 2000e:pp.2, 3) on land reform taking place between 
government and various non-state bodies including the CFU.  This was part of a broader 
‘politics of broadly-based policy dialogue and negotiation’ (Moyo et al. 2000b:p.186) 
that the ruling party had tentatively adopted in the late 1990s.  For many commentators 
on Zimbabwe, this high-profile stance was a fraudulent veneer because there was a 
‘complete democratic breakdown in the late 1990s’ (Andreason 2003:p.385) in 
Zimbabwe and hence ‘a decreased likelihood of obtaining an inclusive policy 
environment’ (Andreason 2003:pp.395-396).   
 
The specific ‘land’ dialogue led initially to the LRRP Phase II Policy Framework and 
Project Document dated September 1998 (GoZ 1998a). On the other hand, in October 
1997, the government made the shock announcement that 1,471 commercial farms (on 
prime land) would be acquired on a compulsory and urgent basis.  This reflected the high 
level of frustration within the state with purely market-based reforms, particularly given 
the non-support of the international donor community.  At the same time, this ‘adoption 
of a centralised method of compulsory land acquisition’ was ‘instigated’ by ‘the war 
veterans’ (Moyo 2001:p.314) and ZANU-PF was also under pressure from its own 
radical nationalist wing to adopt this route.  In this regard, it appeared that the state was 
determined to ‘go it alone’ (Moyo 2000b:p.2) without seeking confirmation or support 
from key stakeholders.   
 
This ambivalence and inconsistency embedded in land reform policy was an outward 
expression of the dilemmas facing the government in responding to the underlying social 
crisis.  As Moyo notes: ‘Throughout the mid-1997 to 1998 period of compulsory land 
acquisition, the government publicly appeared not to be providing room for negotiation, 
when in fact negotiations and trade-offs with stakeholders had long been underway.’ 
(Moyo 2000a:p.28)  In fact, the proposed acquisitions never materialized as many farms 
were de-listed and others were challenged legally.  However, the gazetting of the 1,471 
farms effectively marked the beginning of Phase II and the government’s intent to retreat 
from the neo-liberal market-based approach of Phase I.  
 
  201 
 
9.4 Land Policy and the Inception Plan 
 
In his opening comments to the provisional Phase II documentation of September 1998 
(GoZ 1998a:p.v), President Mugabe emphasized that the land question remained a 
‘vexing issue’.14  According to the Policy Framework and Project Document, a 
‘participatory approach’ had been employed to produce the documents, and likewise all 
future ‘detailed planning of programme activities will be participatory’: ‘The GoZ is 
committed to more effective communication with the public on the LRRP.  This includes 
broader civic participation in policy development on land issues, as well as programme 
implementation.’ These (working) documents would be subject to revision through 
‘broad-based consultations’ with a range of stakeholders, including during the September 
1998 Donors’ Conference.   
 
The government of Zimbabwe had arranged the conference to marshal financial support 
for a reinvigorated land redistribution process, and in attendance were both foreign 
government representatives and bilateral donors.  For the government, the conference 
was a ‘major milestone’ and it was expected to ‘galvanize donor support’, particularly 
support from the ex-colonial power of Britain.  At the time, few donor agencies were 
directly involved in financing land reform (particularly land acquisition) although many 
were ‘engaged directly in development assistance activities related to the main support 
service activities’ of the resettlement schemes.  The documents acknowledged that the 
productivity thrust of recent years ‘meant the virtual neglect of the land needs of the land 
majority in the Communal Areas’, and that currently there was ‘growing public agitation 
for land’. Yet, the government insisted that land redistribution would retain ‘a core of 
efficient large-scale producers’ without though specifying the racial make-up of these 
landed capitalists.  
 
                                         
14 All quotations in this and the next two paragraphs are from these documents (GoZ 1998a). 
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The documents were at pains to highlight that the government ‘values the legal process, 
fairness and justice’, and that this respect for due process seriously inhibited the 
compulsory acquisition process from 1990.  Further, commercial farmers under Phase II 
would be given ‘timely notification ... to minimise disruption of on-going production 
activities’.   Five million hectares of land would be acquired and resettled over a five- 
year period, involving 91,000 families at a total cost of $ 1.9 billion (U.S.) of which 
government would provide one-third.  This would be done without adversely impacting 
on productivity within the large-scale commercial sector because of ‘considerable 
underutilisation’ and it would entail in the main compulsory acquisition methods rather 
than the willing seller principle.  ‘A1’ schemes (80% of the total) would be mixed 
farming and village-based schemes, and settlers would include communal peasants, farm 
workers and ex-combatants (or war veterans).  ‘A2’ schemes would be small-scale self-
contained (commercial) farm units for productive farmers.  The provision of 
infrastructure in resettlement areas would be phased ‘to facilitate accelerated settlement’, 
with non-critical assets being constructed beyond the five year period.  Simultaneously, 
communal areas were to be ‘reorganized’ through a process labelled by the President as 
‘villagisation’ along the lines of ‘A1’ schemes.  Readers of the documents were assured 
that the ‘second phase is poised for greater success than the first’ because, amongst other 
reasons, there were now in place innovative financial arrangements, enhanced 
organizational capacities and speedier acquisition methods. 
 
International donors were being strenuously lobbied to formally support the new LRRP 
prior to the International Land Donors’ Conference to be held in Harare on 11th 
September 1998.  At this conference, and much to the distaste of the Zimbabwean 
authorities, the British Government emphasized that funding would be forthcoming only 
if the land programme was guided by good governance, was focused on poverty 
reduction, and did not entail the non-transparent allocation of large tracts of land to the 
ruling party faithful.  Because of this (and other reasons), a fragile compromise was 
reached.  A communiqué (Statement of Agreed Principles) arising from the conference 
stated that land reform would be implemented ‘in a transparent, fair and sustainable 
manner, with regard to respect for the law, and broadened stakeholder as well as 
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beneficiary participation.  It should also be affordable, cost effective, and consistent with 
economic and financial management reforms.’ (Comm. 1998)  A report a year later by 
the British bilateral aid agency the DFID (and the European Union) reiterated that any 
future funding for land reform would be contingent on such an approach.   
 
Based on the conference, the Phase II working documents were considered and reviewed, 
and this led to the conceptualization of an initial two-year Inception Phase of resettlement 
prior to a longer-term Expanded Phase beginning in 2001.  This revision was approved 
by the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Development, consisting of government 
Ministers.  Resettlement would involve a shifting combination of existing (and improved) 
state approaches to resettlement as well as a range of non-state organizations involved in 
‘an “alternative” or complementary approach which would focus on trying out new 
market based, community led and stakeholder driven implementation processes.’ (Moyo 
2000e:p.3)  It will be shown later that the policy formation initiatives of the late 1990s 
were largely undermined by the events of the year 2000 and, hence, this discussion is not 
meant to imply that policy implementation can be read from policy initiatives.  However, 
the policy environment of the late 1990s is important because it had ramifications for the 
work of ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe. 
 
The Inception Phase Plan document (GoZ 1998b) spoke enthusiastically about the 
impending land reform.15  The Inception Phase (IP) would widen stakeholder 
involvement and promote more flexible approaches to implementing land acquisition and 
resettlement.  It would ‘accelerate land delivery’ by maximizing the supply of land from 
multiple sources and through various forms of acquisition, and would ‘broaden the 
overall national capacity (public and private)’ of all relevant organizations. It was noted 
for example that ‘inadequate capacity of government departments’ is a constraint at both 
the policy and implementation level and, because of this, ‘[t]he “accelerated planning” 
process’ as propagated by the massive compulsory acquisition announcement in 1997 is 
‘not the most appropriate’.  As well, in highlighting the gap between policy positions and 
policy implementation, it noted that ‘bureaucratic delays, rivalry when 
                                         
15 All quotations in this and the next paragraph are from this document (GoZ 1998b). 
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duties/responsibilities are duplicated and under-capacity result in untimeous 
implementation of policy’.    
 
The IP would employ both the Complementary Approaches and the Existing and 
Improved Government Approaches as set out in the Phase II documentation.  There 
would be an improvement to existing government approaches ‘mainly by promoting 
beneficiary and stakeholder participation in planning and improving the design of 
government resettlement models’. There would be a degree of flexibility in the 
implementation of specific resettlement schemes, so that ‘planning will no longer be 
standardised and mechanistic’. The complementary approaches would provide ‘an 
enabling environment’ for non-state organizations to test and establish new ways of 
mobilizing resources, acquiring land, and implementing resettlement schemes.   
 
The Complementary Approaches reflected a compromise on the part of the government, 
as these approaches had the potential to undermine the ‘command mindset’16 that was 
still hegemonic within state ministries.  Further, the Inception Phase, though highly 
technical in its conceptualization, was also a tactical-cum-political intervention to slow 
down the process of acquisition (as the first one million hectares would be now settled 
over two years) and to put a break on any further radicalization of land reform.  Yet, as 
Moyo (2001) notes, the ‘temporary reprieve from the radical demand for massive land 
transfers, which had arisen from the Donors’ Conference in 1998, calling for a gradualist 
approach, entitled “Inception Phase Framework Plan”, was shaky, as it had no 
guarantees.’ (Moyo 2001:p.318)  If anything, it was a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ and, in 
fact, the main contending parties had failed to follow through on their conference 
commitments with any degree of seriousness and without seeming remorse.  Thus, ‘[i]n 
the year that followed the Conference, the donor partners, dissatisfied with Zimbabwe’s 
fulfillment of the agreed conditionalities, did not fulfill their pledges.’ (Mbaya 2001:p.5)   
 
                                         
16 D. Dore, independent consultant, ‘Critical analysis of Land Report and recommendations’ in Wkshop 
1995. 
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This reflected a further hardening of donor’s positions on land reform in Zimbabwe, 
particularly in the light of questionable government actions and inactions in recent years, 
including numerous economic reform policy slippages, the massive compulsory 
acquisition announcement and the sustained intervention in the civil war in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  As a result, ‘land reform became marginal in the donor 
agenda’ (Moyo 2000e:p.5), at least in terms of the prevailing conditions. The 
Zimbabwean state continued to take policy initiatives, including notably the 
promulgation of the 1999 Land Policy that, amongst many other things, focused policy 
attention on the position of agricultural labourers in the resettlement process.  This policy 
action took place in the context of heightened politics in the countryside, including 
ongoing illegal land self-provisioning by the peasantry and the unprecedented nationwide 
strike by farm workers in October 1997 over wages and benefits.  The strike by farm 
workers has been described as ‘the greatest disruption to the large-scale commercial 
farming sector since Independence’ (van der Walt 1998:p.88).  It took on a noticeably 
‘uncivil’ form, including public demonstrations that included the stoning of vehicles.  
However, Phase II (as then constituted) was soon to be overtaken by the turbulent events 
of 2000 and the emergence of the Third Chimurenga. 
 
As will be discussed more fully later in the thesis, the formation of the Phase II approach 
likely represents the high waters of NGO engagement with the state on land reform in the 
post-colonial era, before this engagement crashed on the beaches of the Third 
Chimurenga.  In the early stages of Phase II, there was tremendous optimism that this 
phase was heralding the revitalization of land reform in Zimbabwe. Certainly, there was 
an air of excitement within the NGO sector that finally its time had come.  Moyo, who 
was directly involved in the Phase II policy formation process (including the Inception 
Phase documentation), suggested (just prior to the disruptions in 2000) that the new 
programme had a pronounced anti-statist thrust with the ‘guiding principles’ of equity, 
accountability, transparency and participation, and that it would ‘facilitate stakeholders’ 
full consultation and involvement at all levels’ (Moyo 2000d:p.4).  Of particular 
importance, he claimed that (historically) the landless and land short ‘have not been fully 
integrated into the dialogue on land policy formulation’ (Moyo 2000d:p.14 emphasis 
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removed) and that the LRRP Phase II would provide the necessary remedial action to 
this.  It seems though that the peasantry had other thoughts on the matter. Their 
involvement in the ‘uncivil’ action from the year 2000 onwards had a significant bearing 
on the LRRP, such that it was completely revised in 2001 to accommodate this on-the-
ground action. The LRRP Phase II in its original form was never implemented. 
 
 
9.5 Accelerated Reform and the Agrarian Question of Labour 
 
All this was taking place at a time of significant illegal occupations of land by the peasant 
under-classes, such that in 1997 and 1998 there were at least fifteen major land invasions 
including during the donors’ conference (Moyo 2001).  This land self-provisioning 
seemed to express a growing rift between the state and the peasantry.  Ruling party 
politicians initially condemned the invasions.  Thus, John Nkomo argued: ‘If we allowed 
this kind of behaviour it will spread like veldt fire.  The law will take its course if 
irregular settlers refuse to move back to their villages.  Policy cannot be compromised.’ 
(Sithole et al. 2003:p.4)  Measures taken against the squatters often failed and squatters 
would even return to their site of eviction.  As well, squatters were often encouraged, 
supported and protected by local party leaders and other ‘big men’ who became ‘rural 
“landlords”’ (Zishiri 1998:p.13).  At times, national ZANU-PF figures expressed 
qualified support of the squatters, arguing though that the peasantry was expressing its 
longstanding grievance against racially based land distribution and not any dissatisfaction 
with the pace of land reform set by the government.  Clearly, squatting in the late 1990s 
was ‘a macro challenge at National level’ (Zishiri 1998:p.v).  Zishiri’s study found 
squatters along main rivers (often gold panners), in national parks, resettlement areas, 
near growth points, and on state land and private farms.  He claimed that in Mashonaland 
West Province alone there were an estimated 205, 537 squatters or nearly 20 % of the 
population.  
 
Many agrarian specialists on Zimbabwe (Moyo 2001; Moyo and Yeros 2005b; 
Sachikonye 2002, 2003; Marongwe 2003a) highlight significant differences in character 
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between the current round of land occupations and earlier ones, including the sustained 
intervention of the state in managing the ‘accelerated’ land movement.  In general, earlier 
occupations are seen as more spontaneous and peasant-based.  Much of my discussion of 
accelerated reform will entail critically engaging with the arguments of Moyo and Yeros, 
because their conceptual (and ultimately political) framework is regularly used as a 
sounding board in scholarly works on the Third Chimurenga.  Moyo and Yeros claim that 
the ‘essence’ of land occupations in post-independence Zimbabwe has ‘remained the 
same’ (Moyo 2001:p.321).  Indeed, they weave together a story of unbroken rural action 
by the semi-proletariat that portrays the recent occupations as a ‘climax’ of constant and 
consistent struggles over land (Moyo 2001:p.314) and as dramatically addressing the 
national question and advancing the NDR.   
 
Their argument at times seems very close to romanticizing the peasantry (the Subject of 
history?) and insinuating that, against all adversity and despite negligence on the part of 
other social classes, the land-short peasantry forever sought to advance land reform and 
the NDR or, in other words, they ‘never abandoned the revolution’.  This is what Moore 
refers to as the ‘peasants have taken charge of history’ narrative (Moore 2001:p.257).  
This narrative seems consistent with the ‘old left trap of turning some group amongst the 
marginalised or exploited into the fetishised vessel of  ... [the analyst’s]  ... personal 
hopes by projecting some sort of dehumanising ontological purity… on to the chosen 
group’ (Pithouse 2003:p.127).  Without wanting to romanticize the land movement in 
Zimbabwe, Bernstein (2003) in line with Moyo and Yeros nevertheless claims that it 
represented an ‘objectively progressive’ (Bernstein 2003:p.220) expression of the new 
agrarian question of labour, because land occupations as a (last gasp) reproductive 
strategy of the peasantry addressed the unfinished business of the NDR.   
 
In this regard, a conspiratorial theory of the accelerated occupations based on the 
argument that the state stage-managed the occupations and manipulated the peasantry in a 
process of top-down mobilization becomes problematic. This theory reproduces a 
‘history from above’ while the ZANU-PF narrative is a ‘history from below’.  Thus, 
Sachikonye erroneously claims that the recent occupations differed from the ones in the 
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late 1990s in that the latter were ‘spontaneous, and thus not orchestrated or directed by 
state institutions’ (Sachikonye 2003:p.234).  Likewise, Bond distinguishes between the 
‘organic land invasions’ of the late 1990s and the ‘war-veteran induced’ movement of the 
years 2000 and 2001 (Bond 2002:p.37).   
 
 
9.6 Social Composition and Local Governance 
 
Yet, in the case of accelerated reform, there are clear signs of voluntarism and 
spontaneity in the pattern of physical movements between the communal lands and 
occupied farms, involving a rich diversity of individuals, motivations and interests that 
cannot be reduced to some ill-defined state-cum-party political manipulation.  For 
example, in the case of the occupations in Chiredzi district, Chaumba et al. (2003a) note 
their ‘fluid and complex nature’ (Chaumba et al. 2003a:pp.588-589), the ‘broad spectrum 
of people’ involved and their ‘contrasting motivations’ (Chaumba et al. 2003a:p.591).  
Many individuals with legitimate concerns and aspirations occupied farms, including 
young men who had difficulty accessing land elsewhere, and widows or divorcees who 
were escaping restrictive social strictures in customary areas. Wealthy livestock owning 
rich peasants and urban-based weekend farmers also seized the opportunity and often 
ended up employing ‘a new class of informal “farm-workers”’ (Chaumba et al. 
2003a:p.593) on their resettlement plots.  
 
The ‘settlers’ also included war veterans; nevertheless, the extent of their involvement 
was open to considerable regional variation.  It is incorrect though to conceptualize war 
veterans as mere storm troopers of the state and to objectify them in this way.  Kriger’s 
extensive research shows that war veterans were never passive instruments of others, and 
that they had their ‘own agendas, distinct from the [ruling] party’s’ (Kriger 2003b:p.2) 
although overlapping.  Yet, at the same time, ‘[f]or the ruling party, ZANU(PF), war 
veterans had symbolic value. Through their links to the liberation struggle for political 
independence, veterans were supposed to legitimate the ruling party’s new war for 
economic independence, signaled by the land invasions’ (Kriger 2003a:p.323). 
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The overriding social base of the land movement was clearly the rural-based semi-
proletariat but it expanded to include the urban proletariat and petty bourgeois elements, 
and this involved bridging the urban-rural divide in a ‘tense but resolute cross-class 
nationalist alliance on land’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.189).  At first, the movement had 
a working class thrust, in opposition to a ‘post-national’ alliance of civil society – a 
mixed political bag including urban-based trade unions and White commercial farmers – 
that made no significant demands for redistribution of resources and had no agrarian 
reform programme. War veterans, with links in both the semi-proletariat and state 
bureaucracy, were able to effectively organize, mobilize and lead the movement. Yet they 
never sought to establish democratic peasant-worker organizational structures during the 
course of the occupations (Moyo and Yeros 2005b).  Indeed, structures of authority in the 
resettled areas, at least initially, seemed rather disorganized, confused and chaotic.  
 
Chaumba et al. (2003a:p.601) identify four overlapping axes of authority in resettled 
areas, namely, war veterans, settler committees, traditional authorities and new elites 
each vying for power.  At times, these authorities ‘have accommodated and tempered 
each other, but there are also tensions and fractures evident in the way these power bases 
interact’.  Particularly important are the committee structures that emerged from the base 
camps set up by the war veterans. These structures have been formalized and they entail 
‘an integrated top-down system of governance’ (Chaumba et al. 2003a:p.598) under the 
watchful eye of ZANU-PF-dominated provincial and district land committees.  Rural 
district councils were in large part bypassed and thereby marginalized from this 
institutional setup, as were sometimes the technical departments of the central state. In 
this sense, there arose a ‘new loop of governance’ (Chaumba et al. 2003a:p.603) at local 
state level in which there is no clear separation between politics and planning.  In other 
words, the local state has become highly politicized.  Yet it is also argued that this state 
restructuring involves a pronounced authoritarian thrust, something which ‘agrarian 
nationalists’ seemingly underplay. 
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Thus, Jocelyn Alexander (2003) argues that scholars such as Moyo and Bernstein have a 
restricted notion of the NDR, such that ‘to focus narrowly on the occupations alone 
misses the point that what they marked was not just an unprecedented assault on the 
unequal distribution of land [Bernstein’s progressive content as noted above] but also an 
extraordinary transformation of the state and political sphere’ (Alexander 2003:p.104) in 
an undemocratic direction.  This restructuring has been noted by a number of authors 
(Hammar et al. eds. 2003, Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004).  For example, the 1999 
Traditional Leaders Act has enhanced the authority of traditional leaders, and this 
represents an attempt by ZANU-PF to ‘extend its hegemony deeper into rural areas at a 
time of political discontent’ (Chaumba et al. 2003a:p.599).  As yet, though, traditional 
authorities have not been fully integrated into resettlement areas.  Further, representative 
district councils (even within customary areas) continue to be weak, and their ward and 
village development committees have in many areas become dysfunctional as planning 
units.  Un-elected traditional bodies are increasingly becoming involved at local level in 
development decisions (Mombeshora and Wolmer 2000).   
 
 
9.7 State Authoritarianism, Uncivil Action and Political Morality 
 
Moyo and Yeros downplay the re-formation of the state in an authoritarian manner 
(Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003).  Rather, they emphasize the functionality of the state in 
legitimizing and strengthening the land movement in the direction of the NDR.  They 
privilege the ‘national’ moment of the movement in deracializing agrarian structures and 
downplay the ‘undemocratic’ moment.   Simultaneously, they are outright dismissive of 
alternative renditions of ‘the nation’, notably a civic nationalism, that at least de jure have 
a more inclusive notion of citizenship based on liberal democratic principles. This 
rejection is based on what is seen as the imperialist-driven character of these renditions.  
Interestingly, prior to the ‘wave’ of democratization throughout Africa during the 1990s, 
Shivji (1989) theorized about the NDR and human rights, and argued (unlike Moyo and 
Yeros today) that the furtherance of the NDR necessitated a distinctive anti-authoritarian 
(and thus democratic) thrust that privileged the right of the popular classes to organize 
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independent of the repressive nation-state.  In this respect, Neocosmos (1993) repeatedly 
emphasizes the critical link between ‘democratisation from below’ (Neocosmos 
1993:p.8) and agrarian reform, and he argues that democratic struggles are ‘the primary 
issue’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.15) in ensuring progressive reform.  At times, Moyo and 
Yeros seem to de-link land reform and democratic change. 
 
Analysts such and Moyo and Yeros clearly celebrate the specific character of uncivil 
action embodied in the land movement, and they argue that land redistribution under the 
accelerated programme has undone racial property rights in rural areas and has redressed 
historical injustices by giving a significant number of peasants land.  This has involved 
what Mandaza approvingly calls the ‘abrogation of that principle that governs capitalism 
per se: the inviolability of the right of private property’.17  In analyzing agrarian reform in 
Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s, Tshuma argued in a similar vein that landed property should 
not be conceptualized solely as a ‘civil right’ or human right (as is done in liberal legal 
theory) but as ‘a complex amalgam of political, economic, legal and cultural 
relationships’.  As a result, compulsory acquisition (including presumably through self-
provisioning) is not in itself a human rights violation if the property acquired has in the 
past failed to serve ‘a social function’ (based on equity criteria) and if the acquisition 
process is subject to ‘transparent and democratic constitutional and legal norms’ (Tshuma 
1997:p.149).  In other words, Tshuma’s concern is the means of acquisition rather than 
the end result.   
 
ZANU-PF’s moral justification for the land movement is implicitly based on a 
historically orientated entitlement theory of justice in which the taking of White 
commercial farms is not so much a process of violating private property as a way of 
restoring property to those who are morally entitled to it (Shaw 2003).  As long as the 
initial acquisition was unjust (as it was under brutal colonial expansion), any subsequent 
legal transfers become irrelevant and must be rectified through expropriation and 
repossession.  The Abuja Agreement brokered by the Commonwealth in 2001 sought to 
resolve the dispute between the Zimbabwean and British governments but it had no clear 
                                         
17 ‘The Scrutator’, The Zimbabwe Mirror, 12 to 18 January 2003. 
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timetable for implementation.  However, the agreement did link land reform to respect 
for the rule of law and, intriguingly, the Zimbabwean government ‘manipulated the 
looseness of the proposals’ by claiming that it had abided by this (moral) requirement by 
pushing through the Supreme Court a ruling that legitimized (legally) its land programme 
(Raftopoulos 2002:p.416).  Quite explicitly, the government depicted the land movement 
as the third war of liberation, and thus as a revolutionary moment in which the civilities 
of peacetime are to be suspended.  The morality of this position, even in the light of 
colonial ‘land theft’, is open to debate.  For this thesis, a key point is that the movement 
represented a dramatic local assertion against the global trajectory on the sanctity of 
private property and ‘free’ market exchanges.  
 
In the eyes of critics of accelerated reform, the mode of land acquisition has no moral 
significance to or for the state, and the implications of redistribution in terms of costs and 
benefits (for example, the livelihoods of farm workers) are in large part inconsequential 
or at most secondary.  Current land reform involves restricted pre-settlement infra-
structural development and downplays tenure reform, such that the ‘land resettlement 
programme continues to issue insecure, permit-based rights to its beneficiaries’ without 
offering an all-encompassing agrarian reform package for the settlers (Mbaya 2001:p.15).  
The failure on the part of the government to seriously address the complex terrain of land 
tenure represents a thread of continuity throughout the post-colonial era.   In this regard, 
it is also argued that ‘the capacity of agriculture to generate growth, foreign exchange 
earnings and self-sufficient food security in the short- and medium term appears to have 
been placed in jeopardy.’ (Sachikonye 2003:pp.227-228)  Indeed, Chaumba et al. 
(2003b) claim that, despite the seeming chaos in the resettlement areas, colonial-style 
‘technical tools and discourses of land-use planning’ (Chaumba et al. 2003b:p.533) are 
very much in evidence (as in the 1980s) and that this may lead to more coercive and 
authoritarian land-use regulations and patterns in the near future that are at odds with 
livelihood strategies and with confronting the ‘agrarian question of labour’.  There may 
be ‘no emancipatory release’ from the ‘technical parameters of disciplining development’ 
for the newly settled farmers (Chaumba et al. 2003b:p.550).   
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Because the re-distributive narrative of the ruling party under accelerated reform employs 
land as a signifier of sovereignty, the programme has also failed to address localized 
grievances through land restitution.  The government has articulated the struggle for land 
as a grand narrative about ‘land theft’ divorced from particular historical incidents that 
remain lodged in the bitter memories of particular Zimbabweans.  Yet, the alienation of 
ancestral lands continues to be ‘bitterly resented’ (Mombeshora and Wolmer 2000:p.20) 
such as amongst the peasantry near Gonarezhou National Park along the Mozambican 
and South African borders.  Other narratives, including those focusing on ‘communal’ 
area reorganization, have also been marginalized.  Hence, ‘[p]opulist narratives 
concerning peasant agriculture and CBNRM in Zimbabwe have been thrown into stark 
contrast’.  In the light of accelerated reform, peasant-based agriculture emphasises the 
need for the ‘re-appropriation of principally white-owned land’, whilst CBNRM focuses 
on ‘“doing more with less” within existing land and natural resource complements.’ 
(Mombeshora and Wolmer 2000:p.27)  However, according to Sachikonye (2003), fully 
addressing the matter of congested communal lands, which even the Third Chimurenga 
has not done, remains ‘the crux of Zimbabwe’s agrarian question’ (Sachikonye 
2003:p.231). 
 
It is quite clear though that the ruling party has the high moral ground on land reform and 
that it ‘has been able to set the framework of debate, with opponents reduced to caviling 
about the extra legal methods used, about the chaotic and under-financed character of 
redistribution, or about cronyism in the process.’ (Shaw 2003:p.77)  The high moral 
ground was in part possible because the discourse of human rights (propagated by for 
example the MDC) formed part of the neo-liberal discourse that stressed property rights 
as a ‘civilized’ human right (Bernstein 2003).  For instance, there was moralizing about 
the depravity of the Third Chimurenga in the context of the wholesale invasion of private 
conservatories such as the 3387 square kilometre Save Valley Conservancy because of 
what was seen as the massive and indiscriminate poaching (or slaughtering) of wildlife. 
The critics of Moyo and Yeros roundly denounce their underestimation (or underplaying) 
of land occupation violence.   
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Moyo (2001:pp.325-330) for instance argues that the short-term pain of authoritarian and 
violent practices during the occupations must be weighed against the longer-term benefits 
for democratization in advancing the NDR.  Mandaza likewise argues that it is a 
‘politically reactionary position ... to deny the principle of land redistribution simply 
because the methods being employed are said to be bad’.18  For Raftopoulos and 
Phimister, this means that ‘democratic questions will be dealt with at a later stage, once 
the economic kingdom has been conquered’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.376; 
Moore 2003).  They further argue that violence is part of the state’s strategy ‘to drive the 
opposition out of the rural areas and to re-assert proprietary political claims over these 
spaces’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.366).  Violence therefore becomes part of the 
reorganization of the state (including the judiciary and local government) in the state’s 
‘bid to reconfigure its hold on power’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.368). 
 
 
9.8 Class Bias and Social Change  
 
The land movement ‘did not have a single hierarchical structure to organise it’.  Rather, 
‘each isolated group’ on occupied territory proceeded ‘with its own set [of] rules, vision 
and command structure and only occasionally communicating [with] others in times of 
need’.  The occupations were thus ‘highly localised’ such that ‘it is a big fault to reduce 
the whole movement into a state or ZANU-PF act’ (Sadoma 2006:pp.44, 45).  As well, 
besides the pronounced racial element, the land movement expressed a diverse range of 
grievances and aspirations revolving around class, gender, generation, culture and 
religion.  War veterans, peasants, urban working people, agricultural workers and petty 
bourgeois elements all took part in the occupations (Marongwe 2003a).  Further, there 
was significant tension within the ruling party regarding the land movement, resulting in 
contradictory pronouncements by leading members.  
 
                                         
18 ‘The Scrutator’, The Zimbabwe Mirror, 27 October to 2 November 2000. 
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Yet, during the course of the year 2000, the district and provincial war veteran 
associations became increasingly involved in coordinating the land movement.  And, on 
into the year 2001, these associations became subordinated to local, provincial and 
national ruling party structures.  As a result, the land movement took on a more 
formalized, demobilized and subdued form.  In this context, state bureaucrats, ruling 
party leaders and aspiring Black capitalists were able to significantly influence the 
direction and content of the movement, and at times they claimed ‘ownership’ over the 
land revolution based on their liberation, nationalist and indigenization credentials.   
 
In this regard, Moyo and Yeros (2005b) argue that ‘the black elite employed the state 
apparatus to retain its power and prepare the ground for its reassertion in national 
politics’, and this entailed undermining ‘any source of working-class organization outside 
elite ruling-party control, in both town and country’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:pp.192, 
193).  They further argue that the balance of class forces within the nationalist land 
alliance shifted against the peasants, farm labourers and urban working people as the 
black elite soon dominated the policy making process and steered land reform in a 
direction that favour bourgeois interests, an outcome which is very common in reform 
processes globally (Sobhan 1993).    
 
Re-peasantization has been a dominant aspect of the land redistribution process through 
new petty commodity producer establishments under the ‘A1’ resettlement scheme, as 
discussed in the revised LRRP Phase II document (GoZ 2001).  Yet, middle and large 
Black capitalists (based on the ‘A2’ commercial resettlement model) are ‘in political 
alliance under the banner of “indigenization”, seeking to appropriate the remaining land 
and also to tailor the agricultural policy framework to their needs’ (Moyo and Yeros 
2005b:p.199).  The (initial) anti-imperialist potential of the land occupations has thus 
been subverted, and there is the danger of a ‘full reversal’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.194) 
of the agrarian reform process because of the comprador aspirations of the Black 
bourgeoisie.  This argument by Moyo and Yeros borders on instrumentalism and 
reductionism, in that it conceptualizes the land reform process as a coherent class project. 
It should be recognized that the racialized form of the movement continues to offer 
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considerable room for the assertion of a diverse range of localized ‘projects’, and that the 
government remains sensitive to the needs of small-scale farmers in both resettlement and 
customary areas.  Moyo and Yeros downplay the ongoing contradictions embedded in the 
land reform process.  Yet their argument does point to the re-emergence of a class bias to 
the reform process that is consistent with the post-colonial state’s handling of reform 
prior to the Third Chimurenga. 
 
It is critical that the movement is not conceptualized in a manner that over-privileges 
order and direction.  Regrettably this is what Moyo and Yeros do in arguing that the land 
movement has undermined the racial manifestation of the class struggle in Zimbabwe and 
thereby laid the basis for the next – and presumably more class-based – phase of the 
NDR.  Mandaza argues likewise: on the one hand, the emergent African bourgeoisie is 
bound to benefit most from the land reform process, yet this will simultaneously open up 
the struggle ‘tomorrow between the black bourgeoisie and the underclass of society’.19  
This is largely a teleological depiction of Zimbabwean society and history, and it offers a 
highly essentialized conception of class and class struggle.  Race and class continue to be 
experienced and articulated in diverse ways in contemporary Zimbabwe, including in 
relation to land reform. 
 
Moyo and Yeros assert that the strategy of state-led land reform ‘did not go far enough 
within the ruling party and the state to safeguard the peasant-worker character of the 
movement, or to prepare the semi-proletariat organizationally against the reassertion of 
the black bourgeoisie’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.193 their emphasis).  This claim is very 
provocative (and worth exploring) in terms of theorizing about the nation-state and 
political change, yet regrettably it is not clearly formulated let alone substantiated if only 
because Moyo and Yeros – according to Moore – have ‘no theory of the state’ (Moore 
2004:p.415).  It might in fact be argued that the opposite is the case, and that the agrarian 
change strategy went too far within the state and was thereby captured by what 
Raftopoulos labels as the state ‘commandism’ of ZANU-PF (Raftopoulos 2005:p.5).  The 
                                         
19 ‘The Scrutator, The Zimbabwe Mirror, 14 July to 20 July 2002. 
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argument by Moyo and Yeros though is part of their more general state-centred theory of 
change, and is explicitly a reaction to society-centred theories that sometimes 
romantically depict independent civil society expressions (anti-politics or independence 
from political society) as the critical nexus for social transformation.   
 
In the context of Zimbabwe, it has been argued that ‘[d]espite neoliberal shrinkage of the 
state in the semi-periphery of world capitalism, control of the state remains crucial for 
overall power politics, for social reproduction, and for capital accumulation.’ (Bond 
2002:p.38)  In this regard, Raftopoulos (2005:p.5) claims ‘left oriented intellectuals in 
Zimbabwe’ have been marked by ‘their emphasis on the role of the state as the central 
fact of development and transformation’.  Moyo and Yeros reproduce this state-centric 
perspective, and indeed statism is part and parcel of the state commandism of the ruling 
party.  This perspective is important because it recognizes that the tension between ‘the 
global’ and ‘the local’ is often played out within the social field of the state.  But, in the 
end, their argument about the class betrayal of the land movement implies an 
instrumentalist conception of the state in that the state is ‘captured’ by indigenous 
bourgeois forces and wielded accordingly. 
 
For Moyo and Yeros, ‘breaking with the state’ is not ‘a sufficient condition for 
autonomous self-expression’ as both state and society are expected to be civil to the 
needs of capital.  Hence, they argue that ‘breaking with the civility of capital’ – including 
subverting entrenched property rights in land – is the ‘requirement’ (Moyo and Yeros 
2005b:p.179 their emphasis) for independent progressive movements.  On this basis, they 
thus stress that the land movement involved a challenge to the specifically neo-colonial 
(and comprador) character of the Zimbabwean nation-state.  Regrettably, in de-
emphasizing (or in refusing to acknowledge) how this same movement reinforced (and 
reconfigured) the authoritarian form of the state, the antagonistic moments in this 
movement are not properly captured by the authors.  Nevertheless, according to Moyo 
and Yeros, it was during this last period of popular land reform, from the year 2000 
onwards, that un-civility ‘obtained radical land reform through the state and against 
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imperialism’ (Moyo and Yeros 2005b:p.179 their emphasis).  This un-civility posed a 
serious challenge to ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
9.9 The Changing Agrarian Landscape and ‘Land’ NGOs 
 
Chapters Eight and Nine have discussed agrarian and land reform in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe.  Certain historical trajectories prior to the mid-1990s were identified, 
including the truncated character of the land programme focusing on land redistribution, 
the embourgeoisement of agrarian reform, the deepening crisis of rural livelihoods under 
unchanged tenure conditions in customary areas, and the regular acts of land self-
provisioning or land occupations of commercial farms and state land. The land reform 
programme during this period (Phase I) was marked by considerable ambiguity, and this 
revolved around the seemingly contradictory goals of growth and equity, or agricultural 
productivity and historical justice.  In the context though of market-led reform, and 
despite intermittent and tentative efforts at compulsory acquisition, the prevailing thrust 
was capitalist modernization and the respect for capitalist civilities and property rights.   
 
Phase II of the LRRP emerged in the context of increasing tension and conflict within 
both Zimbabwean state and society.  Initially, this phase was marked by significant land 
policy dialogue and consultation, although radical nationalist assertions on land reform 
continually raised the spectre of more far-reaching reform.  Indeed, these contradictory 
messages from the ruling party and government prefigured the reconfiguration of state 
nationalism that was emerging in the context of social crisis.  In large part, intermediary 
land NGOs were exuberant during the late 1990s, as there seemed to be considerable 
space in which they could pursue their advocacy and development work.  Accelerated 
land reform, however, brought a sudden halt to that exuberance.  
 
The land movement derived from a combination of three tendencies.  First of all, there is 
the ‘historical legacy’ in Zimbabwe of racialized landed property that remained 
unresolved twenty years after independence (Bernstein 2003:p.220).  And, secondly, ‘the 
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contemporary “fragmentation” of labour as a feature of “globalisation” impacted on rural 
livelihoods and the desperate struggle for social reproduction’ (Bernstein 2003:p.220).  
Thirdly, there was the radical pan-African nationalism that arose in the face of a 
combination of imperialist aggression, disinterest and withdrawal vis-à-vis Zimbabwe.  
Of course, these conditions neither made the movement inevitable nor determined its 
historical specificities.  But they do show that global trajectories and conjunctural 
moments were significant in the emergence of the Third Chimurenga.   
 
In many ways, agrarian and land reform in Zimbabwe since independence has been 
externally driven, but not necessarily in line with global trajectories.  Certainly, the first 
phase of the LRRP fitted into the demands of Lancaster House and ESAP, although this 
phase had its own unique trends and fluctuations based on the articulation of local 
interests.  Phase II, on the other hand, was a reaction against imperialist trajectories and 
demands (notably since 2000) and it has formed a central component of a state-led 
authoritarian populist project.  In the case of accelerated reform, the tension between ‘the 
global’ and ‘the local’ has been particularly stark and dramatic, and glocalization 
processes in Zimbabwe have been mired in conflict. 
 
The discussion of land reform in Zimbabwe since the mid-1990s brings to the fore the 
many obstacles and challenges that ‘land’ NGOs likely faced both before and during the 
Third Chimurenga.  Accelerated reform though, with its uncivil quality and its affront to 
the sanctity of private property, has fundamentally altered the agrarian landscape in 
Zimbabwe, including relations of production and modes of rural governance.  It has thus 
posed a new series of problems for organizational forms (such as intermediary NGOs) 
that are generally considered to be located at the most respectable (and the most civil) 
end of civil society (Kaldor 2002).  Since the year 2000, ‘land’ NGOs have had to chart 
unexplored and turbulent waters and this has severely complicated their organizational 
practices.  Chapters Eleven to Thirteen explore the world and work of these NGOs in 
terms of ‘advocacy for change’ and ‘development and change’, and they highlight the 
continuities and changes between the ‘periods’ just prior and during accelerated reform.  
Before looking at these ‘periods’, it is first necessary (in Chapter Ten) to provide a 
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comparative and historical perspective for refining our analysis of ‘land’ NGOs in 
present-day Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 10 
‘Land’ NGOs: Comparative and Historical Perspectives 
 
 
From Chapter Nine, it is clearly evident that a large volume of literature on agrarian and 
land reform within Zimbabwean social studies exists.  Likewise, the academic literature 
on NGOs in Zimbabwe is quite considerable.  This latter literature arose during the early 
1990s alongside existing (and ongoing) donor-led ‘in-house project evaluations’ that 
tended to evaluate the NGO phenomenon in post-independence Zimbabwe in a 
‘fragmented’ rather than a comprehensive manner (Jirira 1989:p.1).  Early studies of 
NGOs in Zimbabwe were also a means, in the words of the UNDP Resident 
Representative in Harare, ‘to get a dialogue going’ between international funding 
agencies and NGOs as ‘partners in development’ (Kerkhoven 1992:p.4).  Many of the 
academic studies during the 1990s were also in some way donor-linked or NGO-based 
(Moyo 1992, Dekker 1994, Riddell and Robinson 1995).  This is not to suggest an 
intellectual bias on their part, but it does highlight the action-orientation of this work.  It 
was not until twenty years after independence that more serious efforts to theorize about 
NGOs under Zimbabwean conditions emerged, as exemplified in particular by the work 
of Moyo et al. (2000a) and Rich Dorman (2001).20  
 
This literature, however, fails to capture the interrelations between NGO action and land 
reform in any meaningful manner.  In large part, then, the foci of NGOs and land have 
been tackled as separate and disjointed areas of inquiry within Zimbabwean studies, 
although Sam Moyo recognizes this chasm and has sporadically sought to address it 
(Moyo 2001).  Further, with regard to my definition of ‘land’ NGOs, the almost exclusive 
focus within the prevailing literature is on development NGOs.  In the light of this slant 
in the literature, I discuss in this chapter rural development-centric NGOs in Zimbabwe 
                                         
20 However, there continues to be action-orientated studies of Zimbabwean NGOs by scholars.  See for 
instance the Masters of Policy Studies dissertation by Bohwasi (1999) on the role of NGOs in building the 
capacity of community-based organizations in Zimbabwe.  
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from independence to the mid-1990s.  However, the empirical focus of this thesis is not 
only rural NGDOs but is also intermediary advocacy NGOs engaged in land reform.  In 
order to transcend this limitation of the Zimbabwean NGO literature and thereby offer a 
comparative framework for studying advocacy NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe, it is 
necessary to look beyond Zimbabwe.  I thus provide a brief overview of advocacy NGOs 
and land reform in the South and East based on a mix of secondary and primary 
literature.  This literature, at least in relation to Africa, adopts a very restricted notion of 
NGO involvement in agrarian and land reform by focusing exclusively on advocacy 
NGOs (or land-centric NGOs) engaged in land policy formation and implementation.  
Thus, this chapter provides a comparative and historical background to the empirical 
focus of ‘land’ NGOs in present-day Zimbabwe discussed in Chapters Eleven, Twelve 
and Thirteen. 
 
 
10.1 Two Comparative Studies of Land-Centric NGOs 
 
The literature on advocacy NGOs and land is relatively sparse and dispersed, and it is 
rare to find a comprehensive study of land advocacy by NGOs or a collection of works 
dealing with it.  There are however two informative studies that deal with NGOs-cum-
civil society and land reform that are worth highlighting.  First of all, there is the 
excellent collection of essays edited by Ghimire (Ghimire ed. 2001) that provides a 
sweeping international perspective with chapters on Latin America, Asia and Africa.  
And, secondly, there is the short but thought-provoking analysis on Africa provided by 
Kanji et al. (2002) that brings to the fore some key conceptual points as well.21 
 
The collection edited by Ghimire raises an important methodological issue regarding land 
reform and NGOs, namely, that ‘how civil society organizations operate in concrete 
contexts and what makes them effective [or ineffective] in their actions are difficult 
                                         
21 The NGOs referred to in the works by Kanji et al. and Ghimire include not only intermediary NGOs but 
also grassroots organizations. This is also true of other available literature, and thus it is necessary to be 
circumspect with regard to making comparative comments about NGOs and land reform advocacy, whether 
in Africa or elsewhere. Often, the available literature does not clearly distinguish between civil society and 
NGOs.  Any comments I make on this issue in this chapter need to be seen in this light.  
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questions’ to unpack (Ghimire 2001:p.26).  Seeking to ‘measure’ land policy engagement 
and impact by NGOs (as with other social groups and organizations) is notoriously 
difficult.  In relation to Zimbabwe, Moyo has noted for instance: ‘There is indeed a 
yawning empirical gap in our understanding of how policy making is configured by state 
relations and linkages to key organs of civil society’ (Moyo 1999a:p.11).  However, the 
general conclusion arising from the Ghimire volume is that the ‘buoyant perspectives’ of 
NGOs prior to engaging in land reform soon ‘prove utopian’ (Ghimire 2001:p.26) and 
that, concomitantly, NGOs have played only a minor role in reform processes globally.  
Unconditional successes in influencing nation-state land reform agendas have been rare 
indeed; yet engaging in this advocacy process is ‘relatively easier’ (Mannan 2001:p.89) 
compared to involvement in the implementation of land policy.  For example, it has been 
noted with respect to South America that, relative to policy formation, ‘getting good 
[land] laws enforced effectively and honestly is usually much more difficult’ 
(Barraclough and Egucen 2001:p.230).  At the same time, there are significant regional 
variations, with the involvement of NGOs in land reform (including supporting peasant 
organizations) being ‘considerable’ in Latin America (Mozder and Ghimire 2001:p.206), 
being less so in Asia (except perhaps in the Philippines) where there is ‘no independent 
vibrant NGO sector … calling for sweeping land reform measures’ (Mannan 2001:p.95), 
and much less so throughout the African continent. 
 
There are many reasons for the failure by NGOs to make more important and sustained 
contributions to agrarian and land reform.  Of particular importance to this thesis are 
choices on their part not to participate in reform efforts and to rather pursue mainstream 
(but not necessarily less complex and demanding) development work.  Hence, ‘[t]he 
position of NGOs concerning land reform is complicated’, particularly as it regularly 
involves challenging entrenched rural and national power configurations (Mannan 2001: 
p.89 my emphasis).  In fact, authoritarian nation-states sometimes deliberately close the 
space available for NGO involvement in reform.  In Thailand, NGOs ‘opted to work for 
environmental protection, appropriate technology, alternative agriculture and so forth, 
thereby avoiding the thorny issue of agrarian reforms and peasant mobilizations’ 
(Ghimire 2001:p.36 my emphasis).  This ‘thorniness’ (in a ‘high risk’ area for NGOs, in 
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the words of Mannan 2001:p.97) arises in part because of resistance from dominant 
agrarian groups and, as a result, NGOs ‘tend to avoid being implicated [directly] in actual 
land reform programmes since this requires confrontation with local power structures’ 
(Ghimire 2001:p.28).   
 
Another drawback for NGOs, it is argued, is their perpetual dependence on the agendas 
and priorities of donors.  In South Asia, the majority of NGOs shifted recently from land 
reform to ‘non-land issues, as they become concerned with their … financial 
sustainability’ given that donors ‘are reluctant to support NGOs which call for 
widespread changes in property relations’ (Mannan 2001:p.97).  Simultaneously, donors 
at times are also reluctant to fund land reform.  For instance, in the case of southern 
Africa: ‘Donors in Southern Africa increasingly see assistance in land reform as 
politically sensitive and complex, likely to result in negative consequences whatever the 
moral foundation, and therefore best avoided… Unlike other sectors (e.g. education, 
health, water supply), official development assistance to land reform presents particular 
problems arising from its volatile, cyclical and politically sensitive nature.’ (TT 2003:p. 
12)  A further problem is the lack of ‘appropriate management and organizational skills’ 
possessed by NGOs and the lack of ‘accountability in their work’ with rural communities 
(Bravo 2001:p.74).  
 
Based on a study specifically of Mozambique and Kenya, Kanji et al. suggest that NGOs 
‘have had significant impacts on land policy processes’ (Kanji et al. 2002:p.vi).   In 
arguing so, they employ four criteria for measuring or assessing the impact of NGO 
advocacy work.  These criteria are concerned with NGOs undertaking the following: 
strengthening civil society groupings, bringing about pro-poor changes in land policy, 
deepening government accountability to civil society interests, and providing direct 
‘material’ benefits to the rural poor (for instance, intervening to resolve local land 
conflicts or to block land expropriations).  In this sense, both the process of policy 
formation (for example, mechanisms of transparency and accountability) and the product 
(for example, the content of land legislation) become important matters for NGO 
lobbying.  Kanji et al. make the critical point that ‘there may be trade-offs between 
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NGOs trying to influence [a particular] policy change and trying to strengthen 
community groups’ as part of a longer-term capacity-building process (Kanji et al. 2002: 
p.23).  This notion of a trade-off is often noted in the available literature, such that ‘the 
emergence of new policy lobbying organisations (agrarian lobbies)’ such as NGOs has 
sometimes involved ‘the weakening of the growth of peasant organisation’ (HIVOS 
1989:p.3).  
 
The insightful analysis of Kanji et al. is based on a non-linear model of policy formation 
in which policy implementation cannot be ‘read’ from (or reduced to) official policy or 
government legislation.  Policy is also developed (or at least re-worked if not 
transformed) during the very process of implementation and this occurs in the context of 
variable local politics, including forms of resistance within the state and by landed classes 
(Palmer 2000).  In the case of land reform in southern Africa, ‘it is difficult to detect a 
linear relationship (or any kind of systematic relationship) between the analysis of a 
problem or opportunity and the assessment of the evidence, the formulation of 
recommendations and the announcement of the policy change.’ (TT 2003:p.16)  This 
yawning gap between policy formulation and implementation of land reform has 
important implications for NGOs.  Because of the ‘policy gap’, Kanji et al. argue that it 
becomes crucial for NGOs to monitor policy implementation processes and also to build 
the autonomous capacity of peasant groups to push implementation in a pro-poor 
direction.  As Barraclough has noted, unless the rural under-classes ‘can participate in 
and influence policy implementation, even well intentioned [agrarian] policies designed 
to alleviate their poverty will most likely be deformed during execution to benefit others.’ 
(Barraclough 1990:p.16)  Given that NGOs in themselves do not embody significant 
forms of social power, they can most likely maximize their ‘legitimacy and policy clout’ 
by aligning themselves with grassroots organizations that ‘can cause social disruption’ 
(Kanji et al. 2002:p.31). 
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10.2 Advocacy ‘Land’ NGOs: Thematic Issues 
 
Self-proclaimed ‘land-centric’ NGOs seek to link issues of land reform to social justice 
and poverty alleviation and, in the case of southern and east Africa, this has involved, 
besides direct advocacy work, ‘awareness raising on policy issues, the provision of legal 
advice and services and mobilization of communities to benefit from new policies and 
legislation.’ (Makombe ed. 2001:p.9)  In Zambia, for example, NGOs have trained rural 
communities to undertake independent advocacy on land issues; in Mozambique they 
have aided communities in registering their land in a manner consistent with ambiguous 
state regulations, and in South Africa they have promoted awareness amongst affected 
communities about impending land legislation. The advocacy work by NGOs pertains to 
a range of land-related matters, including insecure land tenure, land markets, 
democratizing land management and customary land-use institutions (Saruchera and 
Odhiambo 2004).  Often this advocacy arises in the context of land commissions or 
constitutional review commissions (ZLA 2004), and during the formulation of national 
land policy (ZLA 2002) or the drafting of policy-based land bills.22  Women’s groups 
have been particularly active, seeking to ensure gender-sensitive land policies given the 
prevalence of patriarchal land systems.   
 
Yet, in the case of southern Africa: ‘While NGOs in the region have been very effective 
in bringing these [gender] issues to the attention of the public and to politicians, they 
have been less than successful in obtaining concrete action in the legislatures or 
advancing concrete policy proposals.’ (TT 2003:p.10)  In general, lobbying work in 
Africa has been highly uneven in its impact, and Odhiambo (2002:p.5) argues that ‘the 
governance structure in each country determines the level of NGO involvement’ with 
land issues and ‘the impact of such involvement’.  In the case of Kenya, the Kenyan 
African Nation Union government ‘never got to accept that NGOs had a legitimate role in 
policy processes’ (Odhiambo 2004:p.133) on land, and land advocacy by individual 
                                         
22 On advocacy around an impending land law, see MNCS (2002).  For an account of the Uganda Land 
Bill, see Paul (1998). 
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NGOs during the late 1990s was ‘sporadic’, ‘did not last long’ and ‘had little impact on 
actual policy formulation’.  On the other hand, the Uganda Land Alliance as an 
‘umbrella’ body for NGOs had a cordial relationship with the government of the National 
Resistance Movement, and it became ‘a major player on land issues’ and ‘sits in major 
policy formulation and implementation committees’ (Odhiambo 2002:pp.11, 12).    
 
The available literature emphasizes the importance of national land networks that now 
exist throughout much of Africa.  These civil society formations tend however to be 
generally weak, at least compared to Latin America (Ghimire ed. 2001).  This is 
exemplified by the ‘fragmented nature … of civil society interventions’ on land  in east 
and southern Africa (LRNSA 2000:p.17).  After attending a NGO land conference in Dar 
es Salaam in 1997, Robin Palmer from Oxfam reflected that (even compared to 
Zimbabwe) ‘Tanzanian NGOs were far weaker, less well organised and less coordinated 
than I had expected’ (Hakiardhi 1997:p.5).  Thus, the National Land Forum in Tanzania, 
consisting of gender, pastoral and media NGOs, was ‘divided in terms of agenda and 
priority’ (Kibamba and Johnson 2003:p.27) and was unable to have its views integrated 
into land legislation.  At a National Land Committee workshop on gender and land policy 
in South Africa in April 2000, a ‘major obstacle’ identified was ‘the disarray in the NGO 
sector, which is not engaging in coordinated way’ (SANL 2000:p.7).   
 
Likewise, Greenberg speaks of the ‘weakness of independent progressive civil society’ in 
southern Africa as a major reason for the persistent failings of land reform in the region, 
and he refers specifically to the NGO ‘sector’ in South Africa during the 1990s as 
‘toothless’ (Greenberg 2004:pp.113, 118) in lobbying government for changes in land 
policy.  He argues that the relationship between NGOs and rural land activists in South 
Africa was at that time ‘driven by the assumptions and interests of the NGOs’.  And 
NGOs themselves were, according to Greenberg, driven in large part by the neo-liberal 
development paradigm and were ‘most interested in short-term funding than in 
establishing a durable and independent movement of rural people.’ (Greenberg 2004:pp. 
118, 119)  Donor funding of NGOs involved in land advocacy seems to raise the standard 
pitfalls, including (unpredictable) short-term funding and the unwillingness by donors to 
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fund core costs.  Related to this, NGOs are concerned about how some donors view 
advocacy work, as it is sometimes ‘treated in the same way as service delivery 
programmes which can show quantifiable results’ (Kanji et al. 2002:p.19).  This donor-
dependence also inhibits NGOs from gaining credibility ‘as implementers of home-grown 
agendas on land’ (MWENGO 2000b:p.27).  Greenberg’s analysis though raises the 
likelihood that in supporting donor-driven land programmes, NGOs are not necessarily 
pursuing an ideological agenda but are rather tactically engaged in accessing funds to 
maintain some form of organizational sustainability. 
 
National land networks in southern Africa were by the year 2000 in ‘different stages of 
development’, ranging from ‘well developed’ to ‘non-existent’ (LRNSA 2000:p.34).  
These networks are sometimes dominated by urban-based NGOs and they do not have 
strong (or organic) links with rural communities.  Often, national land networks of 
NGOs, such as the Working Committee on Land Reform in Namibia, do not have any 
national NGOs working exclusively on land issues, and ‘[l]and reform is not the primary 
focus of most members … and in some cases it is at the bottom of the list when priorities 
in terms of allocation of resources are made’ (MWENGO 1999:p.16).  In other cases, 
NGOs join such networks not because of any specific interest in land reform but rather to 
‘access donor funds’ (Bazaara 2003:p.4).  To bolster these national networks, more 
extensive networks at regional and continental levels have been formed in Africa since 
the year 2000.  These include the Africa-wide bodies of Pan-African Programme on Land 
and Resource Rights and LandNet Africa.  Sub-regional chapters of LandNet Africa were 
also formed, including The Land Rights Network of Southern Africa (LRNSA).  Included 
on its Interim Steering Committee was the Zimbabwean-based NGO called ZERO that 
during the late 1990s played a significant information, research and advocacy role on 
land and natural resources in Zimbabwe.  At the southern Africa network’s meeting in 
Harare in October 2000, the importance of moving beyond ‘the prevailing parallelism’ in 
the programmes of the NGOs making up the network and developing a more 
‘coordinated process’ was stressed (LRNSA 2000:p.7). 23   
                                         
23 Simultaneously, the Southern Africa Network on Land (SANL) existed.  ZERO was also on the steering 
committee of SANL as was the National Land Committee (NLC) from South Africa. NLC, although also 
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Funding for these networks is a perennial problem, although the DFID and Oxfam-GB 
have been heavily involved.24  Yet, ‘as no organization exists solely for purposes of 
networking’ (Odhiambo 2002:p.14), NGOs consider their involvement in networks as 
creating additional responsibilities that invariably take second place to their own 
programmatic processes if only due to ‘work pressure’ (LRNSA 2000:p.28).  Donors too 
are wary of networks.  Few donors will fund networking as a distinct activity, as ‘it is not 
considered an end in itself.’ (Odhiambo 2002:p.14)  Questions arise amongst NGOs 
about the real intention of bilateral donors such as DFID, and whether they may have 
hidden (neo-liberal) agendas that ‘may not necessarily be consistent with the local 
interest’ (Odhiambo 2002:p.16).  Nevertheless, the formation of land networks and 
coalitions is meant to overcome a serious weakness in land lobbying, namely, that it is 
largely ‘reactive’ (Makombe ed. 2001:p.35).  In the case of Malawi, a civil society 
conference revealed that in the ‘area of gender and land’ there are ‘no groups that were 
proactive in offering possible solutions.’ (MNCS 2002:p.3)  
 
It is argued that ‘NGOs generally tend to start working together on land issues when it is 
already too late’ (Hakiardhi 1997:p.5), for example after a land commission has 
submitted its report, or after a national land policy has been established, or even after a 
land bill has been enacted and awaits implementation.  Yet even pro-active lobbying 
alone is considered problematic and the National Land Alliance of Zambia speaks about 
NGO ‘action beyond advocacy’.  Despite the emphasis on advocacy by Zambian NGOs, 
the Alliance notes that ‘the [flawed] Land Act 1995 is still in place, women’s right to 
land is still far from reality and the traditional land tenure system is still under threat.’ 
(MWENGO 2000b:p.13)  Hence, regarding NGOs and land in southern and east Africa, 
‘[i]t is not uncommon for years of advocacy to result in little or no desired change’. 25 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
on the original steering committee of LRNSA, subsequently expressed concern about the formation of 
LRNSA and did not attend the Harare meeting. 
24 In 1999 the DFID commissioned studies to consider the possibilities of sub-regional networking on land 
issues in Africa.  In the year 2000, LRNSA was solely funded by DFID. 
25 See Annex 4 in LRNSA (2000). 
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10.3 Peasant Movements, Class Interests and ‘Land’ Advocacy NGOs 
 
In Chapters Six and Seven, the importance of robust peasant-led movements in 
explaining significant agrarian and land action by nation-states was highlighted.  Peasant 
militancy, or the threat of such militancy, often leads to reform initiatives.  However, it is 
sometimes argued that the work of NGOs may undermine these movements and thus 
forestall land reform.  At a NGO workshop on land held in Windhoek in November 1999 
(organized by MWENGO), the keynote speaker (from Zimbabwe) argued that ‘NGOs in 
Southern Africa are a reactionary force regarding land reform.  I do not mean every one 
of them but most of them.  … I mean reactionary in the sense of being not pro-change 
although they are so-called change agents.  They are also reactionary in the sense that 
they are not playing a leadership role in bringing change.  This is a very serious problem, 
I am convinced that NGOs are behind [or less proactive than] the state in the issue of land 
reform.’ 26 (Moyo 1999b:p.2)  On the other hand, the few progressive NGOs supporting 
land reform are ‘timid’ and ‘peripheral’, such that they ‘sit back when communities 
organise themselves to try and get land rather than considering how they can build on this 
momentum to come up with something constructive.’ (Moyo 1999b:p.3)   
 
At another MWENGO land workshop a year later, the NGO delegation from Malawi 
exclaimed that ‘NGOs have not come out in defence of land-hungry people who encroach 
on private land and are moved off by law enforcers.’ (MWENGO 2000b:p.19)  In this 
regard, NGO professionals should not be seen as classless ‘free floating “activists”’ 
(Shivji 2004:p.8).  At times, it is argued that the petty bourgeois class interests and 
ideology of NGO professionals lead to a neo-liberal pre-occupation with defending 
freehold land title (or converting customary title into freehold title) rather than to 
championing land redistribution and peasant-based movements.  For example, in 
                                         
26 Sam Moyo, in his paper developed to this workshop, included not only self-proclaimed advocacy NGOs 
but also rural development NGOs within his conception of reactionary land NGOs.  In what seems to be an 
earlier draft of the same paper (p.7), Moyo says these development NGOs ‘limit their activities in land 
reform to projects in which they promote the control or regulation of the use of land and natural resources 
in “customary land tenure areas” rather than demanding the expansion of land accessible to peasants.’  In a 
sense, then, peasants have to be taught how to farm efficiently and effectively prior to be given access to 
further land.  
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discussing the prospects for agrarian transformation in southern Africa, it was noted at a 
NGO workshop in Zimbabwe in November 1989 that the ‘class interests of the people 
that man the NGOs are in contradiction to those of the people they purport to serve’ 
(HIVOS 1989:p.9), particularly when land advocacy NGOs based in urban areas operate 
autonomously from peasant bodies.  As Moyo puts in relation to NGOs in Africa, ‘the 
predominantly urban-led civil society has not formally embraced extensive redistributive 
land reform, given the class interests of especially the NGO leaderships.’ (Moyo 2004:p. 
120)  In this regard, NGO involvement in land reform is understood as more donor-
driven than community-rooted.  In other words, NGOs (for class reasons) tend to align 
themselves with market-based development agendas rather than with progressive peasant 
movements.  This donor dependency inhibits the radicalizing of NGOs and they thus ‘fail 
to promote autonomous rural development thinking and strategies’ (Mozder and Ghimire 
2001:p.207).  
 
Petras argues that NGOs in Latin America act as a ‘social cushion’ (Petras 1997:p.1) 
between the major social classes: ‘There is a direct relation between the growth of [rural] 
social movements challenging the neoliberal model and the effort [by donors] to subvert 
them by creating alternative forms of social action through the NGOs.’ (Petras 1997:p.2)  
Hence, peasant bodies are ‘largely neglected’ by foreign donors as they prefer to fund 
‘rural agricultural and income generating projects’ implemented by compliant 
intermediary development NGOs (Ghimire 2001:p.52).  Mannan argues in some detail: 
‘South Asian NGOs have now acquired experience in working with the rural poor in 
wider poverty alleviation programmes.  They have gained significant experience in 
providing training to peasants together with new ideas and skills necessary for 
agricultural production.  At times, they are able to mediate conflicts between the 
administration and peasants. …  They are seeking to improve education and educational 
facilities in rural areas.  They may help to inject credit and technical inputs in local 
production systems.  What this actually means is that the NGOs’ work could actually 
help to stop growing rural radicalism associated with land redistribution or other 
organized demands for changes in power structure and resource sharing.’ (Mannan 2001: 
pp.94-95)  In this sense, then, NGOs become ‘rival organizations’ to militant peasant 
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organizations as they ‘encourage groups to think in terms of “projects” not agrarian 
reform’ (Petras 1998:p.4).  Thus, ‘the appearance of solidarity and social action’ by 
NGOs vis-à-vis peasant communities simply ‘cloaks a conservative conformity’ (Petras 
1997:p.6 his emphasis).    
 
Quite probably, international capital does have a keen interest in land reform in the South 
and East, and seeks to address and fulfil it in a market-led manner that suits its 
globalizing agenda.  Also, at times, it may be possible to speak of (and even identify) the 
‘objective class interests’ of intermediary NGOs, their neo-liberal modes of development 
thinking and their effects in inhibiting the emergence of radical peasant movements.  But 
these are simply historical trajectories and possibilities, and should not be conflated with 
some asserted ‘essential condition’ of intermediary ‘land’ NGOs marked by a 
‘conservative conformity’.   In fact, the literature review in this section is very suggestive 
of diverse positions and practices adopted by ‘land’ NGOs.  Epistemologically, the 
functionalist argument that NGOs have a dragging or breaking effect on land reform and 
peasant mobilization fails to offer an understanding of the organizational practices of 
advocacy NGOs.   Likewise, the claim that these NGOs are tools of global ‘outsiders’ is 
equally problematic in ‘capturing’ the genesis of NGO practices as embodied in 
organizational processes.   
 
The case of land reform is highly illustrative of the ambivalent social field within which 
all intermediary NGOs are located, and the many interfaces (for example, global donors, 
peasant groups) that mark the boundaries of their social space and impinge on it (and 
hence reconstitute it) in a conflictual manner.   Intermediary ‘land’ NGOs ‘balance’ and 
‘manage’ their contradictory social relations in complex ways that are historically 
specific, and thus the ‘effects’ cannot be read from global imperatives or as global 
impositions.   The historical possibility exists that a ‘land’ NGO might align itself 
unreservedly with an uncivil peasant movement, and for reasons other than ‘committing 
class suicide’.  The theory of NGOs contained in this thesis allows for this real possibility 
and has the (potential) explanatory power to account for it.  
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Indeed, the existing literature implies that intermediary NGOs engage in land reform on 
an advocacy basis for numerous reasons, and these reasons entail a rich array of long-
term ‘values’ and short-term ‘interests’ ranging from a deep commitment to agrarian 
justice and democratic reform to a desperate need for funding to sustain the organization 
temporarily.   This involves ‘negotiated processes’ on the part of NGOs that cannot be 
reduced to class politics, or to ‘class’ or ‘politics’.  Many NGOs also refrain from 
engaging in land advocacy work or are hesitant about engaging in it, and the literature 
highlights the complicated political character of advocacy interventions by intermediary 
NGOs that inhibit such interventions.  Later in this thesis I will argue that this complexity 
in large part revolves around ‘internal’ organizational imperatives rather than ‘external’ 
political-cum-ideological imperatives. 
 
 
10.4 Early Years in Zimbabwe: Nation-Building and Developmentalism 
 
The year 1995, or more generally the mid-1990s, seems to be a defining moment in 
Zimbabwean history and society: ‘The period in Zimbabwean history beginning in 1996 
and culminating in the current conjuncture will loom large as a decisive phase in 
Zimbabwe’s political economy. During these years, the political and economic terrain 
was substantively restructured, setting out the contours of the current crisis in 
Zimbabwe.’ (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:p.355)  This was brought out in the 
discussion in Chapter Nine of the social crisis in contemporary Zimbabwe.  NGOs and 
land reform in present-day Zimbabwe (from 1995 onwards) will be examined in Chapters 
Eleven and Twelve in relation to both the years immediately before accelerated reform 
(1995 to 1999) and the accelerated period (2000 onwards).  First, though, I provide a 
brief (and necessarily schematic) historical account of the activities of intermediary 
NGDOs in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1995.27 
 
                                         
27 The notion of ‘NGO’ as used in the literature quoted or cited below varies considerably, and generally is 
more all embracing than my notion of non-membership intermediary organizations that is used throughout 
the thesis.  
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Dekker (1994) argues that with independence in 1980 there was a ‘marked change’ 
(primarily involving an expansion) in the NGO sector ‘triggered by the availability of 
international funds, the urgent need and the high expectations in the country’ (Dekker 
1994:p.1).  This expansion took place in the context of the state-centric 
developmentalism of the post-colonial regime and its ‘highly partisan’ (Saul and 
Saunders 2005:p.5) nation-building project.  As the State President, Canaan Banana, said 
in reflection fifteen years after independence: ‘Many NGOs in particular accepted our 
prescriptions – should I say, joined us. In fact our prescriptions and perceptions were 
basically theirs in the first place. We became partners in development.’ (Thorpe and 
Vekris eds. 1995:p.4)  Thus, in conjunction with the nation-state and working closely 
alongside relevant line ministries and local government structures, international and 
indigenous NGOs engaged in post-war rehabilitation focusing on the reconstruction of 
rural infrastructure and extending social services to neglected communities.   
 
As the 1980s moved on, NGOs became involved in a fluctuating combination of drought 
relief and development work, notably in the communal areas but also in the emerging 
resettlement areas.28  Riddell and Robinson (1995) provide a broad overview of the 
development activities of NGOs in rural Zimbabwe, and they give a mixed review of 
these efforts.  For instance, in terms of poverty alleviation strategies, they argue that the 
‘poorest households’ in the communal areas tend to be ‘excluded’ from NGO 
interventions (Riddell and Robinson 1995:p.242).  Simultaneously, they speak about the 
willingness on the part of NGOs to ‘experiment and innovate’ (Riddell and Robinson 
1995:p.278), including their involvement in community resource management schemes 
such as CAMPFIRE.  In so doing, NGOs were able to ‘make good use of’ WADCOs and 
VIDCOs (Makumbe 1998:p.33), that is, the development sub-committees of Rural 
Councils. 
 
This NGO development work was based on principles and ideals of participation and 
sustainability.  Indeed, Makumbe (1996) claims: ‘That NGOs in Zimbabwe facilitate 
                                         
28 Moyo et al. (2000a) provide a four-phase periodization of NGO activity in Zimbabwe from 1980 through 
to 1995. 
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beneficiary participation in development cannot be disputed.’ (Makumbe 1996:p.79) 
Others have argued that most rural NGOs in Zimbabwe appeared ‘to think for their 
intended beneficiaries.’ (Kerkhoven 1992:p.13 my emphasis)  Indeed, an official of the 
Forestry Commission (a well-established state regulatory agency) claimed that NGOs 
working in agro-forestry often created a ‘dependence syndrome’ rather than economic 
self-reliance in rural communities (quoted in Wellard and Mema eds. 1991:p.29).  During 
the early 1990s these development practices occurred under conditions of neo-liberal 
structural adjustment (ESAP) and this effectively increased the demand and need for 
NGO social service provisioning and gap filling (Thorpe and Vekris eds. 1995).  For 
instance, ESAP led to serious financial constraints on the part of the central state, and this 
was – from the perspective of the Ministry of Lands – ‘an important factor’ behind the 
Ministry’s ‘increasing openness towards other agencies [like NGOs] operating in 
agriculture’ (quoted in Wellard and Mema eds. 1991:p.11).  In general, NGOs simply 
sought to alleviate the effects of ESAP on hard-hit communities, and they did not 
question ESAP ‘in any extensive way’ and hence ‘paid relatively little attention to the 
policy-level of government’ (Rich Dorman 2001:p.168).  In reference to the entire period 
from 1980 to 1995, Moyo and Makumbe (2000:p.7) conclude that development NGOs in 
Zimbabwe ‘tended to be responsive by nature’ rather than more proactive.  
 
Throughout this period, the Zimbabwean government had no formal policy on NGOs 29 
and the NGO ‘sector’ had an ambivalent, contradictory and fluid relation with the central 
state.  A Ministry of Lands official said in 1991 that ‘[t]he attitude of the government to 
NGOs in Zimbabwe has, over the past decade ranged from: indifference, hostility, 
reticence and wait-and-see to direct involvement, supervision and welcoming of NGO 
activities’ (quoted in Wellard and Mema eds. 1991:p.10).30  On the one hand, there was 
some ‘suspicion of the agenda of NGOs’ by government (Dekker 1994:p.16), particularly 
of international NGOs.  On the other hand, ‘NGOs seem[ed] to enjoy the freedom and 
latitude of operation in the country’ (Sibanda 1994:p.10), at least compared to other 
countries in Africa (Riddell and Robinson 1995:pp.238-239).  Indigenous NGOs in 
                                         
29 NGOs were omitted from the following development plans: Growth with Equity (1981), Transitional 
National Development Plan (1982-85) and the First Five Year Development Plan (1986-1990).   
30 Hostility was particularly marked during the Matabeleland conflict during the 1980s (Rich Dorman 2001: 
pp.136-138). 
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particular had a ‘weak and uncertain financial base’ (SW 1992:p.17) and this led to 
significant staff turnover.   
 
NGOs were a mixed bag with ‘a conglomeration of heterogeneous organisations’ 
including both ‘black-dominated’ and ‘white-dominated’ NGOs, with a wide range of 
‘objectives and goals, as well as plans and operational strategies’ (Jirira 1989:p.26).  
Thus, in 1997, one NGO practitioner claimed that NGOs were characterized by a ‘high 
capacity of uncooperativeness which manifests itself when they do not support each 
other, they cannot share resources, personnel’ (quoted in Madzima 1997:p.29).  Indeed, 
‘the national NGO movement in Zimbabwe’ was ‘divided’ and this entailed serious 
‘distrust’ even between NGOs (Kerkhoven 1992:p.17).  This seemingly uncoordinated 
diversity led to isolated pockets of development activity (or ‘patchwork’ development) in 
communal areas managed by different NGOs, such that the Minister of Local 
Government spoke of NGOs as ‘unguided missiles’ (quoted in Makumbe 1996:p.75).  
This diversity amongst NGOs also led to varying relations between NGOs and the state, 
and hindered their advocacy efforts as well (Madzima 1997). 
 
 
10.5 Politics of Inclusion and NGO Advocacy 
 
Overall, overt advocacy by NGOs with the intent to influence state policy formation was 
limited during this period.  In the early 1990s, there were ‘very few NGOs that 
specialise[d] in advocacy’ (Moyo 1992:p.3).  NGOs constantly complained about the 
centralist thrust of state policy (or state-centred development) and ‘about the 
inaccessibility of policy decisions’ (Kerkhoven 1992:p.22).  This meant that cooperation 
between the state and NGOs was ‘uncoordinated at the national level’ (Kerkhoven 1992: 
p.24).  Lobbying by NGOs was largely ‘ad hoc’, ‘silent’ or ‘restricted to the level of 
implementation’ (Dekker 1994:p.34), and hence effectively occurred informally as NGO 
practitioners worked alongside technical line ministry staff or with district and provincial 
officials.31  Yet, in the face of a crisis of livelihoods emerging from ESAP and with 
                                         
31 This relates to what Moyo (1992:pp.8-9) refers to as the ‘complementary model’ of advocacy.  
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autonomous opposition to the ruling party emerging in the early 1990s, NGOs in 
Zimbabwe were ‘increasingly demanding involvement’ in the policy formation process 
beyond provincial level to ensure ‘policies that are appropriate for sustainable 
development’ (Sibanda 1994:p.3).  However, at a NGO workshop in 1995, it was argued 
that ‘NGOs are now reacting to the effects of ESAP and evolving programmes to 
alleviate its adverse effects. .. [T]hey should have been involved and visible in the debate 
prior to its finalisation and implementation.’ (Thorpe and Vekris eds. 1995:p.30 emphasis 
in original)   
 
Indigenous NGOs concerned with human rights (for example, ZimRights),32 women’s 
rights (such as Women’s Action Group)33 and environmental sustainability (for instance, 
ZERO) had emerged and were actively involved in various forms of lobbying.34  Yet, in 
the case of the 1995 Private Voluntary Organisations Act that was designed specifically 
to regulate and control the NGO ‘sector’, NGOs appeared tentative and limited in their 
lobbying because they were ‘reluctant to challenge the regime’ (Rich Dorman 
2003:p.847).  In fact, in the middle 1990s it was argued that ‘little is being done’ by NGO 
umbrella bodies like VOICE ‘to influence development policy in Zimbabwe. Sometimes 
these NGOs come on the policy scene far too late to make any difference.’ (Makumbe 
1996:p.118)  A major NGO convention held in April 1997 was designed to chart the way 
forward, specifically in seeking to build a more effective national organization (Madzima 
1997). 
 
At independence, the post-colonial state had adopted an authoritarian state-centric 
corporatism along the lines discussed by Mandaza, who argues that ‘the principle of the 
sole and authentic liberation movement [ZANU] provided the rationale, and indeed the 
licence, whereby the party in post-independence period can ride rough-shod – in the 
interests of the masses! – over the interests of the very people it purports to serve.’  
(Mandaza 1994:p.257)  Thus, while it may be true that civil society was ‘extensively 
                                         
32 See Rich Dorman (2001:pp.145-162). 
33 See WAG (1998).  
34 Sibanda (1994) offers a detailed account of two advocacy efforts during this period, by the Zimbabwe 
Federation of the Disabled and by the National Association for Non-Governmental Organizations. 
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developed’ in Zimbabwe (Kerkhoven 1992:p.8), it is equally the case that during the 
1980s many civil society groups such as trade unions, women’s groups, the co-operative 
movement and small-scale farmer organizations became almost subservient wings of the 
ruling party.  In this sense, the state constituted civil society, or at least it sought to ‘flood 
the space’ available to civil society by ‘building out from the party and state and into 
society itself’ (Saul and Saunders 2005:p.5).  This has been referred to as the ‘statisation 
of civil society’ (Shivji 2004:p.8) or as ‘the destruction of civil society’ (Neocosmos 
1993: pp. 5-6).   
 
Yet by the turn of the decade, there had emerged a more ‘societal corporatist model of 
governance’ that enabled the state ‘to retain state power while allowing for greater NGO 
participation’ (Moyo 2000b:p.60).  Both forms of corporatism fall under what Rich 
Dorman (2001) calls the ‘politics of inclusion’ during the 1980 to 1997 period, which 
was based on a blend of ‘societal quiescence and demobilization’ (Rich Dorman 
2001:p.41) along with forms of coercion when necessary.  By the mid-1990s, this mode 
of domination began to unravel as the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe 
deepened.  Hence, ‘in conditions of increasing poverty under the structural adjustment 
programme’, NGOs became ‘more willing to make a more frontal political assault on the 
state over the issue of democratisation.’ (Moyo et al. 2000a:p.xi)  This heightened civic 
activism will be noted in discussing the contemporary period (1995 onwards) in Chapters 
Eleven and Twelve. 
 
 
10.6 Agrarian Change and NGDOs in Zimbabwe 
 
During the earlier period (before 1995), the NGO ‘community’ in Zimbabwe was in large 
part marked by a ‘strategic pragmatism’ in which NGOs ‘fram[ed] what few challenges 
they make to the political order in a depoliticising discourse in order to make themselves 
acceptable to their colleagues and the state.’ (Rich, quoted in Raftopoulos 2000a:p.23)  
This incorporation into dominant societal discourses and practices, which was based in 
part on consensus and in part on compliance, was not simply imposed upon NGOs.  
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Rather, it was the outcome of ‘negotiated’ processes as NGOs sought to ‘balance’ their 
action in a manner that would allow for organizational sustainability.  It is instructive that 
at the end of a NGDO workshop in Harare on ESAP in March 1995, the rural 
development participants concluded: ‘NGOs have in the past avoided participation in 
debates involving issues of National Development.  Examples were cited of debates 
concerning the land issue which is a central issue and one of the main problems affecting 
the various constituencies of the NGOs in Zimbabwe’ (Thorpe and Vekris eds. 1995:p. 
31 my emphasis).  Repeated acknowledgements of this kind, and the simultaneous (and 
ongoing) failure to act on the acknowledged weakness, vividly highlight ‘the great leap 
forward’ needed to engage proactively in land reform advocacy.  The failure on the part 
of NGOs to meaningfully engage with the nation-state in advocating on land policy 
cannot be reduced to state centrism, as this weakness amongst Zimbabwean NGOs was in 
many ways self-defined and self-inflicted.   
 
Likewise, the failure by NGDOs to directly tackle agrarian change in their development 
activities during this period is also abundantly clear.  In fact, Jirira (1989:p.28 my 
emphasis), in summing up her argument about development NGOs in post-independence 
Zimbabwe, claims that they ‘do not assist in the creation of an environment of non-
exploitative relations but just support communities to adjust to the given environment’.  
Many other writers on Zimbabwean NGOs, including Riddell and Robinson 
(1995:p.244), would concur in some way with this perspective.  In other words, NGOs 
involved in rural development in Zimbabwe have simply reproduced the prevailing 
agrarian structures of domination rather than facilitating their transformation.  Again, this 
takes us back to the claim that, if anything, NGOs simply inhibit progressive rural 
change.  Thus, in looking at NGOs and prospects for rural transformation in Zimbabwe, 
Nyathi argues that “I deny that any meaningful transformation has taken place in rural 
Zimbabwe’ and that this requires the ‘rural poor’ to ‘have the political clout to determine 
the agenda for their own development’ (Nyathi 1991:p.25). 
 
In this regard, and in the contest of a discussion of the agrarian question, Neocosmos 
(1993) argues that ‘[t]he objective economic effect of development aid programmes’ by 
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NGOs in southern Africa (including Zimbabwe) ‘has been precisely the reproduction of 
PCP [petty commodity production] and the restriction of the proletarianisation process.’ 
(Neocosmos 1993:p.61)  He continues: ‘Indeed, the main effect of rural development 
programmes is arguably to reproduce state power in rural areas. … Democratisation is 
not a question of transferring the powers of state agencies to supposedly more neutral 
NGOs … It is about providing the conditions in which the oppressed majority in the rural 
areas can build their own economic and political organisations as independently as 
possible from state regulation.’ (Neocosmos 1993:p.66)  In this sense, NGDOs have not 
contributed to resolving the ‘agrarian question of capital’ or have simply delayed its 
resolution.  Simultaneously, they have ‘assisted’ rural communities in coping with the 
crisis of livelihoods (or the ‘agrarian question of labour’) that has arisen from global 
restructuring, and have thereby softened (and, again, not resolved) the social reproduction 
squeeze.  While these arguments may have a degree of empirical validity, assessing the 
functionality of NGOs in itself does not provide an understanding of the emergence of 
these organizational effects.  
 
In the literature on NGDOs in Zimbabwe, there is functionalist obsession with ‘effect’ 
and ‘impact’.  The ‘empiricist’ literature (for example, Riddell and Robinson 1995) 
focuses primarily on project or programme ‘effect’ as a measurement of development 
‘success’, while ‘structuralist’ theorists (for instance, Jirira 1989) are more apt to reflect 
upon society-wide effects or the restructuring of rural societies.  However, the claim that 
intermediary ‘land’ NGOs involved in rural development in Zimbabwe reproduced state 
power or relations of exploitation in the countryside is a mute point.  After all, social 
transformation in the Zimbabwean countryside also did not occur because of the actions 
of independent peasant organizations and rural trade unions.   
 
Of course, NGDOs invariably impact on rural communities, although not always in the 
ways intended because of the open-endedness of the development process.  It may be that 
NGO development ‘effects’ are often consistent with the global imperatives of capitalism 
as set out in neo-liberal development discourses.  But the prioritizing of ‘the other’ 
(invariably, the ‘global other’) in explaining NGO development practices leads to 
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functionalist and instrumentalist explanations, and fails to account for the remarkable 
NGO diversity that is highlighted even in the literature on Zimbabwe.   Furthermore, it 
detracts from offering a ‘thick description’ of the world and work of NGOs, including the 
organizational processes that constitute NGOs as social forms.  ‘Capturing’ these 
organizational practices enables the analyst to understand ‘from within’ the genesis and 
trajectory of organizational ‘effects’. 
 
In this context, I now examine NGOs and land reform in contemporary Zimbabwe from 
1995 onwards.  The empirical material in Chapters Eleven and Twelve provides an 
overview of ‘land’ NGO work during this period, and the empirical discussion in Chapter 
Thirteen deepens the analysis through two case studies that are rich in organizational 
detail.  These extensive and intensive foci are not meant to be fully comprehensive and 
exhaustive.  Rather, they seek to identify important trends and issues in a way that 
contributes to the reworking and refinement of sociological theory on NGOs.  They are 
illustrative of the sociological perspective on NGOs that has been developed in this 
thesis, rather than proving it.  I analyze NGOs and land reform during the few years 
before accelerated reform (1995–2000) and the accelerated period from 2000 onwards.  
Important continuities and changes between these two ‘periods’ are highlighted.  The 
conceptual distinction made between ‘advocating for change’ and ‘development and 
change’, as two moments in the work of social change by ‘land’ NGOs, forms the basis 
for the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 11 
‘Land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe: Advocating For Change 
 
 
Since the early 1990s NGOs in Zimbabwe have generally speaking adopted a more 
pronounced advocacy stance.  Raftopoulos, in looking back over the 1990s, hence argues: 
‘The economic marginalisation of the majority of Zimbabweans that has accompanied the 
adjustment programme [ESAP], created an environment for advocacy on poverty issues.  
In addition the growing authoritarianism of the Zimbabwean state provided a platform for 
groups to mobilise around the question of governance.  … This transition is characteristic 
of many NGOs, which began as providers of welfare services for the poor, and evolve 
into organisations that questioned the basis of poverty in society.’ (Raftopoulos 
2000b:p.6)   
 
The significance of NGO advocacy work also became manifest within the realm of land 
reform but on a more limited basis.  Indeed, advocacy by NGOs on governance-cum-
democratic reform, as part of a broader civic nationalist movement against the ZANU-PF 
government, appeared to have the marked effect of crowding out and displacing land 
reform advocacy.  Nevertheless, NGOs ‘began to recognize the primacy of land in the 
mid 1990s and began formulating strategies for intervention as well as contributing to 
policy formulation.’ (CREATE 2002:p.9)   In 1998 an environmental research and 
advocacy NGO, ZERO, spoke about land as ‘a core issue in power relations’ and as ‘at 
the centre of the societal, political and economic relations’ in the country.  Accordingly, 
‘land’ NGOs were expected to be ‘in the forefront in any meaningful debate on 
sustainable development’ in relation to the agrarian political economy (Matowanyika and 
Marongwe 1998:pp.5, 8).  Yet, up until that time (and beyond) NGOs in Zimbabwe had 
by and large ‘neglected’ land reform (Moyo 1999a:p.5).  
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11.1 State Centrism and NGO Marginalization  
 
ZERO unashamedly admitted that NGOs (and civil society more broadly) were ‘largely 
ineffective and too weak’ to push the government to meet its agrarian reform obligations.  
Further, ‘[c]ivil society has … not been able to demand its right to information on the 
land reform process as well as their [sic] right to participate in land policy formulation… 
This all goes against effective people driven land reforms and policies.’ (Matowanyika 
and Marongwe 1998:pp.20, 21)  This ongoing exclusion from national policy processes, 
or the fact that NGOs had ‘generally remained marginalised’ in this regard (Marongwe 
2003b:p.14), has often been explained by NGOs as arising from the centralized top-down 
thrust of the nation-state in post-colonial Zimbabwe.  Hence, they claim that their basic 
participatory ‘right’ (as part of civil society) has been consistently violated.  A NGO 
Consultative Conference on land in 1997 (see below) spoke about ‘a complete lack of 
transparency, corruption and self-interest on the part of the elite at both national and local 
levels’ (Mutepfa et al. 1998a:p.16).  This was particularly the case in relation to land 
allocation in the resettlement process.  The centralized thrust of reform processes, 
according to ZERO, has also ‘nurtured’ the development of land-based conflicts 
(Marongwe 2002:p.16).   
 
The top-heavy implementation of land reforms in Zimbabwe, along with (at times) an 
almost patronizing ‘modernist’ development discourse emanating from the nation-state, 
has been regularly highlighted in the academic literature.  This statist thrust is said to 
dramatically underestimate the capacity and willingness of the rural under-classes to 
actively engage in meaningful agrarian change (Robins 1998, Moyo 1999a).  Moyo, who 
for many years has awkwardly straddled the academic and NGO worlds, further argues 
that the outright exclusion of NGOs by the state in the land process represents a ‘lost 
opportunity’ because the hands-on experience of development NGOs that have been 
‘working with the people’ over extended periods of time has not been tapped and 
incorporated into land policy (Moyo 2000a).  In this context, during the late 1990s ‘land’ 
NGOs in Zimbabwe regularly highlighted the significance of their countervailing 
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influence (against state commandism), and their (supposed) well-known effectiveness in 
enhancing the organizational capacity and policy reach of rural communities in both 
customary and resettlement areas.    
 
During the early years of the LRRP Phase II (from 1997 to 1999), a number of NGOs 
seemed to be involved in a flurry of research and lobbying activities around land reform.  
This advocacy work can be traced back to the appointment in November 1993 of the 
Rukuni Land Commission35 on land tenure, before which many NGOs gave evidence.  Its 
three-volume report was submitted to the government in October 1994 and was finally 
released to the public in August 1995.  The controversial report and the government’s 
response to it, as well as the likelihood of new land legislation on this basis, set off a 
round of concerted advocacy efforts by NGOs.  Thus, the Women and Land Lobby 
Group (WLLG), as a network of local gender NGOs, argued that the appointment of the 
Rukuni Commission ‘heralded the development of more coordinated efforts toward NGO 
consensus building and response to the concerns of women on the land question’ 
(Makombe ed. 2001:p.18).   
 
Numerous seminars, workshops and conferences were held in which intermediary NGOs 
(supported by various donors) played a significant part.  For instance, a group of NGOs, 
including prominent gender organizations such as Women’s Action Group and 
Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau (but also ZimRights), arranged a Women Farmers’ 
Conference in November 1995 that was funded by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), a 
German donor agency.  This conference was designed to make heard the views of 
‘smallholder’ women farmers (seventy-four attended) on the glaring gender-weaknesses 
(or biases) contained in the Rukuni Report (Chenaux-Repond 1996).36  Women NGOs 
also formed a Task Force to lobby government officials to ensure a gender-sensitive land 
bill but ‘little significant progress was made due to the lack of a structure to coordinate 
                                         
35 The full title of the Report is Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems, 
Volumes One, Two and Three, 1994. 
36 Two other workshops/conferences focusing on the Rukuni Report and funded by FES also took place 
around this time, in November 1995 (involving the small-scale Black farmer body the Zimbabwe Farmers 
Union) and in April 1996 (involving State ministries under the auspices of the Ministry of Lands and Water 
Resources). 
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the diversity of interests, a lack of capacity by individual NGOs and general fatigue 
arising from the lengthy nature of the process. … The increasingly proactive role of 
NGOs on land however, had the effect of increasing the government’s willingness to 
involve them in the process.’ (Makombe ed. 2001:p.18)  It is of significance to note that 
the problems identified in this appraisal were organizational weaknesses rather than 
government intransigence. 
 
 
11.2 1997 NGO Consultative Conference 
 
In this context, a wide range of NGOs, including human rights, women and 
environmental organizations, held what was a milestone NGO Consultative Land 
Conference in May 1997 to chart the way forward.  It was hoped that this conference 
would set the basis for ongoing advocacy activities and for a ‘genuine partnership 
between civil society and Government’ (Mutepfa et al. 1998a:p.22) on land reform, as 
well as to ensure through policy initiatives that marginalized groups had access to quality 
and viable land for different livelihood activities.  It was also highlighted at the 
conference that the nation’s vision on land was not clearly articulated or shared, and that 
this significant lacuna hindered the more active engagement of NGOs in land reform.  In 
the late 1990s, various networks of NGOs interested in land reform were being formed, 
such as the ELF-NGO Land Working Group, the Women and Land Lobby Group and 
later CREATE, the latter being funded by international donors through IFAD.37  In a 
sense, then, the real possibilities for inclusive land engagement as contained within the 
state’s LRRP Phase II ‘had the effect of reenergizing NGO efforts toward coalition 
building’ on land reform (Makombe ed. 2001:p.19).  For example, in early 1998 the ELF-
NGO Group emerged in order to provide a formal basis for unified input by NGOs into 
Phase II (then under intensive formulation), and the NGOs involved developed a series of 
important position papers in order to lobby government (Mutepfa and Cohen eds. 2000). 
 
                                         
37 CREATE included over thirty groups, including international NGOs such as Care International and 
ITDG, and local NGOs such as Manicaland Development Association and Silveira House.   
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Preparations for the 1997 Conference give us some insight into NGO thinking and 
strategizing on land reform.  Various workshops on activism were held by NGOs during 
1996, including one financed by Norwegian People’s Aid in June and another by 
MWENGO in September.  ZimRights seemed to be particularly prominent in organizing 
these workshops, and later expressed concern that it was being sidelined during the 
months immediately prior to the conference.  Four main areas of activism were identified 
at the 1996 meetings, namely, the Private Voluntary Organizations Act, the constitution, 
macro-economic policies and land reform.  Land seemed a particularly urgent issue given 
impending land legislation arising from the Rukuni Report.  Thus, out of the workshops 
arose recommendations for NGO activism on land reform, as ‘the land question 
represents a major challenge to civil society in Zimbabwe’.38  This activism would entail 
‘getting those NGOs involved in environmental, civic education and gender-land related 
programmes as representatives of grassroots communities to provide input into Land 
Reform policies’.39  The representative function of these NGOs and their accountability 
to ‘grassroots communities’ was however highly questionable.  
 
Yet, several NGOs soon formed a steering committee, and this committee included key 
indigenous NGOs such as ZERO, ZWRCN, ZimRights and Zimbabwe Women Lawyers’ 
Association. The committee sought ‘to promote a framework and opportunity for the 
widest possible dialogue’40 on land, particularly given that there had been only limited 
public debate by civil society on the Rukuni Report.  At some length, the committee 
debated the need ‘to petition government to postpone the tabling of any new [land] 
legislation to allow for consultation with stakeholders’ but this action was eventually 
considered as ‘counterproductive’41 and was not pursued.  Rather, a conference was 
agreed upon to facilitate dialogue, and this would be a ‘unique’42 opportunity for NGOs 
                                         
38 A Consultative Land Conference Statement by Working Group (draft), sent by fax from ZWRCN to 
ZERO on 23rd May 1997. ZERO LAND FILES. 
39 Undated document entitled ‘Project Proposal for a Workshop on the Land Tenure Commission Report’. 
ZERO LAND FILES. 
40 Letter dated 7th May 1997 from Director of ZERO on behalf of steering committee to possible 
participants of NGO conference. ZERO LAND FILES.  
41 Document dated 11th March 1997 on NGO land conference, submitted by ZERO in collaboration with 
members of the NGO Steering Committee. ZERO LAND FILES. 
42 Ibid. 
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to engage with government and to make concrete and constructive policy 
recommendations on land reform.  Indeed, the Minister of Lands, K. Kangai, in his 
opening speech to the conference, referred to it as a ‘historic workshop’ that would mark 
‘the beginning of a meaningful engagement between our ministry and civil society’.43  
The conference was also expected to help build the capacity of NGOs to vigorously 
analyze land related issues.  There was extensive communication between the organizers 
of the conference as to whether donors should be invited, as many ‘felt having donors 
there might influence discussion.  Also it contradicted the image of self-funded workshop 
which was not being donor-driven.’  Further, if donors were present, ‘the government 
might perceive the conference to be influenced by donors’.44  As it turned out, NGOs had 
the opportunity to engage with donors over a year later and in a different setting. 
 
 
11.3 Donors’ Conference and the Inception Phase 
 
The September 1998 donors’ conference has been described (as late as the year 2002) as 
‘the high point for NGO involvement in the land reform programme’, although even at 
that time (in 1998) NGOs ‘lacked a clear strategy’ for any coordinated involvement in 
agrarian change (CREATE 2002:p.9).  The compromise Agreement reached at the 
conference formed the basis of the two-year Inception Phase of the LRRP Phase II.  From 
November 1998 to March 1999, the Technical Committee of the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development worked out the finer details of the 
Inception Phase.  Sam Moyo, who was at the time chairperson of ZERO, headed this 
government committee (GoZ 1998b).  In April 1999, the Zimbabwean Cabinet formally 
approved this plan of action.  Various NGOs are acknowledged by the technical 
committee as having provided significant input into the drafting of the Inception Phase 
framework, including WLLG, ZERO, ITDG and Care International.  Generally speaking, 
then, a range of NGOs was involved in state-civil society policy dialogues in the late 
1990s, including before, during and after the historic donors’ conference.  Hence, the 
                                         
43 K. Kangai, Speech to be delivered to 1997 Consultative Conference. ZERO LAND FILES. 
44 Minutes of NGO Working Group on Land meeting held on 16 May 1997 at ZimRights offices. ZERO 
LAND FILES. 
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land policy formation process during this period was ‘fairly participatory’ compared to 
previous years, but any significant input was ‘only made by the “organised civil society”, 
mainly NGOs’ (Marongwe 2003b:p.16). 
 
The 1998 Phase II Policy Framework and Project Document, as presented to the donors’ 
conference, emphasized that government would ‘mobilise the existing capacities of 
various NGOs’45 to contribute to the land programme, and that this would include 
encouraging development NGOs to become involved in support activities at resettlement 
scheme level.  These activities would entail extension and training services as well as 
credit and marketing facilities for resettled farmers, possibly provided on a sub-
contractual basis.  NGOs would also be ‘encouraged to facilitate locally based initiatives 
and capacity building in the beneficiary communities’ and to ‘select components of the 
land reform programme they wish to sponsor’.  In the Phase II documentation, NGOs 
were explicitly conceptualized as partners (with government) in land reform, and hence 
their ‘accumulated experience’ in working in (and with) rural communities would be put 
to maximum use.  In other words, NGOs were seen as ‘vital … stakeholders in the land 
reform programme because of their vested interests in economic and development 
activities’.  Phase II categorized NGOs in terms of their main focus of activity, and the 
documents noted how NGOs concerned with poverty eradication and environmental 
conservation would be particularly drawn to the land programme.  Intriguingly, it even 
spoke glowingly about ‘democracy NGOs’, and about how these NGOs ‘may be attracted 
by the transparency in the implementation of the land reform programme’.  
 
The LRRP Phase II (on paper at least) appeared to give NGOs considerable space for 
direct involvement in land reform through what came to be known as non-state 
Complementary Approaches (CAs).  ‘Land’ NGOs (including NGDOs), according to 
CREATE, ‘were expected to try out new approaches in resettlement’ and to ‘facilitate a 
demand-driven process as opposed to the supply-driven one that was being championed 
by the government’ (CREATE 2001:p.9).  These approaches, involving research, 
                                         
45 All quotations in this paragraph are from GoZ (1998a). 
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experimentation and innovation on matters such as agricultural productivity, poverty 
alleviation and environmental stability were intended (from the viewpoint of the 
government of Zimbabwe) to create ‘an enabling environment’ (GoZ 1999) for the 
inclusion of NGOs as facilitators in the land reform and resettlement process.    This 
appeared to be an open and unrestricted invitation to NGOs to have at least an indirect 
impact on land policy formation and implementation.  In fact, according to the Farm 
Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ), an NGO involved on commercial farms, the 
state’s policy represented a major shift away from a largely exclusionary approach 
marked by state centrism and ‘a culture of secrecy’ that had also included a ‘few’, 
‘privileged’ local NGOs aligned to the state (Mutepfa and Cohen eds. 2000:p.17).  
 
Potentially, it thus entailed ‘a change in operational parameters of the government to 
include issues of transparency, accountability and democratic participation’ in land 
reform (Moyo 2000d:p.9).  Yet, as A. Dengu of ITDG noted, this more inclusive mode of 
operation simultaneously increased the complexity of the process, because ‘the levels of 
uncertainty’ deepen ‘as the number of players in the land reform process increase’ 
(Mutepfa and Cohen eds. 2000:p.7).  As highlighted in the previous chapter, this idea 
about complexity is a constant refrain when it comes to NGO involvement in land reform.  
Despite this seeming complexity, NGOs were seen (admittedly often by themselves) as 
being in a particularly privileged position – based on their ‘comparative advantages’ – to 
ensure that the rural under-classes who had historically been excluded from the land 
policy process would finally have their voices heard and acted upon.  
 
Project proposals by NGOs under the initial IP of the Programme were expected to focus 
on, amongst other groups, the landless poor, displaced farm workers and congested 
communal area residents, and these beneficiaries were ‘expected to gain control or be 
empowered through management of resettlement schemes.’ (GoZ 1999)  Intense 
lobbying by NGOs (and by the national agricultural workers’ union GAPWUZ) in the 
late 1990s, including numerous workshops and seminars, is said to be significant in the 
belated incorporation by the Zimbabwean government of farm workers into Phase II 
reform as a distinct category of settler (Moyo et al. 2000b).  NGO performance during 
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the Inception Phase would be monitored and evaluated with regard to effectiveness, 
efficiency and sustainability, or in tangible terms of ‘converting inputs into outputs, 
outcomes into impacts (i.e. results)’ (GoZ 1999).    
 
In addition to NGO involvement in the CAs, the launching of the National Economic 
Consultative Forum’s Land Reform Task Force in 1998 gave NGOs the opportunity to 
provide inputs into land policy on an ongoing consultative and advisory basis.  A further 
initiative to advance the advocacy cause of ‘land’ NGOs was the formation in the late 
1990s by Sam Moyo (at SAPES Trust) of the Zimbabwe Land Reform Research 
Network.  Its purpose was to develop ‘policy-oriented research on land’ and to ‘promote 
the development of a broadly based capacity in Zimbabwe to formulate, analyse, and 
create advocates of land reform policy’ (Moyo 2000d:pp.1, 5).  In so doing, the intention 
was (in the short-term) to provide important policy inputs into key state land institutions 
during the implementation of the IP. 46 
 
 
11.4 NGO Exuberance and Civic Activism  
 
Generally speaking, at this juncture there seemed to be an optimistic mood amongst 
intermediary NGOs, intermittently marked by sobriety and realism, about their role as 
land advocates and about, more specifically, their potential incorporation into the Phase II 
land programme in relation to both policy and practice.  Thus, the director of the Farm 
Orphan Support Trust (FOST) speaks positively about the policy environment in the 
years preceding the accelerated programme, and notes for instance how FOST and other 
NGOs played an important part in ensuring that farm workers were given the right to vote 
in local government elections.47  This optimism is also exemplified in the case of the 
WLLG.  In a moment of exuberant reflection, this NGO argued that its efforts ‘have seen 
the redrafting of the LRRP Resettlement Policy framework and Programme Documents 
                                         
46 See also Annex 3 in LRNSA (2000).  
 
 
47 Interview conducted with L. Walker, Director, FOST, 3rd November 2005. 
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to accept women’s individual rights to land and the inclusion of the principle of 
affirmative action to promote women’s participation.  Gender issues have also been 
included in the draft Land Policy Framework while the issues of women’s land rights 
formed a part of the discussions and inputs into the draft Constitution development 
process.  There is a greater visibility of women and women’s issues in the current land 
reform programme and an acceptance of the role of the WLLG as a key stakeholder.’ 
(Makombe ed. 2001:p.19) 
 
Any substantive attempt to evaluate such a claim is invariably marked with difficulties 
because, as noted earlier, policy formation is a highly complex and convoluted process.  
Yet no doubt there is a ring of empirical truth to its claim.  Certainly, subsequent to its 
formation in March 1998, the WLLG is widely acknowledged as having been a critical 
‘land’ NGO network in Zimbabwe, notably at the donors’ conference.  Like other land 
NGOs it sought to move beyond advocacy to venture into operational activities, including 
training, extension services and revolving loan funds for women farmers.  However, it 
soon had to establish a secretariat, and this led to its programme becoming ‘more 
institutionalized’ with ‘less participation from [NGO] members’ (Makombe ed. 2001:p. 
19).  Clearly, despite the Inception Phase-related exuberance, difficult challenges lay 
ahead for NGOs working on land reform in Zimbabwe and seeking the way forward.  For 
instance, ITDG reiterates that ‘[t]o effectively take up the space and challenges’ of land 
reform implementation during the Inception Phase, ‘the wide array of civil society groups 
need to coordinate their efforts’ (Mutepfa and Cohen eds. 2000:p.13).   
 
As well, NGOs raised very serious questions about institutional and procedural matters 
underlying the Phase II Programme.  In particular, as evidenced in the position papers of 
the ELF-NGO Group, a major concern was with the (seemingly still centralized) state 
institutional setup designed to translate Phase II policy into practice.  Hence, in line with 
the NGO mantra on participatory development, the Working Group emphasized the need 
to further decentralize the implementation authority of the Programme in order to 
maximize the involvement of marginalized rural communities.  This ongoing fixation 
with institutions and systems on the part of NGOs brings to the fore the ‘proceduralist 
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thrust’ of NGO advocacy action (Moyo 2004:p.122) on land reform during this period.  
This emphasis on procedural and governance issues was often at the expense of (or at 
least took priority over) a broader concern with redistributive and equity issues.   
 
As a result, NGOs offered regular criticisms of the state-centrist land acquisition 
approach (announced in 1997) without raising such fervent doubts about the prevailing 
market-led reform of the first fifteen years of independence.  As Moyo asserts (rather 
than demonstrates), soon after the emergence of land occupations in the year 2000, this 
meant that NGOs in Zimbabwe ‘never prioritised the land reform agenda’ accept as 
advocates of market-based reforms and, in this regard, international aid linkages 
‘militated against’ the propagation of ‘radical land reform’ by NGOs (Moyo 2001:p. 
313).  If this was indeed the case, then such linkages need to be clearly spelt out, as this 
would assist in ‘capturing’ the genesis of NGO practices on land reform.  In fact, to the 
contrary, the private inter-organizational correspondence leading up to the 1997 
Conference support the argument that indigenous NGOs sought a degree of autonomy 
from donor agendas, if only for tactical reasons. 
 
By the beginning of 2000 over twenty NGOs had been accredited by the Zimbabwean 
state for various forms and levels of involvement in resettlement projects in terms of the 
Inception Phase.  For instance, ZERO was accredited to undertake research on land-based 
resources.  However, external funding and agricultural land for the CAs were not 
forthcoming, and the IP never got off the ground.  Moyo offers a broad explanation for 
the eventual collapse of the entire Inception Phase of LRRP Phase II in the year 2000, 
and this focuses on a range of misguided actions by key stakeholders.  Notably, he argues 
that NGOs and donors misread the prevailing political dynamics, and ‘believed wrongly’ 
that the land occupation movement ‘was merely a political and partisan ploy’ by the 
government to maintain its grip on power ‘rather than a socially grounded demand’ that 
ZANU-PF ‘was responding to (albeit also for its political benefit).’  The ‘expectation’ of 
NGOs ‘was that the individual political survival of Mugabe and of Zanu-PF at the 
elections would obviate pressures for land reform.  This detracted attention [of NGOs] 
from land reform to the electoral contests of [June] 2000.  …The few NGOs that had 
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been interested in land reform [before 2000] … became directly entangled in the broader 
political struggles for constitutional reform and elections, as a means of eventually 
addressing land reform, rather than engage on actual land redistribution project 
development and financing.’ (Moyo 2000e:pp.4, 5)  Particularly in the face of only 
minimal funding forthcoming from donors in the late 1990s (despite donors’ conference 
commitments to the contrary), ‘land’ NGOs did not involve themselves in any 
meaningful land projects under the Phase II Programme. 
 
Rather, as part of the broader civic movement then emerging, many (notably urban) 
advocacy NGOs pursued an anti-authoritarian civic nationalism and focused more on 
human rights and governance than on redistributive agrarian reform.  In so doing, they 
consciously aligned themselves with the processes leading to the formation of the 
opposition party, the MDC.  This included a number of NGOs, such as ZimRights and 
ZWRCN, which had been particularly active in the previous rounds of advocacy work on 
land reform, and which had thereby sought to engage critically with the state rather than 
to directly confront it.  For instance, even a cursory analysis of the ZWRCN’s magazine 
Woman Plus during the years 1999 and 2000 almost leads to the conclusion that it 
became just another mouthpiece for civic nationalism and the MDC (ZWRCN 1999, 
2000).  This civic activism was viewed by the central state as unpatriotic and it led to 
angry suspicion and mistrust of the broader NGO ‘sector’.   
 
At a Civil Society Reflection meeting held in December 2004, some participants 
suggested that during the late 1990s NGOs were ‘confrontational’ and that perhaps the 
state was justifiably ‘paranoid’ about NGOs given their role in the formation of the NCA 
and MDC.48  Yet, many radical analysts (for example Hammar et al. eds. 2003) 
conceptualize the activism of urban civil society during the late 1990s as epitomizing the 
emergence of a stronger, more autonomous and increasingly vibrant civil society, and as 
undermining the domination of civic formations by the nation-state.  Indeed, it is likely 
for this reason that the state sought to rein in the urban civic movement.  
                                         
48 Notes from End of Year Civil Society Reflection, MWENGO, Jamieson Hotel, Harare, 16th December 
2004. 
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11.5 Accelerated Reform and NGO Responses 
 
The land re-occupation movement (the Third Chimurenga) that arose in early 2000 
dramatically altered the political and agrarian terrain in Zimbabwe and this led to a 
pronounced disabling environment for those NGOs seeking to lobby government on land 
reform.  Simultaneously, the land movement caught NGOs totally unaware and off-guard, 
and they were grossly ill prepared for its devastating implications and impact.  They 
literally found themselves in ‘disarray’  (ZERO 2000:p.22).  Even those ‘land’ NGOs that 
just a year before (in early 1999) had shown an exuberance and robustness were now less 
sanguine.  Thus, the WLLG argued that the accelerated programme had made the issue of 
women’s land rights a ‘marginal issue’ (Makombe ed. 2001:p.19).   
 
For all intents and purposes, it seemed that once again NGOs found themselves totally 
peripheral to land policy formation and implementation.  In fact, especially during the 
early stages of the accelerated reform initiative, NGOs painted the occupations as 
vigorously driven by an authoritarian state. Undoubtedly, this portrait was designed to 
draw attention to the undemocratic, violent and non-transparent procedural threads 
running through the programme.  Further, the failure to provide proper pre-settlement 
infrastructure and marketing and support services on the resettled farms also risked 
Zimbabwe ‘turning itself into a nation of peasants’ (CREATE 2002:p.14).  Also, 
international donors rejected squarely the accelerated land programme, and thus 
considerable volumes of both multilateral and bilateral aid were withheld or withdrawn 
from Zimbabwe because of the land occupations and the suspension of the rule of law.    
 
Initially, a group of concerned NGOs made a desperate appeal, and urged the government 
to resettle people in a planned and orderly procedure, and without losing sight of the 
broader considerations as stated in the Inception Phase and its CAs.  In August 2000, 
NGOs and civic groups presented a proposal entitled Practical Action to End the 
Impasse, and this was to be based on twelve highly visible pilot resettlement projects in 
three provinces to be funded by government, the CFU, bilateral donors and NGOs.  These 
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projects were to include farm workers and communal villagers, to have sufficient pre-
settlement infra-structural development, and to ensure a structured coordinating role for 
established local state administrations rather than for ad hoc militarized bodies emerging 
on the occupied farms.  However, the projects never materialized, and the policy space 
for NGO involvement in land reform had effectively collapsed.  As CREATE noted: ‘The 
NGO community in the country … [was] … caught in between as donors withheld 
funding for the land reform exercise while government narrowed the space for NGO 
involvement in land reform.’ (CREATE 2002:pp.2-3, my emphasis)  Indeed, the land 
movement had undermined the Land Programme Phase II as then formulated and 
constituted, and it was later revised in 2001 and then implemented in a pronounced state-
centric manner. 
 
Subsequent diplomatic efforts, but particularly the signing of the Abuja Agreement in 
September 2001 by the British and Zimbabwean governments, seemed to have the 
potential to break the impasse and to once again allow for the possibilities of CAs.  The 
Agreement stressed that the land reform programme should be implemented within the 
laws and constitution of Zimbabwe and it made provision for 300,000 hectares 
specifically for NGO involvement in land redistribution.  Various NGOs along with the 
national NGO association, NANGO, held a consensus-building workshop in November 
2001 to see how they could ‘exploit opportunities’ opened up by the Abuja Agreement, to 
‘once again re-engage the government in the whole land reform process’, and thereby to 
contribute to the implementation of the Agreement (CREATE 2001:pp.6, 10).   
 
At the time, CREATE suggested various forms of NGO involvement in land reform, 
including encouraging donor funding, providing emergency and relief infrastructure on 
settled farms, strengthening the organizational capacities of Rural District Councils 
(RDCs) and resettled communities, and engaging in proactive land and tenure research. 
CREATE reiterated that NGOs ‘possess’ capacities and resources that are ‘value adding’ 
to processes of rural change (CREATE 2002:p.3).  This involvement would however be 
conditional on the provision of an enabling environment by government and once again 
recognizing NGOs as partners in the agrarian reform process.  The NGO workshop also 
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sought to rectify a serious weakness within the NGO community by developing a NGO 
position paper on the land question so that a common stance, always lacking in the past, 
could be presented in its lobbying efforts internationally and locally.   
 
However, the Abuja Agreement was never implemented.  At the 2001 workshop, 
CREATE had indicated that if the Zimbabwean government did not adhere to the 
Agreement, then CREATE ‘will be unable to make any significant further contributions 
to land reform in Zimbabwe’  (CREATE 2001:p.12).  The ITDG, a research and 
development NGO, noted that because of the failure to implement the Agreement, ‘[a]t 
the moment there is no alignment’ between state and civil society on the matter of land 
reform, and NGOs needed to find ways and means of collaborating more fruitfully with 
the state (CREATE 2001:p.15).  Also, given the centrality of land reform in sustainable 
development, in August 2002 the Zimbabwean Coalition on Debt and Development as 
part of the alternative globalization movement called for an All-Stakeholder Land 
Commission ‘to ensure that there is no future inequality based on land ownership’ 
(ZIMCODD 2002; Manyanya 2003:p.102).  At that time, however, NGOs continued to 
be ‘on the fringes’ of land reform in Zimbabwe because (in part) they did not have ‘a 
clear strategy on how they could effectively participate’ in the reform process  (CREATE 
2002:p.1).  Yet, by then, ‘land’ NGOs had been left with little choice but to accept what 
ZERO describes as the ‘irreversibility’ of the accelerated resettlement programme despite 
its initial illegalities and glaring procedural weaknesses.  Thus, according to ZERO, any 
meaningful engagement by NGOs on land reform must be done largely on the state’s 
terms and must recognize that the failure of the current land programme ‘will not benefit 
anyone’ (Marongwe 2002:p.90).  
 
 
11.6 Beyond Advocacy? 
 
Research-orientated ‘land’ NGOs such as ZERO, ZWRCN and Women and Land in 
Zimbabwe (formerly WLLG) have a central function in advocacy on land reform and that 
is probably what they do best.  But, increasingly, they have come to realize that the 
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esoteric quality of research information often makes it difficult for land advocacy NGOs 
to bridge the social gap between themselves and the rural underclasses that they purport 
to represent.  Thus, in October 2003, the director of ZWRCN noted that ‘information is 
power but it is also intellectual’, and that NGOs ‘involved in the dissemination of 
information are having a hard time because people are overwhelmed by poverty’.49   
Despite noble intentions, they have limited prospects and resources for engaging rural 
communities in tangible projects.  But certainly there is a deep appreciation of the need to 
link short-term gain to long-term participatory change, as evidenced by the ongoing 
propagation of CBNRM systems in the case of ZERO.  In this regard, Kanji et al. (2002) 
note that the ‘land’ NGOs they studied all stressed the ‘need to engage directly with 
communities and with their immediate concerns and needs if they are to gain legitimacy 
for advocacy’  (Kanji et al. 2002:p.13). 
 
Urban ‘governance’ NGOs, including ZimRights, have at times starkly criticized this 
position.  These NGOs have argued that stressing short-term bread-and-butter needs at 
the (seeming) expense of broader democratic questions only serves to de-politicize and 
sidetrack matters.  For instance, a few years ago mass action by the NCA such as stay-
away calls and public demonstrations received only limited public support.  But the NCA 
disputed what it calls ‘false analysts’ who said that Zimbabweans ‘in the face of biting 
economic hardships such as food shortages and an unaffordably high costs [sic] of living, 
are only concerned about “how to survive” and have no time for issues of governance.’ 
(NCA 2003:p.3)  As will be noted in the next chapter, rural NGDOs have shifted a 
considerable portion of their programmatic work from development to short-term relief in 
the context of a crisis of rural livelihoods. 
 
The point is that both short-term material needs and longer-term democratic change 
(including agrarian reform) could be (potentially) simultaneously addressed in line with 
Fowler’s (1993) onionskin depiction of NGO work, but the specific emphasis and 
combination is open to historical variation.  In discussing anti-systemic organizations in 
the modern world, though, Wallerstein (2002) seeks to highlight the strategy and tactics 
                                         
49 Interview conducted with Director of ZWRCN, Harare, 15th October 2003. 
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of what he calls ‘short-term defensive action’: ‘The world’s populations live in the 
present, and their immediate needs have to be addressed.  Any movement that neglects 
them is bound to lose the widespread passive support that is essential for its long-term 
success.  But the motive and justification for defensive action should not be that of 
remedying a failing system but rather of preventing its negative effects from getting 
worse in the short run.  This is quite different psychologically and politically.’  
(Wallerstein 2002:p.35) 
 
 
11.7 Advocacy NGOs: Tensions and Complexities 
 
This chapter has highlighted the many tensions and complexities that characterized the 
efforts by advocacy NGOs to engage in land policy formation in Zimbabwe from 1995 
onwards.  The late 1990s showed signs of an inclusive policy approach developing.  Yet, 
the government was sending out contradictory signals, and there was significant tension 
and animosity between the Zimbabwean government and global financiers of land 
reform.  Accelerated reform however put a sudden halt to this process of incorporation.  
Further, constant demands by NGOs for inclusion were offset by concerns about the 
deepening ‘uncertainty’ that arises from participatory and hence more complicated modes 
of operation.  This concern relates in part to the many organizational weaknesses that the 
NGOs at that time already displayed.   
 
These weaknesses though were not simply (‘external’) incapacities revolving around the 
‘dos and don’ts’ of advocacy and the practicalities of engaging in lobbying processes.  
There were also more fundamental questions about (‘internal’) systems and procedures 
that would sustain these NGOs as organizational forms over the necessary long haul 
without experiencing ‘fatigue’.  At most times, these advocacy NGOs were small 
indigenous NGOs with tremendous dedication and zeal but with limited organizational 
history and capacity.  They relied on a small core of permanent staff, and often (as during 
the preparation for the 1997 Consultative Conference) personality quirks and 
organizational turf got in the way of more sustained inter-NGO cooperation.  The fact 
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that they were able to hold this conference is testimony to their commitment and 
perseverance.   
 
Eventually, accelerated reform dramatically brought out what was already in many ways 
implicit in the social field of these NGOs, namely, that they were caught in a web of 
intrigue that had been jointly woven by global donors and the Zimbabwean government 
over a number of years.  The NGOs distanced themselves from both, and thus they were 
not in either (or any) camp.  They were, in a sense, seeking to balance their 
accountabilities and thereby became ‘caught in the crossfire’.  Their world of advocacy 
was embedded in this tension between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, and their work was a 
vivid expression of it.  Yet, ultimately, the balancing act they performed was made 
simpler by the existence of a greater distance that was forged if only unintentionally.  
This was the distance between the intermediary NGOs and the rural under-classes.  Their 
organizational practices did not necessitate the great uncertainties that would arise from 
trying to incorporate these under-classes into the land advocacy process.  This had the 
effect of simplifying and stabilizing the world of ‘land’ advocacy NGOs. 
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Chapter 12 
‘Land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe: Development and Change 
 
 
Zimbabwe has always had a large number of NGDOs that could be counted as land 
NGOs.  In 1991, twenty-five NGOs were said to be ‘involved in agricultural activities’, 
including international NGOs like World Vision and Plan International and indigenous 
NGOs such as Silveria House (Wellard and Mema eds. 1991).  Moyo (2000b:p.55) also 
noted for the mid-1990s ‘a high concentration [nearly one-third] of NGO activity in the 
areas of agricultural and rural development’, including income-generating projects, dam 
construction and provision of agricultural inputs.  During the latter half of the 1990s (and 
hence before accelerated reform) rural development NGOs (both international and 
indigenous) continued to ply their trade – so to speak – in the main tenure regimes in 
rural Zimbabwe, namely, communal lands, ‘old’ resettlement areas and White-owned 
commercial farms.  Whether such interventions were functional to the reproduction of 
global capitalism is not the subject of this inquiry.  Rather, this thesis aims to 
conceptualize and understand ‘land’ NGOs as organizational forms that are subject to 
tension and ambivalence.  In highlighting themes relevant to this aim, the chapter focuses 
on ‘land’ NGOs involved in rural development in the turbulent transition from the pre-
accelerated reform period to the accelerated period.   
 
 
12.1 Pre-Accelerated Reform Continuities 
 
Much of the operational practices of NGDOs in the late 1990s were a clear continuation 
of what they had done almost habitually in previous years (Chapter Ten), although now 
in the context of a deepening political and economic crisis, and in many cases with more 
tenuous donor funding.  There was also a (relatively speaking) heightening role in land 
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policy formation processes in the years immediately preceding the accelerated period, but 
this was still secondary and intermittent.  As in the past, NGOs were far more active at 
the operational end of agrarian reform, where many NGO theorists and practitioners 
would argue they rightly belong.  By necessity, their organizational and development 
practices continued to entail obtrusive interventions in intricate agrarian processes 
throughout rural Zimbabwean society.  Further, the rural practices of NGDOs were 
largely responsive in their character.  In rural field settings, NGOs haphazardly filled 
development gaps left by an increasingly emasculated nation-state or simply 
complemented meagre government services.  CREATE thus waxes eloquently with 
reference to the (‘old’) resettlement areas established in the 1980s:  ‘NGOs have … 
proved to be extremely versatile and innovative in service delivery.  Their ability to 
inteface [sic] directly with communities places them at a distinct advantage over the 
centralized structures under which the government operates.’ (CREATE 2002:pp.10-11)  
 
This argument suggests that it might be organizationally prudent for NGOs to focus pure 
and simple on what they do best, namely, to meet the basic needs of the rural under-
classes by for example providing education, health and water facilities.  ITDG also sees 
this kind of basic intervention as tactically astute because ‘government was less 
suspicious when NGOs work in such areas’ compared for example to advocacy-cum-
political work (CREATE 2001:p.16).  These claims (by NGOs themselves) are highly 
suggestive, because in different ways they indicate that NGOs ought to refrain from 
forcefully engaging in the bumpy terrain of land advocacy and reform that was addressed 
in Chapter Eleven.  As discussed below, this terrain also seems to be found operationally 
within the ‘new’ (accelerated reform) resettlement areas. 
 
These development (or operational) NGOs, although involved in ad hoc networking, 
largely worked independently of each other in different rural areas and they employed 
diverse and sometimes conflicting development strategies.  For instance, a long-
established indigenous NGO called the Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau employed (during 
the late 1990s) what it considers to be an innovative integrated rural strategy called the 
Homestead Development Programme that seeks in particular to empower women in 
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participatory planning processes, capacity building schemes and household livelihood 
strategies (ZWB n.d.).  And ORAP, working with a membership base in the rural areas of 
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces, adopted what it claims to be a unique 
participatory and decentralized ‘village movement’ development programme (Jamela 
1990, Sibanda 2002).  No matter though what form their development strategies and 
programmes took, all NGOs prioritized community participation as the crux of 
sustainable rural development.  To a large extent, the Zimbabwean government perceived 
these NGOs as performing an important complementary function in the countryside, 
reaching marginal rural communities that state agencies might otherwise not reach but 
also providing at times incremental learning models that the state could possibly replicate 
on a larger rural scale.  Also, despite ongoing tensions with the central state, all NGDOs 
had established close relationships with state functionaries at both provincial and district 
levels.  However, all this changed with the emergence of the land movement. 
 
 
12.2 Accelerated Reform and Organizational Disruptions 
 
The land movement (starting in the year 2000) had a ‘quite dramatic’50 impact on the 
world and work of rural development NGOs.  Most of these NGOs speak of their 
activities under all land tenure systems as being heavily disrupted by the happenings set 
in motion by the ‘occupations’.  In this regard, Palmer argued in 2002 that ‘[m]ost NGOs 
had been slow to respond strategically’ to the events of 2000 and beyond, and they ‘were 
having to spend all their time trying to catch up.’ (Palmer 2002:p.6)  Many development 
projects were suspended or put on hold particularly during the first three years of the 
Third Chimurenga, and the emphasis in practice became humanitarian relief rather than 
sustainable development.  Particularly problematic has been the work of those NGOs 
operating on White-owned commercial farms, one of which (FOST) is discussed in the 
next chapter as a case study.  Thus, the Kunzwana Women’s Association (KWA), which 
was formed in 1995, speaks about having to ‘remobilize’ its programme after the sheer 
havoc caused by accelerated land reform.  This NGO continues to seek access to its 
                                         
50 Interview with Walker, FOST. 
  263 
traditional ‘target’ group (i.e. farm workers) who now reside on resettled A1 or A2 farms 
(or on the fringes of these farms) despite the practical difficulties this entails, as ‘we 
cannot just abandon them’.51  But accelerated reform has also engendered serious 
rethinking and strategizing on the part of other NGOs.      
 
Plan International, for instance, works in communal lands and seeks through its formal 
rural strategic plan ‘to strengthen the long-term capability of all community members to 
manage matters that affect the well-being of children.’  It is engaged in food security and 
poverty alleviation activities involving crop and livestock production as well as primary 
health care.  In so doing, it makes use of local management committees comprised of 
‘beneficiaries’.  However, the uncertain political and economic environment, notably the 
radical land reform programme, has made it ‘not possible’ to plan agricultural 
interventions ‘in precise terms’.  Hence, ‘focus has shifted to meet immediate food needs’ 
(Plan 2002:p.10).  In recent years, Save the Children (Norway) has also engaged in 
considerable internal reflection and evaluation as it seeks to establish a strategic 
management approach to maintain its rural relevance.  While it speaks of ‘capacity 
building of local structures and organisations’ as a ‘strategic methodology’, it has now 
‘prioritised the need for flexible plans and relevant responses to the emergency, without 
necessarily sidelining the development plans that have lasting impact on children’s lives.’ 
(STC 2002:pp.3, 8)  
 
In fact, there has been an array of international NGOs such as World Vision and Christian 
Care that became part of the UN World Food Programme effort in Zimbabwe and hence 
they were heavily involved in the distribution of emergency food aid.  This often 
involved sub-contracting to indigenous NGOs.  The humanitarian crisis in the country, in 
no small proportion blamed by NGOs on accelerated reform, thus moved NGOs into 
emergency gear with a pronounced welfare and relief element in their post-1999 
operations (PRF 2002).  The mammoth size of the relief exercise severely taxed the 
organizational capacity and technical expertise of NGOs, notably the indigenous NGOs.   
                                         
51 Interviews conducted with Mrs. Mutara, Kunzwana Women’s Association, 29th July and 10th November 
2005. 
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12.3 Communal Lands and ‘Old’ Resettlement Areas 
  
Despite the adverse economic and political climate, NGOs continue to undertake rural 
development work.  Detailing the activities of World Vision, the Lutheran Development 
Service and ITDG enable us to identify certain themes and problems. World Vision 
operates in all provinces in Zimbabwe, mainly in communal lands but at times in ‘old’ 
resettlement areas.  Its mission statement refers to the importance of ‘transformational 
development’ and the ‘promotion of justice’.  It is involved in large-scale, but not 
necessarily fully integrated, rural development programmes designed to benefit 
marginalized communities with a specific focus on children.  Its Area Development 
Programmes (ADPs) include water and sanitation, dam construction and irrigation, 
housing, health, agricultural production, education and HIV/AIDS.  To enhance food 
security it is implementing an agricultural recovery programme to benefit over 130,000 
communal farmers, and it also has an agricultural input credit scheme and a micro-
financing facility for marginalized rural entrepreneurs.   
 
It seeks to build the organizational capacity of rural communities and speaks about how 
its ADPs make ‘remarkable achievements in terms of empowering communities’ (World 
Vision 2002a:p.5).  In fact, the communities with which it works are said to be the 
‘partners’ of World Vision in sustainable development.   It also provides skills training on 
such matters as borehole maintenance, agro-forestry and livestock disease control and, 
where appropriate, communities provide labour inputs into specific projects.  
Beneficiaries, at least at the individual level, ‘are selected according to their degree of 
marginalisation’ (World Vision 2000a:p.4).  World Vision works very closely with line 
ministries and with other NGOs that may offer more specialized technical services.  After 
normally a two-year preparatory phase, an ADP functions for a period of up to fifteen 
years and is then handed over to local management structures that are meant to become 
development associations.  As its director says: ‘Drilling of boreholes and developing the 
community’s knowledge on better cropping methods remain sound interventions but 
more critical is working with communities to find ways of continuing to enjoy those 
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services long after the non-governmental organisation has moved out of their 
community.’ (World Vision 2000b:p.2) 
 
World Vision has a well-established research and evaluation unit engaged in feasibility 
studies and baseline surveys, and this includes participatory rural appraisals and 
appreciative inquiry processes designed to identify community needs and aspirations.  
The unit also does programme proposals to secure additional funding as well as 
programme designs, plans and evaluations.  It is claimed that ‘representatives of the 
community and other stakeholders in the community’ play ‘a critical role in the 
development of the design documents.’ (World Vision 2001:p.8)  This unit does mid-
term evaluations of ADPs and end-of-programme assessments to determine the potential 
for sustainability.  In the four evaluations conducted during the year 2002 it was 
concluded that ‘significant achievements’ were made, despite the lack though of reliable 
baseline details for the communities concerned (World Vision 2002a:p.10).  World 
Vision has identified what it calls ‘transformation development indicators’ to show 
effects and impacts, and these include such matters as child nutrition, community 
participation and household resilience.   
 
Like other rural development NGOs, World Vision has come under scrutiny and 
suspicion by the central state for supposed involvement in rural politics during 
parliamentary and presidential election periods.  In December 2001, the manager of 
Hurungwe ADP in the far north of the country spoke about his organization’s operational 
transparency and declared: ‘World Vision is a Christian development organisation.  We 
have no other agenda but to work with the communities.’ (World Vision 2002b:p.10)  
The funding of World Vision is largely from child sponsorships emanating from outside 
the country plus multilateral donor organizations.  Yet, it also has an active local resource 
mobilization unit that secures donations in cash and kind as well as partners from the 
corporate sector within the country.  In 2002, only three percent of total funding was 
from Zimbabwe but there has been ‘an encouraging response from the local business 
sector’ (World Vision 2002c:p.7). 
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The Lutheran Development Service (LDS) operates in drought prone and marginal areas 
in southern districts of the country, as four of its programmes elsewhere were suddenly 
terminated in 1998.  It works amongst the very poor in terms of national wealth ranking 
criteria, and it uses a number of characteristics such as lack of economic activities and 
perennial food shortages to identify such rural communities.   It currently operates within 
the confines of a five-year country strategy plan that ends in 2006 and that is based on an 
external evaluation conducted in 2001.  This external evaluation had no community 
involvement.  The main programme of LDS is the inter-disciplinary Integrated Rural 
Development Project (IRDP) revolving around a lofty vision that includes ‘equity and 
social justice in the community through empowerment’.  Thus, ‘[c]ommunity 
participation is the central principle for LDS involvement in development. We believed 
that communities had the capacity to develop themselves and outside intervention should 
only come to assist the communities in achieving their desired objectives.  The 
organization saw itself only as a catalyst to the development process of an area with the 
community fully involved.’ (LDS 2002:p.6) 
 
LDS works in specific rural districts for extended periods of time and will only move to 
new wards when existing IRDP communities are assessed as being ‘sustainably 
empowered’ (LDS 2001:p.2).  Community awareness and motivation workshops and 
meetings, often with line ministry involvement, are conducted as part of development 
education and to ensure long-term community ownership of projects.  The IRDPs hence 
focus on sustainable development entailing ‘a participatory approach that is 
environmentally aware, gender sensitive, culturally sensitive and technologically 
appropriate.’ (LDS 2001:p.18)  Currently, this involves rural water supplies such as 
dams, boreholes, irrigation and brick water tanks; food security such as drought tolerant 
crops and granaries; income-generating projects and, on a significant level, savings and 
credit schemes.  Income-generating activities currently pose a serious problem because of 
the economic climate, notably the unavailability and cost of basic inputs.  Likewise, its 
seed programme has faced difficulties because of the scarcity of maize and sorghum seed.  
Further, LDS is also extensively involved in environmental rehabilitation focusing on 
overgrazing and tree cutting and this normally involves food-for-work projects.  Local 
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community labour is also used in, for instance, dam construction but community turn out 
has been recently ‘affected by the drought with people concentrating on looking for food’ 
(LDS 2002:p.13).  Like most other NGOs in rural Zimbabwe, it is mainstreaming 
HIV/AIDS into its field operations.  The external evaluation noted that cost-benefit 
analyses of projects and needs assessments are not properly implemented if done at all.   
 
Overall, though, the external evaluation says the LDS programme has been ‘implemented 
well and has had positive contributions to marginalized people’s lives’ (LDS 2001:p.15).  
As well, LDS itself speaks of ‘satisfactory results’ in 2002 (LDS 2002:p.4).  Most 
funding comes from outside the country, largely from church organizations. LDS 
appreciates though the importance of elaborating a comprehensive funding strategy, 
including a local bias, but notes that high quality reporting would be a critical tool for 
this.  Because of the hyperinflationary environment, budget control and monitoring have 
become exceedingly difficult.   The political impasse in the country, with pronounced 
community polarization, is seen as a ‘serious threat to LDS’ as it becomes ‘much more 
difficult to organize meetings among communities and to make villagers participate in 
developmental activities.’ (LDS 2001:p.6)  Hence, ‘[f]ear for political repression keep 
people from actively taking part in public discussions and activities’ (LDS 2001:p.10).  
LDS highlights the general disregard for the rule of law in the context of accelerated land 
reform, and the country strategy plan stresses the importance of advocacy on human 
rights and on development policy directly pertinent to its ‘targeted’ communities.   
 
ITDG is a clear example of a development NGO that combines research and lobbying 
with on-hands practical development initiatives.  It receives extensive external funding 
from a wide variety of multilateral and bilateral donors including the European 
Commission and German Agro Action.  This means that its financial and accounting 
systems have to be designed to ‘meet the needs of different audiences’ (ITDF n.d.:p.5).  It 
speaks though about donor fatigue and the downsizing and relocation of some major 
traditional funding agencies to other countries within the southern African region.  
Besides donors, ITDG has recently formed a development consultancy unit that generates 
revenue but in 2002 this formed less than ten per cent of income.  Its vision speaks about 
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a world free of poverty and injustice and it claims that ‘technology is key to 
reducing/eradicating poverty’ in rural communities and that successful development 
interventions need to be scaled up and implemented elsewhere in the countryside through 
‘user friendly knowledge sharing platforms’ (ITDG n.d.:pp.1, 7).  Its operational 
activities in rural Zimbabwe are very diverse and include the rehabilitation of rural water 
points, dairy groups, water harvesting and conservation, bee keeping and honey 
marketing, and mushroom and guar bean production.   
 
ITDG argues that ‘people living in poverty drive their own development’, and it seeks to 
build ‘on local skills and knowledge’ and to fully incorporate local communities in the 
various strategic planning stages of a project in order to generate appropriate rural 
livelihood strategies and solutions.  Thus, it works with rural communities ‘to strengthen 
their institutional and technological capacities using demand driven participatory 
approaches’ (ITDG 2002:pp.3, 10).  It emphasizes community-based management of 
projects and trains village community workers to ensure a sustainable technological and 
administrative maintenance programme once the project is complete.  Links with service-
providers, area committees and skills associations with long-term mandates in the rural 
area are also forged to enhance sustainability.  In its annual reports, ITDG stresses the 
visible impacts of its projects that become the envy of surrounding communities, as well 
as how local communities have come to own the development intervention.  At times, 
though, it has been difficult to work with local communities because of personal interests 
overriding group interests.  ITDG also worries about the ‘worsening diplomatic relations’ 
within the country and this involves a ‘growing stakeholder concern in the development 
arena including our key partners’ (ITDG 2003).  It notes as well that in the face of famine 
there has been ‘the prioritisation of food distribution over main stream development 
activities’ by donors (ITDG 2002:p.22). 
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12.4 Ex-Commercial Farms and ‘New’ Resettlement Schemes 
 
Beyond the ‘old’ resettlement and communal areas, NGOs are also active on ex-large-
scale commercial farms.  These include KWA, FOST, DAPP-Zimbabwe and the Farm 
Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ).  FCTZ took over the programmes of Save the 
Children (UK) and is involved in numerous community development projects on 
commercial farms.  These projects include health, Blair latrines, education, HIV/AIDS 
and well sinking.  FCTZ relies heavily on external donors including Save the Children 
and NOVIB.  According to FCTZ, its interventions are designed to empower farm worker 
communities and, for this purpose, it has an Empowerment of Farm Workers project and 
has helped to establish (under the auspices of RDCs) village and ward development 
committees on numerous farms.  However, because of the Third Chimurenga 
disturbances, many of these structures have fallen away.  In general, according to its 
board chairperson, the recent insecurity and uncertainty on the farms due to farm 
invasions and national elections ‘made it difficult for us to continue with normal field 
operations… As a result we had to scale down certain activities… [I]t became difficult 
and perhaps unrealistic to discuss and convince farm owners on the need for investment 
in social developments on their properties.  As an organisation we are concerned that the 
hard won gains achieved … may be compromised as a result of what has gone on.’ 
(FCTZ 2001a:p.6) These factors, as well as the general economic hardships, have altered 
the terrain of FCTZ’s operations in that, at least temporarily, the organization has shelved 
certain planned and budgeted activities.   
 
FCTZ sees a change in the needs of commercial farm workers, mainly from long-term 
development to short-term relief needs such as food and shelter.  In a limited study of 
farm workers in early 2001, FCTZ expressed concern about the plight of ex-farm workers 
and their families.  As indicated by the study, ‘no examples were found of farm workers 
being able to compensate in any substantial way for lost earnings from agricultural 
work… The burden of coping with lost income, therefore, falls on expenditure.’ (FCTZ 
2001b:pp.19-20)  According to FCTZ, this necessitates flexibility and creativity on its 
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part in order to remain relevant.  For instance, during 2002 the FCTZ made efforts to 
‘develop a humanitarian response programme, particularly around the provision of food 
and other material support to vulnerable children and adults in former commercial 
farming areas.’ (FCTZ 2002:p.3)  There is now considerable input into a child 
supplementary feeding programme, a food aid programme and emergency work amongst 
farm families in informal settlements.  As well, the deteriorating economic climate made 
it difficult for FCTZ to retain staff.  Despite the turbulent times, FCTZ has been able to 
maintain relatively cordial relations with provincial officials and extension officers in line 
ministries and continues to work closely with RDCs.  Recently, in part because of the 
downswing in field operations, a significant amount of time has been spent on staff 
development, including on participatory rural appraisal methodology, team building, and 
monitoring and evaluation.     
 
In reviewing the work of NGOs involved on commercial farms, Moyo et al. (2000b) 
argued in the year 2000 that these NGOs ‘lacked pro-active and holistic strategies to 
resolve the problems facing farm workers, focussing instead on narrowly defined social 
welfare approaches, which seek to “band-aid” problems rather than promote structural 
change.’ (Moyo et al. 2000b:p.188)  Considering that welfare provision is ‘an important 
lever in the power relations’ (Moyo et al. 2000b:p.193) on commercial farms, it could be 
argued that the interventions of NGOs simply reproduced an oppressive form of 
‘domestic government’ (Rutherford 2001).  By and large, NGOs took for granted the 
sanctity of private farm property and they never lobbied for radical changes such as land 
expropriation.   
 
These NGOs however have become increasingly involved in advocating for the land (and 
political) rights of agricultural workers.  During the land occupations, countless farm 
workers lost their source of livelihood and their place of abode, yet they were not 
properly incorporated into the land redistribution exercise.  For instance, FCTZ argued 
that accelerated reform ‘does not adequately cater for the interest of farm workers’ with 
less than two per cent of programme beneficiaries being farm worker families (FCTZ 
2001a:p.15).  NGOs active on commercial farms, in part because of the history and 
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personnel of these bodies, have sometimes been seen in official circles as protecting (if 
only by default) the interests of White commercial farmers.  Save the Children Fund-UK 
was a catalyst for intensified NGO involvement on commercial farms in the late 1990s, 
and in 2000 it published From Bus Stop to Farm Village that details the history of its 
farm programme.  The wife of a MDC Member of Parliament authored this public 
document and, as a result, further production has ceased.52   For these and other reasons, 
government has often seen such NGOs as part of an anti-land lobby (Moyo et al. 2000b).   
 
DAPP-Zimbabwe is an indigenous NGO that is linked to HUMANA People to People 
internationally.  It operates primarily in the Shamva District of Mashonaland Central 
province.  Prior to accelerated reform, it owned five commercial farms in the district.  In 
the mid-1990s it initiated a Communal to Commercial (CC) Farmer Programme in which 
communal peasant farmers would be taught modern commercial farming methods.  The 
CC programme was done with the full acknowledgement and support of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  It involved selecting a limited number of seemingly capable communal 
farmers and allocating them land on DAPP commercial farms.  These farmers would live, 
work and be trained at these farms over a three-year period and would then qualify as 
(government-recognized) ‘master farmers’, after which they could apply for resettlement 
as part of the government programme or jointly purchase a commercial farm with DAPP 
assistance.  The CC programme started at one of the farms in 1997 and the first intake of 
farmer-students began to graduate just prior to the emergence of the land movement.   
 
The government designated three of the five farms owned by DAPP, including one large 
600 hectare farm that was purchased by DAPP in 1999 and at which the NGO had major 
plans to expand the CC programme.  It is left with two smaller farms, one that houses 
HUMANA’s international offices and one that offers internal training for HUMANA 
employees who work throughout southern Africa.  HUMANA senior staff members are 
all White expatriates, and they have a pronounced altruistic drive that emanates from 
many decades of involvement in NGO work.  Their development ideas and methods have 
a paternalistic thrust, as encapsulated in the notion that peasants need to be ‘made 
                                         
52 Discussion with T. Ncube, Information Officer, Save the Children-UK, 29th July 2005. 
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modern’.  Yet, in the light of land reform, they argue that Zimbabweans have the right to 
decide their own development destiny.  As a result, and unlike other NGDOs, they have 
not distanced themselves from the accelerated programme.  Thus, soon after their farms 
were taken, they approached the Ministry of Lands and asked what kind of NGO work 
would be appropriate under the altered political and rural landscape.  It was suggested to 
them that the CC programme could now be implemented ‘on site’, that is, in the ‘new’ 
resettlement areas.  For the past few years, and in conjunction with government 
agricultural extension officers, they have been doing this on a significant scale in the 
Shamva District.  Hence, they are trying to instil within ‘new farmers’ on A1 schemes the 
modern commercial mode of agricultural work and life. 
 
 
12. 5 From Development to Relief 
 
Whether at the policy formation level or at the operational level, ‘land’ NGOs in 
Zimbabwe have operated in a fluctuating and difficult political and economic 
environment during the LRRP Phase II in Zimbabwe.  To some degree, NGOs have 
found themselves simply overwhelmed by the sheer immensity of the problems and 
challenges facing themselves and the communities that they serve, particularly since the 
year 2000.  Yet they have shown much tenacity and commitment despite the adversities 
and pressures.  In the face of disruptions in their development work, they have sought to 
engage in various forms of organizational reflection, learning and strategizing, and have 
done so in a reasonably proactive manner.  In this respect, the representative of an 
international NGO in Zimbabwe that facilitates capacity building amongst local NGOs 
recently described this conceptual work as the ‘software’ of NGO practice and the work 
of execution as the ‘hardware’.  He employs the metaphor of a hammer and a nail, and 
claims that unless the hammer (or organization) is properly maintained and effectively 
wielded then no development work in the agrarian field can be accomplished.53  In this 
regard, and throughout the accelerated ‘period’, ‘land’ NGOs have tried to stand back and 
                                         
53 Interview conducted with S. Schwersensky, Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1st March 
2005. 
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strategically plan and implement development projects in an organizationally sound 
manner.  Yet many of their current programmes have had to be significantly revised or 
put on hold because of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the rural areas of the country.   
 
The rural crisis has a desperate human face and, despite the progressive language about 
justice and democracy in the mission statements of NGOs, this crisis of livelihoods is 
ignored by NGOs likely at their own organizational peril.  The crisis is manifested in, 
amongst other things, the reduced agricultural yields and food shortages emanating from 
both natural (for example, recurring droughts) and political (for instance, accelerated 
reform) causes, as well as in the HIV/AIDS pandemic that continues to cause untold 
suffering particularly as the burden of caring for AIDS victims lies squarely on the 
already-weakened shoulders of the rural underclasses.  Because of this, rural NGOs have 
had little option but to mainstream AIDS awareness and prevention into their 
programmes, along with integrating important forms of relief and emergency work into 
their development agendas and activities.  In doing so, they have shown significant levels 
of technical and administrative capacity.  They have focused on this short-term 
emergency work for many reasons, including their altruistic commitment to the ‘rural 
poor’ as found in organizational visions but also because of hard financial facts such as 
the preference of donors for relief interventions during times of humanitarian crisis.  
Further, operational NGOs withdrew from their sustainable development goals (at least 
temporarily) during the first few (turbulent) years of accelerated reform because this 
longer-term work had reached such levels of complexity that it significantly 
compromised the structural integrity and sustainability of these NGOs as organizational 
forms. 
 
The short-term focus also seems to make sense for NGOs in terms of maintaining their 
organizational relevance as agents of development in the eyes of rural communities.   
Continuing to focus exclusively on participatory development at times of grinding rural 
poverty, when making ends meet becomes a daily challenge for the rural underclasses, 
may be intellectually pleasing but may only serve to alienate development NGOs from 
their targeted communities.  This is something that the ruling ZANU-PF party knows all 
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too well, such that during the early years of accelerated reform it used emergency relief 
as a critical form of patronage and as a means of consolidating its power in the rural 
areas.  During and after specific food aid programmes in the countryside, government 
officials publicly declared that development NGOs exaggerated their role in the relief 
effort and that the state played the more fundamental part.  As well, the central state 
insisted that all relief be channelled through its local structures so that the rural under-
classes, in case they felt otherwise, would see a direct and tangible link between state 
benevolence and food relief.   
 
At times, the government has claimed that it could source and distribute sufficient basic 
foodstuffs to the rural population, and thus for long periods it has effectively suspended 
all NGO involvement in the humanitarian food effort.  Meanwhile, as indicated in July 
2005 by the Humanitarian Programme Coordinator for OXFAM-GB, NGOs sought to 
maintain or even build up their relief capacity in the eventuality that the government 
would rethink its position.54  Combining relief work with development work in times of 
social stress seeks to maintain a form of grassroots relevance.  This is part of a broader 
picture of operational synergy that also includes combining – as noted in Chapter Eleven 
– development work with research or policy work.  ITDG is an example of this 
development and research synergy that is intended to enhance both aspects of its work.   
 
From a long-term perspective, however, ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe perceive social 
development in agrarian economies as premised on building strong and effective rural 
organizations and communities.  Hence, ZERO has ‘the conviction that community 
participation is the answer to many developmental shortcomings.’ (ZERO 1999:p.1)  This 
was also noted in relation to accelerated reform and NGO advocacy (Chapter Eleven), 
with NGOs insisting on greater transparency and heightened community involvement in 
matters such as acquisition of farms, selection of beneficiaries and resettlement models.  
However, despite the emphasis by NGDOs in Zimbabwe on participatory development 
and grassroots capacity building, these concepts are often formulated nebulously and 
                                         
54 Interview conducted with T. Assefa, Humanitarian Programme Coordinator, Oxfam-GB, Harare, 25th 
July 2005. 
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implemented broadly such that they become devoid of any significant meaning and value.  
At times, it would even appear that nearly anything and everything that transcends short-
term relief aid (for example, handing out wheelbarrows) is seen as building capacity and 
empowering communities.  Without doubt, though, there have been serious participatory 
initiatives by NGDOs, including the ‘handing over’ of projects to communities by World 
Vision and LDS, and these have entailed significant capacity-building efforts.  But, these 
remain in large part NGO-driven and their sustainability is still questionable.  As a result, 
external evaluations on record do not take the form of all-embracing social audits with 
grassroots input but are more restricted and inhibiting, and these evaluations are mainly 
initiated and shaped by donors and their social conceptions.   
 
 
12.6 Organizational Space and Agrarian Change 
 
NGOs in Zimbabwe tend to conceptualize land reform in terms of obscure notions of 
social and economic development instead of models of agrarian change or rural 
transformation.  For example, in a ZERO publication, it is said that ‘[l]and related issues 
continue to be one of the major challenges toward sustainable development’ (Mutefpa et 
al. 1998b:p.8).  Or, as ORAP put it many years ago, but it remains equally relevant today, 
‘the enormous challenge of sustainable development ... must be characterised as the 
single most important challenge to the whole phenomenon of NGO enterprise’ (Jamela 
1990:p.23).  In fact, the pursuance of sustainable development is seen as the critical issue 
for ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe.   
 
Operational NGOs, in terms of their self-definitions, are development-centric rather than 
agrarian-centric organizational forms.  In this respect, NGOs ‘do not emphasize 
egalitarian land redistribution as a key aspect of rural or agricultural development’ (Moyo 
1999a:p.21).  Despite the breath-taking language of emancipation that is normally found 
in the visions of intermediary NGOs in Zimbabwe, it would seem that these NGOs 
operate – due to a mixture of choices and constraints – within a social space that is 
defined and delineated by nebulous paradigms of development.  Yet, ironically, the 
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accelerated period in Zimbabwe has seen the most significant and far-reaching processes 
of rural restructuring since independence, a process that caught these NGOs largely 
unaware and ill prepared for any meaningful response and engagement.   
 
This raises the question of ‘space’ for ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe, including both 
advocacy and development organizations.  Normally, ‘land’ NGOs conceive themselves 
as organizations with noble intentions that seek by all means to open and widen space for 
democratic development for the benefit of society at large.  On the other hand, the state is 
said to be overbearing and it is labelled almost as a sordid villain that tries to restrict and 
close space for NGOs unless it is forced to do otherwise.  Thus, ITDG speaks of the need 
for a ‘strong and empowered civil society to monitor ... [the state]… and ensure that local 
government structures do not become corrupt and rent seeking.’ (ITDG 2001:p.25)  In 
this sense, a crude dichotomy between state and civil society is often asserted.  For 
instance, in the case of land reform, there is said to be a centralizing and authoritarian 
state that imposes its will on rural inhabitants, and a progressive and democratic civil 
society – including ‘land’ NGOs – that seeks an egalitarian solution to land reform based 
on the rule of law.   
 
Yet Moyo rightly argues, at least for the years leading up to 2000: ‘A strong central state 
has been able to limit and guide the democratic space of both partisan and policy lobby 
interest, in a manner intended to contain radical policy demands or political mobilisation 
for the comprehensive redistribution of land and related resources’ (Moyo 1999a:p.21 my 
emphasis).  Elsewhere, as noted earlier in a different context, Moyo claims that the 
Zimbabwean state during the latter half of the 1990s sought ‘a societal corporatist model 
of governance, which enables it to retain state power while allowing for greater NGO 
participation.’ (Moyo 2000b:p.60 my emphasis)  Of course, these arguments are meant to 
identify state strategies that are designed to maintain and consolidate social power.  But 
they also insinuate that the nation-state at times promotes space for NGOs, albeit 
simultaneously seeking to structure and contain this space as part of a corporatist 
strategy.  As well, despite its centralizing thrust and repeated acts of repression against 
land ‘squatters’ historically, the Zimbabwean government is more firmly embedded than 
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intermediary ‘land’ NGOs in agrarian communities.  Further, the state yielded 
immediately (if not decisively) to the rural mobilization of the war veterans and the 
peasant under-classes during the year 2000, if only for reasons of political expediency. 
 
‘Land’ NGOs stood at an almost bemused distance, as seemingly passive commentators 
and spectators.  Hence, it might be apt to argue that many limitations on democratic, 
operational and policy space for ‘land’ NGOs have arisen from miscalculated action or 
blatant inaction on the part of these organizations themselves.  Indeed, in blaming the 
state for closure of space, NGOs are externalizing their problems.  They are also 
manifesting their own incapacitated condition, because they are expressing their inability 
to take responsibility for their own dilemmas.  In this regard, NGOs often represent the 
historical trajectory of land reform in Zimbabwe as being dominated by the intransigence 
of the nation-state.  They argue that international donors were prepared to make available 
almost unlimited funds for land acquisition on a willing-buyer/willing-seller basis and 
that donors continually offered policy guidance to the state, such as the taxing of 
underutilized commercial land to fund acquisitions.  However, the state was ‘not 
interested’ in land reform until the late 1990s and then only to ‘maintain or expand 
patronage’ in the context of demands by war veterans and rural inhabitants.55   
 
During most of the independence period, NGOs in Zimbabwe failed to occupy the gap in 
land policy formation resulting from the under-representation of the rural under-classes in 
formal lobbying structures and processes (Moyo 1999a).  And when they were more 
active in land advocacy, such as during the 1996 to 1999 period, these lobbying efforts 
involved a significant trade off in that their efforts were at the expense of seeking to 
embed themselves in rural communities and of building the organizational capacity of 
these communities.  In large part, NGOs have chosen to focus narrowly on an exclusive 
and patchwork ‘participatory’ development strategy while leaving land reform in large 
part un-addressed.  Thus, restrictions on space are sometimes self-defined, self-imposed 
and self-inflicted.   
 
                                         
55 Interview with Schwersensky, FES. 
  278 
At times ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe failed to exploit or to maximize on opportunities 
because of acts of commission based on strategic miscalculations, including such errors 
as misguided involvement in the messy terrain of party politics.  At other times, land 
NGOs have failed to identify and create opportunities for themselves because of acts of 
omission.  In part, this is because they appear trapped in development paradigms that fail 
to come to terms with the ambivalent political processes that characterize contemporary 
Zimbabwean society.  In this regard, the dominant response of NGOs to the accelerated 
land acquisition process has been disengagement, and this has occurred for a range of 
political, ideological and organizational reasons.  As noted below, this disengagement is 
highly problematic.  Yet, accepting accelerated land resettlement as a given or as an 
accomplished fact, and working in terms of it and alongside it may in fact enact closure 
on analyzing its fluctuating social and class bases.  In doing so, NGOs may also fail to 
highlight trajectories within the process that amount to new forms of political co-
optation, control and compliance that leave land reform in Zimbabwe largely unresolved.   
 
Either course of action (whether principled disengagement or blind acceptance) inhibit 
NGOs from identifying the shifting, uneven and fragmented spaces that are riddled with 
cracks and crevices and that open up opportunities for organizational practices that 
enhance agrarian change.  In this respect, Kanji et al. (2002) make the critical point that 
regular and systematic reflection enables an NGO ‘to identify entry points and strategies 
to promote longer term changes in [agrarian] social relations’ (Kanji et al. 2002:p.30).   
 
A key point that arises from the discussion in this and the previous chapter is that 
understanding the relationship between NGOs and land reform involves looking at the 
decisions and strategies of NGOs themselves.  NGOs are not merely manipulated and 
marginalized as ‘objects’ by ‘others’, although they may at times represent their action in 
this manner.  Intermediary ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe do not simply articulate – in 
discourse or in practice – ‘global’ agendas on land, and nor are they simply sidelined on 
land reform by a ‘local’ authoritarian state.  Rather, within the constraints of their social 
field, NGOs are active ‘subjects’ that make choices about forms (and degrees) of 
engagement that have organizational effects on land and agrarian processes.  The two 
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case studies in Chapter Thirteen demonstrate the ways in which intermediary ‘land’ 
NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe handle the tensions between ‘the global’ and ‘the 
local’. 
 
 
12.7 Politics, Ideology and Organizational Dispositions of ‘Land’ NGOs  
 
At a civil society consultative workshop held by the Commonwealth Foundation in 
Harare in the year 2002, one participant depicted NGOs in Zimbabwe as ‘dancing around 
the same spot’ (NANGO 2002: p.13).  Potentially, this portrait has a triple meaning.  First 
of all, it may mean that the spot never changes, and thus NGOs have all their wheels in 
the rut.  In this regard, it implies that NGOs are not learning organizations, that they 
function without strategic forethought and that they are inherently conservative (if not 
politically then organizationally).  Secondly, the portrait may mean that NGOs prefer (or 
are constrained) to remain on an unchanging spot while all spots around them are 
constantly shifting.  Third of all, the phrase might mean that all NGOs dance to the same 
tune, although at times the tune (or spot) might change.  In other words, NGOs have 
some sort of herding instinct or have the same shepherd, and hence they are invariably 
found pursuing common development and democracy-building policies and practices.  
All three shades of meaning likely have some element of truth.  But none, on its own, 
serves as an accurate barometer of intermediary ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwean society 
since the mid-1990s.  And, combined, the three meanings crudely ‘fix’ NGOs as a static 
and a historical social entity devoid of all fluidity and diversity.  It has been the very 
purpose of this thesis to transcend such ‘static’ treatments of intermediary NGOs, as 
encapsulated in the subject-object dichotomy that conceptualizes a common object (all 
NGOs) ‘in the pocket’ of for instance a ‘globalizing other’. 
 
‘Land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe are complex social phenomena that are constantly in motion 
and they are marked by considerable diversity.  Although (as a ‘sector’) they have not 
been particularly proactive in ‘handling’ accelerated land reform, specific NGOs have 
shown significant adaptive capacity.  Further, responses to land reform have been 
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incredibly diverse, ranging from the ‘hands off’ approach of SOS to the ‘testing the 
water’ position of FOST to the ‘gung ho’ approach of DAPP (see Chapter Thirteen).   To 
pin an all-embracing (catch-all) label (of any kind) on intermediary NGOs is highly 
problematic not only empirically but also theoretically.  For instance, such labels fail to 
come to grips with the ambivalences and contradictions that invariably mark the world 
and work of NGOs.  Generally speaking, NGOs seek to ‘manage’ and ‘negotiate’ their 
social world through a multitude of organizational strategies that often pull in opposing 
directions.  The organizational practices of NGOs are not necessarily one-dimensional or 
unidirectional, and they are subject to significant levels of ambiguity, fluidity and even 
confusion.  Therefore, if NGOs are dancing, then they are more than likely ‘dancing on 
many spots’, and on uneven, unstable and shifting ground. 
 
NGOs often ‘manage’ the ambivalences in their world by avoiding or simplifying 
complexities through specific organizational practices.  In doing so, they try to stabilize 
their world.  The outcome of this ‘managed’ process is open to considerable historical 
variation.  In the case of contemporary Zimbabwe, it has resulted in NGOs – as a general 
trajectory – creating ‘distance’ between themselves and land reform, both before and 
during accelerated reform.  Prior to the year 2000, the distance was particularly telling at 
the level of advocacy.  NGOs refrained from concerted lobbying despite a reasonably 
conducive environment for doing so.  On the other hand, under accelerated reform, there 
is a marked distance at the operational level, as development NGOs seem disengaged 
from the ‘new’ resettlement areas.  Politics and ideology, and the conflicts they inspire, 
clearly contribute to the sheer complexity of engaging in land reform either at the policy 
or implementation level, and hence this distance exists. After all, land reform and the 
struggles it entails invariably reflect ‘issues of power and social relations, bringing 
governance and state-society relations sharply into focus’ (Kanji et al. 2002:p.2).   
 
In Zimbabwe today, politics and ideology seem to rule the roost.   Thus, with few 
exceptions, there is outright suspicion if not hostility between NGOs and government.  
For instance, many NGOs consider their internal affairs as strictly private affairs because 
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the ‘the environment is too sensitive to release information’.56  And, recently, the 
Resident Representative of a German-based NGO that has extensively funded land 
research in Zimbabwe described land reform as a ‘presidential preserve’.  For this reason, 
he argued that current publications on land reform financed by his organization (for 
example, Masiiwa ed. 2004) were of ‘no use’ as an advocacy tool. 57   Those ‘land’ NGOs 
that continue to lobby government on land, notably Women and Land in Zimbabwe, are 
particularly aware of the politics of land reform, and they criticize the more 
‘confrontational’ approach to government that has been adopted by urban civics in recent 
years.58 
 
Simultaneously, the initial knee-jerk (rather than reflective) response by NGOs to the 
land repossessions was largely negative and the resettlement programme was strongly 
criticized as an ill-planned, chaotic and counterproductive state intervention.  This 
portrayal of accelerated reform speaks volumes about the political and ideological 
predispositions of many ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe.  More sensitive theoretical (and 
organizational) reflections may have highlighted the many progressive threads weaving 
their way through the land movement, and this may have provided the basis for tactical 
‘entry points’ by NGOs into the land reform process.  Such a stance may also have 
contributed to developing a degree of rural accountability and legitimacy for ‘land’ 
NGOs that otherwise seem to operate without an unequivocal rural mandate.  The failure 
to reflect regularly and meaningfully on organizational practices is considered to be one 
of the ‘biggest weaknesses’ of NGOs in Zimbabwe because ‘we are operational all the 
time’.  This means that when NGOs do come together to reflect collectively, ‘we give off 
a lot of heat but not a lot of light’.59 
 
                                         
56 Interview conducted with F. McManus, Acting Programme/Country Director, GOAL Zimbabwe, 29th 
July 2005. 
57 Interview with Schwersensky, FES. 
58 Interview conducted with A. Mgugu, Women and Land in Zimbabwe, 16th March 2004. 
59 Notes from End of Year Civil Society Reflection, MWENGO, Jamieson Hotel, Harare, 16th December 
2004. 
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Donors also contribute to the politics of land.  USAID does not lobby the government on 
land because ‘the situation is not conducive to this’60 and CIDA refers to influencing 
policy formation on land subsequent to accelerated reform in Zimbabwe as a ‘non-
starter’.61  The fact that major bilateral donors such as USAID, DFID and SIDA refuse to 
fund programmes or projects in the ‘new’ resettlement schemes (again on political 
grounds) is of significance in hindering NGO involvement.  USAID no longer provides 
aid for development work in part because the macro economic and fiscal policies of the 
central state are ‘anti-development’.62  The Development Programme Specialist for 
USAID in Zimbabwe noted that his agency is continuing to undertake forms of 
humanitarian assistance in the country but only within communal areas and amongst 
former farm workers who have been internally displaced.  He added that working within 
the ‘new’ resettlement areas ‘might be frowned upon as it involves legitimating the land 
reform programme’.63  This is particularly the case with agricultural projects on ‘A1’ 
settlement schemes involving small-scale farming.  Some NGOs seek to go around this 
by receiving donor support for what they consider to be welfare (and not agricultural) 
work on farms. 
 
Undoubtedly, intermediary ‘land’ NGOs are dependent on the donor community in some 
form.  Smaller indigenous NGOs especially are at the ‘mercy’ of external donors who 
have a disdain for high administrative or core NGO costs.  As a result, these NGOs find it 
exceedingly difficult to retain qualified and committed professional staff that at times can 
only be offered short-term contract employment.  This also makes it ‘difficult to plan 
because funding may become unavailable’ at relatively short notice.64  ZERO, in its 1999 
Annual Report, highlights the need for financial independence from global donors, and it 
undertakes contract research for other organizations and also provides technical project 
assistance in seeking what it calls ‘partial financial sustainability’.  In pursuing this, 
ZERO recognizes that it must be highly competitive and productive in a market sense.  In 
the year 2000, over forty percent of its income was from fees for services rendered.  But 
                                         
60 Interview conducted with M. Manda, Development Programme Specialist, USAID, 1st March 2005 
61 Interview conducted with S. Landon, Head of Aid, CIDA, 22nd February 2005. 
62 Interview with Manda, USAID. 
63 Interview with Manda, USAID. 
64 Interview with Director, ZWRCN. 
  283 
it stresses that it could never ‘be fully independent of philanthropic subsidies’ and it 
wonders ‘[h]ow does an organisation remain loyal to its values/purpose whilst chasing 
the donor or otherwise derived dollar.’ (ZERO 1999:p.26)    
 
The executive director of World Vision in Zimbabwe made a similar point at a 
Transparency International workshop in 2001.  She frankly admitted: ‘NGOs approach 
donors with proposals meant to benefit the society but most of these do not meet the 
society’s needs and many NGOs tailor their proposals as they know what the donor’s 
interests are.  The intended beneficiaries do not [have] any say in the proposals and they 
therefore cannot make the NGO accountable…. It is essential ... to empower the 
beneficiaries; this will give them the right to question any decision made by the NGO 
supposedly on their behalf.’ (Transparency International 2001:p.4)  Rural communities in 
Zimbabwe are rarely if ever empowered during this process.  They remain in large part 
beneficiaries of externally driven interventions of ‘land’ NGOs and are certainly not rural 
citizens with non-discretionary rights empowered to determine their own development 
destiny.   This is true despite the fact that donors in Zimbabwe freely speak about NGOs 
and targeted communities as ‘partners’ and that they are contemplating a rights-based 
approach to development in line with global paradigms on the subject.65  But an even 
more telling point that arises from the quotation is the negotiated quality of the 
relationship between donors and NGOs.  Donors do not simply impose themselves on 
NGOs, and in a sense NGOs tactically ‘negotiate’ their dependence on (if not domination 
by) donors.  In this regard, ‘land’ NGOs that distance themselves from the ‘new’ 
settlements are not in a strong position to place blame solely on the politics and agendas 
of global donors, as the case of FOST (in the next chapter) shows.  
 
Since 2003, a more structured and regularized land reform process has emerged 
subsequent to the highly volatile first few years of accelerated reform.  Of particular 
relevance is the ongoing failure on the part of development NGOs to actively (and 
proactively) involve themselves in the ‘new farmer’ resettlement schemes, in contrast to 
the older and more-established schemes dating back to the 1980s.  This is intriguing 
                                         
65 Interview conducted with V. Chipunza, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid, 16th March 2005. 
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considering the keen anticipation by NGOs of their potential participation in the 
Inception Phase of the LRRP Phase II in the late 1990s.  Hence, Chaumba et al. (2003a) 
highlight the fact that civil society organizations, including NGOs, have been ‘largely 
absent’ from the new schemes.  According to them, ‘[t]hese spaces [or schemes] fall 
outside of the realm of NGOs working in the communal areas.  This is partly for political 
reasons: NGOs tend to be identified by war veterans and ZANU(PF) supporters as 
“opposition” who should keep out of resettlement areas...; and partly because – 
notwithstanding the village committees – these new areas are yet to have a formally 
recognised administrative structure with which NGOs can engage.’ (Chaumba et al. 
2003a:p.604)  The latter reason is especially revealing because it raises the question of 
complexity when it comes to NGO organizational practice. Thus, NGOs may be willing 
to work in new resettled areas, but the complexities of so doing may place considerable 
strain and stress on them and undermine their viability as sustainable organizational 
forms. 
 
Moyo notes in a more general context that ‘[s]ome NGOs have argued that it is 
complicated to be involved in land reform, given the state interest in it and its politics.’ 
(Moyo 2001:p.319 my emphasis)  He continues: ‘However, at an ideological level, many 
local NGOs seem to be against land reform. The few truly Zimbabwean NGO proposals 
for land reform merely sought to train the resettled but hardly any sought to lead the 
demand for greater land transfers.’ (Moyo 2001:p.319)  The point is that seriously 
engaging with a controversial and volatile land reform process is a highly complex, 
turbulent and demanding venture that NGOs prefer to refrain from, but not necessarily for 
ideological-cum-political reasons.  In other words, the ‘complications’ that Moyo speaks 
about cannot be reduced to ‘politics’, although politics clearly complicates the world of 
land NGOs.  Further, the disengagement does not simply arise because NGOs are 
‘against land reform’, no matter how empirically factual this may be.   
 
Beyond politics and ideology, the complexities and complications spring from the 
ambivalences that necessarily marks the work of NGOs.  There are apolitical 
organizational dispositions and interests that lead NGOs to ‘manage’ this complexity by 
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disengaging from accelerated reform generally and from the new resettlement schemes in 
particular.  Political reasons such as the centralizing thrust of central-state land policy 
formation or an ideological disdain for the content and procedures of accelerated reform 
do not sufficiently explain why ‘land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe are generally distanced and 
disengaged.  The point about organizational dispositions is developed more fully in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. 
 
.   
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Chapter 13 
Case Studies: FOST and SOS Children’s Villages 
 
 
This chapter discusses two case studies of ‘land’ NGOs, namely, the Farm Orphan 
Support Trust and SOS Children’s Villages Zimbabwe.  These in-depth studies are 
particularly important in offering ‘thick descriptions’ that detail the internal processes 
and tensions of intermediary NGOs as organizational forms.  An important argument of 
this thesis is that any sociological analysis of intermediary NGOs needs to re-construct 
the work of ‘actually-existing’ NGOs from the meaning-laden perspective of NGOs 
themselves.  In other words, the practices intermediary NGOs engage in, and why they do 
what they do, cannot be directly ‘read from’ outside.  Conflicting pressures and demands 
that impinge upon the ambivalent social field of NGOs are ‘handled’ through 
organizational practices that help NGOs to ‘negotiate’ their way through their tension-
filled world.  These practices have the effect of bringing a degree of order and stability to 
world that is otherwise not sutured.  The case studies that follow are meant to illustrate 
this. 
 
 
13.1 Farm Orphan Support Trust: Its Formation 
 
Farm Orphan Support Trust (FOST) was formed in 1996 in large part as an initiative of 
the White-dominated Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), and hence it arose from ‘the 
philanthropic ethos of the farmers and their wives’ (REPSSI 2002:p.5).  Exploratory 
studies of the orphan situation amongst agricultural worker families on commercial 
farms, notably in Mashonaland East province, led to a seminar in August 1995 attended 
by commercial farmers, NGOs, the Department of Social Welfare and donors.  At this 
seminar, a steering committee was established to oversee the formation of a NGO 
(FOST) specifically designed to facilitate and implement foster care on commercial 
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farms.  This steering committee included individuals from the CFU, SAfAIDS (an AIDS 
network), GAPWUZ, and Save the Children-UK  (FOST 1996).  Further studies were 
conducted in 1996 in Mashonaland Central province, and FOST in that year began to 
action a commercial farm orphan care model in the province as part of the Department of 
Welfare’s national orphan care programme in Zimbabwe. (FOST 1998)  From the 
beginning, FOST has always worked closely with both White farmers and relevant 
government ministries.  
 
Since its inception, the overarching aim of FOST has been to develop sustainable 
community-based foster care schemes for orphaned children on commercial farms, 
particularly in the light of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  Thus, FOST says its programmes 
‘are aimed at proactively increasing the capacity of communities on commercial farms in 
Zimbabwe to respond to the orphan crisis.’ (FOST 2002b:p.5)  This is particularly 
challenging because, relatively speaking, farm worker communities are said by FOST to 
lack social cohesion and support networks comparable to agrarian communities in 
communal areas.  By the year 2000, FOST was operating in rural districts in 
Mashonaland Central and Midlands provinces.  
 
 
13.2 Accelerated Reform Troubles 
 
Like other NGOs involved in land-related issues, an optimistic mood prevailed at FOST 
in the late 1990s despite intermittent moments of sober realism.  The director of FOST 
looks back positively on the policy environment that existed in the years immediately 
before accelerated reform.  She remarks for instance on how FOST (and other NGOs) 
supposedly played an important part in ensuring that farm workers were given the right to 
vote in local government elections.66  The land movement however (starting in the year 
2000) had a ‘quite dramatic’67 and negative impact on the world and work of FOST.  In 
effect, the advances made by FOST in terms of the provision of social services and 
                                         
66 Interview with Walker, FOST. 
67 Interview with Walker, FOST. 
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amenities in farming communities ‘have been reversed’ (REPSSI 2002:p.11).  The 
heightened uncertainty on commercial farms because of accelerated reform as well as the 
deteriorating economic conditions in the country soon undermined the capacity-building 
efforts of FOST and, indeed, the ability of farm communities to support orphaned 
children.   
 
Hence, ‘[m]ost households currently struggle to support themselves and have neither the 
time nor emotional energy to consider the needs of non-family members’ (FOST 2003b: 
p.1).  In a study conducted in 2004 by FOST, it came as no surprise that commercial farm 
worker communities and former farm worker families ranked inadequate food as their 
most pressing daily problem.  Coping strategies for food insecurity included reducing the 
number of meals per day and cutting back on the quantity of food eaten by each member 
of the household.  The study further noted that ‘the current prevailing situation in farms is 
one of: NO WORK – NO HOUSE’, and that the new ‘owners’ of the farms are seemingly 
unaware of the plight of orphaned and vulnerable children, or the problems encountered 
by these children are not a priority for the ‘owners’ (FOST 2004b:p.26). 
 
This emergency situation has forced FOST to adopt more short-term goals in the form of 
relief, and this includes child supplementary feeding schemes and the provision of non-
food items such as clothing and blankets.  This has now become a perennial problem, as 
reiterated most recently in the 2005 Annual Report (FOST 2005).  FOST realizes that 
these short-term interventions bring with them ‘the fear of creating dependency’ amongst 
farm communities, but it claims that its relief efforts have always been linked to the 
longer term aims of developing sustainable solutions rooted in the community (FOST 
2003a:p.17).  In this regard, FOST continues to provide educational assistance and 
emotional support to child-headed households, orphans and vulnerable children.  Under 
more stable political conditions, it would opt for longer-range development goals, 
including non-agricultural income generating projects based on micro financing.  Clearly, 
accelerated reform has significantly altered the programmatic approach of FOST.  
Originally, it intended to be a facilitator of foster care on farms by bringing together 
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farmers, agricultural workers, local governments and line ministries.  Now, it has 
increasingly become an almost reluctant deliverer of goods and services.  
 
Presently, FOST is unable to plan realistically for future interventions because of the 
‘current period of transition in commercial farming areas’ in the light of land reform.  
Indeed, it argued in the year 2002 that ‘the gains and successes of the past five years have 
been lost’ because of the fragmentation and dislocation of farm worker communities 
(FOST 2002a:p.13).  Three years later the dust of accelerated reform had begun to settle, 
yet the ‘continuing mobility of farm communities as the ownership of farms changes and 
new management and leadership structures are put in place’ still makes it extremely 
difficult ‘to maintain continuity of support’ (FOST 2005:p.31).  In general, land reform 
has involved a restructuring of power relations on the resettled farms, and FOST has been 
unable to work with the new governance structures because ‘the situation on farms is yet 
to cool down’ (REPSSI 2002:p.16). 
 
Further, moving and operating on commercial farms and ex-commercial farms have at 
times posed serious risks for FOST staff and fieldworkers, because of government 
suspicion of NGO activities and also intrusive legislation that has circumscribed the 
holding of training and community awareness meetings and workshops.  FOST, like most 
NGOs, has formally adopted a non-partisan political party stance but its historical links 
with the CFU has over the past few years raised doubts in the minds of government 
officials about the existence of hidden anti-land reform agendas.  In fact, its national 
office continues to be located at the head office of the CFU in Harare.  Thus, the tight-
knit relationship with the CFU ‘worked well for FOST until the changes brought about by 
the land reform exercise.  In the current political climate this works against the 
organisation heavily.  There have been incidents where the staff of the organisation has, 
along with other NGOs working in the field, been accused of being part of the opposition 
politics.’ (REPSSI 2002:p.30)  Because of the many operational problems in the field, 
FOST has spent considerable effort over the past few years in building its own internal 
capacity, which it understands as a combination of administrative-procedural and 
adaptive-strategic capacities.  
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13.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
FOST highlights the importance of broad-based participatory evaluation of its NGO 
practices, incorporating in particular its targeted farm communities as crucial evaluators.  
But it currently lacks the human capacity and resource base for undertaking such 
evaluations.  Instead, in May 2003, an external donor-led evaluation of FOST was 
undertaken. The evaluation noted that there are ‘no indications that FOST holds [even] 
externally facilitated self-initiated annual evaluations of its work on a regular basis.’ 
(REPSSI 2002:p.24)  In this regard, the evaluation brought to the fore many important 
organizational issues pertinent to FOST as a NGO.   
 
For example, the evaluation highlighted that it was extremely difficult to assess the 
impact of the work of FOST for two main reasons.  First of all, the objectives of FOST as 
a NGO are ‘not subject to quantification’ because there are no defined and thought-out 
empirical indicators of effect and impact.  Secondly, even if such indices existed, there is 
‘no baseline from which they [the objectives] can be judged’ or measured over a period 
of time (REPSSI 2002:p.10).  Although FOST does undertake some form of internal 
monitoring and evaluation, the basis on which this is done is highly questionable.  Even 
in its project proposals, there is ‘a general weakness in planning’ for monitoring and 
evaluation (REPSSI 2002:p.23).  Within FOST, there is a ‘need for a system that will 
enable tracking of progress in the desired direction according to activity and objectives 
and finally the mission of the organisation’ (REPSSI 2002:p.24).   
 
The external evaluation of FOST also stressed the importance of reinforcing forms of 
strategic management and planning in the face of a fluctuating and turbulent external 
environment, and it noted that this would invariably entail a comprehensive review of the 
NGO’s mission and vision as well as of its organizational policies and practices.  At the 
same time, the evaluation argued that FOST ‘needs to remain where it is at the moment, 
buying time, so that it can then take stock of itself once the current impasse is over.’ 
(REPSSI 2002:p.3)  Yet, as noted earlier, FOST has chosen to shift (at least temporarily) 
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its programmatic focus in response to chronic and pressing material needs found within 
farm communities.  FOST also recognizes that the impasse, once ‘over’, will reveal a 
fundamentally different social and political landscape in rural Zimbabwe that will 
significantly alter its operational parameters.  Many aspects of this changing landscape 
were revealed during the discussion of the accelerated land reform programme in Chapter 
Nine.  Their work, for instance, may entail a shift towards the families of internally 
displaced ex-agricultural labourers or the families of newly settled small-scale farmers on 
ex-commercial farms. 
 
 
13.4 Donor Dilemmas 
 
An added problem for FOST has been the hyperinflationary economy in Zimbabwe and 
the fact that FOST salaries ‘are generally in the lower levels of local NGO salary scales’.  
This makes work ‘highly stressful’ such that the organization ‘may not be able to retain 
existing staff’ despite high levels of commitment and loyalty throughout the organization 
(FOST 2003b:p.2).  In fact, at times FOST staff – both in the offices and fields – has been 
bordering on a condition of overload and burnout.  As well, staff members ‘have issues 
that they cannot raise at the staff monthly meetings without fear of victimisation.  Staff 
harbour several issues of discontent on working conditions.’ (REPSSI 2002:p.24)  
Throughout most of the history of FOST, there has been no workers’ committee to which 
staff could bring their grievances.  Staff insecurity has arisen in large part because of the 
uncertain and transitory funding base of FOST as an indigenous NGO.  Recently, some 
donors have reduced their funding of FOST while at least one (the Royal Danish 
Embassy) has withdrawn completely from Zimbabwe.  In early 2002, it was noted that 
‘financially, the organisation is not on a sound footing/stand point’, that most of the 
current funding expires in 2002, and that there is ‘no firm fundraising strategy or plan’ 
which forms part of organizational processes within FOST (REPSSI 2002:p.22). 
 
Yet, since then, FOST has been able to significantly broaden its funding base.  In this 
regard, it does not see international donor fatigue or withdrawal as a particularly acute 
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dilemma in relation to Zimbabwe.  From the year 2002, FOST has considerably expanded 
its staff component and has opened two new provincial offices.  Yet, in its 2004 Annual 
Report, FOST reflected that it was unable to scale up its activities beyond certain districts 
in its operational provinces of Mashonaland Central and Manicaland because of limited 
financial resources (FOST 2004a).  The widening funding base has also created its own 
set of problems, which is particularly noticeable amongst smaller NGOs like FOST.  For 
instance, given that different programmes are funded by different funding partners, FOST 
has been ‘striving to avoid fragmentation and compartmentalization of our activities’ and 
thereby maintain some degree of organizational cohesiveness (FOST 2005:p.7).  A 
further problem concerns the question of donor accountability.  As FOST argues: ‘The 
demands created by having a range of funders with many different requirements and 
reporting formats and, occasionally, inflexible systems, has created a massive workload 
for a small administrative team.’ (FOST 2003a:p.18)  FOST wants to negotiate with 
donors for the ‘basket-funding of administrative costs’ so that more funds can be released 
for programmatic activities, as well as for ‘an umbrella reporting system’ that would 
satisfy the reporting demands of all donors (FOST 2005:p.34). 
 
Simultaneously, the director of FOST claims that donors do not simply impose their will 
on the NGO, but that there is significant room to manoeuvre in terms of programmatic 
focus and activity.  If FOST is dependent on donors for its existence, this dependence is 
not an unbridled imposition.  In the words of the director, many donors are ‘prepared to 
bend and negotiate’.68  Currently, and on political grounds, the major bilateral donors 
such as USAID and DFID refuse to fund programmes or projects in the ‘new’ 
resettlement areas, particularly the small-scale A1 schemes.  FOST does not support this 
position, and it has hence sought to circumvent the prohibition by seeking donor 
assistance for what it considers to be welfare (and not agricultural) work on farms, and in 
this sense it tries to ‘depoliticize’ its work.69  FOST is currently undertaking pilot projects 
on resettled farms on HIV/AIDS under the auspices of the Department of Welfare.  
Donors that are not official bilateral agencies give more leeway to FOST in this regard.  
                                         
68 Interview with Walker. 
69 Interview with Walker. 
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The FOST director expresses a keen interest in working with the ‘new’ farmers and 
settlers, but notes that it ‘would be much the same as it was when starting on the 
commercial farms initially’.  This would entail ‘great effort’ and would mean ‘getting 
accepted’ likely in the face of ‘resistance’.70 
 
 
13.5 Political Relations 
 
Along with other NGOs involved with agricultural labourers on commercial farms, FOST 
has argued consistently that the Zimbabwean government has made no comprehensive 
and sustained effort to involve these labourers in the accelerated reform process and thus 
‘relatively few farm worker households’ have been allocated land (FOST 2003a:p.15).  
FOST claims that land reform needs to be significantly de-politicized so that farm worker 
advocates are not seen as part of an anti-reform movement.  In this light, the ongoing 
fixation by FOST with the sheer number of agricultural workers being displaced (or 
potentially displaced) by land acquisitions has sometimes been interpreted by the 
government of Zimbabwe to imply that the NGO is part of an ‘anti-land’ lobby.  In 
response to this conception, FOST have pursued a strategy of constructive engagement 
with the state, and this involves ongoing lobbying work amongst local and central state 
officials for the integration of the agricultural workforce into accelerated reform.  More 
generally, it also entails mainstreaming farm worker issues into national economic 
development plans.  As well, FOST continues to advocate for the rights of orphaned 
children at both provincial and district levels as part of their overall child protection 
policy.  Generally, though, according to the major external evaluation conducted in 2002, 
FOST has tended to focus its practices around the question of needs rather than the 
question of rights: ‘There is therefore a need to move away from a needs based to rights 
based programming’ (REPSSI 2002:p.18 emphasis in original). 
 
More often than not, FOST has found it possible to work with local technocrats in line 
ministries who are not as antagonistic to its work as central state ideologues might be.  
                                         
70 Interview with Walker. 
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FOST finds it ‘more difficult to work with government as you go up the hierarchy as, in 
doing so, the issues become more politically charged.’71  But even with line ministries 
and local government structures there is now considerably ‘more tension and suspicion’ 
in Zimbabwe compared to previous years, such that NGO personnel ‘have to be 
politicians’ in ‘negotiating sensitive power structures’.72  As late as early 2005, in some 
of the districts within which FOST operated, there was ‘[u]ncertainty and suspicion of the 
activities of NGOs by district and ward structures’ (FOST 2005:p.33).  In general, then, 
FOST has noticed that the ‘policy receptiveness’ of government has ‘decreased 
significantly’ since 2000.73   
 
 
13.6 Altered Landscape and Organizational Challenges 
 
There is no doubt that accelerated reform has had a significant impact on the practices of 
FOST as an NGO.  A pronounced disabling environment has emerged and this has forced 
FOST to channel its activities in a direction that does not readily maximize the 
achievement of its original vision and mission.  The lofty ideals that FOST originally set 
up have in a sense been sacrificed in part or put on hold.   In the meantime, the NGO 
seeks to sustain itself as a viable organizational form while also in some way remaining 
relevant to the needs of its targeted communities.  Relief and emergency work does not 
equate to providing long-term foster care schemes or to promoting the rights of farm 
workers.  But it does offer a basis for the continued existence of the NGO, and this is 
particularly so considering the significant donor backing that normally comes with such 
work.  Indeed, it is likely through its relief interventions that FOST has been able to 
expand its operations over the past three or four years.   
 
The social and organizational complexities on the ground in the ‘new’ settlement areas 
are recognized by FOST as requiring careful and considered study before engaging with 
them.  These complexities have severely inhibited FOST from seeking to embed its foster 
                                         
71 Interview with Walker. 
72 Interview with Walker. 
73 Interview with Walker. 
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care programmes within the restructured agrarian landscapes.  Vigorously seeking to 
penetrate these areas may have severely compromised the structural integrity of the 
organization during the current turbulent period.   As it were, staff members at FOST 
were already stretched to the limit, and any further organizational demands may have 
simply demoralized them.  Thus, in the face of accelerated reform, FOST has sought to 
‘balance’ its development practice through ‘sensitive negotiations’ with both global 
donors and local power structures.  As a result, it has been able to ‘weather the storm’, 
and to manoeuvre its way through a restructured and volatile agrarian landscape in a 
manner that has not seriously jeopardized its organizational integrity and sustainability.  
 
 
13.7 SOS Children’s Villages: The Village Concept 
 
SOS Children’s Villages International (called SOS-KDI for short) was formed in Austria 
in the immediate post-World War II period in response to the orphan crisis in Europe 
arising from the war.  Over the past fifty years it has expanded around the globe in an 
effort to care for the needs of orphaned, abandoned and abused children.  It operates in all 
countries in southern Africa. Its organizational structure in Zimbabwe is in many ways 
representative of its operations globally.  SOS Zimbabwe is registered as a welfare 
organization in Zimbabwe, and has been in the country since the late 1980s.  It functions 
on the basis of the Village concept that has been the trademark of SOS-KDI since its 
inception. The Villages are located within urban communities but exist as self-enclosed, 
separate fenced-off entities.  Normally, SOS owns the property on which the Villages are 
located, and this is said by SOS to express its commitment to remaining within any 
particular country no matter what political changes ensue.  In Zimbabwe, there are three 
Villages: in Bindura, Harare and Bulawayo.   
 
Each Village consists of about ten houses that are run by a Mother and assistant Mother, 
both of whom are full-time employees of SOS.  Each house has about twelve children, of 
both sexes and of many ages.  The children are wards of the state, and are referred to SOS 
by the Department of Welfare in the Ministry of Labour.  SOS is thus legally responsible 
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for the upbringing of the children, and the children are meant to leave the SOS system in 
their early twenties after completing some form of post-secondary education.  With start-
up capital, they are expected to find employment or become self-employed.  A male 
Director (until recently referred to as the Village Father) heads each Village.  Each 
Director falls under the National Director at the National Coordinating Office (NCO) in 
Harare.  All Village Directors and staff are Black. 
 
The Village concept is an institutionalized form of childcare.  Over the years, SOS-KDI 
has spoken glowingly about this concept as a form of childcare that replicates as closely 
as possible an ideal family setting.  The implication of this claim is that SOS ‘produces’ 
children and youth who become almost model citizens integrated into the broader 
community once they depart from the Villages.  In the case of Zimbabwe, this claim is 
problematic because there is no clear evidence supporting and justifying it.  SOS-KDI has 
a Tracking Footprints programme that is designed to monitor and evaluate the livelihood 
status of SOS youth who have left the SOS system, but this has never been implemented 
in Zimbabwe in any systematic fashion if at all.  Simultaneously, though, considerable 
rethinking and strategizing has taken place recently within the organization 
internationally and experimental changes are occurring with regard to childcare (SOS 
2002).  For instance, in South Africa, a more community-integrated approach is being 
implemented in which individual SOS houses are intermingled within the community.   
 
Formally, the Department of Welfare in Zimbabwe frowns upon institutionalized care.  
Thus, its recent policy paper on Children Living in Difficult Circumstances outlines 
various childcare options for orphaned, abandoned and abused children, and it 
recommends community-based care as an alternative to forms of institutionalization (SPP 
2001).  SOS Zimbabwe has sought to cater for this, though as part of a wider global 
initiative in the light of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  It has thus opened up Social Centres 
near its Villages that care for (non-SOS) orphaned children in the community on-site.  
The Villages and Social Centres depend almost entirely on foreign funding for their 
operations.  
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On completion of their secondary schooling, SOS children have the option of pursuing 
further education and training.  The academically gifted go to university, and others go to 
various types of technical colleges.  However, those children (now youth) who fail to 
pass their ‘O’ level examinations normally end up at what are called the SOS Vocational 
Training and Production Centres (VTPC) located on two farms fifteen kilometres from 
Bindura in the Shamva District of Mashonaland Central province. At present, there are 
about fifty youths at the VTPC being trained in agriculture and engineering.  
 
 
13.8 Vocational Training and Production Centres 
 
There are three NGO projects (called facilities) at the two farms: SOS Agricultural 
Training Scheme, SOS Maizelands Farm and SOS Engineering.  Each facility has a 
Manager and an Administrator.  SOS Maizelands farm is a commercially run farm that 
was purchased in 1989 and currently it grows maize, soybean, wheat and bananas.  It is 
expected by the NCO to turn over a profit (which it normally does) and thus generally it 
does not receive grants or subsidies from SOS Zimbabwe.  Simultaneously, SOS 
Zimbabwe discourages it from seeking bank loans for the purchase of capital equipment 
as this goes contrary to proper NGO practice.  In large measure, capital equipment has 
been purchased from profits.  The farm itself was purchased for a mixture of reasons: to 
offer a commercial environment in which to train SOS youth in agriculture; to provide a 
temporary farmer settler scheme through which SOS youth would pass after graduating 
from the training scheme; and to provide staple food for the Villages.  Effectively, the 
farm operates like any other private commercial farm in rural Zimbabwe.  To any outside 
observer, and even to most of the junior farm employees, the formal NGO status of the 
farm has always been unclear.  The Manager and Administrator are White and are 
husband and wife.  The NCO now recognizes this working relationship as contrary to 
good NGO practices of accountability but it has decided to let it continue.  The farm 
Manager receives an annual commission based on farm revenue and profit.   
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The Manager and Administrator do not consider themselves bound to the SOS Conditions 
of Service in terms of the salary scale in force, and they pay their permanent staff (about 
100 staff members) considerably less than the SOS scale.  About half (or 40%) of their 
staff have SOS contracts of employment but receive salaries amounting to 50% less than 
the official scale.  The other permanent staff (guards and irrigation ‘boys’) are contracted 
directly to the farm, and are paid according to National Employment Council 
(Agriculture) rates, which amount to about $ 7 U.S. per month. The farm has always 
justified this type of arrangement on the grounds that paying their workers SOS rates (a 
minimum $ 60 U.S. per month presently) would create problems amongst their 
neighbouring farmers and would make the farm unproductive.  SOS Zimbabwe has over 
the years accepted this rationale.  Besides the permanent staff (nearly all male), the farm 
employs numerous weekly or seasonal contractors (nearly all female), many of whom 
reside on the farm as family members or relatives of permanent staff. 
 
At SOS Glen Avilin Farm there are two vocational facilities for SOS youth: an 
agricultural training scheme (ATS) and an engineering training scheme (SOS 
Engineering).  Both projects have a Manager and an Administrator, and all are White 
except for the Administrator at ATS.  The long-standing Manager of SOS Engineering 
has always hired Whites as his Administrator because he believes that Blacks cannot be 
trusted.  At times he has thought of employing his wife as the Administrator.  He once 
informally raised this with the previous National Director (who retired in March 2005), 
but it was rejected on grounds of NGO transparency.  The wife of the ATS Manager is 
the sister of the SOS Maizelands Manager, and there is considerable overlap (and indeed 
confusion) between professional and private lives at the two farms.  This situation has 
also led to the blurring of distinctions between public NGO goods and private employee 
goods.  For instance, the wife of the Maizelands Manager operates a farm store at 
Maizelands (and profits from it), and the wife of the ATS Manager regularly uses her 
husband’s NGO-owned vehicle for private trips.  At times, these practices border on the 
privatization of public goods.  
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SOS Engineering has a large, well-equipped engineering workshop and it is supposed to 
run as a commercially viable venture.  In the past it did significant volumes of work for 
White commercial farmers in the area, including the building of fixed assets such as farm 
sheds and repairs to moveable assets such as tractors and ploughs.  Currently, though, it 
mainly relies on furniture orders from SOS-KDI for villages under construction 
throughout southern Africa.  Over the past few years, because of reasons of political 
instability, SOS-KDI has put on hold any further Village construction in Zimbabwe itself.  
ATS has a much more limited commercial side to its operations, primarily in the form of 
a grinding mill.  The VTPC Managers have constantly questioned the status of their 
facilities with NCO.  The ATS Manager has downplayed the (unprofitable) ‘commercial’ 
aspect of his facility so that NCO will continue to subsidize his vocational facility.  The 
Engineering Manager failed to do this, and now he is under intense pressure from NCO to 
commercially ‘break even’ in terms of operational costs.  All major building construction 
and the purchase of fixed assets at these facilities have involved grants from SOS-KDI.   
 
Both facilities offer a three-year training programme, and each has two training officers.  
ATS has about thirty-five trainees and SOS Engineering has about fifteen trainees.  Most 
of these youths come from the three Villages but included are also fifteen non-SOS 
(‘scholarship’) youths at the facilities drawn from other children’s homes in Zimbabwe.  
Presently, on behalf of the Villages, SOS Zimbabwe pays the training facilities an 
amount of $ 4,500 U.S. per year per trainee. These facilities also receive the same amount 
for each ‘scholarship’ youth.  The training fees are meant to cover trainee-related costs 
incurred by the facilities.  The youth, who are all Black and mainly male, stay at hostels 
on SOS Glen Avilin Farm.   
 
Once the agricultural trainees finish their three-year programme, they move to the Avilin 
Tenant Scheme that is located on Glen Avilin Farm.  Initially, this was meant to be a 
transitional phase for the SOS youth venturing into agriculture on a full-time basis after 
leaving the SOS system.  However, SOS has never had a strategy or plan for integrating 
their youth into surrounding agricultural communities in Shamva.  At the Scheme, the 
tenants are given one or two hectares of land for cropping mainly maize, soybean and 
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cotton.  Over a three-year period as a tenant, they are expected to become financially self-
sufficient although they also receive considerable support from Maizelands farm (for a 
cost) in the form of, amongst other things, tractor ploughing and agricultural inputs.  In 
the end, they are expected to learn what it takes to be a farmer in the real (post-SOS) 
world.  Recently though, and quite controversially, this temporary scheme has been 
turned into a permanent scheme.  
 
SOS Maizelands farm and SOS Glen Avilin Farm are located in a prime agricultural area.  
Up until the year 2000, the Shamva District had about forty White commercial farmers.  
Only five are left.  As well, communal areas are within a thirty-minute drive from the 
SOS farms, and two ‘old’ resettlement farms (originally settled in the 1980s) border 
them.  HUMANA People to People, as noted in Chapter Twelve, once owned five 
commercial farms in the district. 
 
 
13.9 The Years Preceding the Accelerated Reform Programme 
 
By the time accelerated reform emerged in the year 2000, SOS Zimbabwe had been 
operating in the Shamva district for over ten years.  Yet, it had formed few if any 
structured linkages with the surrounding rural communities.  Rather, these linkages were 
in large part ad hoc and personal.  For instance, the White Managers and Administrators 
developed close personal ties with a number of White commercial farmers, and socialized 
with them outside working hours including at the Shamva Golf and Country Club.  
Indeed, prior to taking up his position at SOS Maizelands, the farm Manager was 
employed as a Manager by the White commercial farmer at nearby Nyamwanga Farm. 
These personal ties, and the positions adopted by the White SOS senior staff, came back 
to haunt SOS during the land reform programme.  Also, as noted earlier, SOS 
Engineering relied almost exclusively on White commercial farmers for productive work 
for its workshop.  As well, Maizelands Farm drew female labour (for example, to grade 
maize seed) from the communal areas on a seasonal basis, and would daily truck them in 
on its lorry.  There was rarely any contact with the ‘old’ settlers, except when their cattle 
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strayed on to SOS property and feasted on its crops or when SOS farm workers illegally 
cut down trees in the resettlement areas.  Lastly, many rural people in the surrounding 
area would travel to the ATS grinding mill to have their maize ground.  
 
SOS Zimbabwe, and local management on the two farms, never saw any reason to 
meaningfully engage with the multi-faceted rural communities in Shamva in any 
conscious, direct or comprehensive manner.  Such an approach never formed part of its 
organizational strategy, particularly given that its core business (and the centre of the 
organization) was the Villages.  SOS Zimbabwe, and in fact SOS-KDI, exist solely 
because of the Villages.  The VTPC were designed to serve that child-centred purpose, 
and to offer some kind of future to their youth who (without ‘O’ levels) would likely have 
no opportunities to further their education.  In this sense, the VTPC had an inward-
looking policy and approach, and never felt the need to embed themselves within the 
broader agrarian communities.   
 
 
13.10 The Accelerated Reform Programme 
 
In September 1999, the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
was formed in Zimbabwe.  Its leader, Morgan Tsvangarai, soon came to the provincial 
capital of Bindura to hold meetings and to drum up financial support.  He held a meeting 
at Insingisi Farm, just outside Bindura, and White farmers thronged to hear him.  Many 
farmers publicly declared their support for the MDC and even became local 
representatives for the party in the area.  The referendum on the draft constitution, which 
included clauses on land acquisition and the executive presidency, was to take place in 
February 2000, and the MDC was campaigning for a ‘no’ vote.  In the months preceding 
the referendum, farm workers in Shamva were loaded and squeezed onto the back of 
lorry trucks by commercial farmers and sent to MDC rallies in Bindura.   
 
Most White commercial farms in the Shamva District were occupied soon after the 
holding of the referendum, although this was an uneven process.  At times, specific 
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occupations arose as a direct result of ZANU-PF rallies in the town of Shamva.   Base 
camps, normally headed by war veterans, were set up on the occupied farms.  Initially, 
there were constant negotiations between ‘settlers’, farmers and the district war veteran 
office in Shamva (located at the DRC offices) about the status of the ‘settlers’ on the 
farm.  The ‘settlers’ made their presence felt on the farms by positioning their camps near 
the entrance of the homestead of the White farmer, by placing demands on the farmer for 
food and transport, and by at times forcefully preventing the farmer from ploughing or 
harvesting his fields.  The occupied farms were later designated for resettlement, and a 
few farmers were still leaving their properties as late as the year 2005.  The remaining 
White farmers have been able (for now) to secure their continued presence in the district. 
 
The two farms owned by SOS were never occupied, and it appears that there was an 
unwritten directive from government that they not be occupied. Certainly, the local 
ZANU-PF Member of Parliament, Nicholas Goche, intimated this to the author in May 
2000.  Yet, this did not leave the SOS farms untouched by land reform.  For instance, 
some supporters of ZANU-PF set up a base camp on Maizelands farm called the Border 
Gezi Base Camp, named after the (now deceased) ZANU-PF provincial governor for 
Mashonaland Central.  On special occasions, this camp would issue (officially stamped) 
hand-written notes to SOS facility Managers, requesting contributions of various kinds 
(invariably transport and meat) for national celebrations such as Heroes Day.  Demands 
of this kind also led Maizelands farm to contribute furniture (built by SOS Engineering) 
at no cost to a new secondary school in the immediate vicinity.   
 
ZANU-PF activism on the SOS farms also increased dramatically during the years 2000 
and 2001, and there were regular marches as well as meetings at which all farm workers 
were expected to attend. The SOS farms were rumoured to be sympathetic to the 
opposition.  This was based on a claim by local ruling party activists that most of the 
ballots found in the boxes at the farm election points after the 2000 parliamentary and 
2002 presidential elections were for the MDC.  Numerous SOS workers were labelled as 
MDC supporters and at times were subjected to intimidation.  Also, staff dismissed from 
work at the SOS farms on legitimate grounds (for example, theft) used Third Chimurenga 
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threats to intimidate their superiors.  Thus, one dismissed employee at ATS organized a 
banner march on SOS Glen Avilin farm against the Administrator, and a former 
employee at SOS Engineering arranged for the new ZANU-PF-backed trade union 
federation (the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions) to pay the National Director an 
impromptu visit at his offices in Harare.   
 
Further, the Maizelands farm Manager allowed a prominent commercial farmer aligned 
to the MDC to stay at the SOS farm house when he was experiencing extremely difficult 
times at his farms.  The Manager also permitted farm equipment from occupied farms 
(notably from Nyamwanga Farm) to be moved onto the SOS farms for safekeeping, as 
this was designed to prevent the equipment from being taken by the new farmers.  In 
time, settlers from Nyamwanga Farm came to SOS Glen Avilin Farm (along with the 
police and a camera crew) and removed what they claimed was Nyamwanga (and thus 
their) property.  In the process, and despite being shown documentation on SOS assets by 
the chief Security Officer at the SOS farms, they took assets (for example, irrigation 
pipes) that rightfully belonged to SOS.  
 
As well, in 2001 the Government designated SOS Glen Avilin Farm for resettlement 
purposes.  In response to a local appeal by SOS, the Provincial Governor wrote to SOS 
and promised that the farm would not be resettled.  The designation however was never 
repealed, although its period of enforcement has since lapsed.  More recently, in 
December 2005, the Government listed SOS Maizelands Farm for land redistribution in 
terms of a recent amendment to the Constitution.  The farm is now state land and there is 
no basis for appeal.  SOS NCO has written to the relevant state authority about the listing 
but no response has been received.  SOS though has the option of asking for a 99-year 
lease on the property.  In the meantime, a prominent Black farmer in the area who is also 
a high-ranking military official has assured the Maizelands farm Manager that SOS can 
continue as normal in its farm operations. 
 
In the context of accelerated reform, the SOS farms continued to operate in an inward-
looking fashion.  They have been largely reactive in their stance, responding to specific 
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pressures and demands as they emanate.  No attempt has been made to understand the 
radical agrarian change that has taken place in the district, and certainly no linkages 
whatsoever have been established with the newly resettled farmers.  If anything, VTPC 
management bemoans the loss of the White commercial farmers as a source of both 
business and friendship. 
 
 
13.11 Organizational Dynamics 
 
SOS Zimbabwe has its national office in Harare.  Its long-serving ex-National Director 
held the reigns of power from the year 1990 to March 2005.  He is a former White 
commercial farmer.  Although not a founder member of the NGO, over the years he 
without doubt stamped his authority and style of management on the organization.  This 
had direct implications for the VTPC in Shamva.  All three White Managers at the VTPC 
are also long-serving staff members and over the years they developed close personal 
relations with the National Director to whom they reported.   
 
In effect, the Director considered the VTPC as his sole responsibility and he did not allow 
any other member of the NCO to interfere in the VTPC operations.  For instance, SOS 
Zimbabwe for many years has had the position of Financial Controller located at NCO.  
The financial affairs of the Villages have always fallen directly under the ambit of the 
Financial Controller, and Village Administrators have reported to the Controller.  In the 
case of the VTPC, the Administrators have reported only to their facility Manager and 
they did not have any structured relationship with NCO.  The current Financial Controller 
at NCO speaks about being ‘sidelined’ by the former National Director when it came to 
the VTPC.  The (White) assistant National Director at the time (now the National 
Director since April 2005) was also marginalized and his area of responsibility was 
strictly the Black-run Villages.  He at times described the VTPC Managers as ‘the three 
musketeers’.  Further, the position of Human Resources Officer at NCO was created in 
1996 and a Black woman was appointed.  Despite her protests, she was denied access to 
the VTPC and subsequently resigned.  The position was then abolished.  For many years 
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at NCO there has been an Education Coordinator responsible for, amongst other things, 
the (post-secondary school) academic and vocational needs of the SOS youth.  Again, for 
reasons that remain unclear to the current occupant of this position, the VTPC have 
always fallen outside the parameters of this position.   
 
This hands-off approach has led to the three NGO projects (or facilities) at the farms in 
Shamva being in large part privatized by the White Managers.  Hence, these Managers 
have been given the leeway to conduct themselves and administer their projects in a 
manner that may not necessarily be in the best interests of the NGO as a whole, or that 
may at least be inconsistent with the vision of SOS.  Intriguingly, the most junior of staff 
at the farms have noted this process of privatization.  Thus, in the eyes of many workshop 
staff at SOS Engineering, the Manager is seen to ‘own the company’.  And, after 
discussing the issue privately for many years, the irrigation workers have recently written 
to the Maizelands Manager to ask if they are employed by SOS, Maizelands farm or by 
the Manager himself.   This privatization of public (NGO) goods arose and developed 
with the tacit support if not the active encouragement of the ex-National Director.   
 
The Heads of Department at NCO, including the Financial Controller and the Education 
Coordinator, never directly challenged the Director on this score.  And nor did the staff 
employed on the two Shamva farms openly question the facility Managers.  In large part, 
staff felt powerlessness and feared risking their employment or the special benefits they 
received.  The ATS Manager in particular has used his position to give perks to his key 
staff as part of some kind of patrimonial patron-client relationship.  This has ensured their 
compliance to the system if not their loyalty to him.  In this regard, many of the 
relationships at the VTPC have been personalized.  This privatized and personalized 
system has meant that the VTPC operate as almost autonomous facilities (or fiefdoms) 
within SOS Zimbabwe.   
 
Even more striking, there remains no clear indication that the VTPC in any way 
contribute to the overall vision and mission of SOS Zimbabwe.  In this respect, there is 
no record of any form of either external or internal evaluation of the three farm facilities 
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throughout their entire period of existence.  This is a highly unusual state of affairs for an 
international NGO.  It is also particularly problematic and perplexing given that the 
VTPC as projects within SOS-KDI are quite unique to Zimbabwe and thus constant 
monitoring and evaluation would presumably be critical to their overall forward 
direction.  However, unlike the Villages, processes of evaluation have never been 
integrated into the organizational systems at the VTPC.  Further, there is no monitoring 
and evaluation department at NCO to ensure that this gaping lacuna at the VTPC is 
rectified.  In this context, it would appear that the VTPC have been deliberately shielded 
and protected from any outside investigation and interference.  It is also highly unlikely 
that the VTPC Managers would welcome any monitoring and evaluation as it may 
uncover the many organizational dysfunctions that seem to exist at the VTPC.    
 
 
13.12 Organizational Dysfunctions 
 
The three farm facilities are NGO projects but, as noted above, they have been privatized 
and commercialized.  They are not consciously and intentionally run as NGO facilities, 
and there is no systematic attempt to develop a NGO organizational culture amongst the 
staff.  The ex-National Director gave the three White Managers extraordinary perks 
(compared to the Black Village Directors) yet they do not have a basic understanding of 
NGO theory and practice.  In fact, two of the Managers have no formal qualifications in 
any field and the third has a certificate in tobacco farming.  On the other hand, the 
Village Director closest to the farms (in Bindura) has recently obtained a Masters degree 
in business administration.  The White Managers have never sought to develop their 
managerial or NGO skills, and they normally avoid attending the managerial workshops 
organized by the Education Coordinator for all senior SOS Zimbabwe staff.  In a sense, 
the ex-National Director granted them ‘protected’ or ‘sheltered’ employment, and they 
are now entrenched in their positions.  Despite the tremendous changes taking place over 
the past six years in rural Zimbabwe, they have stuck it out.  This is not because of some 
deep altruistic commitment on their part to the vision of SOS Zimbabwe.  Rather, it 
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emanates from their unlikely ability to obtain comparable employment and benefits 
elsewhere in the country.  In a sense, they have nowhere else to go. 
 
This state of affairs has led to serious dysfunctions at the VTPC.  I have already noted the 
failure on the part of NCO to properly evaluate the farm projects and the seeming 
disregard by the Managers for developing their managerial capacities.  Beyond this, there 
are considerable financial irregularities and asset mismanagement at the VTPC.  For 
instance, one Manager in the past has (along with his wife) purchased numerous personal 
items (including alcohol and cigarettes) with SOS funds and has had these items hidden 
in trainee canteen expense accounts.  He has also disposed of SOS assets on an 
unauthorized basis, often to his own staff.  As well, he had a major stake in the building 
company that up to recently did most of the construction on the farms.   
 
Prior to his departure, the ex-National Director warned the VTPC Managers of 
impending changes likely to take place after he left.  He highlighted in particular that the 
new National Director (at the time his assistant) might place the Financial Controller 
more directly over the farm facilities.  One VTPC Manager raised deep concerns about 
this, and hoped that the Controller would merely implement an accounting function and 
not an audit function.  In a similar vein, when a Human Resources Office was opened at 
the VTPC in late 2004, the VTPC Managers insisted that the job description of the 
Human Resources Officer specify that the Officer report not to NCO but directly to them.  
For over a year, the Officer refused to accept this clause.   
 
Probably the most serious dysfunction concerns the major stakeholders of SOS, that is, 
the youth.  The VTPC do not have to formally account to NCO for the expenditure of 
training fees they receive, nor for the conditions under which the youth live and train.  
The Managers at ATS and SOS Engineering wholly control the expenditure of the fees, 
without any input from the Training Officers.  In so doing, the VTPC make a significant 
gross profit on their training departments (if training expenses are subtracted from 
training fees).  Fees meant for the training department are used for other purposes in an 
uncontrolled fashion, such that the training facilities are severely under-resourced and 
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compromised.  For example, at the SOS farms there are more than ten computers but only 
one has been assigned to the training department.  This is found in the office of a 
Training Officer, and thus the students have no access to a computer.  There is also no 
library and recreational facilities are negligible.  Recently, the long-standing canteen for 
trainees was converted into a number of offices, and for over a year the trainees were 
served their food from the back of a trailer drawn by a tractor.   
 
On a regular basis, the Training Officers have raised serious concerns about these issues 
to the ATS and SOS Engineering Managers, but no discernable changes have been 
forthcoming.  The officers, despite their strategic position within the VTPC, feel largely 
excluded from the decision-making process within SOS and they would like to see the 
involvement of the national Education Coordinator in the farm facilities.  The youth 
themselves, as the ‘target group’ of the NGO, are given few if any opportunities to 
formally raise complaints with VTPC management.  In fact, they are in large part treated 
by management as ‘objects’ of development.  A participatory mode of facilitating ‘target 
group’ involvement does not exist. But, through their (largely defunct) Student 
Representative Council, the youth have recently lodged a series of complaints and they 
regularly express their displeasure in everyday forms of resistance.   
 
The Village Directors have also requested that they have an input into the management of 
the VTPC, considering that their youths are being trained there.  They cite for example 
the case of the tenant settler scheme referred to above.  In recent years, this scheme has 
been changed into a permanent scheme so as to become the kumusha (permanent rural 
home) of agricultural training graduates.  The ex-National Director put this change into 
effect, and he spoke glowingly about it at his retirement gathering at the farm in March 
2005.  Senior Black staff members at the farms refer to this as ‘a white man’s dream’.  
Indeed, the change goes contrary to the SOS policy that all SOS children be re-integrated 
into the broader community.  From an original eight tenants in the late 1990s there are 
now about forty tenants occupying small houses.  The land given to each tenant has 
decreased from three hectares to less than one hectare.  For this and other reasons, the 
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Bindura Village Director recently declared that his Village would no longer be sending 
any youth to the VTPC. 
 
 
13.13 Agrarian Change and Organizational Standstill 
 
At SOS Zimbabwe, there seems to be a serious discontinuity (if not gap) between the 
vision and mission of the organization on the one hand, and organizational practice on the 
other.   There is also considerable tension within organizational practices.  SOS-KDI, and 
consequently SOS Zimbabwe, rests the legitimacy of its childcare interventions on its 
unique Village concept.  This approach to childcare may have been path breaking and 
respectable decades ago, but in the context of current thinking (even Zimbabwean 
government thinking), institutional care is increasingly criticized for not being good value 
for money.  In other words, institutional care is financially draining and does not 
contribute to healthy personal development.  Despite this, SOS continues to rest on its 
laurels so to speak by promoting the Village model, although at times (as noted earlier) in 
slightly modified form as in South Africa. The sustainability of SOS as a NGO rests 
fundamentally on upholding this model.  However, despite its Tracking Footprints 
programme, SOS has yet to systematically evaluate its childcare work in Zimbabwe.   
 
Presently, there is no basis on which the organization can stridently claim that it is 
contributing in any significant manner to sustainable livelihoods amongst its ex-youth as 
its most critical group of ‘stakeholders’.  In this regard, the practices of the organization 
may be contributing more than anything else to the sustainability of the organizational 
form as a site of employment for its staff (as another body of ‘stakeholders’).  Thus, the 
organization may be more staff-driven than beneficiary-driven.  If ‘sustainable 
livelihoods’ is used as a crude proxy for sustainable development, then there appears to 
be a marked tension within SOS organizational processes between promoting sustainable 
development for the youth and promoting a sustainable organization for the staff.  This is 
particularly noticeable at the Village level.  Despite (if not because of) the fact that the 
Village Directors and other senior staff are clearly committed to the vision of the 
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organization and they show a keen interest in their children and youth, the tension exists.  
They continue to sustain an organizational form that may in the end be counter-
productive to the achievement of the mission of the NGO. 
 
On the other hand, the tension at the VTPC is more between organizational vision and 
organizational practice than within practice itself.  Unlike their counterparts at the 
Villages, the VTPC Managers are in no sense driven by the SOS mission and vision.  In 
this respect, there is a near chasm between a publicly declared NGO mission and 
privately held motivations and agendas. The vision and the practices seem to be pulling 
in opposing directions.  This has arisen for reasons outlined above, namely, because of 
the relationship that developed over a number of years between the NCO and the VTPC, 
particularly between the ex-National Director and the VTPC Managers.  This 
relationship, involving significant autonomy for the VTPC, was never conducive to the 
formation of solid NGO values and practices at the VTPC.  What is problematic at the 
VTPC is not simply the product of their work but also the very organizational processes 
through which this product is to be generated.  In sustaining the VTPC through the land 
reform period in the face of considerable adversity, the Managers were not seeking to 
maintain the interests of SOS as a NGO but rather the interests of an organization per se 
and their positions of privilege within it.   
 
The VTPC Managers have in large measure been insulated from the insecurities that arise 
from ‘chasing donors’.  In fact, the NCO has ensured that there is a regular flow of funds 
to sustain the projects, either in the form of grants or subsidies.  In a sense, then, NCO 
has shielded the VTPC from the effects of ‘the global’.  At the same time, the business 
and personal links that the Managers established with the surrounding agrarian 
communities have focused exclusively on White commercial farmers.  These, of course, 
have been significantly disrupted because of land reform.  Subsequent to this, the 
Managers have not sought to establish any organizational links with farmers in the new 
settlement schemes.  This organizational inclination not to become embedded in ‘the 
local’ has served, at first sight, to stabilize the world of the VTPC.  Effectively, the VTPC 
inhabit their own secluded world, and almost seem detached from the glocalization 
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processes occurring within the broader agrarian economy.  They seem to be at a standstill 
organizationally despite the winds of agrarian change.  The current dysfunctions within 
the VTPC exist not so much because of tension between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, but 
because of the absence of tension.  The glocal tensions that inhabit the world of 
intermediary NGOs are ‘healthy’ tensions if ‘balanced’ and ‘handled’ in a manner that 
leads to organizational sustainability.  In their absence, there is always the chance that a 
NGO (such as the VTPC at SOS) will turn inward and almost implode upon itself.   
 
 
13.4 NGO Values, Policies and Practices 
 
The discussion in this chapter raises questions about the relationship between 
organizational values, policies and practices.  In relation to land reform, it was 
highlighted earlier that policy formation and implementation processes should not be 
understood in terms of a linear or instrumentalist model.  This means that the ‘success’ or 
‘failure’ of policy (and the effectiveness of state ‘land’ actions) cannot simply be read 
from the differences between policy intention and policy implementation.   
 
Likewise, the ‘effectiveness’ of NGOs cannot necessarily be read from the extent or form 
of deviation of organizational practices from NGO missions and visions, and NGO 
practices cannot be judged solely (if at all) in those terms.  In this regard, I raised the 
argument that NGOs are often more involved in sustaining their own organizations than 
in facilitating sustainable development as enunciated in NGO mission statements.  
Further, the failure of NGOs to deliver on their development promises does not invariably 
undermine their continued existence.  In fact, if NGO practices were actually assessed in 
terms of NGO values and policies, then it is highly unlikely that the NGO phenomenon 
would survive considering the wide chasm between NGO values and NGO practices.   
 
This is the import of the work of Mosse (2004), who raises intriguing questions about the 
international development system: ‘[W]hat if development practice is not driven by 
policy? … What if the practices of development are in fact concealed rather than 
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produced by policy? What, if instead of policy producing practice, practices produce 
policy...?’ (Mosse 2004:p.2)  Clearly, Mosse seriously doubts the causal link between 
policy and practice.  Unlike postmodernist discourse analysts, he is not claiming that 
policy arises to rationalize and mystify sinister ulterior purposes that in the end inform 
existing practices.  Rather, policy emerges from the world and work of development as 
practitioners articulate and frame coherent representations of development practices, and 
thus ‘success in development depends upon the stabilisation of a particular interpretation, 
a policy model’.  Thus, ‘development projects are “successful” not because they turn 
design into reality, but because they sustain policy models offering a significant 
interpretation of events.’ (Mosse 2004:pp.8, 20)  Policy exists primarily to legitimize 
rather than to guide practices and, indeed, the latter sustains the former.  This public 
representation is a negotiated outcome between all groups (‘developers’ and ‘un-
developed’) engaged in a particular development programme and it serves their varied 
interests.  In this regard, the ‘the gap between policy and practice is constantly negotiated 
away’ (Mosse 2004:p.27).  
 
In terms of Mosse’s argument, NGO policies do not serve as mere ‘standard-bearers’ and 
‘beacons’.  They also serve to make sense of the world of NGOs by weaving together a 
stabilized interpretation of the organizational practices of NGOs in facilitating 
development and building democracy.  This story acts as a form of representation, and 
depicts the work of NGOs as marked by order, coherence and direction.  It thus animates 
the world of NGOs and justifies it.  Hence, as long as the groups involved sustain and 
validate the dominant representation, major discontinuities between ‘policy’ and 
‘practice’ are not necessarily dysfunctional to the sustainability of NGOs as 
organizational forms.  This was shown clearly in the case of the VTPC at SOS 
Zimbabwe.  This thesis goes further by arguing that stabilization is not simply a 
discursive practice that is socially constructed through development processes and 
practices.  NGOs also seek to stabilize their organizational practices by bringing 
simplicity and order to their world.  This will be brought to the fore in the concluding 
chapter to the thesis. 
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Chapter 14 
 Understanding Intermediary NGOs 
 
 
This thesis has provided an original understanding of intermediary NGOs in the modern 
world.  In doing so, it has drawn upon a diverse range of existing methodological and 
theoretical claims, and has woven these into a coherent perspective.  This unique 
understanding of NGOs has been developed and illustrated with reference to ‘land’ 
NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe, most notably with respect to the radical restructuring 
of agrarian relations that emerged from accelerated land reform.  The shifting agrarian 
landscape in Zimbabwe offered a solid empirical basis for theorizing about intermediary 
NGOs. 
 
 
14.1 The ‘Inside Story’ 
 
 
The thesis has argued that intermediary NGOs tend to reproduce a Glocal modernity, that 
is, they pursue strategies and practices that reproduce global forms of social domination.  
This trajectory is abundantly clear from the discussion of contemporary Zimbabwe, 
where ‘land’ NGOs failed to significantly challenge unjust agrarian relations either 
through advocacy or development practices.   In many ways, this conclusion about NGOs 
and the reproduction of global trajectories is commonly found in the academic literature, 
although it is expressed in different ways and is arrived at through a multiplicity of routes 
(Zaidi 1999, Sader 2002, Manji and O’Coill 2002).   
 
My theoretical perspective on intermediary NGOs is particularly significant because it 
decisively moves beyond the main perspective of sociological behaviourism that prevails 
in the academic literature on NGOs.  Sociological behaviourism leads to functionalist and 
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instrumentalist accounts of NGOs, as understood as part of broader civil society.  It has 
‘empiricist’ and ‘structuralist’ trends, with differing political orientations.   
 
The empiricist trend bypasses analytical deconstruction and treats intermediary NGOs as 
un-deconstructed concrete totalities.  In doing so, it underplays the structures of global 
domination that significantly mark the social world of NGOs, and it over-privileges 
contradictions in the interaction between NGOs and nation-states in the South and East.  
In terms of policy recommendations, it merely calls for selected reforms to the 
development industry (or changing the rules of the game).   
 
On the other hand, the structuralist trend deconstructs the development system and aptly 
highlights global forms of domination.  However, it does not move beyond 
deconstruction and fails to reconstruct the contradictory world of NGOs as immersed in 
real historical processes.  It hence depicts NGOs as un-reconstructed abstract totalities.  
Further, it argues for radical restructuring of the development industry (or changing the 
game altogether) in order to address global domination.  Neither trend within sociological 
behaviourism ably captures simultaneously both ‘contradiction’ and ‘domination’ as 
essential ingredients of NGO social realities in the modern world.  
 
Despite their conceptual and moral differences, both trends are problematic in two key 
analytical senses.  First of all, they treat NGOs in terms of a subject-object dichotomy.  
For instance, structuralists conceptualize NGOs in the South and East as objects that 
function to reproduce global capitalism.  And empiricists envisage NGOs as subjects that 
function to advance democracy and development in the ‘peripheries’ and, in the process, 
NGOs regularly confront authoritarian states.  Such arguments revolve around the 
ontological notion of NGOs as ‘things’.  Admittedly, NGOs do have an objective 
existence, yet the subject-object dichotomy in large part disembodies NGOs of 
contradictory social relations and also distracts from a sustained analysis of processes and 
practices internal to NGOs as organizational forms.   
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The second problem concerns the pronounced realist account of the relationship between 
NGOs and their external world.  NGOs do things to others or have things done to them by 
others, but all this is seemingly unmediated by ‘meaning’.  In other words, sociological 
behaviourism does not examine the many ways in which NGOs meaningfully construct 
their world through ongoing engagement and negotiation with their ‘significant others’.  
For example, structuralists portray global capital as simply imposing international 
agendas on subservient and compliant NGOs.  They appear oblivious to the possibility 
that the relationship between global capital and NGOs may entail active and forceful 
initiatives on the part of NGOs, and that the ‘subservient’ outcome may be what NGOs 
seek.  As well, empiricists are insensitive to the likelihood that, in interacting 
meaningfully with rural communities, NGOs may be more interested in sustaining their 
own organizational forms than in facilitating sustainable development.  In general, then, 
the realism of sociological behaviourism ‘reads’ NGO realities independent of the 
meanings that NGOs give to their ambivalent world.  
 
This thesis has overcome the methodological problems pertaining to realism and the 
subject-object dualism by returning to the thoughts of Marx and Weber.  Marx’s 
epistemology suggests the fruitfulness of conceptualizing NGOs as contingent 
organizational forms, and as embodying and expressing contradictory relationships.  For 
analytical purposes, throughout the thesis I highlighted the contradictions between ‘the 
global’ and ‘the local’, and I argued that NGOs are immersed in uneven processes of 
glocalization.  Understanding NGOs as a social ‘form’ deals with the first problem 
discussed above, namely, the subject-object dichotomy.   
 
Form analysis overcomes functionalist and instrumentalist renditions of the NGO world.  
NGO ‘function’ is mediated by NGO ‘form’ and is not posited a priori.  The 
contradictions embedded in the ‘form’ imply that NGOs, within boundaries set by these 
contradictions, can ‘move’ in any direction, depending on how the contradictions work 
themselves out under real historical processes.  Specific NGOs may – or may not – 
reproduce global forms of domination.  Hence, deriving from Marx’s epistemology, this 
particular insight allows my perspective to account for both ‘domination’ and 
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‘contradiction’, as well as for the considerable diversity that exists between NGOs 
operating throughout the South and East. 
 
The Weberian notion of ‘meaning’ transcends the second problem noted above, that is, 
the realist accounts of NGOs that predominate within the literature.  It highlights the fact 
that NGOs interface with their ‘external’ world in a meaning-soaked manner, and that 
NGOs ‘handle’ the contradictions within their social field through meaning-laden 
organizational practices.  The contingent interfaces that delimit the world of NGOs, 
namely, the interfaces with global donors, nation-states and rural communities, are 
‘constructed’ and ‘negotiated’ interfaces.  NGOs give specific (historically contingent) 
meanings to these interfaces and act accordingly.   
 
From a ‘meaning’ point of view, the world of NGOs must be seen ‘from inside’ through 
‘thick descriptions’ of organizational processes and practices.  If for instance 
intermediary NGOs are seemingly ‘in the pocket’ of global capital (or if they reproduce a 
Glocal modernity), then this historical tendency is not simply imposed upon them in an 
unmediated fashion independent of meaning.  It is a negotiated organizational outcome of 
NGOs that is pursued on a basis (or for reasons) that cannot be properly read ‘from 
outside’. 
 
The unique perspective on intermediary NGOs identified and developed in this thesis 
revolves around a double ‘inside story’.  On the one hand, as part of deconstruction, 
Marx’s epistemology leads us to go inside the NGO ‘form’ and to unmask the 
contradictory social relations that make up the form.  This enables my perspective to go 
significantly beyond instrumentalist and functionalist accounts of NGOs.  Form analysis 
demonstrates that the world of NGOs is turbulent rather than static, and that it is 
invariably characterized by ambiguity and ambivalence.  As a result, NGOs may ‘travel’ 
in numerous directions and ‘position themselves’ in different spots, depending on the 
specific historical circumstances.  In addition, this allows my perspective to incorporate 
and explain the considerable diversity that exists within the NGO ‘sector’ globally.  
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On the other hand, Weber’s ontological claim about the relevance of ‘meaning’ (and 
meaningful practices) again requires us to go inside the form, but now as part of 
historically reconstructing the world of NGOs.  This claim brings to the fore the notion 
that the world of NGOs is not simply forced upon them ‘from outside’.  Rather, NGOs 
actively negotiate their way through this (their) world, and they ‘handle’ and ‘manage’ 
the contradictions and tensions that come their way through meaningful social action.  
Although by no means exclusively so, it is absolutely critical that NGOs be understood 
from ‘the inside’.  This would entail a detailed analysis of organizational systems, 
practices and conflicts in order to grasp the origin, formation and development of NGO 
action.  This action, as it impinges on the outside world, cannot be reduced to NGO 
‘functions’.  Rather, this action involves contingent NGO ‘outcomes’ and ‘effects’. 
 
In drawing on specific claims made by Marx and Weber, this double ‘inside story’ marks 
the original and unique significance of the theoretical perspective on NGOs contained in 
this thesis.  The perspective is not ‘positional’ in the sense of being hamstrung by a 
particular sociological tradition, whether Marxist or Weberian.  Indeed, it offers a 
sensitive and nuanced rendering of the complex and intricate world of NGOs without 
‘slotting’ NGOs into a fixed and necessary social or political trajectory.  In this sense, 
NGOs themselves are also not depicted as ‘positional’, that is, as invariably following a 
particular path or agenda.   
 
Ultimately, this thesis is a discursive work, or an analytical work of deconstruction.  That 
is the singular strength of the thesis.  The empirical discussions on land reform and NGOs 
have been designed primarily to illustrate, and hopefully tantalizingly, the original 
theoretical framework developed in the thesis.  I make no claim to the effect that the 
empirical material provides a comprehensive reconstruction of the world of NGOs under 
specific historical conditions.  In other words, the historical reconstruction in this thesis is 
in large part exploratory.  It seeks to be suggestive of the importance of the theoretical 
perspective and to offer fruitful leads for further research.  In this regard, the thesis opens 
up the prospects of a new research agenda on NGOs, deriving from the uniqueness of the 
‘double inside story’.   
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14.2 Intermediary ‘Land’ NGOs in Zimbabwe 
 
In theorizing about intermediary NGOs, the thesis consistently brings to the fore the 
ongoing contradictions between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ in the modern world.  It 
argues that ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ are internally related and constituted, and that 
these moments are manifested in processes of ‘glocalization’.  These contradictory 
moments are expressed in and through the world and work of NGOs.   
 
This is shown empirically through an investigation of intermediary ‘land’ NGOs in 
contemporary Zimbabwe.  A conceptual distinction is made between ‘advocating for 
change’ and ‘development and change’, and ‘land’ NGOs are discussed on this basis.  In 
general terms, the thesis shows the ways in which development and advocacy NGOs – 
from the mid-1990s onwards – constantly manoeuvred and negotiated their way through 
the unfolding tensions between the global and local moments of agrarian and land reform, 
or processes of agrarian glocalization. 
   
On the one hand, agrarian glocalization has marked homogenizing tendencies in terms of 
both policies and struggles.  In the case of policies, it is shown that global agrarian 
commodity chains dominate the world market and that market-led land reforms are found 
throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America.  The historical development of these 
processes of global levelling is highlighted with respect to a shift, albeit tentatively, from 
a state-centred to a society-centred land reform programme internationally.  Generalized 
struggles over land also exist because of the common crises of rural livelihoods and 
social reproduction strategies in the ‘peripheries’.  Of particular significance are uncivil 
forms of struggle engaged in by the peasantries, including land occupations or land self-
provisioning.  The thesis links these global changes to contemporary thinking on the 
agrarian question. 
 
At the same time, there are significant regional and local variations to agrarian 
glocalization.  In this regard, the ‘local’ Zimbabwean agrarian landscape cannot be read 
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from ‘global’ trajectories.  Although reform in Zimbabwe during the Phase I land 
programme (from 1980 to 1996) was consistent with global trends and indeed was shaped 
by them, land initiatives – including halting land reform – were also structured by local 
forces and interests within both the White and Black populations.  This phase left 
unaddressed livelihood problems with reference to farm labourers on White commercial 
farms and to small-scale farmers in customary areas.   
 
Throughout Phase II of the programme (from 1997 to current), the localized moment of 
agrarian change in Zimbabwe was dramatically highlighted by nationalist assertions on 
land, significantly during the Third Chimurenga.  This uncivil action led to an 
acrimonious debate within Zimbabwean social studies, which the thesis thoroughly 
addresses.  But this action also raised serious challenges for the civil NGO ‘sector’ in 
Zimbabwe.  During Phase II in particular, ‘land’ NGOs (whether engaged in advocacy or 
development endeavours) found themselves ‘caught in the crossfire’, but not in the firing 
line of deepening conflicts over land.  They did not die a sudden and brutal death, but 
managed to dodge the bullets and agonizingly maintain their NGO operations in an 
altered but still viable form. 
 
‘Advocacy’ NGOs were, relatively speaking, particularly active during the late 1990s 
when there was public dialogue on land reform and intense land policy formulation.  
However, with the emergence of the accelerated reform programme in the year 2000, the 
advocacy door was firmly closed.  Over the past decade, advocacy ‘land’ NGOs became 
entrapped in a sticky web of intrigue between global donors and the Zimbabwean 
government that had been spun continuously throughout the post-colonial period.  They 
eventually became almost ‘immobilized’ in this web and, in a sort of organizational 
balancing act, ‘distanced’ themselves from the main antagonists to the land conflicts and 
from strenuous advocacy work.   
 
This distancing act cannot be reduced to political and ideological dispositions on the part 
of advocacy NGOs, although undoubtedly such dispositions played a part in the outright 
rejection by many NGOs of the accelerated land reform programme.  Nor can the overt 
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pressure placed upon these NGOs by global donors provide a sufficient explanation.  
Instead, it is critical to go beyond politics and to enter the ‘inside world’ of these NGOs.  
This entails identifying the ‘internal’ dispositions and interests that shape NGO 
organizational practices.  Notably, seeking to engage in full-blown advocacy work on the 
highly complex and contentious terrain of land reform in contemporary Zimbabwe would 
have placed considerable strain on these NGOs as organizational forms, and this may 
have jeopardized their continued functioning.   
 
In a similar vein, ‘development’ NGOs in Zimbabwe – in the face of the on-the-ground 
complications and tensions of accelerated land reform – hesitantly stepped back from 
their long-term development programmes in the ‘old’ resettlement areas and customary 
lands.  Instead, they increasingly engaged in short-term humanitarian aid and agricultural 
recovery work.  At the same, they stood at an almost bemused distance from the turbulent 
‘new’ resettlement areas.  It is tempting to argue that ‘development’ NGOs were forced 
to do this under the sheer weight of political circumstances.  Yet, like advocacy NGOs, it 
is possible to discern organizational dispositions through the political clouds.  
Development NGOs, at a time of donor intransigence with the Zimbabwean government, 
were able to maintain their financial (and organizational) lifelines because of their 
humanitarian work and their distancing from accelerated reform.   
 
Hence, it is highly problematic to assume that these acts of immobilization and distancing 
on the part of ‘land’ NGOs represent signs of NGO incapacities and weaknesses.  The 
case studies of FOST and SOS point to organizational actions (and inactions) which 
appear at first sight to indicate blatant NGO failure, such as the retreat from long-term 
development initiatives on commercial farms and the inability to become embedded 
within changing agrarian communities.  Yet, such a conclusion may entail confusing 
organizational problems with organizational solutions.  In other words, these 
organizational practices turned out to be the NGO way or solution to weathering the 
storm of accelerated land reform in Zimbabwe, and to remaining as viable organizational 
forms under politically volatile conditions.  
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It is also tempting to interpret immobilization and distancing in terms of the (middle) 
class bias of intermediary NGOs, or at least in terms of their (apparently conservative) 
political and ideological dispositions.  Again however this in large part involves a 
conceptual confusion and, in this case, between political dispositions and organizational 
dispositions.  NGOs are disposed to minimize the complexities of their world through 
organizational practices, albeit unintentionally.  And, as this thesis consistently 
demonstrates, land reform is a particularly turbulent and complicated terrain for 
intermediary NGOs, in relation to both advocacy and development work.  The existence 
of organizational dispositions that stabilize their world indicates that NGOs are not 
invariably against radical land reform or that, if they are, this stance is not to be 
interpreted in purely political terms.  If ‘land’ NGOs do operate contrary to local 
empowering initiatives and thereby reproduce global trajectories (as in the case of 
contemporary Zimbabwe), they do so primarily because of their own organizational 
interests. 
 
 
14.3 Stabilizing Practices and Complementary Interests 
 
This thesis seeks to understand why intermediary NGOs do what they do in a manner 
which is sensitive to the ‘inside story’.  In this regard, it is inadequate to claim that 
intermediary NGOs work on behalf of global forces or at their behest, although there may 
be some empirical truth to suggestions that they do.  For instance, even a cursory reading 
of recent documents produced by USAID leads to the instrumentalist conclusion that 
American foreign policy seeks to consciously and deliberately slot NGOs into its global 
hegemonic designs (USAID 2002).  It may also be asserted, with some justification, that 
‘existing power relations’ within the development industry ‘distort and divert the best-
intentioned [value] approach’ of NGOs (Rowlands 2003:p.6) and therefore NGOs – by 
some structural necessity – are subservient to global relations of domination.   
 
Yet, in reproducing processes of Glocal modernity, NGOs do not directly capitulate to 
powerful interests or structural demands in some unmediated fashion.  Rather, the 
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historically forged and contingent interests of NGOs tend to be consistent with the 
contemporary interests of capitalist modernist globalization, and hence these NGO 
interests could be labelled as ‘complementary’ interests.  These interests are not abstract 
structural interests but arise as NGOs seek to stabilize their inherently ambivalent and 
ambiguous world.  Thus, these interests do not entail brute material rationalizations, but 
are subjective interests heavily laden with meaning. 
 
In pursuing this argument, it is important to recognize that NGOs have space to 
manoeuvre.  Indeed, it may be argued that they have considerable room to manoeuvre 
and negotiate because they have multiple sources of accountability as located along their 
major social interfaces, including with global donors, the rural under-classes and nation-
states in the South and East.  This multiple accountability gives them, at least potentially, 
‘relative autonomy’ from any particular interface or ‘significant other’.  However, NGOs 
tend to manoeuvre ‘towards’ donors and the state rather than the rural under-classes.  
They do so not by wilfully responding to (and complying by) the whims and wishes of 
donors and the state, but rather by simplifying their relationship with the rural under-
classes as the least privileged interface.    
 
Eade (2003:p.249 my emphasis) argues that ‘development agencies, albeit 
unintentionally, depoliticise development.  This may be to accommodate a particular 
worldview or policy agenda, or to allow them to tap into donor funding.  All 
bureaucracies tend to perpetuate themselves, and aid agency staff is no different from 
other workers in being disinclined to court their own unemployment.’  This quotation 
reiterates the notion of complementary interests of NGOs, and expresses how these 
interests are mediated (and indeed modified) by social meanings and contingent 
negotiations.   
 
Intermediary NGOs negotiate their way in and through their social world, and this 
involves ambivalent, uncertain and (often) frustrating relations with donors, rural 
communities and the state.  NGOs, although without conscious intent, resolve the 
tensions and ambivalences in their world by ‘fixing’ or ‘stabilizing’ their own 
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organizations even if this goes contrary to sustainable development (Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith 1992).  This explains in part why the development industry continues 
unabated, as a recursively self-reproducing set of global relations, although there is only 
limited if any sustainable development taking place because of it.   
 
NGOs structure, stabilize and enact closure on their world; in other words, as an 
organizational disposition, NGO suture their world and bring a simple coherence and 
logic to it.   Edwards (1993) argues that NGOs have ‘their own agendas’, and in a general 
sense this is undoubtedly true.  Yet, it is important not to over-privilege qualities of intent 
and purpose in speaking about NGO agendas as these qualities invoke conspiratorial 
connotations.  He goes on to claim though that NGOs are ‘often protective, defensive and 
resistant to criticism’ (Edwards 1993:p.81) such that they have been known to engage in 
‘turf struggles’ (Thomas-Slater and Sodikoff 2003:p.156) as a means to control and order 
their world.   
 
Other NGO writers have provided isolated yet intriguing comments about NGOs and how 
they seek to stabilize their world of ambivalence.  For example, NGOs are said to 
consider their standard development methods as defining ‘who we are’ and ‘what we are’ 
(Kaplan 2003:p.65); they ‘exercise a significant amount of self-censorship to avoid 
confrontations’ (Okuku 2002:p.94); they often ‘fall back into narrow self-justification’ 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000:p.84); they are in a ‘rage to conclude’ and a ‘rush to closure’ in 
their development practice (Ellerman 2003:pp.31, 32); and they engage in utilitarian 
thinking and practice by conceptualizing what is useful as true and what works as good 
(Power et al. 2003:p.91).  All these comments imply that NGOs give structured meaning 
to their (otherwise) unstructured world and they do this by way of stabilizing practices.  
This may entail all sorts of simplifying assumptions and practices that undermine 
sustainable development and serve only to reproduce the status quo, including 
homogenizing the needs of the rural under-classes or restricting their participation (and 
empowerment) to the bare minimum (Crewe and Harrison 1998:pp.190-194). 
 
  324 
In undertaking their development and democracy work, NGOs tend to prioritize ‘the 
global’ and problematize ‘the local’.  But, in the end, they over-privilege their own 
organizational stability and sustainability.  Although they work within the confines of 
global forms of domination, NGOs re-centre the world of development in a way that 
gives primacy to their organizations.  As Power et al. (2003:p.87) put it, NGOs ‘set up 
internal but largely unrecognised barriers to their own values-driven goals’ so that the 
latter – along with needs of the rural underclasses – are often, unconsciously, sacrificed 
on the altar of NGO self-preservation.  
 
This is how NGOs walk the tightrope of tension between the universal and the particular, 
and between the global and the local.  They do not seek to reproduce global domination, 
nor are they manipulated to do so, but in pursuing order and stability along the social 
interfaces of their world, they by implication preserve the existing relations of 
domination.  This, though, is not an inevitable consequence of the development system.  
Rather, it is the product of the existing balance of forces within the development industry 
that allows NGOs to make problematic but not privilege the rural underclasses while 
simultaneously remaining ‘in business’ as organizational forms. 
 
 
14.4 Towards a Theoretical Perspective 
 
In this thesis I deliberately refrain from developing and presenting a ‘theory’ of 
intermediary NGOs, and particularly a ‘grand theory’.  This is not necessarily because it 
is beyond the scope of the thesis.  Rather, the very notion of ‘theory’ has far too 
definitive a connotation for a subject matter – intermediary NGOs – that still remains 
under-theorized.  To advance a ‘theory’ of NGOs would entail (overly) strident and bold 
claims about a field of social life for which much further analytical and empirical work 
still has to be done.  
 
I prefer the usage of ‘theoretical perspective’ to designate what the thesis seeks to 
develop and refine.  I have sought to develop an approach or framework for making sense 
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of the world and work of NGOs.  This perspective, by necessity, entails specific 
epistemological and ontological commitments.  Yet, my perspective does not fit easily 
and neatly into any particular theoretical tradition found within the history of sociology.  
Certainly, I emphasize key claims made by both Marx and Weber that I see as critical to a 
sensitive rendering of the social realities of NGOs.  But I would label my theoretical 
perspective on NGOs as neither Marxist nor Weberian.  Certainly, this thesis is indebted 
to the works of these two foremost classical sociologists.  Indeed, the strength of the 
thesis in large part lies in returning to Marx and Weber, although not in the sense of 
paying homage to them.   
 
I have intentionally refrained from boxing NGOs into a corner, or from pigeon-holing the 
world of NGOs into a grand theory or grand theoretical perspective.  Nevertheless, I have 
forcefully argued that ‘going inside the form’ – not once, but twice – are critical moments 
in the processes of deconstructing and reconstructing the social world of intermediary 
NGOs in the modern world.  As the case of ‘land’ NGOs in contemporary Zimbabwe 
shows, this ‘inside story’ provides a strong basis for further social research of 
intermediary NGOs. 
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